Pakistan’s Afghan Policy: Historical Perspective 1947-1977

Naseem Ahmed∗

Abstract
At the time of the division of India, the Afghanistan government denounced the treaty, which was concluded between Afghanistan government and British Indian government in 1893, known as ‘Durand Line Agreement’ Afghanistan launched a territorial claim and supported the Pakhtunistan issue and Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. Sardar Mohammad Daud was the strong supporter of Pakhtunistan particularly in early 1970s, in response to Daud’s hostility Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto introduced the ‘Forward Policy.’ But in 1976, Daud realized and tried to improve relations with Pakistan. Daud and Bhutto exchanged visits and relations were improved. The primary objective of this paper is to give the brief history of Pakistan Afghan policy and the relations between two countries from 1947 to 1977. Most significantly, the paper evaluates how the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issues became the major factors in Pak-Afghan relations.

Pakistan’s Initial Afghan Policy 1947-58
Historically speaking, the territorial disputes that became major issues in Pakistan’s foreign policy, began at the time of creation of Pakistan. Dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir was one such issue which is still the bone of contention between

∗ Senior Research Fellow, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
India and Pakistan. The other major row was at the North-western border. This was the issue of settling the boundary of Pakistan along Afghanistan. Territorial dispute with Afghanistan not only caused the foreign policy issue over Durand Line but also spurred internal crisis of separatism in NWFP.\footnote{Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.} As Mehtab Ali Shah has pointed out that since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistani-Afghan discord has remained an almost perennial factor in Pakistan’s Afghan policy.\footnote{Methab Ali Shah, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Pakistan Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1947-1994} (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), p.181.} Therefore, Afghanistan is the one of the most important defining issues for Pakistan in terms of security, domestic politics, ideology, and political and economic development.

In fact, engagement with Afghanistan has been problematic for Pakistan since day one. The tone of relationship between the two countries was set even before the inception of the latter in 1947. Despite the commonality of faith and ethnic origins, the two neighbours remained at loggerheads throughout most of their turbulent histories. Initially, the main objectives of Pakistan Afghan policy were to settle the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issues with Afghanistan and have friendly relations with Kabul so that it would not have to contend with security threats to its sovereignty and integrity from both the East (India) and the West (Afghanistan).

Nevertheless, the perceived “security threats made defence the foremost priority for subsequent Pakistani governments since the inception of the country in 1947. The military establishment came to regard itself as the sole institution responsible not only for the defence of Pakistan but also as the protector of the country’s Islamic ideological frontiers.”\footnote{Rizwan Hussain, \textit{Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan}, (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p.59.} Pakistan’s perception of India as its greatest enemy, bent upon the destruction of the ‘Islamic’ state, allowed defence to take nearly two-thirds of the central government’s budgetary allocations from as early as 1949.\footnote{Quoted by Rizwan Hussain, Omar Noman, \textit{Pakistan: A Political and Economic History since 1947} (Kegan Paul International, 1990), p.19.}
Pakistan faced several challenges from India and Afghanistan, moreover, it was drawn into internal crisis of ethno-nationalist movements.

A friendly Afghanistan was, therefore, important to Pakistan. It is for this reason that numerous official statements were made by Pakistani leaders 1947 onwards. On 3 December, 1947, shortly after the independence of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam had declared,

I desire that the relationship between these two sister Nations may be the greatest and most lasting friendship, and I hope that the two governments will soon be able to settle and adjust, in a spirit of goodwill for the benefit of both, all those matters which require our immediate attention, and I do trust that the coming negotiations, that may take place, will secure and strengthen all the more the goodwill and friendship between our two countries which already exist.5

In November, 1947, Sardar Najibullah Khan came to Karachi as special envoy of His Majesty King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, and held talks with Pakistani officials. Najibullah Khan met the Governor General of Pakistan Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah. “He was heard patiently but his demands were politely rejected. On his return home Najibullah said in a broadcast that Afghanistan had made three demands on Pakistan: first, the tribal areas inhabited by Pathans and Afghans must be constituted into a free, sovereign province; secondly, Pakistan must give Afghanistan access to the sea either by the creation of an Afghan corridor in West Baluchistan or by allotting a free Afghan Zone in Karachi; and thirdly, Afghanistan and Pakistan should enter into a treaty which should permit one party to remain neutral if the other was attacked.”6

However, Najibullah’s visit did not significantly change the situation of Pak-Afghan relations. Diplomatic relations were developed in 1948 but the political estrangement continued. Afghan government had serious concerns regarding the happenings in Pakhtunistan such as over the imprisonment of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib. Moreover, during 1949-1950, there

were many cross-border raids by Afghan troops in the tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan. On 12 July, 1949, a Pakistani Air Force plane bombed an Afghan village near the border, but a joint commission of the representatives of both countries having found that the bombing was accidental; peacefully settled the matter upon payment of damages by Pakistan. However this did not help much to improve the bilateral relations.

“King Zahir Shah chose the inauguration of the seventh session of the Afghan National Assembly on 30 June, 1949, as the occasion for making an anti-Pakistan speech, and the assembly itself proceeded to pass a resolution repudiating all treaties, and agreements signed between the Afghan and British Governments before the birth of Pakistan and rejecting the Durand Line as the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan—Afghan radio and press propaganda against Pakistan continued unabated and there were also reports of Afghan raids into Pakistan.”

Nevertheless, Pakistan was always in the favour of good and mutual relations with Afghanistan and Islamabad wanted to settle all disputes through diplomatic ways. The hope that co-operation with Afghanistan would be of mutual benefit prompted Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan’s statement to the Constituent Assembly on 9 January, 1950, that the Pakistan government, from time to time, had offered to discuss with the government of Afghanistan.

