ETHNICITY, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM
Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 1937-1947

Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah

National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research
Centre Of Excellence Quaid-I-Azam University
(New Campus) Islamabad, Pakistan
2015
ETHNICITY, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 1937-1947
NIHCR Publication No.171

Copyright © 2015

All rights reserved. No part of this publication be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing from the Director, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to NIHCR at the address below.

National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, (New Campus) P.O. Box No.1230, Islamabad - 44000, Pakistan.

Email: niher@hotmail.com, niher@yahoo.com
Website: www.nihcr.edu.pk

Editing/Proofreading: Muhammad Saleem

Title: Zahid Imran

Published by
Muhammad Munir Khawar, Publication Officer.

Printed at
M/s Roohani Art Press, Blue Area, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Price Pak Rs.700.00
SAARC Countries Rs.900.00
US $.20.00

CONTENTS

Map vi
Acknowledgements vii
Abbreviations x
Introduction xii

1 NWFP and its Society 1
2 Government and Politics in the Province 15
3 The Frontier Congress in Office 1937-39 51
4 Revival of the Frontier Muslim League 91
5 Politics During the War Years 115
6 Moving Towards Communalization of Politics 153
7 Muslims of NWFP and Pakistan 183
Conclusion 233

Appendices
I Statement of Khan Abdul Akbar Khan, President of the Afghan Youth League and Mian Ahmad Shah, General Secretary of the Afghan Youth League, Charsadda 241
II Speeches Delivered on the Occasion of the No-Confidence Motion against Sir A. Qaiyum’s Ministry (3 September 1937) 249
III A Reply to Hindu Critics (by Sardar Mohammad Aurangzeb Khan, MLA) 253
IV A ‘Red Shirt’ Camp (Ms F. Mary Baar) 257
V Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan’s Letter to the Convenor, Committee of Action, All-India Muslim League 261
VI Letter from Mian Abdullah Shah, President District Muslim League, Peshawar to M.A. Jinnah (6 August 1947) 265
VII Dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry: Correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State (8-9 August 1947) 267

Glossary 271
Bibliography and Sources 273
Index 291
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is based on my D.Phil dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford titled ‘Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province’. Therefore, my foremost thanks go to my supervisor Professor Judith M. Brown, whose wisdom, scholarly pursuits and encouragement have been a great source of inspiration to me throughout the period of this research. Without her guidance and support, this dissertation would not have been completed. I am greatly indebted to her for all that she did for me during my stay at the University of Oxford. I am also indebted to Dr David Washbrook (Oxford), Anil Sethi (Cambridge), Dr Sikandar Hayat (Islamabad), Dr Shah Jahan (Peshawar), Dr Gopal Krishna and Mrs E. Krishna (Oxford), Dr Lal Baha (Peshawar), Abdul Karim Khan (Hawaii), Dr Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat (Peshawar), and Dr Iftikhar H. Malik (Bath), for discussions and for their interest in the subject. My special thanks are also due to Dr John Stevenson (Oxford), Dr Nandini Gooptu (Oxford), M. Saleem Qureshi (IOLR, London), Professor Richard Gombrich and Sanjukata Gombrich (Oxford), Mr Roger Shilcock (Oxford), Dr Rafique Afzal (Islamabad), Dr Naeem Qureshi (Islamabad), Dr M. Anwar Khan (Peshawar), Dr Z. H. Zaidi (Islamabad), Dr Tariq Siddiqui (Islamabad), A. K. Gupta (New Delhi), Dr Sher Zaman Taizai (Peshawar), and Nigar Ali Khan (Peshawar). I am also thankful to Dr Peter Parkes (Kent), Dr Yunus Samad (Bradford), Dr M. Banerjee (Oxford), Mr David Page (London), Mr Javed Badshah (London), Dr M. Waseem (Oxford), Dr Raj Wali Shah Khattak (Peshawar), Dr Qasim Kamawl (Jalalabad), Mr Saifullah Aziz (Kabul), Dr Inayatullah Khan (Charsadda) Dr Arif Mahmood (Oxford), Professor M. Ayub (Bannu), Javed H. Syed, Aziz Ahmad Chaudhry, Dr Dushka Syed, and my other colleagues at the Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, for helping me at different stages during my research. My thanks are to Arif Ali Shah, my brother, who always took great pains in sending me material from Pakistan. My special thanks are to my friend Aimal Khattak, who shared with me the hardships of my research field trips, even in the rugged mountains of Waziristan.
I am grateful to the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom for their funding during my three-year stay at the University of Oxford. Moreover, I must also thank the Beit Fund (Oxford), Worcester College (Oxford), and Charles Wallace Pakistan Trust (London), for their financial support in the final stages of the completion of the dissertation.

My thanks are to Tariq Mansoor Jalali, Director, and the staff of the NWFP Provincial Archives, Peshawar. I am grateful for the cooperation and great help provided by the staff at various archives, repositories, and libraries, notably by the Tribal Research Cell, Peshawar; the National Archives of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad; National Archives of India, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, and Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi; Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge; India Office Records and Library, London, and the Indian Institute Library (New Bodleian), University of Oxford.

In Pakistan certain individuals helped me in the collection of material and facilitated my visits to various parts of the NWFP. They included M. Ajmal Khan Khattak (Nowshera), Abdul Wali Khan (Charsadda), Dr M. Rehan (Nowshera), Shahzad Gul Bacha (Mardan), (late) Warris Khan (Rashakai), (late) Mir Mehdi Shah (Peshawar), Loe Khan and his family (Wana, Waziristan), Ghafoor Shah (Razmak, Waziristan), Mr Inamullah Khattak (Peshawar), Sayed Tajdar Shah (Rawalpindi), Alam Zeb (Germany), and Jehanzeb Malik Shah (Tehkal, Peshawar). I must thank them for their support and encouragement. In India, I am thankful to Jagat Ram Sahni, M. Yunus, and particularly to Ishar Das Talwar, who despite his old age and poor health took great pains in coming to New Delhi from Rajasthan, to share the sweet memories of his ancestral land: Pashtoonkhwa.

Through the encouragement and co-operation of my supervisor Professor Judith M. Brown, Professor Ravinder Kumar, Director, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, and, K. L. M. Singhvi, the Indian High Commissioner, London, I was able to visit India and consult the valuable material available in NMML, and other repositories. I am grateful to them for their courtesy and
help in that connection. Our stay at New Delhi with Mrs Lalita Sethi, Shikha, and their family was one of the best periods we ever spent abroad. In New Delhi, various individuals helped me in different ways. They included Surajit Roy and his family, Dr A. P. Sen, Umaish Jha, and Dr Jamal-ud-Din (Jamia Millia), J. L. Gera, D. S. Rautela, Jiwan, Baren Ray, Mr Manchanda (NMML); Raj Mohan Gandhi and his wife Usha, Rajiv Bhora (Gandhi Peace Foundation), and Iqbal Singh and his wife Rupinder Kaur.

Whenever I got stuck with the computer, Dr Samia Kamal, our very close friend at Oxford came to my rescue at very short notice. She deserves many thanks. I must also thank my father Sayed Qamar Shah and mother Aapaji, who despite their old age allowed me to go to the University of Oxford to undertake this study. I am grateful to them for telling me so much about the culture and politics of Pashtoonkhwa. I must express my deep love to my two daughters, Pashmina and Zalanda, especially the former whose naughty and loving pranks helped me in finishing the book in her own way. Finally, I must thank my wife Nazia, who would be more pleased than anyone else on the successful completion of the book. I must confess that without her patience, encouragement, and help, this could never have been done so easily.
ABBREVIATIONS

AFM  Archives of Freedom Movement
AICC  All-India Congress Committee
AIHM  All-India Hindu Mahasabha
AIML  All-India Muslim League
AINC  All-India National Congress
CA  Constituent Assembly
CLAD  Central Legislative Assembly Debates
CD  Cunningham Diaries
CID  Central Intelligence Department
CP  Central Provinces
CSASC  Centre for South Asian Studies Cambridge
CWC  Congress Working Committee
FCR  Frontier Crimes Regulations
FPCC  Frontier Province Congress Committee
FPML  Frontier Province Muslim League
GR  Governor’s Report
HDP  Hazara Democratic Party
HMG  Her Majesty’s Government
HSNP  Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party
Home/Poll  Home and Political Record
IAR  Indian Annual Register
IGP  Inspector General of Police
IOLR  India Office Library and Records
IPC  Indian Penal Code
JUH  Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUS</td>
<td>Jamiatul Ulema-i-Sarhad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Muslim Independent Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Archives of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>National Archives of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMML</td>
<td>Nehru Memorial Museum and Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAD</td>
<td>Provincial Legislative Assembly Debates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QAP</td>
<td>Quaid-i-Azam Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHC</td>
<td>Shamsul Hasan Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNP</td>
<td>United Muslim Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Provinces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This book deals with the complex political and ideological developments in the North-West Frontier Province named as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in April 2010 during the last decade of colonial rule. By focusing on the Khudai Khidmatgar movement it examines the emergence of modern styles of agitational and democratic politics among the NWFP Muslims, the majority of whom were Pashtoons. The issue of Pashtoon ethnicity, its interaction with subcontinental Muslim identity and Indian nationalism, are central themes of this study. This tripolar relationship had its ambiguities, especially in relating Pashtoon ethno-regionalism with Muslim nationalism as articulated by the All-India Muslim League.

There are two major reasons to study this particular period (1937-47) in the history of the province: i) Following the implementation of the Government of India Act of 1935, the NWFP experienced open, semi-constitutional politics and governance during the decade leading to independence. New political structures and incentives, like a wider franchise and greater powers for provincial politicians, meant a new and intensive style of politics, necessitating a new relationship between politicians and the wider public; ii) It was during this decade that the AIML evolved as the most significant all-India Muslim force by spearheading the demand for ‘Pakistan’. Such a super-ordinate programme essentially led to regionalist responses from India’s regional Muslim groups, varying from co-operation to sheer antagonism. It was vital for the League to establish itself in the Muslim majority provinces, in order to pave the way for the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. Its claims to be a ‘representative body of the all-India Muslims’ were challenged in the NWFP by a majority of the Frontier Muslims, who found articulation through the Khudai Khidmatgar movement under the leadership of the Khan Brothers. They gave the League a cool response, taking no interest in its communal ideology and party programme. During this crucial period the League remained busy trying to ‘wrest’ the NWFP from the Khudai Khidmatgar-Congress.
alliance, and to establish itself as the real representative of the Indian Muslims. The Frontier Congress had to counter the League’s advances, by mobilizing the Pashtoons’ dislike of British imperialism and their anti-colonial stand on an all-India level. Moreover, this period saw the shifting of loyalties, the abandonment of old allies and former ‘comrades-in-arms’.

A chronological account of political development is central to its historical reconstruction. A systematically constructed account of significant events discloses the political processes and their inherent dynamics. History is not merely a collection of events but, more importantly, a study of interaction between political structures, dominant ideologies, and given power configurations at a given point in time and place. In this thesis, the interplay of all these elements is articulated, in order to account for political developments prior to 1947. However, the approach adopted in this thesis is not simply chronological, as within a broad chronological framework there is an analysis of the underlying themes of the inter-relationship between ethno-regional and transregional forces. The book also examines the social basis of provincial politics, mobilization strategies applied by different parties, and the role of colonial administration. The politico-administrative framework established under the Government of India Act of 1935, supplied the context within which the various competing forces organized themselves to pursue their own respective ends.

