In recent times quite a few good books about Pakistan’s political history have been written by Pakistani scholars and journalists residing in America. These books are likely to promote debates and discussions about the grave challenges and issues which have tormented Pakistan and its people for decades. One such book has been written by Hassan Abbas, a Research Fellow at the Harvard Law School. The book is entitled *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism? Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror*. The other book is entitled *Pakistan between Mosque and Military*. It is written by Husain Haqqani. Both books provide interesting and fascinating analyses of the role of Islamists and the Military in designing the domestic and foreign policies of Pakistan. The themes of the books as well as the fears and apprehensions about the future of Pakistan are similar. Both books are unconventional and thoroughly researched works, though Hassan Abbas has an edge as far as language and style are concerned. Even otherwise also, his book is more coordinated and comprehensive. But Haqqani’s book becomes more engaging and revealing when he describes the role of Islamists in general and Jamaat-e-Islami in particular. An ‘insider’ of the Jamaat-e-Islami and an adherent of Maulana Maududi as he is his depositions and disclosures of the strategies, tactics and policies of the Jamaat are quite captivating for an ordinary reader. Since he himself had played a very significant role as a person in charge of publicity for the election campaigns of 1988 and 1990 on behalf of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim League, respectively, his statements and narration of the events naturally assume great significance.
Husain Haqqani is presently a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at Washington, D.C., and an associate professor of International Relations at Boston University.

Haqqani is a former politician and journalist who received his initial grooming and orientation under the shadow of Maulana Maududi. After dissociating himself from Jama'at-e-Islami, he served as adviser to three former prime ministers of Pakistan, namely, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif and Benezir Bhutto. He was also ambassador of Pakistan to Sri Lanka from 1992 to 1993. The experience of administration that he gathered in these latter capacities is fully reflected in his book and makes his narration of events all the more attractive and thrilling.

Haqqani’s book is a valuable source of information for the students of history, as well as for serious scholars. His account of important events and his remarks about different political figures provide a rare opportunity to the researchers to see the record of history in its true perspective. Those who have been mirrored by him in his book may not like to see their true faces thus depicted, but history will certainly appreciate and judge his narration on the merit of the testimonies and evidences adduced by him.

Haqqani tries to explain how in the wake of the demise of the Quaid-i-Azam the Muslim League politicians and the civil bureaucracy had marginalized the people and very surreptitiously paved the way for the rise of the clergy, which derailed Pakistan from the path of democracy. But very soon the reins of power were snatched by the military bureaucracy from the hands of the civilians and they began to henceforth rule the country directly or indirectly and the Islamists joined hands with them as collaborators and supporters in all their unconstitutional endeavours, villainies and adventurisms.

The book consists of seven chapters, but all of these are not engaging. Two or three chapters especially arrest the reader’s attention where Haqqani flies and floats. But it does not mean that the book is free from errors of judgment and reporting. There are quite a few historical distortions where Haqqani staggers and falls headlong, especially where he describes and discusses Pakistan Movement and its leadership. To support his argument he relies on those scholars who are pronounced rightists and hidden enemies of Jinnah and carry no weight in the intellectual world.

In the first chapter of the book which deals with ‘the identity and ideology of Pakistan’, Haqqani writes that ‘the first formal step towards transforming Pakistan into an Islamic ideological state was taken in March 1949 when the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan
presented the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly.' After the Objectives Resolution, there was no turning back from Pakistan’s status as an Islamic ideological state.1 ‘Pakistan was now the bastion of Islam and an Islamic state, even if the pious elite did not yet rule it,’ he writes.2

Explaining the circumstances and reasons which provided an opportunity to the Islamists to become more vocal and powerful, Haqqani writes that the religious frenzy began to grow when the theologians who had not supported the demand for Pakistan, started calling for the new country’s Islamization.3 The fact of the matter is that right from its inception, Pakistani politicians have been playing upon religious sentiments of the people as an instrument for strengthening of Pakistan’s identity. ‘Under ostensibly pro-Western rulers, Islam has always been a rallying cry against perceived Indian threats.’4 Not only that, but Pakistan’s state institutions, especially the military and intelligence services have been playing a leading role in building its national identity on the basis of religion. Explaining further Haqqani writes that ‘Islamist groups have been sponsored and supported by the state machinery at different times to influence domestic politics and support the military’s political dominance.’5