They have, from time to time, offered to discuss with the government of Afghanistan all matters of common interest relating to border areas, such as, schemes of economic, educational and moral uplift of the people on both sides of the borders. From the negative response that this Government have received it can only infer that the Government of Afghanistan is not so much concerned with the moral and material welfare of the people of the border areas as with securing for themselves political advantage in their own country or diverting the attention of their own people for the political and economic deterioration in Afghanistan...while the

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7 S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 74.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Government of Pakistan is willing to establish friendly relations with the Royal Government of Afghanistan.\(^{10}\)

On the other hand, Afghanistan had adopted hostile policy towards Pakistan since day first; the first international display of Afghan hostility towards Pakistan was made at the United Nations, on 30 September, 1947, when the Afghan delegate, Hosayn Aziz, cast the only opposition vote against Pakistan’s membership to the United Nations Organization.

He said, “We cannot recognize the North-West Frontier as part of Pakistan, free of any kind of influence—and I repeat, free from any kind of influence to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan.”\(^{11}\)

Afghanistan’s policy towards Pakistan was more aggressive, and she could never miss any chance to propagate against Pakistan at all levels. Against the rumour of US-Military aid to Pakistan the Afghan embassy in Delhi issued a statement to the effect that such assistance would strengthen Pakistan’s role “as a ‘colonial’ power over the freedom–seeking people of Pakhtunistan.”\(^{12}\) Afghanistan reacted sharply to the Pakistani announcement, in March 1955, that the various parts of the western wing of Pakistan would be amalgamated into one administrative unit under the name of West Pakistan. It was alleged that this would further erase the separate identity of the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.\(^{13}\)

Despite shared interests and their common faith, it is ironical that relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan throughout their history have remained far from friendly and at times they deteriorated to dangerous levels. The root-causes of the mistrust between the two countries were 1200 miles long border (Durand Line). The second factor responsible for tension was Pakhtunistan issue.\(^{14}\)

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13 *Ibid*.
Initially there were two main objectives of Pakistan’s Afghan policy: one was the recognition of Durand Line as international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the other was the end of Pakhtunistan issue once for all. Pakistan wanted to settle all issues with Afghanistan peacefully through bi-lateral diplomacy but Afghanistan always tried to raise these issues at regional and international forums. In the proceeding pages we shall discuss the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issues as main factors in Pak-Afghan relations, for our main purpose, i.e. to understand the objectives and interests of Pakistan regarding the Afghanistan.

(a) Durand Line as Controversial Boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan

The most important event of the closing decade of the nineteenth century was the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan and Indo-Afghan (Durand Line) frontiers.\(^\text{15}\) “Durand Agreement” of 1893, settled most of the boundaries between Afghanistan and British India, and the demarcation of the new boundaries took place between 1894.

Abdur Rehman reportedly had stated that:

The short come of the conversation between Durand and Abdur Rehman was this that the boundary line as agreed upon from Chitral and Broghel Passes up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i-Malik Shujah (the tri-junction of Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan) in the way that Wakkhan, Kafiristan, Aswar, Mohammad of Lalpura and one portion of Waziri (Birmal) came under my rule and I renounced my claim from the railway station of New Chaman, Chaghi, the rest of Wazire, Biland, Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajour, Swat, Dir, Chilas and Chitral.\(^\text{16}\)

As the British rule over India drew to a close, the Afghan government decided to question the validity of the Durand Line boundary with Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan worsened over the issue of Pakhtunistan and Durand Line. Ever since Ahmad shah Abdali (1747-1773) conquered the North-Western territories of present day Pakistan, the Durrani rulers came to believe they had a rightful claim over these areas. After loosing

\(^{15}\) Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line Its Geo-Strategic Importance* (Peshawar: Area Study Centre (Russia, China & Central Asia), University of Peshawar, 2005), p.126.

the territories to the British, they had “fondly cherished the dream of recovering… [the] lost parts.”\textsuperscript{17}

In 1944, with the expectations of British departure from India, the Afghan’s became interested in regaining the control of the territories west of the Durand Line. However, the British replied that “the Durand Line was as an international boundary, and, therefore, Afghan interest stopped at the end.”\textsuperscript{18} Afghanistan maintained that the treaties between Afghanistan and Britain signed in 1893, 1905, 1919, and 1921, did not explicitly acknowledge the Durand Line as an international boundary but confirmed the respective spheres of influence of the two states.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1947, King Zahir Shah attempted in vain to reclaim these territories by declaring to the interim Government that the Durand Line Agreement had lapsed. Later, Afghanistan never completely recognized Durand Line as an international frontier with Pakistan. After the creation of Pakistan the Afghans insisted that the Durand Line was illegal and imposed by Britain. However, Afghanistan’s claims were confusing and contradictory as compared to the strength of Pakistan’s case. Even then, countries such as Soviet Union and India fully supported the Afghan claims on Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issue.

Subsequently, Pakistan based its case upon the principles of International Law. As Rizwan Hussain discussed, “the Pakistan Government argued that as the successor to British India it had inherited the entire complex of international rights and obligations previously held by the British Indian Government.” But Afghanistan continued to utilize Pakhtun nationalism in order to undo the Durand Line. Abdul Ghaffar Khan during the 1930s, in his speeches and articles in the Khudai Khidmatgar’s periodical, had preached Pakhtun nationalism. Therefore, the Pakhtun nationalists with the support of Afghanistan and India started to demand for independent state for the Pakhtuns named as Pakhtunistan.

\textsuperscript{17} Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p.68.
\textsuperscript{19} Government of India, Military Report on Afghanistan (classified) (Calcutta: General Staff, 1925), p. 69.
(b) Pakhtunistan Issue

The Pakhtunistan issue was raised at the time of the division of Subcontinent into India and Pakistan. It is closely linked to the question of the acceptance of the Durand Line as international border between newly independent Pakistan and Afghanistan. Generally speaking, British left legacies of bitterness for the newly independent Pakistan. One bitter legacy was the line dividing the Pakhtun people became extremely irritating to the Afghans and created problems for the Pakistani government.