In the context of the all-India programme of the AIML, the NWFP was imbued with its own ethnic particularism. This particularism, which was articulated by the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, was not in tension with Indian nationalism as advocated by the AINC. But it posed greater problems to the League for whom the NWFP was a crucial province in their future ‘Pakistan’. Such an intricate and competitive configuration made the politics of the province an arena of intense debate. Eventually the transregional forces represented by the League were able to bypass the region’s ethnic specificity and, like several other South Asian regions, the NWFP experienced a new phase in its politics. Following the referendum of July 1947, political events from across the Indus overtook provincial politics and the NWFP became a constituent of the new state of Pakistan.
With the emergence of the Khilafat movement in the early twentieth century, nationalist sentiments, in the modern sense, became accentuated in the NWFP. The Khilafat movement, which had both anti-imperialist and Islamic inspirations, exerted great influence on the emerging political consciousness of the province. These early beginnings were important for the later development of nationalist politics. The nationalism of the Frontier was, in its ethos, religious—in harmony with Islam—and radically anti-imperialist. Given the structure of support that the empire had established for itself, it was inevitable that nationalism should find itself in opposition to the hitherto dominant notables of the province. As a result throughout the period of our study a conflict ensued between the proponents of the nationalist movement, especially the Khudai Khidmatgars, and the notables, who were the pillars of the political establishment. Of the region’s ethnic groups the Pashtoons constituted the largest, comprising more than 56 per cent of the population in the settled districts and almost 100 per cent in the tribal areas. Given the special administrative nature of the NWFP, which was bifurcated into ‘tribal’ and ‘settled’ areas, the present study found it more expedient to concentrate on the settled districts which composed the core of the province. The choice of the province lies in the fact that it is a structured political arena and also because Pashtoon ethnicity covered the province as a whole. It was the achievement of the Khudai Khidmatgars to have established themselves amongst the numerically dominant group, but it inevitably meant that their opponents, the British administration in the province as well as the Muslim League in later years, would seek to mobilize many of the non-Pashtoon groups to the cause of Pakistan when the crisis of the empire escalated in 1946-7.

The struggle between Indian nationalism and Muslim particularism which called itself an alternative, legitimate nationalism, and was

---

1 The NWFP consisted of the settled districts and the tribal areas. Since the scope of the book is confined to an analysis of organized party politics and its relationship to the national movement, the tribal areas have not been included in the study. In order to maintain a close military control the colonial government did not allow organized political contestation in those areas. Consequently the base of the freedom struggle and of the Khudai Khidmatgars was virtually non-existent in those areas.
represented by the AIML, became acute following the partial transfer of power under the Act of 1935. The League acquired a far greater following in the Muslim minority provinces than it did in the Muslim majority provinces, viz, Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, and the NWFP. Among these, only the NWFP was dominated by the Congress, while in the other provinces different local groups, e.g. the Krishak Proja Party of Fazlul Haq in Bengal, the Unionists of Sir Fazl-i-Hussain in the Punjab, the Sindhi ‘nationalist’ Muslims under Allah Bakhsh Soomro and G. H. Hidayatullah, competed with the Muslim League for political allegiance. There were thus two sets of conflict among the Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces: one between the Congress and the Muslim League and, the other between the Muslim League and other ‘nationalist’ Muslim parties.

After the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution by the Muslim League in March 1940, a conflict between the Muslim League and the so-called ‘nationalist’ Muslims became acute. While Muslims in every province of what later became Pakistan were ethnically distinct from each other, and generally aspired to local autonomy, the Muslim League sought to subordinate them to a more centralized control. The drive towards the centralization of Muslim politics gathered intensity after the Cripps Proposals of 1942, which seemed to concede the possibility of the separation of the Muslim majority. The primary resource mobilized by the Muslim League to establish its ascendancy over local movements for autonomy in the Muslim majority provinces was the slogan of ‘Islam in danger’, and hostility towards the Hindus. While this strategy succeeded in Sindh, Punjab, and Bengal, it did not get very far in the NWFP simply because there were few Hindus in the province. While Hindus in Bengal and Sindh, and Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab were in substantial numbers, enough to constitute a threat to the League’s design, in the Frontier they could be ignored. This meant that the cause of nationalism could be successfully pitted against Muslim separatism on the one hand and the League’s pursuit of hegemony on the other. Frontier nationalists could thus combine nationalism and ethnic aspiration in harmony. Rittenberg correctly observes that the Khudai Khidmatgars ‘saw much less scope for the expression of Pashtoon
regionalism within the Muslim League, for its ideology demanded that they abandon their separate ethnic ambition in the interest of communal unity. For the Muslim League on the other hand it was vital to enlist the Muslim majority provinces, especially in the north-west, to the cause of Pakistan—if any one of them were to opt out there could be no Pakistan. Hence the League sought ferociously to overcome political opposition in these provinces.

Ethnicity was more important in the politics of the NWFP rather than class differences. It was one of the least economically developed provinces of the British Indian empire. There was very little industry, not much western education, and little urbanization. The role therefore played by the Muslim intelligentsia in the development of provincial politics was, less significant in comparison with provinces like Bengal and the Punjab. The Khudai Khidmatgars had established their following almost wholly in the rural population, while the Muslim League was largely urban in its following until the crisis of 1946-7. The rural, middle-landed class support-base of the Khudai Khidmatgars held good despite a growing appeal to Islam in the context of the partition agitation. The final outcome of the struggle, as reflected in the July 1947 referendum did not suggest that their support had significantly diminished. In this respect, the hitherto established view of the scholars that somehow the referendum signified a triumph of Muslim nationalism, drawing its strength from religious sentiments, is highly questionable.


3 Ethnicity is a junior partner of nationalism and may have its cultural, ethnic, secular or traditional postulations. The lingual, religious, biological, or spatial (territorial or diasporic) togetherness rationalized through historical consciousness may project towards ethnic, national or transnational solidarity. For more details see, E. J. Hobsawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1992); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1983); and, B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983).

4 Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns, pp. 244-5; E. Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan (Stockholm, 1981), pp. 220-28.
The very special features of the region gave rise to distinctive developments and alignments during the last decades of imperial rule which were of great significance to its history. This study addresses them through the following questions: Why did the NWFP Muslims prefer the Congress to the Muslim League? What did the Congress get from its alliance with the Khudai Khidmatgars, the Pashtoon nationalists, and vice versa? During the later years of the freedom movement, the Muslim League, which earlier had no grass roots support in the NWFP, succeeded in establishing a foothold in various parts of the province. Did this signify any substantial change in the outlook of the Frontier Muslims? What were the reasons behind the shifting of loyalties before Partition? Furthermore, why were the Khudai Khidmatgars ‘abandoned’ by the Congress in the final stages of the freedom struggle, and with what implications for the NWFP? How far did the Muslim League’s religious appeal affect the politics of the NWFP? What were the specific ethnic problems and issues which distinguished the NWFP from the rest of India, and gave it its peculiar identity and importance in the colonial period and also in independent Pakistan?

The book is a contribution to the historiography which has developed in the light of new data and approaches now available to historians. The very idea of religious/communal, territorial, ethnic, and ultimately ‘national communities’ in India would have been anathema to Indian nationalists who considered the Raj to be the ultimate spoiler of an ‘Indian unity’. Pakistani nationalists, conversely, traced the roots of Muslim nationhood from the very advent of Islam in South Asia, with the Raj and baniya only conspiring to weaken it through various tactics. On the other hand, the ‘Cambridge School’ of South Asian history came to see the political conflicts in the subcontinent from the perspective of competing elite groups pursuing their own worldly interests, and the colonial state, itself, playing broker amongst feuding territorial, religious, and ideological communities. In addition, one notices a wider spectrum of intellectual positions, derived from leftist and subaltern orientations, seeking explanations of the role of the
The politics of Muslim communities and their identities in India have received much attention from historians. After the partition of India the main focus of historical writing centered on the emergence of modern Indian nationalism, the independence of India, and the creation of Pakistan. From the 1970s this changed in favour of an emphasis on regional studies and the relationship of regions with their particular types of society and politics to all-India politics. Various studies have appeared on the growth of Muslim nationalism and its insistence on a separate destiny for Muslims, which culminated in the establishment of Pakistan. For some historians regional structures have appeared crucial, for others skilful leadership, and for yet others identity and Islamic consciousness.

Anil Seal offered a new and ground-breaking perspective on the politics of the educated elite. He concentrated on the inter-elite factional struggles and the accompanying strategies of political mobilization as they affect particular regional, social, and economic structures in the Indian society. His main subject is the Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras during the Viceroyalty of Lytton, Ripon, and Dufferin. Apart from utilizing the published official record, Seal relies on a number of private papers of local rulers and elite politicians in order to track their ‘attitudes and policies’. The local population, Seal argues, could not expel the British by force: not because the foreigners were stronger but because the Indians lacked unity.

The Raj initially relied on force, not only striking terror in its opponents but also awe and respect. But obviously the British could not rely on force at all times. Moreover, they were confronted with the main issue of whether to rule India from Calcutta or from London. Gradually, they were convinced of the need to utilize and exploit the services of the locals in strengthening British imperialism in South Asia. This also saved them money in paying for additional Britishers. The locals who

---

5 It appears to be a rather simplistic overview of the major trends though one has to be cognisant of the variations and a multipolar nature of intellectual debates amongst the historians within each category.
offered themselves as ‘collaborators’ of the Raj did so for a number of reasons: they wished to earn for themselves a prestigious position in the modern society, and also to reap handsome dividends in return. Gradually this whole effort led to the evolution of a western educated elite who could play the role of intermediaries between the government and a majority of the local population. It also gave rise to the political mobilization of more Indians. The pioneers of the modern political mobilization in India, according to Seal, were these western-educated people, majority of whom were based in the Presidencies. Thus Bengal, Bombay, and Madras which were important centres of Indian political life became the early centres of Indian political organization of a non-traditional type.

The inter-elite struggle, according to Seal, is primarily an educated urban middle-class struggle. The warring elite try to mobilize other social groups and classes, and if need be, the masses in general, in order to gain more strength and recognition. They seek government attention and are willing to serve as ‘collaborators’ to win its favour. This favour helps them against their counterparts in this bid for power, authority and control. While there is no gainsaying that ‘collaboration’ between the educated elite and the colonial government made sense in urban settings, Seal’s argument cannot be applied to the case of NWFP as a whole. Firstly, there was no large scale educated urban middle class in the NWFP. It was backward politically, educationally, socially, and economically. Secondly, the dominant political elite were the rural elite, big Khans, landholders, and the titled gentry. The level of socio-economic development in the province was low, with the result that there were few privileged social groups in the system. Power was vested in the big landowners, and rural middle classes, apart from some ulema and sajjada nashins. The elite were from the rural middle class, followed by a sprinkling of educated persons such as lawyers, journalists, teachers, and students. Thus there was little room for urban elite to manoeuvre. Politics was primarily the work of landed interests, particularly the rural middle class, as represented by the likes of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, and Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, to name only a few.