The factors which led to the formation of an Alliance between Mosque and Military were also included the ‘perceived Indian threats’6 and ‘the danger of world communism’.7 Just as the winds of the cold war were blowing fiercely and the world was divided into two hostile camps, Pakistan opted to become a camp follower of the west. In May 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan declared ‘Pakistan’s alignment with the United States’ but ‘in the domestic arena, however, he continued to use the term ‘Islamic Ideology’, making it possible for the Islamist ideologues to assert their role as interpreters of that Ideology’.8 In other words, ‘the

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1 Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military* (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005), pp.16-17.
2 Ibid., p.24.
3 Ibid., p.10.
4 Ibid., p.2.
5 Ibid., p.3.
6 Ibid., p.2.
7 Ibid., p.33.
8 Ibid., p.32.
acceptance of an Islamic ideological state, led to the inevitable claim by Islamists of their right to define the contours of that state.  

At the birth of Pakistan, the military was already a significant institution, one that existed well before the country came into being. The fear of being ‘submerged under the tidal wave of communism’ led Ayub Khan ‘to combine Ideology and economic development aided by the west’ as the safest way for national consolidation.

Elaborating on the role of Maulana Maududi and his party, Jamaat-e-Islami, Haqqani writes ‘that the Jamaat-e-Islami was an Islamist party similar to the Arab Muslim Brotherhood. Maulana Maududi, its founder aimed his calls for Islamic revival at middle class professionals and state employees rather than traditional mullahs. He had not been part of the campaign for Pakistan and had been critical before partition of the Muslim League “un-Islamic” leadership.’ Anti-Ahmads’ riots in 1953, brought him into further limelight.

After reading these accounts of Husain Haqqani the most pertinent question which comes to mind and demands an explanation is how the Islamists who had neither roots in the masses nor in the national politics nor had any strong political party or any parliamentary group in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, succeeded in transforming the democratic dimension of Pakistan into an ideological state, especially when, according to Haqqani, ‘Jinnah had never spoken of Pakistan as an ideological state’, and instead time and again pledged to make it ‘a national Modern State’.

This enigma has been solved and explained by Haqqani in a very witty and subtle manner without provoking the susceptibilities of bigwigs of Jamaat-e-Islami, by throwing very strong hints and concealed information here and there in the book for the guidance of researchers and students of history.

Haqqani writes, ‘one of Maulana Maududi’s earliest contacts with the Pakistan’s establishment was Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari who had served as office secretary of the All India Muslim League and who shared Maulana Maududi’s vision of a greater role for religion in

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9 Ibid., p.43.
10 Ibid., p.39.
11 Ibid., p.21.
12 Ibid., p.15.
Pakistan. Both Maulana Ansari and Maulana Maududi were consulted by the first head of the country’s Civil Service, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, who subsequently became Pakistan’s Prime Minister. These secret consultations culminated in the shape of the Objectives Resolution which was drafted by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali.

Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was a great admirer of Maulana Maududi. He was a very conservative and orthodox Muslim and knew Arabic very well. Maulana Maududi had intimate relations with him. ‘Before partition, Maulana Maududi quite frequently visited the latter and used to stay as his guest in his official residence.’

On the other hand, Liaquat Ali Khan was not only very much enamoured by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali’s efficiency and hard work, but was also highly impressed by his religious pretensions and sanctimonious blandishments. The influence of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali over Liaquat Ali Khan was so profound that ‘he would not start his Cabinet meetings until he arrived.’ Now, as far as Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari was concerned he was a very shrewd and hidden politician. ‘He exercised immense influence on Maulana Maududi and would always assure the latter that one day fortune would smile on him and he would be able to capture power in Pakistan. Side by side with it, Ansari strove hard to promote the Jamaat in the corridors of power, and for these services he was so liberally compensated by Maududi that it created bad blood between Maududi and Saeed Malik who vehemently protested against such charity out of the Bait-ul-Mal.’