British policy in the area before 1947 contributed to the development of the Pakhtunistan problem. Historically speaking, in 1901, they had created a new administrative area, the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), which they detached from the Punjab, and had divided the new province into Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies, the latter ruled not by the provincial government but by a British political agent who reported directly to Delhi.20

On the eve of transfer of powers in India (mid 1940s), the government of Afghanistan suggested to the Great Britain that the people of Frontier land be given the choice of becoming independent or rejoining with their motherland, Afghanistan. Their demand was based on the assumption that since the British government was withdrawing, the Durand Agreement of 1893 between Afghanistan and British India lapsed automatically.21 Jawaharlal Nehru, as the Minister in charge of External affairs in the interim government of British India, had categorically rejected the validity of the Afghan’s claim to the territory east of Durand Line.22

In 1947, Afghans demand that if an independent Pakhtunistan could not be established then the Frontier Province should join Afghanistan. On June 2, 1947, Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Khan, in an interview given in Bombay after 3rd June Plan, stated, “If an independent Pakhtunistan cannot be set up, the Frontier province should join Afghanistan in order to get an out-let

21 Razvi, p. 35.
to the Arabian Sea.”

The Afghan government made this demand on three bases. Firstly, that the boundary agreement was concluded under duress, secondly, it argued the boundary was ‘unnatural’ because it divided the Pakhtun people who lived on both sides of the boundary, and thirdly by professing sympathy with the ‘miserable plight of the Pakhtuns.’ This issue poisoned relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan for many years. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Pakhtunistan issue was manifested not only in bitter denunciations but also by such actions as Afghanistan’s casting of the sole negative vote on Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. The then Afghan government raised the said issue at the UN General Assembly session in 1947. The Afghan diplomat at the UN said, “We can’t recognize the NWFP as part of Pakistan…”

However, the Pakhtuns on the Eastern side of the Durand Line did not show much desire to join Afghanistan. It could be judged from the results of referendum, which was held in the NWFP and Baluchistan, which resulted in the favour of Pakistan. But successive Afghan leaders and diplomats kept harping on the Pakhtunistan issue.

Afghanistan did not claim a Pakhtun state that would incorporate the entire Pakhtun ‘nation’ on both sides of border the Afghan Pakhtuns were not to join Pakhtunistan. Historically, the Afghan Amirs maintained close political, military, and economic links with the Pakhtun tribes who roam the lands to the south of the Durand Line. But in the era of the nation-state both Pakistan and Afghanistan laid claim to the allegiance of many different people and tribes. Afghanistan’s ethnological argument, in fact, could be read as inimical to its own interests, since the country housed so many different ethnic groups with links to the lands beyond Afghanistan.

Afghan support for the Pakhtunistan basically originated from the historical desire of all governments in Afghanistan, to get

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access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistani Baluchistan province. It is rightly reflected in words of Abdul Rahman, “Afghanistan ought to secure a footing upon the ocean…the south-western corner of Afghanistan is very close to the corner of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and from this only a small, plain plateau of ground between Kandahar, Baluchistan, Persia, and part of Karachi [sic]…I always had a great fancy for a little piece of this sandy desert…of great value if annexed to Afghanistan in order to bring the country in touch with the ocean…if Afghanistan had access to the ocean there is no favourable opportunity occurs in my lifetime to bring about this purpose, my sons and successors must always keep their eyes on this corner.”

Pakistan being a Commonwealth member looked to Britain for assistance in resolving the Durand Line issue. On her part, the British government categorically stated, “the Durand Line formed the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, under the international law Pakistan was the lawful inheritor of the rights and duties of the British Indian government.”

The Governor of the NWFP, Sir Olef Caroe was very sceptical about the viability of a Pakhtun state and Afghanistan’s backing for it. He noted:

Pathanistan [sic] cannot subsist financially or otherwise on its own legs. The weakness is that the Pathans have hitherto been divided among themselves to set up a stable state, and where they have ruled they have ruled as conquerors of alien populations. They themselves had always been in a state of anarchy right through history until we came and put them into order (Afghanistan is not really a Pathan state at all).

However, the Afghan government started propaganda against Pakistan and carried out cross-border raids. In 1952, the Afghan Information Bureau in London published a long tract detailing the territory, resources, and potential of a Pakhtunistan that incorporated the areas between the Afghan-Pakistan border and Indus River, which is the natural and historical border of the Indian

28 Sir O. Caroe (North West Frontier Province) to Sir J. Colville (Extract). L/P&J/224:f 45.22 May 1947, quoted in Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, pp.43-44.
Subcontinent. It noted that the lands from Chitral in the North to Balochistan in the South connected with the Arabian Sea have always been considered one of the most fertile regions of the world.\textsuperscript{29}

In 1955, the decision of merging the province of Pakistan into one unit affected the Pak-Afghan relations. Afghanistan viewed it as an attempt to disfigure the Pakhtun identity. Prime Minister Daud’s “open criticism of Pakistan inspired mobs in Kabul to attack the Pakistan Embassy in April, 1955, inflicting severe damage. The mob also hoisted the Pakhtunistan flag on the Embassy building. Similar attacks were carried out on Pakistani consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad with connivance of the Afghan Government.”\textsuperscript{30}

During the period from 1947 to 1958 the main thrust of Pakistan’s Afghan policy was to settle the issues like Durand Line, Pakhtunistan and transit trade with Afghanistan through bilateral diplomacy but Afghanistan remained hostile throughout this period and always tried to raise the issues at regional and international forums. Afghanistan and Pakistan did not reach on any amicable solution of Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issues during the above-mentioned period.

On the domestic front, to make itself more relevant for state, the military strengthened itself institutionally through enhancing its control over defence and foreign policy making. The political leadership was far too fragmented to establish control over the military and issues of national security. The senior generals, especially Ayub Khan, who was the first army chief, insisted that defence matters were the military’s forte.\textsuperscript{31} It was necessary for the military to establish domination over defence and foreign policy issues because the defence budget was a major share of the national expenditure, and swallowed about 68 per cent of the central government’s revenues.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{29} Hilali, \textit{US-Pakistan Relationship Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan}, p.47.
\textsuperscript{30} Hussain, \textit{Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan}, p.71.
The political leadership failed to provide any alternate agenda, it confined to project Pakistan as an insecure Muslim state. This further strengthened the armed forces.\textsuperscript{33} A new development took place in domestic politics of Pakistan when it experienced the first Martial Law in 1958.