---

6 Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1971).
There was hardly any distinct and developed educated urban middle class. Thus unlike the rest of India, the nucleus of power, necessary for political mobilization rested in the rural areas. The tussle was not between the educated elite groups, rather, it was between the powerful landed elite: the pro-British big Khans enjoying government favours and the rural middle-class Khans who were unhappy over the dominance of big Khans in government affairs. Aggrieved and alarmed at the growing influence of the big Khans, they joined the newly formed Khudai Khidmatgar movement in large numbers. Indeed the movement comprised a significant number of these Khans, in addition to a large number of peasants, tillers, artisans, and members of other working classes, particularly in Peshawar Valley. Despite their large numbers, these middle-class Khans followed the party programme and policy of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Hence, there was no inter-elite struggle in the sense suggested by Seal. Political struggle was primarily between the rural middle class on both sides, for, and against the British imperialists. The anti-British camp was further divided: one entirely against any sort of collaboration, cooperation and contacts with the British (Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the majority of the Khudai Khidmatgars), and, the other seeking some contact rather than collaboration with the British government (Dr Khan Sahib and other provincial Congressmen) to pursue their anti-British agenda. The former favoured social uplift schemes and agitational politics while the latter was inclined towards constitutional politics.

Thus, one cannot agree with Seal if one takes the case of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the party leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars who did not belong to the educated urban middle class and who was against any collaboration with the government. On several occasions he refused even formal meetings with the representatives of the Raj, including the Chief Commissioner of the province. Seal’s argument, however, may seem somewhat relevant while discussing Dr Khan Sahib’s case. A firm believer in constitutional politics, the western educated Dr Khan Sahib, elder brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, at various occasions collaborated with the government and accepted three times the Chief Ministership of the province during the last decade before Partition. But, one must remember that the
permanent leadership of the Khudai Khidmatgars rested with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and not with Dr Khan Sahib.

According to D. A. Low, the British, since their advent in India, created a class of ‘chieftains’ and ‘intermediaries’ in order to facilitate the ‘peaceful’ and orderly functioning of the Raj. During the early decades of the twentieth century, the British relied on these people and used them against the nationalists, specially during the 1930s. As for the day-to-day administration of the country, the members of the subordinate bureaucratic ‘Provincial Services’ were used. Majority of them, Low argued, were drawn from the landed aristocracy and elitist families which had a vast experience of serving the rulers. They provided the link between the British and the social elite, the majority of whom were landlords and prosperous peasants in the rural areas. Gradually, the British realized that the bureaucracy could not help much in the continuation of their rule in India. They deployed ‘neo-darbari’ politicians who could serve their purpose better. In addition to the conferment of titles, awards, and honours, under this modified system, ‘prominent’ Indian notables were appointed to the central and provincial legislatures. It also led to the introduction of legislative politics by electing the Indians to municipal committees and district boards. This ‘large scale’ political mobilization of the Indians resulted in the formation of various associations and political parties including the Indian National Congress, the All-India Muslim League, and many more political organizations advocating their own respective ideologies and party programmes.7

Unlike other parts of India, the majority of the inhabitants of the NWFP were against British rule in India. The British, however, in line with their efforts in other provinces of India, did try and create a class of loyalists, including some ‘chieftains’ and big Khans to support their rule. In recognition of their services to the Raj, jagirs, honorific titles, and inams were conferred upon them from time to time. These loyal Khans and other pro-government landed aristocracy were used against the Pashtoon patriots during the civil disobedience movements. Like other provinces of British India, a

large number of these people were included in the Provincial Legislative Council (1932). However, during the first Congress Ministry, laws were passed which aimed at curtailing the privileges of the nobility. The passage of Agriculturists Debtors Relief Bill, the abolition of honorific titles, inams, of Zaildari, Lambardari, and the Honorary Magistrates and, putting an end to the system of nomination of the sons of nobility for higher government positions were a few other anti-Khan measures adopted by Congress ministry to ‘undermine’ the influence of the ‘nobles’. This was regarded a ‘death-blow’ to the prestige and position of the big Khans and other title-holders. The Governor of NWFP, however, tried his best to protect the allies of colonialism. Wherever possible, he withheld his procedural assent necessary to the formal approval of all such legislation. While disagreeing with Low that loyal Indians were appointed to the central and provincial legislatures, in the NWFP, unlike other provinces of British India, anti-colonial forces not only dominated politics outside the assembly but they were also in a majority within the provincial legislature. Thus, political mobilization in the NWFP was provided by the anti-imperialist forces and not by the loyalist elements, as was the case in some parts of India.

In the Punjab, the Unionists, including Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, Sir Sikandar Hayat, and Khizar Hayat Tiwana, belonging to landed aristocracy, not only provided political mobilization to their own community, the Muslims, but also bridged the gap between various other communities. They succeeded in bringing Hindus and Sikhs within the fold of the Unionist Party, thus making it a cross-communal organization. But they were more interested in the protection of their class-interests rather than contributing to communal harmony between the various communities inhabiting the Punjab. No wonder, during the Partition massacre, the Unionists failed to avert the communal massacre in the province.

In the NWFP, which was an overwhelming Muslim majority province, the Khudai Khidmatgars, not only provided a platform for the anti-British elements in the province, it also resisted the outbursts of communal violence in the province. Its anti-British stand won for it support at the grassroot levels. The Khudai Khidmatgar resisted the onslaughts of the landed aristocracy—the
big Khans against the poor peasants, tillers, and other working
groups making the organization popular. The Khudai Khidmatgar
leaders approached the masses directly. This was one of the main
reasons for its popularity in the province which resulted in a great
political mobilization in the NWFP.

Francis Robinson’s work deals with the gradual separatist	
tendencies among the UP Muslims in the wake of Hindu
revivalism, the Hindi-Urdu controversy, dissension over jobs, and
membership of various representative bodies and the adversarial
relationship that this engendered between the two communities.
The UP Muslim elite, according to Robinson, were far from a
unitary group as the ideological rift between various sections of
Muslims, i.e. Shias and Sunnis, betrayed any effort for unity. In the
same vein, the cleavage between the modernists and the
traditionalists or generational differences between the ‘Old Party’
and the ‘Young Party’ only added to existing fragmentation. Issues
like the Aligarh University, the local language controversy, the
need for a Muslim political party, the Cawnpore Mosque
controversy, and the attachment to Pan-Islamic issues brought
divergent Muslim leaders including the ulema, sajjada nashins,
and modernists together but only for a while. Thus, the Muslim
elite, after 1857, were not only engaged in an ever-changing
relationship with the colonial state and an increasingly powerful
majority, they were equally arraigned against one another. In such
a state of affairs, there ensued a race for personal aggrandizement
and sectional interests. After 1922, one sees a major transformation
when the landed interests stage a come-back with sectional
interests superseding community interests.8

Ian Talbot’s main argument revolves around the ‘collaboration’ of

8 F. Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the
United Provinces’ Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974). For an
interesting debate on this subject see, P. R. Brass, ‘Elite Groups, Symbol
Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia’ in D.
Taylor and M. Yapp, eds., Political Identity in South Asia (London, 1979);
and, F. Robinson, ‘Islam and Muslim Separatism’, ibid. Also see, P. R.
Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge, 1974);
and, G. Pandey, The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1926-
34 (Delhi, 1985).
the inhabitants of the Punjab with British imperialism. He analyses the causes of this association which led to the maintenance of British authority in the Punjab, a Muslim majority province, crucial to the future state of Pakistan. The relationship between the local loyal notables, who always were at the forefront of political mobilization in the province, and, the central government has also been discussed. The region’s importance, according to Talbot, was not only owing to its strategic location, but also because it was the centre of army recruitment on which lay the foundation of the British empire in India. Talbot seeks to explain how the British secured the overwhelming support of the rural population of the province to strengthen the imperial army by joining it in large numbers. Moreover, political mobilization in the province, with a particular reference to the formation and growth of the Unionist Party—a loyalist coalition of Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh landed aristocracy is also examined at great length. Talbot also focuses on the final phase of Partition by providing details of the Punjab politics when the Unionists gave way to AIML which succeeded in winning over the majority of the Muslim population of the province, which he describes as ‘the heartland of a future Pakistan state’. Talbot has concluded his account by examining the riots in the Punjab followed by the partition of India.9

The majority of the NWFP population, unlike the Punjab, were anti-establishment. Pashtoons, the dominant ethnic community of the province, resisted British imperialism in that part of South Asia. Their sense of belonging to a superior race always kept them motivated and charged in defending their region against the invaders, including the British. The strategic position of the NWFP made it a ‘hunting ground’ for the imperial army. Alarmed at the expansionist policy of Tsarist and afterwards, Soviet Russia, the British regarded it as the most important area in defence terms and guarded it against Russian advances. To keep a close watch on the Frontier tribes and to provide the area an ‘efficient administration’ the area was separated and constituted as a separate province in 1901. Special legislation was introduced and the province was kept under the charge of a Chief Commissioner. All constitutional reforms enacted in other provinces of India were refused to the

province on the grounds of its peculiar situation. Apart from a small number of leaders of landed elites, unlike the Punjab, the majority of the people of the Frontier Province did not collaborate with the Raj. Army recruitment in the province was negligible and apart from a few tribes in the southern districts (and that too was for economic reasons) no one seemed willing to enlist in the army to strengthen imperialism. Moreover, unlike other Muslim majority areas, in the NWFP, the communal concerns had entirely different connotations.

The NWFP, in a stark contradiction to the Punjab, was an overwhelming Muslim majority province. While viewing the cross-communal nature of the Unionist Party in the Punjab, the majority of its members belonged to the landed aristocracy, loyal to the Raj, struggling for the protection and security of their common class-interests. In the NWFP, prior to the communal riots in northern India (1946-7), which changed the outlook of a number of Pashtoons, there existed communal harmony in the province. The Muslims who were 93 per cent of the population had no threat perceptions from the minority community, most of them traders and businessmen. This being one of the major reasons that fears of ‘Hindu domination’ found no place in the Frontier and the AIML initially failed in popularizing its ideology and party programme there. The peculiar circumstances of the province and the nature of Pashtoon particularism provided a chance to the Congress to establish itself in the NWFP, a stronghold of Pashtoon nationalists. In contrast to the elements of loyalty in the Unionist members in the Punjab, the cross-communal nationalists politics of the NWFP were anti-British. Unlike the Punjab, there were no large scale communal riots during the Partition because despite their ‘desertion’ by the AINC, the Khudai Khidmatgars still held strength in the province and this being one of the main reasons that during Partition the large scale killing of non-Muslims was prevented in the NWFP. The Khudai Khidmatgars who had successfully combined the values of Pashtoonwali with their political philosophy, followed the strong traditions of Pashtoon culture and protected the lives and property of the non-Muslims in the NWFP.