In short, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali played the role of Trojan horses for the Jamaat-e-Islami in the power corridors and the inner circles of the ruling establishment of Pakistan.

It may be a big surprise for the students of history to learn that Quaid-i-Azam’s inaugural address of August 11, 1947, to the Constituent Assembly was mutilated and disfigured because it was not to the liking of some of the high ups in the administration. ‘The man behind mutilation was also Chaudhri Muhammad Ali. The address was so badly clipped and censored that the moth-eaten form in which it appeared the

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14 Husain Haqqani, *op.cit.*, p.25.
15 Interview of the author with Syed Amjad Ali (1994) who was Finance Minister in the Cabinet of Feroz Khan Noon.
16 Interview of the author with Saeed Malik (April, 1994) who was a stalwart of Jamaat-e-Islami and the first renegade after partition.
18 Interview of the author with Saeed Malik before he died in April, 1994.
whole spirit of the message was outrageously killed.' Criticizing Muslim League’s leadership Haqqani writes that leaders of the Muslim League had given little thought to and had made no preparation for how to run a new country, ‘issues such as the new nation’s constitutional scheme, the role of religion and theologians in matter of state were also still unresolved at independence.’ This is all propaganda against Jinnah by his Islamist opponents and contrary to the historical truths. The pattern of Government for Pakistan which Quaid-i-Azam repeatedly mentioned on different occasions was a secular democratic government. In an interview which he gave to Mr. Doon Campbell in New Delhi in 1946 the Quaid said: ‘The new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed. Then his speech on 11 August 1948, as president of the Constituent Assembly is one of the clearest expositions of a secular state. In his broadcast to the people of Australia on 19 February 1948 he again reiterated that Pakistan was not going to be a theocracy. On one occasion in 1948 talking with a member of the Constituent Assembly he said that ‘Pakistan will be a national modern state.’ After reading these facts how can one accede to what Haqqani has to say on the subject?

‘As far as the role of religion and theologian, in matter of state was concerned, Jinnah time and again stressed and emphasized upon the legislators and the people not to drag religion into politics. He said that every Pakistani was free to practise his religion according to his conscience and creed but the state of Pakistan will have no religion. He was convinced that the role of political ulema had always been very negative in the history. These ulema were responsible for dividing the Ummah into sects. They were responsible for the ignorance of the masses. They had been enemies of change and progress, knowledge and reason. His deep aversion to the sectarian interpretation of Shari’ah by the ulema is reflected in his interview with a journalist who asked him which Shari’ah he was going to introduce in Pakistan? M.A. Jinnah retorted: Whose Shari’ah; Hanafis’; Hambalis’; Shafis’; Maalikis’; Jaafaris’? I do not want to get involved. The moment I enter this field, the ulema will take over, for they claim to be experts and I certainly

20 Husain Haqqani, op.cit., p.5.
21 Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia (Lahore: Vanguard, 1979), p.29.
22 Ibid., p.30.
don’t propose to hand over the field to the ulema. I don’t propose to fall into their trap.’