**General Mohammad Ayub Khan’s Afghan Policy 1958 to 1969**

On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza dismissed Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon’s government, dissolved the National Assembly, and abrogated the Constitution passed two years earlier and declared martial law. He appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Ayub Khan wanted the seat of President to get political and diplomatic legitimacy for that the only barrier was Mirza. On the night of 27/28 October, 1958 Ayub Khan sent three Generals—Burki, Azam, and Sheikh—to the President to ask him to resign. “They had with them a typed resignation letter and asked for his ‘signature,’ which Mirza first resisted. But General Azam pulled out his pistol, upon which he signed the letter of resignation after consultation with his wife. He was flown to Quetta under escort.”\textsuperscript{34} With the exit of Iskander Mirza, the way was clear for Ayub Khan to assume the office of President.

General Ayub Khan succeeded General Douglas Gracey in January, 1951, as the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In 1958, Pakistan was in the grip of a serious economic crisis. The government was running out of funds. Smuggling, black-marketing and hoarding had increased. There was turmoil in the industrial sector. The incompetence of political leadership and widespread corruption convinced the disciplined generals in uniform that it was about time they stepped in and took control of the situation to keep the state intact.\textsuperscript{35}

The army tried to take charge and control the situation with the help of civil bureaucracy. Since they lacked in administrative


\textsuperscript{34} Jahan Dad Khan, *Pakistan Leadership Challenge* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.38.

knowledge, the military generals let most of the civil bureaucracy stay intact.\footnote{Siddiqua-Agha, \textit{Military Inc.}, p.73.}

Soon after the \textit{coup d'état}, Ayub Khan began to constitute a civilian structure of government which was formally established with the introduction of the system of “Basic Democracy,” the basic democracy system, a prescription for a grass-roots political structure, in which 80,000 basic democrats (BDs) half in each wing, formed its lowest tier. Each BD, who was to be directly elected, represented about 1000 voters—twenty of these BDs formed a union council, which was to manage local works like village problems, and handle development funds.

Under this system the President was to be elected not through direct popular vote but indirectly through an electoral college of individuals called Basic Democrats who, in turn, had been elected through local bodies elections at the village level. Ayub institutionalized the process of economic planning. This led to rapid economic progress in the early 1960s, but exacerbated inter-class inequities in the distribution of income.

This was by design, on the premise that the road to eventual equality lay through initial inequalities. Ayub had implemented ‘trickle down economics’ in Pakistan much before Ronald Reagan in the United States. His biggest concern was communism, and he was prepared to do anything to combat that menace.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the field of foreign affairs Ayub Khan had to balance things to ensure Pakistan’s security as well as western assistance for economic development.\footnote{Khan, \textit{Pakistan Leadership Challenges}, p.46.} Ayub Khan signed a Mutual Security Agreement with the United States in 1959. And in 1961, General Ayub proclaimed in an address to the joint session of the American Congress, that Pakistan was the most “allied ally” of the United States.

However, these professions of solidarity wore thin very soon when in 1962, even without bothering to consult their “most allied ally” the US airlifted military equipment to India. It was that single event which sparked off a reassessment among policy makers.
including General Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, for the need of an opening to the People’s Republic of China as a counterweight to India.\textsuperscript{39} On the account of the public’s dislike and the government’s own indifference towards the nature of the western-backed pacts, Pakistan could realize that United States would not support Pakistan against India.

General Ayub’s visit to China in March, 1965, was the connection of that change in Pakistan’s policy; he received an extremely warm reception. According to Altaf Gauhar, “from the airport to the city of Beijing, there was a mass of humanity marshaled along the road, singing patriotic songs, while Ayub, accompanied by Chou En-lai, stood in an open car waving to ecstatic crowds lost in a pageant of colour and music…this visit transformed the political climate in Pakistan. All opposition to Ayub literally melted away. The people felt elevated by the knowledge that China had become Pakistan’s friend and ally against India.”\textsuperscript{40} This tilt towards China was also influenced, to a great extent, by developments in the region which drastically transformed the dynamics of the situation.\textsuperscript{41}

Thus, the divergence in Pakistan-American perceptions was apparent when General Ayub Khan travelled to Washington in December, 1965, following the end of the war with India and he told Johnson quite plainly “if I break with America, I will simply lose my economy, but if I break with China, I may even lose the country.”\textsuperscript{42}

On Afghanistan front, as a result of Martial Law in the country, relations between Karachi and Kabul deteriorated sharply with the military’s arrest of veteran Pakhtun leaders Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai. Daud vehemently denounced these actions. Significantly, the Afghan Ambassador to Washington, Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal, complained to the State Department about the arrest taking into view the United

\textsuperscript{40} Jon A. Teta, \textit{Pakistan in Picture} (Sterling Publishing Company, 1976), p. 28.
\textsuperscript{41} Khan, \textit{Pakistan Leadership Challenges}, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Times}, 10 December, 1965.
States’ influence in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{43} However, Ayub Khan wanted to settle issues with Afghanistan peacefully through negotiations. Therefore, President Ayub held a long meeting with Sardar Naim, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, in June 1960. Ayub explained to him “…Afghanistan held sway over some parts of what is now West Pakistan. But there were also times, of much longer duration, when Delhi’s sovereignty extended up to Kabul and beyond, if the old conquests were to be our guide, then Pakistan should have more interests in the future of Pathans living in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{44}

Ayub Khan appealed to Sardar Naim to abandon the policy of hostilities towards Pakistan and said to him that it is in our mutual advantage to live as friendly neighbours. But the failure of the Ayub-Naim talks of 1960, further deteriorated Pak-Afghan relations. Afghan lashker (contingent) of about 15,000 men entered Pakistan’s Bajour area. The Afghan government recalled 70,000 of its reservists to raid on Pakistan’s territories. In 1961, heavy fighting erupted in the Bajour area with constant border clashes.\textsuperscript{45} Pakistan closed its consulates and trade agencies in Afghanistan, and asked Kabul to remove its mission from Pakistan. Afghanistan retaliated by severing diplomatic relations and closing the border in 1961.\textsuperscript{46}

After this crisis, the Kennedy Government tried to resolve the issues between the two countries and tried to involve Shah of Iran for mediation. The United States was cautious that this initiative should ‘appear to be the natural result of Shah’s previous efforts rather than a result of US intervention.’\textsuperscript{47} In the meanwhile, Daud became unpopular with the royal Family. His interventionist policy towards Pakistan and dependence on soviet Russia undermined his


\textsuperscript{44} Mohammad Ayub Khan, \textit{Friends, Not Masters: A Political Biography} (London, 1967), pp.175-76.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid}.


sincerity towards the state of Afghanistan. Daud was dismissed on charges of generating economic crisis and accepting Russian pressure for changing the position of neutrality in foreign policy.