David Gilmartin explores the major causes that contributed to the
creation of Pakistan, which he regards as the ‘most successful’ of the present century’s Islamic movements that brought an Islamic transformation of the post-colonial state. Indian Muslims, according to Gilmartin, were mobilized in the name of religion. They were exhorted to support Pakistan, thus identifying themselves with the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and the Quran, in a struggle between *Haqq-o-Batil*. The political objectives of the Pakistan movement, Gilmartin argues, were shaped by the institutional structures of the British colonial state. The Muslim leaders urged the Indian Muslims to forge unity in their ranks, thus creating in them a sense of belonging to a separate community, and this eventually led to the establishment of Pakistan. The British government lent their support to the Muslims and under the rapidly changing circumstances encouraged such conceptions. Gilmartin is of the opinion that only after fully comprehending the relationship between Islam and empire, the movement for Pakistan can be understood. He stresses the role of religion in the making of Pakistan. He has tried to piece together the cumulative nature of the Pakistan movement combining *din* and *duniya* to obtain a larger popularity. The Muslim League, according to Gilmartin, had been successful in mobilizing strong support of the *sajjada nashins* and ulema in the Punjab to win over the Muslim masses to support its candidates in the elections of 1945-6, thus paving the way for the achievement of Pakistan.¹⁰

Being an overwhelming Muslim majority province, Islam constituted an integral part of the Pashtoon society. To them a Muslim way of life was correspondent to the Pashtoon culture and their way of life. Therefore, religion in the Frontier was part of a peculiar Pashtoon identity which encouraged and sustained movements against British imperialism. Unlike the Punjab and few other Muslim majority provinces, the ulema in the NWFP were anti-British, always preaching a *jihad* against the foreigners. The struggle of *Haqq-o-Batil* as referred by Gilmartin was thus perceived not as one between the dominant Hindu community of India and Muslims, but a struggle against the British who had ‘usurped’ India. This being one of the main reasons that Muslim

League initially failed in establishing itself in the NWFP. The perceived (or real) threat of ‘Islam in danger’ was utilized by the Muslim League only for a brief period during 1946-7 when the communal riots in northern India alarmed pro-Muslim League Pashtoons and they were for a moment moved by religious rather than ethnic considerations. As in the case of Punjab, the League during the elections of 1945-6 appealed to the Pirs and sajjada nashins in the name of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. It successfully mobilized some prominent Pirs and sajjada nashins including the Pir of Manki Sharif (Nowshera) and Pir of Zakori (Dera Ismail Khan), who, with a large number of their adherents supported the League candidates. Moreover, the murids of the Pir of Manki were at the forefront of the agitation against Dr Khan Sahib during the League’s agitation against the Congress ministry in 1946-7. But once this so-called Islamic sentiment had run its course, the Pashtoon fell back on their ethnic identity as subsequent events amply demonstrated.

Mushirul Hasan’s study is a ‘reappraisal’ of some important themes relating to Indian nationalism, communalism, and separatism. The main theme of his research, however, is to analyse how various sections among the Indian Muslims supported the nationalist politics which eventually led to their support of the AINC. Hasan has also discussed the role of the British government in defining political identities in religious terms and transforming them into constitutional arrangements. Hasan wonders as to why secular nationalism, despite its strong roots in the Indian Muslims, failed to create a united nation, based on the participation of all major Indian communities. Hasan concentrates on the politics at national level, covering both political leaders and organizations. He also discusses ‘high polities’ in two Muslim majority provinces, i.e. Bengal and the Punjab, whose full-fledged support made the creation of Pakistan possible. Hasan also discussed the role of UP Muslims who played a central role in moulding political attitudes and in shaping the destiny of their co-religionists in other parts of the country. He regards the UP Muslims as a community but fails to identify the ‘essentials’ for a community. He has argued that a significant number of Muslims remained loyal to the Congress despite the League’s communal appeal to the Muslims to
support Pakistan. However, during the last few years of the Raj, a widespread sense of the need to ‘safeguard’ Muslim interests was created, which eventually led in places to communal riots, and paved the way to Partition.\footnote{Mushirul Hasan, \textit{Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930} (Delhi, 1994).} Hasan concentrates on the political mobilization of Indian Muslims, particularly of Bengal, the Punjab, and UP. However, wittingly or unwittingly he has ignored the overwhelming Muslim majority province of the NWFP and its strong support for the nationalist politics. As argued in the present study, ethno-particularism of Pashtoons prevented them from considering themselves part of the larger Indian Muslim community. Instead, the Pashtoons viewed themselves as belonging to a larger world Muslim community, thus for the time being ignoring the ‘communal’ appeal of various political organizations. Even during the elections 1945-6, the League failed to mobilize the majority of Pashtoons to its side by campaigning in favour of Pakistan. However, the communal riots of northern India had affected the provincial politics and a section of the NWFP Muslims temporarily gave up their sense of belonging to the Muslim community of India and supported the creation of Pakistan.

Rafiuddin Ahmed’s work deals mainly with the political mobilization of the Bengal Muslims. After analysing in detail the causes of the peaceful association of Hindus and Muslims for centuries, the British government, he argues, acting upon their flagrant policy of ‘divide and rule’ successfully created a split between the two major communities inhabiting India. He tries to explain how the British succeeded in dividing the Muslims and Hindus in the name of religion while they failed to create dissension among them on various other grounds including ethnic and interest-based divisions. Ahmed concentrates upon the growth of Bengali Muslim identity and the resultant political awareness at the turn of the century which led to the formation of AIML in 1906. The Indian Muslims started thinking in terms of protection of their rights and became class-conscious demanding from the government to safeguard their class-interests against the majority
Hindu community.\textsuperscript{12} Unlike Bengal and some other parts of India, in the NWFP, the British failed initially to exploit the religious sentiments of the local population. As there was social harmony between the majority Muslim community and the Hindus, mostly traders and businessmen, communal tension was negligible. This was one of the main reasons that communal politics did not find a way to enter the Frontier during the early decades of twentieth century. The Pashtoon national movement further provided a boost to this consonance between the Muslims and the Hindus annoying the colonialists. The Khudai Khidmatgar leaders were urged by the Frontier authorities to sever their connection with the ‘Hindu Congress’ and the government would accept their demands. But to the chagrin of the Provincial authorities they refused to do so. However, alarmed at various ‘pro-Hindu’ measures of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry, in 1937, some prominent Muslims revived the Provincial Muslim League, promising to safeguard the interests of the Frontier Muslims. Though there were ethnic tensions in the NWFP like Pashtoons vs non-Pashtoons exploited by the government, especially in Hazara, there was no large scale communal violence prior to 1946-7. AIML succeeded in propagating the accounts of ‘Hindu atrocities upon the Muslims’ in other parts of the subcontinent thus providing a chance to communal strife to enter the Frontier Province.

Ayesha Jalal’s emphasis is on the politically astute leadership of Jinnah, who, according to her, combined various vested-interest groups of pro-League Muslims and successfully led them to the creation of Pakistan. Jalal seems to be solely interested in ‘high polities’ as her emphasis remains on the major continental actors in the movement for Pakistan in 1940s.\textsuperscript{13} Farzana Shaikh, however, gives importance to the growth of religious consciousness among a considerable number of Muslims in the subcontinent drawing on the long history of Muslim political thinking about the nature of their community. They came to view their political identity endangered in the Hindu-majority and Hindu-dominated

\textsuperscript{12} Rafiuddin Ahmed, \textit{The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity} (Delhi, 1981).

\textsuperscript{13} A. Jalal, \textit{Jinnah: The Sole Spokesman, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan} (Cambridge, 1985).
subcontinent, and were convinced of their need to protect their interests by creating a separate homeland for themselves. According to her, without a proper comprehension of Islam and its influence on Muslim elite, any study of the Pakistan movement will be incomplete. The author sees the final struggle in the forties in the perspective of enduring Muslim tradition and not merely as a bargaining chip. Sarah F. D. Ansari, in her useful study on Sindh, dilates on imperial control over the region through the landed intermediaries, the majority of whom, unlike the clergy in the NWFP, were pro-establishment. Together, the waderas, the clergy, and Pir were influential in Sindh and the colonial government relied on them for support in return for lands and other types of rewards. In Sindh, Muslim politics was highly fluid with the forming and reforming of groups whose main concern was to safeguard their class interest. However, in the final phase of the freedom struggle, as in Punjab, the majority of Sindhi Pir were won over by the League on the Pakistan issue and thus successfully mobilized the support of the Muslims to the establishment of the new state.

Joya Chatterji has concentrated on the changing patterns of Bengal politics in the crucial period of the last two decades before Partition. Her main focus is on bhadralok politics which in the present century moved away from nationalist politics to more parochial concerns. The central theme of her study is an analysis of the changes in bhadralok politics and to explain their apparent shift from ‘nationalism’ to ‘communalism’. During the period under discussion, according to Chatterji, Bengal lost its transcending position in the mainstream of nationalist politics. The reason being that bhadralok perceived politics more and more in terms of communalism. They focused on provincial concerns rather than all-India affairs. Moreover, besides discussing the various aspects of contemporary Muslim politics in Bengal, Chatterji also analyses


the factionalism in the provincial Congress and particularly the tensions between the Bose Brothers and the Congress High Command. The Brothers, according to Chatterji, were not allowed by the central organization of the Congress to reach an amicable settlement with the Muslims and other communal forces in the province, which resulted eventually in the partition of Bengal. Unlike Bengal there was no bhadralok class in the NWFP society. The politics during the early decades of the present century revolved around the big Khan, majority of them uneducated who lent their support to the Raj. They tried their utmost to keep the local population unaware of the political developments taking place elsewhere in India. Benefiting from the anti-colonial feelings of the majority of the local population, the AINC established itself firmly in the NWFP. Its association with Frontier nationalists provided it a chance to gain grass roots support even in the rural areas of the province. Like the Bose Brothers, the Khan Brothers dominated Frontier politics. However, unlike the Bose Brothers, the Khan Brothers, except for a brief period during the war, enjoyed the full confidence of the Congress circles. Whenever there were indications of the partition of India the Frontier Congress leaders were time and again assured by the Congress High Command that on no terms would they agree to the partition of India. This being one of the main reasons that Abdul Ghaffar Khan paid very little attention to his talks with the League leaders to discuss for the Khudai Khidmatgars, and the NWFP an honourable place in the future Pakistan. On the announcement of the 3 June Plan and the Congress’ acceptance of it, Frontier nationalists were caught in a dilemma. By then it was too late for them to reach an amicable settlement with Jinnah and the Muslim League. This resulted in the resumption of hostilities even after the creation of Pakistan, where they were dubbed as ‘traitors’ and ‘enemies’ of Pakistan and they had to face the wrath of the Pakistani state and its establishment. Moreover, after the 3 June Plan, like the Bengal, the NWFP also lost its importance to the Congress and they only paid a token protest on the ‘imposition’ of the referendum on the people of the NWFP.