In the third chapter of the book entitled ‘Old and New Pakistan’ Haqqani builds an interesting thesis that the alliance of the Mosque and Military was absolutely determined from the very first day of New Pakistan to overthrow the civilian rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for many reasons apart from ideological considerations. But as the circumstances were not favourable for the generals to assert themselves due to defeat and surrender at Dacca, reluctant submission was thought to be the best course to follow. Haqqani writes that ‘Islamic ideology had obviously proven insufficient to keep Bengalis a part of Pakistan’. Even after the surrender of Pakistan’s armed forces at Dacca on December 16, 1971, Yahya Khan was reluctant to transfer power to the elected leadership. Yahya Khan had planned to address the nation on Radio and Television on December 17, 1971 and announce the outlines of a new constitution that in his view, would preserve and promote the ideology of Pakistan. But the total collapse of loyalty to him by junior military officers and civil servants made it impossible for him to do so. ‘A general close to Yahya Khan tried to depute an elite commando unit, possibly to arrest Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in the western wing, as he returned from abroad, but junior officers simply ignored his request.’ But it was General Gul Hassan’s revolt that changed the course of history and Yahya Khan was compelled to transfer power to the civil leadership. Thus the drama of deceit and blood reached its natural end and Bhutto ascended to power on December 20, 1971.

The rise of Bhutto to power was against the designs and desires of the Alliance. The country was passing through a traumatic period. The morale of the nation was at its lowest ebb. The credibility of Army had been shattered. Thus objective conditions were not favourable for the army to assert. So the generals decided to leave the arena of politics, for the time being and began to play the game of wait and see. According to Haqqani, ‘the military as an institution, needed a popular civilian leader to pick up the pieces after Pakistan’s breakup. By allowing Bhutto to come to power, the generals also expected to deflect criticism from their

own conduct in East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, Bhutto was the first civilian politician to rule Pakistan in almost two decades.

To contain Bhutto the Alliance adopted a two-pronged strategy. As a matter of tactic, the Jamaat was supposed to be active and aggressive and generals were supposed to be in low profile and inactive. So we see that from the day one of Bhutto’s rise to power Jamaat-e-Islami began to denounce and condemn Bhutto and hold him responsible for the debacle of East Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami was very vigorously propagating the view that the separation of East Pakistan was the result of a conspiracy hatched by Bhutto. Jamaat accused Bhutto of saying ‘\textit{Udhar Tum, Idhar Hum}’ (you over there, we over here) during 1970 election campaign, which was interpreted to mean that Bhutto wanted absolute power in West Pakistan. Haqqani writes that ‘the phrase was widely attributed to Bhutto, though he had never used those words.’\textsuperscript{28} The obvious purpose of this vilification campaign was character assassination of Bhutto and to cover up the misdeeds and crimes of the generals. It was a futile attempt on the part of the Jamaat to exonerate the generals from the guilt of civil war and its consequences. ‘The Amir or head of Jamaat-e-Islami had appealed to the army to overthrow Bhutto’s government.’\textsuperscript{29} But Bhutto could not have been thrown out of power so easily by generals because he was the popular leader of masses and had earned the respect of international community. In the absence of political disorder it is impossible for any general to simply take over or justify a military \textit{coup d’état}.

Haqqani writes ‘Despite all his weaknesses and mistakes Bhutto had succeeded in creating a new Pakistan in which a secular civilian order attained ascendancy. The military could not return to power without undermining the legitimacy of this civilian order and the military managed to do so with the help of its Islamist allies.\textsuperscript{30}

As Bhutto had won his leadership through election, his fall, too, could have been contrived through elections only. The generals were not capable of changing the hearts of masses but they were smart enough to change the ballot boxes. So they manipulated for an early election.

Let us closely look at the sequence of events before general elections of 1977. On March 1, 1976 Bhutto made Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan’s new Chief of the Army Staff on the recommendation of Lt. Gen. Ghulam Jilani Khan who was head of ISI. Soon after the promotion of Zia-ul-Haq as Commander-in-Chief, ISI prepared a position paper for Bhutto, recommending that he

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, p.91.
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, p.101.
\item \textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, p.96.
\item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, p.129.
\end{itemize}
should hold early elections and renew the mandate. The ISI’s keenness in advising Bhutto to go to the polls was significant in the light of the subsequent events. Explaining ISI’s role, Haqqani writes that ‘Pakistan’s intelligence services are not only responsible for providing political intelligence, but they also have a role in shaping events by their covert operations. Bhutto’s encirclement by the intelligence agencies is relevant to understanding how the Mosque-Military alliance strengthened even when neither the religious parties nor the military was in power.’