Daud was removed from the power for two main reasons: firstly, Kabul wanted to improve relations with Pakistan, which were not friendly during the last 16 years due to the Daud’s strong and constant support for Pakhtunistan and the issue of Durand Line. Secondly, the King Zahir Shah wanted to reduce the Soviet influence in Afghanistan for some valid reasons.

After Daud’s removal, the diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were re-established through the mediation of Shah of Iran and on 26 May, 1963, Pakistani and Afghan representatives agreed in Tehran to restore diplomatic ties. Notwithstanding this agreement, the Afghan Minister, Sayed Qasim Rishtiya, is reported to have stated that the Pakhtunistan issue was still the main obstacle in the development of cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. After Daud, the Soviet influence was not altogether rooted. However, King tried to improve relations with Muslim countries. In early 1960s political change at regional and international level particularly after the Indo-China War in October, 1962, brought historical change in Pakistan’s foreign policy, under the leadership of Z. A. Bhutto as the foreign Minister of Ayub Khan, he laid the new chapter of relationship with China.

Pakistan also improved relations with Afghanistan when President Ayub visited Kabul in 1964, and again in 1966. He proposed a common political platform for Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. The instruments of ratification of Pakistan–Afghanistan transit trade were exchanged at Rawalpindi on 26 August, 1965. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Afghanistan’s attitude remained quite sympathetic towards Pakistan.

On 1 January, 1968, Ayub paid a short visit to Kabul on his way to Tashkent to hold discussions with King Zahir Shah and thank him for the Afghan understanding during the war. In 1968, Zahir Shah paid a return visit to Pakistan.

The government of Ayub Khan had predominant number of Pakhtun officers, especially in the high command and staff position in military. Therefore, the propaganda in Kabul that the Pakhtuns were an oppressed people in Pakistan became all the more redundant. An important development in Pakistan during the Ayub period (1958-1969) was the gradual integration of Pakhtuns into Pakistani society and the military-bureaucratic establishment. It was a period in Pakistan’s political history, which saw a large number of ethnic Pakhtuns holding high positions in the military and the bureaucracy. Ayub himself was a non-Pashto speaking ethnic Pakhtun belonging to the Tarin sub-tribe of the Hazara district in the Frontier. The growing participation of Pakhtuns in the Pakistani Government resulted in the erosion of the support for the Pakhtunistan movement in the province by the end of the 1960s. The Relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1958 to 1969 was not friendly but it was not as unfriendly as in 1950s. Although subsequent Afghan Governments after Daud’s removal continued to pay lip service to the Pakhtunistan issue although it was not central to the Afghan foreign policy of that period.

At domestic front, Z. A. Bhutto started popular political movement against the government of Ayub Khan. Ayub decided to step down from power and not seek re-election. Constitutionally, he was required to turn over power to the speaker of the Assembly. However, he handed over power to the Army chief, General Yahya. Ayub asked Yahya to ‘fulfil his constitutional responsibility’ and impose Martial Law. And finally, President Ayub decided to resign in March, 1969.

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51 Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 207.
52 Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.74.
53 Ibid.
54 Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, p.23.
General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan’s Afghan Policy 1969-1971

According to Jahandad Khan, “One of the most controversial personalities in Pakistan’s history is General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, C-in-C of the Army, later Chief Martial Law Administrator and President, and finally a defeated, tragic figure who lived out his last days in bitter obscurity. An honest assessment has never been made of this Commander who was respected for his professional competence and had achieved a brilliant service record, only to finally gamble it all away and lose his reputation in a political game in which the dice was loaded against him.”

There were three candidates for the appointment of C-in-C—Yahya Khan, Abdul Hameed Khan, and Malik Sarfraz. Ayub Khan finally decided in favour of Yahya Khan in August, 1966. In 1969, Ayub handed over power to General Yahya who declared Martial Law and he ruled the country till 1971. Yahya Khan announced in July 1970, that the National Assembly elections would be held on October 5, 1970. He issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO), whose main features were the maximum devolution of legislative and financial powers to the provinces, with adequate powers being retained by the centre to safeguard the integrity of the country.

Yahya Khan held elections in 1970. The National Assembly’s strength was fixed at 313 members, which included 13 seats for women. The distribution of seats between East and West Pakistan was to be 169 and 144 respectively, fixed on the basis of their population. This gave East Pakistan 25 more seats than West Pakistan. According to most sources, the elections were fair. “…for the first time since 1947, Pakistan had a leader who not only was genuinely committed to free and fair elections but also actually delivered them.”

Due to the political crises in Pakistan Yahya Khan was more concentrating on domestic policy than the foreign policy. Overall, Yahya Khan’s foreign policy was basically the continuity of Ayub

55 Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, p.104.
56 Ibid., p.113.
57 Ibid., p.273.
Khan’s policy. In the case of Afghanistan, he tried to maintain good relations. During the period of Yahya Khan the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were improving. Both the countries had continued their efforts to strengthen relations in the fields of trade and commerce in May 1970, a delegation headed by Pakistan’s Finance Minister, visited Afghanistan to explore possibilities of increasing trade and economic collaboration. The two countries identified certain areas where expansion in the bilateral basis was possible.