Y. Samad has focused on the political and constitutional history with the pre-eminent issues of nationalism and ethnicity. His work is an interesting interface between politics of parties and personalities. By assuming the regional identities as ‘given’, he sees Muslim nationalism, giving in to powerful centrifugal forces. Moreover, he accepts regionalist sentiments as permeating realities much to the chagrin of the India-wide ‘nationalists’ like Jinnah and his successors in the new state.\(^\text{17}\)

T. Hashmi’s research posits the Pakistan movement as a culmination point for Muslim identity among the Bengali peasantry. He perceives Pakistan as an emancipatory ideal for the Muslim peasants in Bengal.\(^\text{18}\)

Despite being a Muslim majority province, the NWFP had very little in common with other Muslim majority provinces of British India. Unlike the significant and influential number of Hindus in Sindh, the Punjab, and Bengal, they were in a negligible position in the NWFP. Politics evolved around Pashtoon ethnicity and its particular type of nationalism, always in contrast with the League’s ideology and party programme. The majority of the NWFP Muslims supported the AINC in the all-India context, thus providing the Congress with a solid base in a pre-dominantly Muslim majority province. Moreover, the majority of the Frontier Ulema were anti-establishment, in contrast with the pro-government clergy in Sindh and the Punjab. Therefore, communalism had very little appeal in the region as compared to the other Muslim majority provinces in the subcontinent. However, the literature on communalism of other regions of India has little to tell us about the pattern of political development of the province, for there was no communalism in the province. Politics in the NWFP developed perforce within the context of politics in the subcontinent. But its regional specificity made it uniquely different from other regions. This book also attempts to provide another regional study of a particular group of Muslims and the relationship between ‘secular nationalism’ and ‘Muslim

\(^{17}\) Y. Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-58* (Delhi, 1995).

nationalism’ in their politics. It shows how in this unique province, ethnic, religious, and, political identities intersected and reinforced each other.

The politics of pre-independence India was dominated by Indian nationalism on the one hand and Muslim particularism on the other. This Muslim particularism developed rather late, from about 1936, and it developed unevenly in different parts of the country. Muslim aspirations were conceived and expressed depending upon local traditions and circumstances. In the Muslim minority provinces ‘Muslim nationalism’ was more popular with Muslims than it was in Muslim majority provinces.

The strength of communal sentiment, which Muslim nationalism harnessed to its political purposes, correlated strongly but immensely with the relative strength of the Muslim populations in the provinces of British India. The conflict between Indian nationalism and Muslim nationalism inevitably divided the Muslims between two camps: ‘nationalist’ Muslims associated with the Congress and Muslim ‘nationalists’ associated with the Muslim League. For the nationalist Muslims being Muslim, i.e. adherence to the religion of Islam, did not entail opposition to Indian nationalism or seeking a separate destiny for the Muslims of the subcontinent, which to most of them seemed utterly impracticable and indeed not in the best interest of the Muslims themselves.

It was, ironically, perhaps only in the NWFP that the Muslims could have aspired to sovereign independence. But in the climate of communal\(^\text{19}\) politics of the time, with the dominant doctrine of self-determination for nationalities and the divisive policies of the Raj, Muslim nationalism emerged as a powerful force in the subcontinent and led eventually to the partition of India.

\(^{19}\) Communalism refers to the coming together of people as a group of a common religious affiliation wherein members consciously choose to define themselves politically as well as religiously in terms of that affiliation and identify with the interest of the group. Usually such unity crystallizes, subsuming vast differences within the group, reducing at certain moments when it opposes a perceived interference into its affairs by another community or by the state.
While in the rest of North India, ‘religious nationalism’ acquired some appeal from the early twentieth century, in the NWFP there was never any real fear of ‘Islam in danger’. This was one of the main reasons that the League, a self-proclaimed representative of Indian Muslims, initially failed to establish itself in the NWFP. Consequently, when in the 1940s, it wished to gain decisive power over areas that would soon constitute Pakistan, it had to revise its strategy in the NWFP. The fact that religion was rarely used for communal purposes (except briefly in 1946-7) has led some scholars to accord primacy to Pashtoon ‘ethnicity’ over Islam in the making of Frontier politics. While it is certainly true that Muslim sectarianism never had much appeal, this does not imply that the Pashtoons treated Islam as a marginal factor in their lives. Deeply religious and steeped in the history of Islamic lore, the Pashtoons viewed Islam as one of the principal constituents of their Pashtoon self-definition. To them a ‘Muslim’ way of life and Pashtoon culture were not opposites but complementary attributes of their identity. This is evident from the emergence and rise to popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. The name Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God) itself denotes the strong bond of Pashtoons with Islam. Pashtoons were urged to join the movement to purge society of anti-Islamic ‘evils’. The presence of a large number of ulema in the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was another sign of the significance of religion, creating a sense of belonging to a larger Muslim *Ummah* (Community). Abdul Ghaffar Khan, himself a devout Muslim, used Islamic symbols of fraternity, love, and brotherhood in creating Pashtoon resistance to British rule and in forging links with all-India nationalism. Being well-versed in the essential knowledge of the Quran and Hadith, and always conscious of the glorious past of Islam, he urged Pashtoons to follow the teachings of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and to observe non-violence. When the Muslim League and the pro-establishment *maulvis* accused the Khudai Khidmatgars of friendship with the ‘Hindu Congress’, they were reminded of early Islam, of the time when the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) himself made certain alliances with Jews against the enemies of Islam.

Therefore, religion in the Frontier was combined with a specific Pashtoon identity and this mix gave rise to regionally specific
political movements against the Raj. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement was a continuation of the religio-political movements of 1897 and the 1910s, but with a difference in strategy. All these movements had aimed at getting rid of imperialism but, while earlier movements advocated armed resistance, the Khudai Khidmatgars adopted non-violence as their creed. However, despite being Muslim, the separate identity of the Pashtoons and their love of what they saw as their traditional society distinguished them from other Indian Muslims.

Their sense of ‘Pashtoonism’ drew on currents which emerged in the late sixteen and seventeen century, when Pashtoons viewed the Afghan-Mughal conflict as their struggle against usurpers from Hindustan and Delhi. It expressed itself in the poetry of Khushal Khan Khattak, the greatest Pashto poet of the late seventeenth century, whose works remained in oral culture and were now widely disseminated with the coming of print culture. Khushal voiced the idea of a separate Pashtoon State, Pashtoonkhwa, stretching from Kandahar to Attock. Abdul Ghaffar Khan combined Islamic values of hatred against slavery with Pashtoon values of freedom, and utilized its combination on the basis of his own freedom struggle. The majority of the Pashtoon had no objection to the Khudai Khidmatgars’ affiliation with Congress because it was ready to help them achieve their regional objectives and encouraged notions of Pashtoonwali.\footnote{The way of life of the Pashtoons in ‘traditional’ Pashtoon society is to a large extent controlled by an unwritten code called Pashtoonwali. They are bound by honour to respect it and to abide by its rules, otherwise they would bring disgrace not only to themselves but also to their families. Though Pashtoonwali is very vast in its meaning and interpretations, the main characteristics of this code requires a Pashtoon to offer Melmasti (hospitality), to grant Nanawatay (asylum) irrespective of their caste and ‘creed even to his deadly enemies, and to take Badal (revenge) to wipe out insult. One of the other pillars in Pashtoon society is its reliance upon the Jirga (assembly of elders). In the past, the Jirga had to perform the three-fold duties of police, magistrate, and judge. It maintained peace and order during disorder and anarchy. The Jirga was the authority for settling disputes and dispensing justice. Cases of breach of contract, disputes about tribal boundaries, distribution of water, claims to lands and pastures, and infringement of customs, grant or inheritance were all within the jurisdiction of the Jirga. Its members were elected by the whole body of}
other hand, advocated the incorporation of Pashtoons into a larger Muslim community of Hindustan (and later Pakistan), and was not ready to accept their separate identity. This was one of the main reasons for a lack of support for the League in the Pashtoon-dominated areas of the NWFP, and its popularity in Hazara and some urban centres of the province where the non-Pashtoons predominated. However, in late 1946 the League succeeded, to an extent, in spreading its communal ideology within the NWFP, largely as a result of the communal violence in north India, especially Bihar. The Pashtoons were asked to save Islam from complete annihilation in the rest of India, and told that Islam was in crisis. For the time being a small but influential section of Pashtoons gave secondary importance to their Pashtoonism, and their sense of belonging to a wider community of Muslims in India temporarily predominated.

One of the most remarkable features of Frontier politics during this period was the adoption of non-violence by the Khudai Khidmatgars as their creed and their strict adherence to it. Until the early 1920s Pashtoon society, like many other tribal societies, was notorious for factionalism and violence, and the Pashtoons prided themselves on military glory and weaponry. Traditionally, the parajamba (taking sides) led many Pashtoons to change allegiance regardless of the ideologies and party programmes of particular political organizations. Tarburwali, (enmity between first cousins) has been regarded by scholars as the main reason for changing loyalties among the Pashtoons. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement represented a complete change from the earlier armed movements to a non-violent struggle against imperialism. Besides getting rid of the foreign yoke, the main emphasis of Pashtoon reformers was the prevention of violence and blood feuds, particularly over property disputes among the tarburs. Its volunteers were taught not to resort to violence; they bore no arms and carried no weapons. Inspiration

the Pashtoon tribe, mostly from among the Speen Geerey (grey beards)—persons of experience, knowledge, and character. No records were kept but the memories of the Pashtoon elders served as the record office. Though in settled districts of the NWFP, after the annexation of the province by the British, the whole tribal system was replaced by ordinary law, it is still in practice in the tribal areas and has not lost its force and validity.
was provided by giving examples from the lives of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and other prophets, including Jesus Christ, of how they faced humiliation and oppression boldly by non-violent means.\footnote{21} The accounts of the lives of the holy men had a great impact on the collective mentality of the Pashtoons. Many biographers of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, including Tendulkar, Desai, Easwaran, Lalpuri, Korejo, and Zutshi, have attributed his non-violence to the influence of Gandhi. They argue that Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s non-violence was a variant of the doctrine preached by Gandhi at the all-India level.\footnote{22} But the emphasis of these authors seems misplaced. Satyagraha was a concept unknown to the Pashtoons. Rather, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his comrades developed their own non-violent ideology on the basis of Islamic and Christian teachings and related it to the circumstances of their province. They were able to spread the message of non-violence so effectively largely because it addressed the problematic issue of blood feuds.

In 1940 a section of Indian Muslims, politically represented by the AIML, demanded Pakistan—a separate homeland for themselves. They demanded the division of India on the basis of two ‘nations’, Muslims and Hindus. The supporters of the Partition claimed that Muslims had a different historical heritage, different heroes, and different collective memories from those of Hindus. To them the only thing keeping India together was British rule. ‘The moment it ceases, India will revert to its old normal component parts’.\footnote{23} In the demand for Pakistan, some saw protection for religion and safeguards for the Muslim minorities in the Hindu-majority

\footnote{21} ‘Congress and Muslims’, Speech of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Mongri Maidan, Calcutta, 4 April 1931, S. No. 1, Tendulkar Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, p. 6.

\footnote{22} For more details see, D. G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bombay, 1967); M. Desai, Two Servants of God (Delhi, 1935); E. Easwaran, A Man to Match His Mountains (California, 1985); G. Lalpuri, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Delhi, 1985); M. S. Korejo, The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in History (Karachi, 1994); G. L. Zutshi, Frontier Gandhi (Delhi,1970); and, R. S. Nagina, Gandhiji Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Ki Nazar Men (Delhi, n.d.).