How Bhutto was flattered by ISI’s memorandum can be easily detected by the tone and language of the letter. The memorandum clearly aimed at convincing Bhutto to hold elections at a time of ISI’s choosing. General Jilani had suggested in his letter that Bhutto was at the height of his popularity and his opponents were quite disarrayed and have little substance to offer to the people. Bhutto would sweep the elections, if elections were immediately held. Unwittingly, Bhutto had become prisoner of ISI manoeuvrings and manipulations to hold general elections. Bhutto fixed the date of March 7, 1977 for the National Assembly elections and March 10, 1977 for the Provincial Assemblies.

‘Bhutto scheduled the elections and was overthrown by the military following mass protests resulting from the allegations of rigging the polls.’

‘Thus in a matter of few days the legitimacy of the entire electoral exercise had been irretrievably lost.’

The rigging was partial and not universal. Especially in the Punjab, only eight seats were won over by the opposition out of one hundred and sixteen seats. ‘When Bhutto saw the results on T.V. he was taken aback by surprise and realized that the elections result had been tampered with. He was sad.’ Had he been a party to the rigging why should have he been sad. But one thing was there that elections had become controversial and controversy had given birth to agitations, demonstrations, strikes and bloodshed. ‘PNA leaders accused Bhutto for the election irregularities, which was also the position of the generals who overthrew him.’ Within three months the demand for fresh elections had transformed into the demand of Nizam-e-Mustafa.

‘Zia-ul-Haq also maintained covert contacts with the opposition. The ISI had contacted some PNA leaders during the course of PNA negotiation with Bhutto and told the leaders not to trust Bhutto.’

31 Ibid., p.111.
32 Ibid., p.114.
33 Ibid., p.121.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p.120-21.
36 Ibid., p.124-25.
There was a deep conspiracy against Bhutto to overthrow him. The secretary general, Rafique Bajwa of Pakistan National Alliance is reported to have said that there was a hand of a foreign power who pumped money into the campaign of PNA.\footnote{Pakistan Journal of History & Culture, Vol.XVIII, No.1, (1997), p.132.} Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in a statement before Supreme Court had contended that the generals began to make their moves long before they struck in July 1977. Their plotting had started before the elections in March and the coup matured slowly as a result of a deal between the Army and Pakistan National Alliance, and between both of them and a foreign power (or powers). The deal at the foreign level was that the PNA would receive Rs.30 crores for winning the elections and if it failed the Army would be supported in a bid for a coup. The deal at the local level was that the army would support PNA’s election campaign. If the election bid failed, the army would take over.\footnote{Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, \textit{If I Am Assassinated} (Lahore: Classic, 1995), p.xviii}

General Chishti has raised a very serious and relevant question in his book, ‘Did Zia want to become COAS or was it a deep conspiracy by someone else who wanted to deal with the democratic elements in Pakistan through him?’\footnote{Faiz Ali Chishti, \textit{Betrayal of Another Kind; Islam Democracy and the Army in Pakistan} (Rawalpindi, 1990), p.28.}

Rigging was there in the Elections, but who did it? Bhutto was not certainly a party to the rigging. Had he been, why would he have been ‘upset, quiet, sleepless and sad in the company of the American Ambassador while watching the result of Election on T.V.’\footnote{Husain Haqqani, \textit{op.cit.}, p.121.} Elections had provided an excuse for intervention to the army to capture power, which was the ultimate goal of the Alliance in the long run.