The new Afghan Prime Minister, Nur Ahmed Etemadi, hoped that a new era of mutual understanding between Afghanistan and Pakistan had begun on 26 August, 1970. Thus all through the year 1970, there was a consistent improvement in cooperation between the two countries, unmarred by any Pakhtunistan slogans.

During Yahya Khan Regime (1969-71), in spite of great internal turmoil and the resultant war with India in 1971, Pakistan continued its efforts to strengthen its relations with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the dissolution of “one-unit scheme” in Pakistan was the catalyst that speeded normalization. The government of Afghanistan on August, 1970, welcomed the restoration of the former provinces of West Pakistan. The basic thrust of Pakistan’s Afghan policy during the period 1947-1971 had been reactive, i.e., Islamabad would be reacting to developments and the initiative was always in Kabul’s hands.

Successive Pakistani governments had followed the ‘Closed Border Policy’ till early 1970s. The elections were held in the country and the power was transferred to civilian government of Z. A. Bhutto. With the advent of Prime Minister Bhutto’s government, Pakistan’s approach became active and Islamabad began to take the initiative in dealing with Kabul. Islamabad began to pursue the ‘Forward Policy.’

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Z. A. Bhutto’s Afghan Policy 1971-1977

Z. A. Bhutto, a feudal lord from Sind, was educated at the Universities of California, Berkeley and Oxford, England. He had subsequently taught law at the University of Southampton, exceptionally bright and articulate. Bhutto was given the commerce ministry by Iskander Mirza, a position in which he was retained by Ayub. After serving in various cabinet positions, he rose to become Ayub’s Foreign Minister in 1963. Tashkent Agreement created differences between Ayub and Bhutto, which never filled. Bhutto dissociated himself from the Tashkent accord and started mobilizing public sentiment against it.

Finally, Bhutto founded his own political party and named it as Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967, with the doctrine: ‘Islam is our faith; democracy is our polity; socialism is our economy; all power to the people.’ Subsequently, in 1970, PPP won the elections in West Pakistan, as result Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Bhutto handled Pakistan’s foreign policy with immense diplomatic skill and high intellect. He was knowledgeable of international affairs and was skilful in negotiations. Bhutto was probably the most charismatic leader Pakistan had produced in the last 25 years of its existence, and his energetic leadership heralded important changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy. However, relations with Afghanistan could not significantly the issue of Durand Line was still unresolved.

Soon after assumption of power in 1971, President Bhutto visited Kabul. It was declared as a gesture of Pakistan’s appreciation of Afghanistan’s neutrality during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Pakistan seemed to welcome the idea of cooperation and arrangement for allowing easy flow of traffic on the Asian Highway. King Zahir Shah, perhaps never wanted to allow his

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61 Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, p.26.
62 Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, p. 132.
63 For details of the agenda see Z. A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, Pakistan People’s Party (Karachi: n.p. 1971).
64 Ibid.
formal commitment to the Pakhtun’s rights of self-determination to come in the way of inter-state relations.

At this stage Pakistan, due to its strategic compulsions after separation of East Pakistan, became more interested in an understanding with Afghanistan. However, Kabul began to openly support secessionist movements in NWFP and Baluchistan demanding autonomy. Bhutto feared that the National Awami Party (NAP) leadership would join up with Afghanistan to gear nationalist moments in NWFP and Baluchistan Provinces. NAP and Jami’at Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) formed coalition governments in NWFP and Baluchistan, differences were increased between the provincial and central governments.

The coalition governments complained of the centre withholding funds, while Islamabad accused the NAP-dominated governments of following their own policies, ignoring federal laws, and projecting their separate entity through Pakhtun and Baloch nationalism. “… in January, 1973, a large consignment of arms was seized from the Iraqi embassy, which was connected to the fears that the NAP government was working for the independence of Baluchistan.” With these perceptions Bhutto dealt with the NAP and Baluch Sardars iron handedly. After the signing of Simla Agreement in 1972, Bhutto was confident that there would be no threat from India and with the passage of 1973 Constitution, he felt free to deal with the Pakhtun and Baluch problems. Islamabad accused Kabul of open interference in and support for the secessionist elements in Baluchistan.

Pakistan asked the UN to pressurize the Afghan government and it also sought the help of friendly countries in persuading Kabul to refrain from helping the insurgency in Baluchistan and interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs. In early 1973, Afghan Prime Minister, Musa Shafiq, who had replaced Dr. Abdul Zahir,

66 Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, p.147.
tried to mend fences with Islamabad by giving indications of softening Afghanistan’s policy regarding Pakistan.\textsuperscript{67}

However, Bhutto introduced ‘forward policy’ to Afghanistan because he realized that Baluch and Pakhtun with the help of Afghanistan could create problem for Pakistan. During his government in 1973, the Afghan cell had been established in order to deal with the issue and provide for a broad based policy input body, which was to assist the government in formulating Afghan policy. The Prime Minister did not preside over the Afghan cell but he was kept informed of its deliberations on a regular basis.

The cell included the Governors, Chief Secretaries and Home Secretaries of NWFP and Baluchistan, the IGFC, and the Foreign Minister and Secretary. The Afghan cell became a policy-making body and its membership expanded to include the DG ISI (Director General Inter-Services-Intelligence), CMLA/COAS, CGS (Chief of General Staff), Corps commanders/MLAs of NWFP and Baluchistan, DIB (Director Intelligence Bureau), DMI (Director Military Intelligence), ministers of Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs and their Secretaries.