\footnote{23} Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, ‘A Reply to Hindu Critics’, Progress, Bombay, 28 April 1940.
provinces. Some saw in it the protection and advancement of the interests of the Muslim aristocracy, the landlords, and the middle classes, whom the Muslim League represented, and ‘who look for their class aggrandizement and want a larger share than they have hitherto had in the administration of the country and the capitalistic ventures of the future’. The Muslim capitalists, it was argued, were unable to compete with their Hindu counterparts. Instead, by misusing religion, they intended to capture governmental machinery to further their own interests and to ‘keep the masses in their present state of poverty and subjection’. Moreover, the chances of success for the Muslim middle class in India were meagre, as they had entered the world of capitalism much later than the Hindus. But if Pakistan were achieved, ‘they would have an opportunity of investing their money, of dominating commerce, the professions, and government service, and of raising the tariffs to foster their own industries’.  

In the NWFP the demand for Pakistan aroused mixed feelings. The provincial Congress regarded the League’s demand for partition during the war years only as the perpetuation of British rule in India. The Muslim League was accused of creating communalism and hatred between the communities inhabiting the subcontinent. The League sympathizers, however, were in no way ready to accept Hindu majority rule under a Hindu Raj. During its tenure of office (May 1943-March 1945), the Muslim League ministry under Aurangzeb tried its best to avoid any discussion of Pakistan. In the elections of 1946 the League approached the Muslims of the NWFP on the issue of Pakistan but failed to win the required support. During 1946 the weak organization of the Frontier Muslim League was transformed, so that it became a formidable rival of the provincial Congress. The majority of the NWFP Muslims were against the role of the big Khans, Khan Bahadurs, and other title-holders in the League. The provincial organization was ‘overhauled’ and the intelligentsia was given a prominent role in it. Moreover, the ulema were also approached in the name of Pakistan, a separate homeland for the Muslims. Pakistan, it was

24 Shaukatullah Ansari, Pakistan: The Problem of India (Lahore, 1945), p. 61.
25 Ibid.
claimed, offered the only peaceful solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem. The riots in northern India proved a blessing in disguise for the Provincial Muslim League. Accounts of the Hindu atrocities against Muslims were related and the Frontier Muslims were appealed to for help on behalf of their Muslim brethren in other parts of the subcontinent. The communal riots in India temporarily changed the outlook of a section of the Frontier Muslims. The League exploited this situation and succeeded in convincing Mountbatten, the Viceroy of India, during his Frontier visit that the Frontier Muslims wanted to join Pakistan. The Frontier Congress leaders could not cope with the drastic situation elsewhere in India. The League’s success in the Frontier referendum was regarded as an expression of the wish of the inhabitants of the NWFP to join Pakistan. The acceptance of the partition plan, and, in particular, the agreement to the holding of referendum in the NWFP on the issue of Hindustan versus Pakistan was a real set-back to Frontier Congressmen, who were not prepared to face the new circumstances, which they regarded as a surrender to the forces of communalism. Despite the strong opposition of the nationalists and other anti-League forces, the ambiguous nature of the demand of Pakistan became a reality for them on 14 August 1947.

Apart from utilizing a number of English language sources the present book is also a result of an extensive survey of Pashto and Urdu sources. The use of Pashto material as well as recently declassified material from Peshawar archives adds a unique dimension to its perspective. In particular, this study utilizes the records of the Special Branch of Police, now housed in the provincial archives, Peshawar. The relevant files of the Special Branch, more than twelve hundred in number, mainly consist of the CID Diaries and confidential secret reports submitted by intelligence officials to the higher authorities. These reports were

26 The AICC Papers in the NMML in New Delhi, now available to scholars for consultation, provide a fairly complete record of the NWFP provincial Congress affairs and their relationship to the central organization. The most important records pertaining to the Frontier politics in the IOLR are the Private Papers in the European Mss. EUR. Collection. These consist of the reports, diaries, and letters written by British officials serving in various capacities in the Indian subcontinent.
aimed at providing information on contemporary political events. In addition, extensive use has been made of various editions of the *Pakhtun*, the official organ of the Khudai Khidmatgars, not available at any one archival centre. About two hundred issues of *Pakhtun* have been collected with great effort, which were mostly destroyed during the police raids. Personal memoirs and diaries, published and unpublished, are another important source. In the latter case, generally the people were reluctant to give their diaries to some one unfamiliar to them: familial connections and personal contacts were used to seek their co-operation. The result was that the author was able to utilize a large number of these memoirs, sometimes providing very rare information on political developments, such as the Khudai Khidmatgar-AINC merger and its impact on the provincial politics, the war time politics of the Frontier Muslim League, the formation and working of the Muslim League Ministry under Sardar Aurangzeb and numerous hitherto unknown details of the events leading to the eventual partition of India. Moreover, a large number of interviews conducted by the author are also used here. These interviews, taken about half a century after the original events took place, are a rich source of information of contemporary Frontier politics. They have been used with great care and have never been used alone to reconstruct the course of events, and their testimony has always been corroborated with official information and other written sources. The author found no difficulty in interviewing the stalwarts of the Frontier politics, especially the hitherto neglected rank and file of various political organizations. Except a former civil servant, no one objected to the use of a tape recorder and thus interviews were duly recorded. However, it was difficult to interview the women Khudai Khidmatgars. Strict observance of purdah in Pashtoon society forbade them to talk with an outsider. Written questions were then provided to them with a request to furnish the relevant information which they did. Being well-aware of both Pashto and Urdu languages, there was no need to acquire local interpreters and translators.

The use of Pashto sources and the verbal testimonies provides rare details of some of the important social and political events of the province, including details of the *Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana,*
particular its educational activities. Abdul Akbar Khan, one of its founding members in his unpublished autobiography (presently in the possession of the author) gives details of the background of the establishment of the *Anjuman*, not available anywhere else. The social and educational backwardness of the Pashtoons, according to Akbar, prompted Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his associates to form the *Anjuman*.

Under the auspices of the *Anjuman*, *Azad Madrassas* were revived, mostly in Peshawar Valley. They proved to be popular institutions, which was reflected in the ever increasing number of students. However, due to paucity of funds and lack of qualified teachers the *Anjuman* members abandoned the project after a few years.

The indigenous sources also provide detailed information on the emergence of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, its development in various phases and its affiliation with the Congress. The Pashtoon patriots were unhappy over the development of an ‘ugly’ situation in neighbouring Afghanistan. Amanullah Khan, the young anti-British revolutionary king of Afghanistan was ousted from power and the country was in turmoil. Pashtoon intellectuals saw the secret hand of British intelligence in his ouster from power. They felt that one important reason that the British succeeded in ousting Amanullah was the relative backwardness of the Afghan people who failed to respond “to the situation. They decided to launch an organized movement towards the ‘uplift’ of the Pashtoon community, hence the formation of the Khudai Khidmatgar organization in 1929. In 1930, the Pashtoon national movement came into prominence. After the Qissa Khwani bazaar massacre on 23 April, the organization was banned and its leaders incarcerated. Under the given circumstances, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his associates decided to affiliate the Khudai Khidmatgars with an all-India organization. Initially, they turned towards the AIML. But keeping in view the anti-British character of the Khudai Khidmatgars, the Muslim League refused to support them. The AINC readily gave their full support to the Pashtoons against the colonists. Abdul Ghaffar Khan affiliated his organization with the Congress, and was accused by his opponents and some of his former colleagues of causing harm to the Pashtoon cause. These and other details on the factionalism in the Khudai Khidmatgar
organization, and, on its association with the ‘Hindu dominant Congress’ were not available anywhere else but in some unpublished Pashto sources and in the verbal testimonies of the Khudai Khidmatgars.

Special effort has also been made to explore Frontier politics during these formative years with reference to gender and peasant conditions. Interestingly, Pashto sources, both written and verbal, provide extensive evidence on these two hitherto unresearched topics. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement, in view of the major female representation in its cadres, provided a unique opportunity to expand the political community of this otherwise ‘male-dominated’ Pashtoon society. To a large extent the motivation to undertake this inquiry was rooted to determine the role of women in the provincial politics. While earlier studies on the Frontier politics are silent over the participation of women in the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, the present work covers this neglected area. Equally, while one finds a growing number of valuable books and articles on peasant studies of regions like Bihar, the UP, and Bengal, there has been no such study on the NWFP. At least one aspect of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was its success in mobilizing peasants against their exploiters—the big Khans and their British patrons.

The ideology of liberation and emphasis on Pashtoon particularism fuelled the Khidmatgar movement, bringing it directly into conflict with colonial rule, big Khans, and the urban bourgeoisie. Pashto sources, both written and unwritten, provide a fairly detailed account of the agrarian unrest in the province during the first Congress ministry. In particular, details on the Ghalla Dher movement which had a telling effect on the agrarian relations in the province are taken from the verbal testimony of the participants of the movement. These include ring leaders like Mian Akbar Shah whose account is supported by the published account in Pashto of Warris Khan, another active contributor to the movement.

In October 1946 Jawaharlal Nehru visited the tribal area of the NWFP, where he faced hostile demonstrations. The Congress accused the British government of plotting these demonstrations against Nehru, which were, of course, time and again refuted by
the government. During a field trip to India and Pakistan in 1994-5, apart from taking interviews in the settled districts of the NWFP, the author also visited the tribal territory including Miranshah, Razmak, Wana, Jandola, Tank, Khyber Agency, and Malakand, all those places visited by Nehru in 1946. Some of those tribesmen who took active part in the anti-Nehru demonstrations were interviewed: it was revealed, about fifty years after the actual event took place, that the Political Department of the Government of India master-minded these hostile demonstrations to convince Nehru and through him the Congress High Command of the waning influence of the Khan Brothers and to prove that the tribesmen were supporting Pakistan. In April 1947 Abdul Ghani Khan, elder son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, formed the militant Zalmai Pakhtun. The main reason behind its formation was to counter the violent activities of the Muslim League National Guards, to protect the unarmed Khudai Khidmatgars and to prevent the violent outbursts of communal violence in the NWFP. No detailed information on the organization, except Ghani Khan’s interviews and few other relevant Pashto documents, are available.

While discussing the last phase of the Frontier politics before Partition, some authors give priority to religion over Pashtoon ethnicity. According to them, religion prompted the Pashtoons to give up their sense of belonging to a separate community and instead gave priority to Islam which was said to be in danger. However, a careful study of the relevant Pashto sources and verbal testimonies reveals that this shifting of loyalties in late 1946 and early 1947 seems to be a transitory phenomenon. After the creation of Pakistan, alarmed at the ‘anti-Pashtoon’ measures of the then Pakistani authorities, particularly their mishandling of the Khudai Khidmatgar organization, the Congress deserters and Pashtoon patriots rejoined the nationalists.