By the time General Zia-ul-Haq had his rendezvous with the destiny on August 17, 1988, Pakistan had plunged into wilderness. The legacy of Zia proved to be more extortionating and oppressive than his rule of eleven years during which every sanctity of the constitutions was violated with impunity in a horrible way. Aslam Beg was not Zia but he was the Chief of Army Staff who dominated over the entire political scene. Army had power to dictate domestic politics and foreign policy. It formed and deformed not only civil governments but parties and politicians, factions and political alliances to suit its design of democracy through rigged elections and horse-trading also. ‘The ISI helped the Islamist recruits and trained militant\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.235.} to promote their agenda. The Islamization of eleven years had totally ruined the society which was in tatters. Hypocrisy and orthodoxy, intolerance and extremism, sectarianism and ethnic hatred and conflicts had eroded the very
foundations of Pakistan. Under new dispensation of Army, the civil leadership which emerged out of controlled election was a mockery. It was nothing more than a puppet show which continued even later on. Haqqani writes ‘president Ishaq Khan waited to nominate Benazir Bhutto as prime minister for fifteen days. Bhutto promised to support Ishaq Khan in the presidential elections due to be held soon. She promised the United States, continuity in Pakistan foreign policy, Army was given a say in the choice of defence minister.’ She assured General Beg ‘that she would not interfere with the military privileges and perquisites.’ Bhutto clashed sporadically with the President and the Army Chief until she was dismissed from office in August 1990.’

According to Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s military has made a concerted effort since 1950, to paint politicians and political activists as corrupt.’ Similarly, Nawaz Sharif was dismissed on charges of corruption, on the behest of the Army although he was a creation of the agencies. ‘The ISI had created a King’s party by engineering defections.’ Since there was no effective political and social pressure on army from anywhere inside the country they began to claim omnipotence. As is evident from General Beg’s statement in the Supreme Court, that he ‘was not answerable to the court regarding his actions as the chief of army staff.’

Islamization at home and ‘jihad without borders’ abroad had sent tremors of alarm around the world.

Russia alleged that Pakistanis had been among Islamists fighting in Chechnya, the Philippine government protested that Pakistanis were fighting alongside Muslim extremists battling for autonomy, Arab governments in Egypt, Algeria and Jordan also identified their foes living in Pakistan since Anti-Soviet Afghan jihad. Besides army, the role of intelligence services in fashioning the parties, elections and personalities also became more aggressive and alarming. Haqqani writes ‘the ISI had existed since 1948 and had managed to operate invisibly for decades. But ISI’s overt involvement with IJI during 1988-1993 and the high profile role of General Hamid Gul and his key operatives made the ISI a household name by the time Bhutto became Prime Minister for the second time.’

42 Ibid., p.203.
44 Ibid., p.217.
46 Ibid., p.259.
48 Ibid., p.261.
49 Ibid., p.229.
With the passage of time, the ISI was transformed into a Frankenstein’s monster dictating policies to the incumbent presidents or prime ministers, which jeopardized the very survival of the state. Between 1980 to 1999, all governments which were demolished, had ISI’s stamp on their backs. Power is a very corrupting agent and too much power is self-annihilating. Free lancing of ISI had led to adventurism in the ranks of the army. Haqqani writes ‘towards the end of 1994, a group of unidentified ISI officers approached several prominent non-political Pakistanis to join a future government of national unity that would follow Bhutto’s ouster.’ In October 1995 several officers were arrested for plotting to overthrow the Bhutto government.

According to Haqqani, the character of Pakistani army is undergoing a change. Army is being polarized. In November 1995, army officers were court martialed, because their plans involved the elimination of the nine army Corps Commanders. The situation and realities are quite disturbing. Now what to do to avert any impending mishap or disaster? How to contain the Alliance of Mosque and military to save Pakistan from reaching a point of no return? The Alliance has decidedly turned Pakistan into a soft state. Pakistan has become a major centre of radical Islamist ideas and groups. The strong links between Pakistan military intelligence apparatus and extremist Islamists has weakened Pakistan over the years. The country’s institutions ranging from schools and universities to the judiciary are in a state of general decline. Now how to wriggle out of this dilemma? Haqqani suggest that ‘a planned withdrawal of the military from political life is essential for Pakistan to function as a normal state.’

50 Ibid., p.237-38.
51 Ibid., p.238.
52 Ibid., pp.314.
53 Ibid., pp.328-29.

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