In 1973, Sardar Daud had overthrown the monarchy and re-emerged as the strongman in Kabul. Pak-Afghan relations took turn for the worse as Kabul began supporting Baluch insurgents and Pakhtun nationalists. With Sardar Daud’s return to power in 1973, Pak-Afghan relations gradually deteriorated. Kabul under the King had not been receptive to machinations of Moscow but when the coup of 1973 brought Moscow’s friend Sardar Daud back to power Kabul once again became the source of anti-Pakistan moves.\textsuperscript{68}

During 1973-74 relations between the two countries worsened so fast that troops were concentrated on their respective borders. For some time it appeared as though Afghanistan had replaced India as the major threat to Pakistan’s security.\textsuperscript{69} Daud still

\textsuperscript{68} See S. Tahir-Kheli, \textit{Pakistani Elites and Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union, Iran and Afghanistan} (London: University Microfilms, 1972).
\textsuperscript{69} Kalim Bahadur, \textit{Pakistan’s Policy towards Afghanistan} (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1981), p. 93.
remained a vigorous advocate of Pakhtunistan even after years of absence from active politics. For him this issue had remained a matter of *Izzat* (Honour). Accordingly, Pakistan viewed Daud’s Pakhtunistan rhetoric and his support for Baluchi separatists, as well as his pro-India foreign policy, as a serious threat to Pakistani security.

Almost immediately after seizing power, President Daud had now referred to the ‘political dispute with Pakistan, which had not been solved’ and he pointed out that relations with Pakistan were subject to the ‘peaceful and honourable solution to this problem (Pakhtunistan) in accordance with the hopes and aspirations of the Pakhtun and Baluch people and their leaders.’ This situation was exploited by the Daud regime and, in the period from mid 1973 to 1975, Afghanistan not only provided sanctuary for the Baluch and Pakhtun dissidents but also provided the Baluch insurgents with arms and ammunition. In 1970’s an Islamic movement was also developing. The major personalities were from Kabul University like the Tajik Professor (*Ustad*) Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Pakhtun Professor Ghulam Muhammad Niazi.

Pakistani government welcomed the anti-Daud groups, and from 1974 onwards began training them for guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto responded by supporting an Islamist Movement in Afghanistan, a strategy that Islamabad would replicate two decades later with the Taliban.

“For Islamabad, the strategy was two-fold. Not only could Pakistan deter Afghan expansionism by pressuring Afghanistan from within, but also a religious opposition would have broad appeal in an overwhelmingly Muslim country without the implicit territorial threat of an ethnic-nationalist opposition. It was from this Islamist movement that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), would introduce the United States to

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72 Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, p.78.
such important later Mujahideen figures as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud, and Gulbadeen Hikmatyar. In 1974, the Islamists plotted a military coup, but Daud’s regime discovered the plot and imprisoned the leaders—at least those who did not escape to Pakistan.74

The following year, the Islamists attempted an uprising in the Panjshir Valley. Again they failed, and again the Islamist leaders fled into Pakistan. Islamabad found that supporting an Afghan Islamist movement both gave Pakistan short-term leverage against Daud, and also a long-term card to play should Afghanistan again seek to strategically challenge its neighbour to the East. With a sympathetic force in Afghanistan, Pakistan would be better able to influence succession should the elderly Daud die. It was thus in the mid-1970s, while both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to ply the Kabul regime with aid, that Pakistani intelligence—with financial support by Saudi Arabia—first began their ties to the Islamist opposition in Afghanistan.75

Pakistan restored to arming Islamist Afghan dissidents and encouraged them to raid various localities in Afghanistan from bases inside Pakistan. These raids occurred during 1974, and reached their climax in the summer of 1975, when some Ikhwani elements succeeded in striking deep inside the Panjshir Valley, northeast of Kabul. Although the Panjshir incursion failed it nevertheless showed the seriousness of Pakistan’s anti-Daud intentions.76 Another operation was planned for Paktia province bordering Pakistan under Gulbadeen Hikmatyar. The anti-Daud opposition spread propaganda regarding the ‘communist dominated regime’ and appealed to the populace to join their Jihad against the regime.77

These events led to the Z. A. Bhutto’s ‘Forward Policy.’ On one hand, Bhutto offered to sign a ‘no-war’ pact with Afghanistan on the pattern of ‘Simla Accord.’ And, on other hand he was

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, p.120.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy

Giving support to Afghan Islamists against Daud government, the purpose of this policy was to put pressure on Daud to stop his interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.

Afghanistan did not lose “any opportunity in international forums to highlight Pakistan’s dismal record in subjugating ethnic minorities. Daud personally wrote to the United Nations Secretary General on 22 November, 1974, regarding Pakistan’s violation of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect to the Baluch and the Pakhtun people. He requested UN intervention to stop Pakistan’s alleged “act of genocide and mass extermination” against the ‘defenceless Baluchi people.”

It is important to examine why the secularist and apparently socialist Z. A. Bhutto should aid Islamist guerrillas who he knew had links with his staunch opponents in the Jamiat-i-Islami of Pakistan. “Firstly, Daud had reopened the issue of Pakhtunistan and the Durand Line, which Pakistan has long considered as settled. However, Daud opted to play the Pakhtunist card more to establish his nationalist credentials and to generate popular support for his regime than for any other tangible effect on the common boundary. Secondly, the Afghan government was involved in aiding the largely Baluch and Pakhtun National Awami Party (NAP), which had the majority of seats in Baluchistan, a province which is contiguous with Afghanistan.” As a result of the dissolution of the NAP government in Baluchistan, the NWFP government, which was a coalition of NAP and JUI resigned in protest. The political confrontation between Bhutto and the NAP escalated and later the leaders were jailed, and trials were constituted against them on the grounds of “treason”. The Pakistan Army was deployed in Baluchistan to fight a costly and destructive counter insurgency war.

However, because of potential internal threats to his government, Daud had to review his foreign policy by 1975. He was unable to gain the support of Soviet Union on the Pakhtunistan

79 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan and the United States (Lahore: Published Bookbiz, 2003), p. 66.
80 Ibid.
issue since Moscow was improving its relations with the ‘progressive’ Z. A. Bhutto regime.\(^{81}\) By 1976, Daud appeared to have realized that the Soviets had an agenda of their own. “They had penetrated the internal politics of the country, providing support and assistance to the revolutionary People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).”\(^{82}\)

The foreign policy changes Daud introduced were radical. He sought to reduce the soviet influence in Afghanistan by improving relations with neighbouring Pakistan, Iran and Western countries. By 1974, Afghan Army personnel started receiving training in countries like Egypt and India and even Pakistan-an indication of fundamental changes in his policies.\(^{83}\)

Afghanistan’s improved relations with Iran positively affected Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in the years 1975 and 1976. Shah urged Daud to resolve Afghanistan’s long-standing dispute with Pakistan,\(^{84}\) through bilateral diplomacy, due to the mediation of the Shah of Iran bi-lateral negotiations between Kabul and Islamabad in 1976-78 indicated that a thaw had begun in their relations. Talks between Prime Minister Bhutto and President Daud (1976-77) and Between Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and President Daud (1977-78) smoothed the path to normalization.