There has been a dearth of serious historical writing on the NWFP, and there are significant inadequacies and limitations in the little research that has been done in the area. One of the main reasons for this being the failure of scholars to consult sources in Pashto and Urdu, and sometimes their lack of access to the NWFP Provincial Archives, Peshawar, and the India Office Records and Library, London.
Among the more important studies on the Frontier politics available in English include: S. A. Rittenberg’s *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province 1901-1947*; E. Jansson’s *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan*; A. K. Gupta’s *North-West Frontier Province Legislature and Freedom Struggle 1932-1947*; and, M. Banerjee’s recently submitted D. Phil thesis entitled ‘A Study of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement 1930-1947 N.W.F.P., British India’ (University of Oxford, 1994). In Pashto and Urdu there are a few studies including Abdul Wali Khan’s *Bacha Khan Au Khudai Khidmatgari*; Warris Khan’s *Da Azadi Tehreek*; Abdul Khaliq Khaleeq’s *Da Azadi Jang*; Ahmad’s *Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek*; Farigh Bokhari’s *Bacha Khan*; and, A. B. Yusufi’s *Sarhad Aur Jaddo Jehad Azadi*. On the development of the Muslim League in the provinces eventually making Pakistan Ian Talbot’s *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of The Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47* remains a major work. My own work, *Muslim League in NWFP* deals with its growth in the province from 1912 to 1947.

Among these studies, Rittenberg’s pioneering work remains perhaps the most important and comprehensive of its kind. He has taken Pashtoon ethnicity as the defining constituent of political consciousness and constructed his account of provincial politics in the pre-Partition era by utilizing a wide variety of archives, in addition to interviews and press reports. Rittenberg has emphasized the traditional divisions in the Pashtoon society, influencing the formatting and reformatting of alliances, which also resulted in greater political mobilization. He concentrates on two crucial periods in the region’s history: 1929-32 and 1945-7. The first period saw the emergence and popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgars and their affiliation with the AINC, while the second witnessed the shifting of loyalties. While acknowledging the role of class factors, he basically sees party politics intertwined with the inter-sectional differences among the Khans—the landing Pashtoon elite. In this scenario, Rittenberg is led by the Swat model formulated by Frederick Barth in his classic study of Swat, essentially an anthropological account of the Pashtoon society of
Primarily there were two difficulties with Barth. Theoretically, he failed to take into account the developmental factors, particularly the increasing role of the Pakistani state in the political affairs of Swat leading ultimately to its demise as an independent princely state. And secondly, Barth is not on solid ground when he works at the micro-level of the society and draws conclusions at the macro-level of political system and elite politics in the state. Rittenberg might have done well to study and analyse the Frontier politics on his own. In fact, Swat, then a monarchy, was politically and administratively different from the rest of the province. No wonder, Rittenberg failed to understand certain significant aspects of Pashtoon ethnicity. For instance, he concludes that the clergy in Pashtoon society is mainly non-Pashtoon; while the fact is that majority of the ulema and the *maulvis* are Pashtoons. In addition, he was unable to consult material which has since become available in the Peshawar archives. Pashtoon ethnicity is the key to understanding Pashtoon political consciousness. It also expresses itself through complex political processes operating in the context of all-India politics and the colonial framework. It is this complex interaction between the trajectories of Pashtoon ethnicity, further compounded by ideological and sectional factors, and the colonial order which carries this study beyond Rittenberg’s findings.

Like Rittenberg, Jansson also gives importance to the traditional factionalism of Pashtoon society. However, he differs from the former on various points, for instance, he rejects the idea that there was a ‘massive’ change in the Frontier politics during the last two years of the Raj, as Rittenberg supposed. Instead, Jansson seeks to trace its origins in the social, economic, and cultural conditions prevalent in the Pashtoon society, which determined the modes of political developments in the NWFP. He identifies various key groups in the Frontier, who in pursuit of their own sectional interests supported the Provincial Muslim League. His source material, besides on Rittenberg, is the record of the AIML. However, he was unable to locate either the source material on the

provincial Congress or documents, now available in the provincial archives, Peshawar. He has also depended on some interviews but remained sceptical of their historical significance 'since human memory is notoriously unreliable and selective, such oral evidence, given more than thirty years after the events it concerns, can be used only with the utmost care'.\footnote{E. Jansson, \textit{India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan}, p. 22.} While agreeing with Jansson that verbal testimonies be used with great care, the significance and historical value of such record should not be undermined, especially in societies like the NWFP where there is very little written record available on politics. The main reason for this being lack of education in the NWFP. Most of the written record presented the official view of the events, which needed more care and thorough investigation.

Analogous to these works, Gupta has discussed the geopolitical importance of the NWFP with particular reference to the British policies in the region. The British Frontier policies, according to Gupta, were dominated exclusively by ‘Russo-phobia’—the fear of Imperial Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, especially after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. These strategic considerations compelled the British Indian government to form the NWFP in 1901. After giving a brief account of the administrative set-up of the new province, Gupta also elaborates on the ethnic composition of the Frontier, concentrating on its dominant group the Pashtoons. However, Gupta tends to ignore the powerful and often ambiguous relationship between politics, society, and ideology. Part of the problem is that he is not able to consult material available in IOLR and the NWFP Provincial Archives, Peshawar. Gupta has extensively used the Provincial Legislative Assembly Debates and the personal papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajendra Prasad thus confining himself only to the legislative history of the NWFP.\footnote{A. K. Gupta, \textit{North-West Frontier Province Legislature and Freedom Struggle 1932-47} (Delhi, 1988).} Emphasis on legislative debates leads him to concentrate more on the legislative developments ignoring some other important issues around him not covered by the Debates, i.e. the Khilafat, Hijrat, and other pan-Islamic movements in the NWFP. Moreover, due to his bias
towards the Congress, he gives very little space to the Provincial Muslim League, its ideology, policies, and programmes in the NWFP, thus lacking objectivity at times.

Banerjee’s recent study of the Khudai Khidmatgars is essentially an anthropological study and is largely based on interviews. She, like Gupta, is of the opinion that it was the constant threat of the Russian expansion that compelled the British to treat the NWFP differently. Besides discussing the emergence of the Khudai Khidmatgars, Banerjee has analysed the factors which successfully drew a ‘segmentary’ society into nationalist and state politics. She concentrates on the nationalist Pashtoons who modified their traditional ideas and adopted new methods to counter British rule. Banerjee has emphasized the traditional institutions and political structures within the Pashtoon society, which encouraged them to join the anti-colonial forces. Given the anthropological approach, Banerjee does not pretend to explain the historical and political processes at work. Also, she is handicapped by a lack of knowledge of Pashto, leading to errors of judgement at various points. For example, she concludes that the ulema in the NWFP were the ‘supporters of British interests’. Interestingly, unlike the other Muslim-majority provinces, the majority of the Frontier Ulema were anti-British and were always at the forefront of movements aimed at getting rid of British imperialism. A large number of ulema joined the Khudai Khidmatgar movement and were its members. Maulana Mohammad Israel, Maulana Ghulam Rasul, and Mian Abdullah Shah Mazara were among the many Khudai Khidmatgar stalwarts who suffered British atrocities during the Civil Disobedience Movement. In addition, Banerjee does not quite follow the flow of events as they unfolded at various stages. She misses important developments and, at times, when she does succeed in identifying them in her narrative, she fails to put them in a proper historical and chronological sequence.\footnote{M. Banerjee, ‘A Study of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement 1930-1947 N.W.F.P., British India’ (University of Oxford, 1994).}

Talbot’s \textit{Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement} is a scholarly account of the provincial politics of the Muslim majority areas that formed the future Pakistan. He has analysed the reasons
for the lack of Muslim League support in the ‘Pakistan areas’. After elaborating on the causes of the League’s success, he concentrates on the issues that brought together various divergent ethnic communities like the Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, and the Pashtoons to jointly struggle from a common platform of the AIML to achieve Pakistan. In a concise fashion, he provides a comparative study of Muslim politics in various major provinces and has successfully contributed in the way the pre-independence regional legacy-retains considerable importance in explaining the pattern of post-1947 developments. It explains, for instance, the lack of support for the Khudai Khidmatgars in non-Pashtoon areas, such as Hazara and the urban Dera Ismail Khan.

Wali Khan’s *Bacha Khan Au Khudai Khidmatgari* is a combination of the author’s personal experiences of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, supported by the archival material in the IOLR. After discussing the strategic importance of the NWFP, Wali Khan gives details of the emergence of the Pashtoon national movement. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his associates, according to the author, were perturbed over the growing factionalism and blood-feuds among the Pashtoons. Moreover, they felt the British government had a vested interest in intentionally keeping the population of the NWFP educationally backward and thus denying them constitutional reforms at par with other provinces of British India. The author gives details of the Civil Disobedience Movement (1930-34) and of the Khudai Khidmatgar-Congress affiliation. He discusses in detail the working and performance of the Frontier Congress ministry, particularly its efforts to curtail the privileges of the nobility. Dr Khan Sahib, the Frontier Premier successfully introduced and passed various legislations which, according to Wali Khan, relieved the common man of undue burden. Khan accused the British of creating ‘communalism’ in India which resulted in the Hindu-Muslim riots in various parts of the country. He sees the secret hand of the British in popularizing the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims, thus giving a boost to the ideology and party programme of AIML. After

---

elaborating on various partition plans, Khan tends to conclude that Pakistan was the brain child of the British government. In this context, he cites certain ‘secret documents’ of the India Office. Moreover, during the war years, he ‘reveals’ collaboration between the Viceroy and the League leaders. He concludes his account by giving details of the final phase of the partition of India with a particular reference to the referendum and finally of the NWFP joining Pakistan.\(^{32}\)

Warris Khan’s *Da Azadi Tehreek* is a comprehensive account of the Ghalla Dher peasant movement. Being a staunch follower of the Khudai Khidmatgar organization, the author mentions various phases of the movement. Most of the land in Ghalla Dher belonged to the Nawab of Toru, an influential zemindar of District Mardan who was not content with the agreed share in the crops, and pressed for more all the time. Harassed and infuriated, the peasants, majority of whom were in the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, were left with little choice but to defy the authority of the Nawab. They started an organized agitation against the ‘high-handedness’ of the Nawab. The Nawab responded by threatening to evict them from his land with the help of local police. This marked the beginning of the Ghalla Dher movement. The peasants had the full support of the local Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars. Dr Khan Sahib, the Congress Premier who himself was in charge of Law and Order, took strong action against the agitating peasants on the Nawab’s request. No wonder, Dr Khan Sahib was accused of protecting the landed aristocracy by using force against the tillers. The agitation lasted for few months and an amicable settlement was reached after the interference of the Congress high command. Warris, himself an activist in the Ghalla Dher *kissan* agitation, provides rare information on the development of the movement. Despite being a member of the Khudai Khidmatgar, he boldly criticizes the pro-Nawab steps of the Provincial Congress Ministry, who were opposed to the cause of the poor tillers, thus alienating a considerable number of the local Khudai Khidmatgars from the organization.\(^{33}\) Although the book deals mainly with the Ghalla Dher movement, it gives details

---

33 Waris Khan, *Da Azadi Tehreek* (Peshawar, 1988).
of the organization of the Khudai Khidmatgar and the causes of its popularity in the rural areas.

Ahmad’s *Khudai Khidmatgari Tehreek* is a firsthand source on the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Himself being a member of the organization, Ahmad has taken pains in providing the minutest details of how the movement spread in Peshawar Valley. The most important portion of the work is the detailed account of the Civil Disobedience Movement (1930-34) and the harsh punishment meted out to the Khudai Khidmatgars. The volunteers bore all hardships with forbearance and courage and, did not retaliate even to the worst kind of humiliation they had to suffer. The author, however, concentrates exclusively on the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, and thus we do not learn much from him about other political forces and organizations in the province.