In June 1976, Pak-Afghan relations began to thaw and Prime minister visited Kabul. Earlier Pakistan had supplied aid to the victims of earthquakes in Afghanistan, which was accepted by Kabul. Propaganda emanating from both countries against each other had also been toned and scaled down over the year and it seemed as if détente was just around the corner. During the talks between both the leaders sincere efforts were made to normalize relations.

President Daud was frank and open with the Pakistani Prime Minister and stated that the Soviet Russia did not want to see the

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\(^{81}\) Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, p.80.


\(^{84}\) Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, p.80.
amelioration of Pak-Afghan relations. Kabul’s primary concern, he said, was the betterment of economic conditions. Afghanistan had no intention of weakening or destroying Pakistan. He also said that Afghanistan could never abandon its interest in the welfare of the Pakhtuns and was deeply concerned with the war in Baluchistan since the Balochi people were its neighbour and fellow countrymen. Daud paid a return visit to Pakistan in August, 1976, and now stressed the importance of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ as the basis for future Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Though neither side gave up its stand on the issues dividing them, they agreed to solve their problems on the basis of five principles of peaceful co-existence.

At domestic front, Z. A. Bhutto decided to hold general elections in March, 1977. Before the elections in 1977, nine opposition parties came together under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The competition was tough. The PNA promised enforcement of Islamic law if it returned to power. Z. A. Bhutto, too, had much to offer apart from his ‘ongoing populist policies.’ Z. A. Bhutto’s PPP won the elections with majority, the PPP won 155 seats and the PNA only 38 out of a total 200 seats. However, the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an amalgam of right wing secular and religious parties, accused Bhutto of rigging the elections and agitations started against Bhutto. The government tried to defuse the situation by announcing ‘Islamic’ reforms. Z. A. Bhutto banned liquor shops, gambling, horse racing, nightclubs etc. and changed the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday.

Z.A. Bhutto did not much to minimize the influence of army on domestic as well as international politics his foreign policy remained with “the classical paradigm” as Siddiqa-Agha points out, this paradigm “naturally strengthens the significance of the

86 Kabul Times, 23 August 1976.
87 Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, p.152.
military.”\textsuperscript{88} The PNA was also backed up by armed forces for tactical reasons.

General Zia taking advantage of the turmoil in Pakistan was successful in preventing the opposition from concluding a deal with Bhutto. Consequently, Bhutto increasingly began depending on the army. Zia used the opportunity to intervene and remove Bhutto through a bloodless coup on 5 July, 1977.\textsuperscript{89}

Therefore, before any settlement of the Pak-Afghan dispute could be made which would have resulted in Kabul’s recognition of the Durand Line (the main foreign policy objective of Islamabad), Prime Minister was overthrown due to a military coup in July, 1977. By the time of Bhutto’s overthrow by the military in 1977, Pakistan’s foreign policy had become more diversified and far less confrontational against India, and its relations with Afghanistan were improving as well.\textsuperscript{90}

Therefore, a policy can only be considered successful if it accomplishes the objectives, which it sets out to achieve. In this case, the policy succeeded in securing the territorial integrity of Pakistan (de-escalation of Pakhtunistan issue) and normalizing relations with Kabul, which was a pre-requisite for any permanent settlement of the Durand Line dispute. But before any treaty or agreement over the Durand Line could be signed the PPP government was overthrown in 1977, and later on President Daud was deposed in 1978.

Thus, within a year both Kabul and Islamabad had lost the leaders, who had nearly reached the point, where an agreement was the next step in the process of normalization. Pakistan has adopted a defensive policy towards Afghanistan until 1978, the border was regularly closed, and Pakistan gave asylum to Islamist groups against Daud, headed by young militants like Hikmatyar and Masoud, who became the leaders of the Islamist Mujahideen movements in the 1980s.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pp.80-81.
Conclusion

Pakistan’s Afghan policy since its inception has revolved around two main objectives: amicable solution of Pakhtunistan issue and the settlement of Durand Line. These security oriented issues created fears among the policymakers, and they always wanted friendly Afghanistan because Pakistan could not face threat from western border as it was already facing constant threat at its eastern border from India. Historically speaking, Afghanistan always had cordial relations with India. While Kabul was hostile to Pakistan historically, the bone of contention was the border separating the two countries the Durand Line, and Pakhtunistan issue. As a result of this from 1947 to 1977, relations were not friendly, except for few years of Z. A. Bhutto and Daud’s understanding for the improvement of relationship. Overall assessment of Pakistan Afghan policy from 1947 to 1977 gives the impression that it has gone through many phases, and ups and downs. Pakistan’s initial Afghan policy is termed as ‘Closed Policy,’ but, later on Z. A. introduced new policy that is known as ‘Forward Policy.’

Initially, the military coup in Pakistan, did not fundamentally affect Pakistan’s improving relations with Afghanistan that had begun during the tail end of the Bhutto era. General Zia continued to build on Bhutto’s work aimed at settling the bilateral ‘differences’ between the two countries. Daud’s seemingly firm hold on power, coupled with a foreign policy seeking to strengthen ties the West and the Islamic nations, had made the environment more conducive to a lasting Pakistan-Afghanistan rapprochement by the end of 1977. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan General Zia introduced jihad policy in Afghanistan under the sponsorship of CIA. Therefore, further, it needs to be investigated what were the implications of General Zia’s Jihad policy in Afghanistan and its implications on state and society of Pakistan.

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91 Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p.82.