Yusufi’s *Sarhad Aur Jaddo Jehad Azadi* is a detailed account of twentieth century Muslim politics in the NWFP. Yusufi dwelt upon the formation of the Frontier Muslim League (1912) and regards it as the first serious foray of the Frontier Muslims in modern politics. The League, however, unlike its parent organization at the all-India level, soon ran into conflict with the British government, providing a platform to the pan-Islamists in the province against the government. The result was that within a few years of its formation, the organization was banned, the leaders either imprisoned or exiled. The most useful part of Yusufi’s work is his detailed discussion of local politics. The urban social workers/politicians were always in the forefront of active politics. Being a political worker, Yusufi was directly involved in the Khilafat and Hijrat movements in the Frontier. He thus provided useful accounts of both events. Yusufi also gives firsthand information of the factionalism in Provincial Khilafat Committee leading to its division into two parts: one supporting the AINC and the National Movement, and the other following the lines of the Central Khilafat Committee and eventually merging into the Frontier Muslim League in 1937. Yusufi also gives the details of constitutional developments in the NWFP. He briefly discusses the

provincial politics during the early 1930s.\(^{35}\) Being a staunch supporter of the Muslim League, Yusufi has given very little credit to the Khan Brothers for the mass mobilization of the Pashtoons and blamed them for their pro-Pashtoon ‘biases’.

The specificity of Pashtoon identity, with its combination of religion and nationalism, is crucial for understanding the character of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement and the political process in the province. The shifting alliances that emerged during the final phase leading up to Partition are to be accounted by the fact that the NWFP was a part of the larger structure of British India and the pressures of developments in north India inevitably impinged, catastrophically in some respects, on the life of the province. This book will enhance the historical understanding of both the general historical processes in the subcontinent since the early 1920s along with the uniqueness of the NWFP. In particular, it addresses the complex issues of emergent regional, ethnic, religious, and national identities in India at a time of rapid political change, leading to the end of imperial rule. The formation of political communities in the twentieth century, issues of identity, evolution of different styles of leadership, and the role of ideology are some of the most important themes of the history of South Asia, and it is to that history that this book seeks to make a contribution.

The theme undertaken in this book is of a broad political movement which was able to contain the multiple identities of the NWFP people as Pashtoons, Muslims, and Indians. However, in 1946-7, this triangular edifice, for reasons very largely external to the NWFP falls apart, leaving the erstwhile Indian Muslim nationalists in a ‘Pakistan’ which they did not want, and in which they lost power and became an alienated group. Such a major transformation has profound implications for our understanding of nationalism, communalism, and identities of nation, religion and ethnic grouping in South Asia.

CHAPTER 1
NWFP AND ITS SOCIETY

Geographical Features of the Province

The region designated by the colonial rulers of India as the North-West Frontier Province has always played a significant role in the making of Indian history owing to its crucial geopolitical location. Once a corridor for countless invaders, this land of the Pashtoons or Pakhtuns (Pathans, is the Hindustani rendering of Pashtoon) remained, in imperial times, a subject of special interest and importance for historians, travellers, politicians, military men, and administrators. It is still a rich field of research for anthropologists, sociologists, and other scholars. The NWFP is situated between the parallels of 31°.4° and 36°.57° north latitude and 69°.16° and 74°.4° east longitude. Its extreme length since its early colonial administrative demarcation is 408 miles, and its greatest breadth 279 miles, giving a total area of approximately 39,900 square miles.¹ On its north lies the Hindu Kush; to its south it is bounded by Balochistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Punjab; Kashmir and Punjab are located to its east and on the west it is bordered by Afghanistan. The province has three main geographical divisions, namely: (1) the cis-Indus district of Hazara; (2) the comparatively narrow strip between the Indus and the hills constituting the settled districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan; and (3) the rugged mountainous region between these districts and the border with Afghanistan, known as the tribal belt. For administrative purposes the province was divided into five districts,² each under a Deputy Commissioner, and a trans-border tribal belt made up of five political agencies subject only to the control of the Chief

---

¹ Census of India 1911, volume XIII, North-West Frontier Province (Peshawar, 1912), pp. 5-7.
² Presently the Frontier districts are twenty-four. They include: Abbottabad, Bannu, Charsadda, Chitral, Dera Ismail Khan, Dir, Hangu, Karak, Kohat, Kohistan, Mansehra, Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Swabi, and Swat.
Commissioner in his capacity as Agent to the Governor-General, each administered by a Political Agent.

The physical features of the province present an extremely complex and varied picture. The province extends from the Sulaiman mountains and Gomal Pass in the south, to Chitral and the Pamirs in the north. It is shut off from the Pamirs by the Hindu Kush mountains (see map). The cis-Indus district of Hazara forms a wedge extending north-eastwards into the Himalayan Range. Its northern areas are hilly and its southern part open, leading to the fertile lands of the Punjab. The average rainfall is about 40 inches. It is bitterly cold in the winter and generally temperate in the summer. Of the other settled districts, the Valley of Peshawar is for the most part highly irrigated presenting in spring an extremely beautiful view of swaying cornfields and laden orchards framed by rugged mountains. Adjoining Peshawar Valley, and separated from it by the Jowaki hills, is Kohat, a rough hilly tract intersected by narrow valleys. The Bannu plain lies to the south of Kohat. Around Bannu city these plains are irrigated from the Kurram river and possess considerable fertility. According to the Census Report of 1921, they ‘appeared to travellers, wearied with the harsh desolation of Kohat hills, a very oasis in the desert’. A vast area, in part green and in part barren, divides the Bannu from Dera Ismail Khan. For the most part the plains of Dera Ismail Khan form part of a clay desert possessing great natural fertility, which in years of heavy rains bears abundant grass and crops. In these districts summers are hot and the average rainfall is much lighter than in Hazara, i.e. about 11 inches in Dera Ismail Khan and from

---

3 Census of India 1921, volume XIV, North-West Frontier Province (Peshawar, 1922), pp. 7-9. Interestingly a popular tradition has compared the province with a palm and the extended fingers of a right hand. According to it, in the palm, at the root of the first finger is Peshawar—the capital, forty miles away to the east from the Attock bridge over the Indus river which flows, across the wrist. The thumb pointing north, leads to Malakand, Swat, and Chitral; the index finger represents the direction over the Khyber Pass towards Kabul; the second finger leads to Kurram Agency via Kohat; the third via Bannu to Waziristan, and the fourth, further south, through Tank to Gomal Pass. The interstices are occupied by the Frontier tribesmen. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, volume 1: Survey (London, 1930), p. 317.

4 Census of India 1921, vol. XIV, pp. 7-9.
12 to 23 inches in other districts. From the early twentieth century the tribal territory has consisted of thickly timbered forests and fertile valleys, while in some valleys there has been some cultivation. The hills in the tribal area are for the most part barren and treeless.

The north-western hills of the NWFP have some very important passes, serving for centuries as routes of invasions as well as trade links between Central Asia and the subcontinent.

The Baroghil and Dorah passes lie in the northern zone of the Hindu Kush, the former leading into the Pamirs, and the latter into Afghanistan. Further south a route leads from Afghanistan via Kunarh Valley into Bajaur, Swat, and then Peshawar Valley. Still further south and beyond the Hindu Kush lies the famous Khyber Pass\(^5\) leading into Afghanistan via Torkham. Piewar Kotal and Shutargardan passes in the south lead to Kabul and Ghazni. The Tochi and Gomal passes also lead to Afghanistan.

**Historical Background**

The province has long seen settled civilization, but as it is situated on a highway of conquest, it has been subject to the vicissitudes of fortune over a long time. It has been overrun again and again by successive invaders, beginning with the Aryans, who penetrated through the northern hills, more than four thousand years ago. Then came the Persians, when Darius I annexed Gandhara around 518 BC. From the sixth century BC to the fifth century AD, this area remained a hunting ground for many groups ranging from the Greeks to the Mauryans, the Bactrian Greeks, Scythians, the Kushan, the White Huns, and the Guptas.\(^6\) The first contact of

---

\(^5\) Khyber Pass, the main route of communication between Afghanistan and the subcontinent is the most famous of all the passes of the NWFP. It has been a witness to the marches of Aryans, Persians, Greeks, Scythians, White Huns, Mongols, Muslims, and many others. There are three routes through the Khyber Pass: the old caravan route for mules and camels; the fascinating zigzag road for vehicular traffic; and the railway line completed in 1925.

the Pashtoons with the Muslims dates back to the middle of the seventh century! By the tenth century an independent Turkish principality had been established by Alaptagin, with his capital at Ghazni. Subuktagin, son-in-law and slave of Alaptagin, was the first Muslim king of Ghazni, who invaded the land of the Hindu Shahiya kings of Kabul and drove them ‘down country’. After this the Frontier underwent a major transformation. The Muslim Turks, descendants of earlier invaders, and a local ethnic group of Muslim Pashtoons emerged as a dominant group, replacing the erstwhile Hindu Shahis. Interestingly, some tribes of the Pashtoons initially opposed the Ghazni forces, but ultimately became the supporters and allies of Mahmud, son of Subuktagin, and helped him win many battles in India and in Central Asia. The incoming Muslims intermingled and intermarried with local inhabitants who gradually and voluntarily accepted Islam. Throughout the medieval period until 1818 the province remained part of the Muslim empires of north India. The internecine wars between the Pashtoon tribes gave a chance for Ranjeet Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, to conquer the trans-Indus region, in 1818, as far as Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. In 1834, after the defeat of the Pashtoons at Nowshera, the Sikhs occupied Peshawar. Their garrisons were stationed only in the plains, and they had to send out troops every time they needed to collect taxes and revenue from the Pashtoons.

Finally, in 1849, after the defeat of the Sikhs and the annexation of the Punjab, the North-West Frontier districts came under the British East India Company. The British divided the Frontier into

7 There are various theories about the origin of the Pashtoons and their identity. According to some indigenous and some other observers like Khwaja Niamatullah, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Afzal Khan Khattak, Qazi Ataullah, H. W. Bellew, Sir William Jones, O. Caroe, M. Elphinstone, Major Raverty and a host of others, the Pashtoons are Semitic. According to another school of historians like Abdul Haye Habibi, Bahadur Shah Zafar, Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Abdul Ghani Khan, the Pashtoons are Aryans who migrated from Central Asia and settled in the plains and hills of eastern and southern Afghanistan and north-western regions of Pakistan. For more details see, Afzal Khan Khattak, Tariikh Murrassa (Peshawar, n.d.); Bahadur Shah Zafar, Pashtane Da Tariikh Pa Ranha Key (Peshawar, n.d.); Qazi Ataullah, Da Pakhtuno Tariikh (Peshawar, n.d.); Abdul Ghani Khan, The Pathans (Peshawar, 1958) and Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Tariikh i Afghanistan (Kabul, n.d.).
two parts for governmental purposes. The plains were organized as the settled districts with a regular administration, and the mountainous region was considered as an independent tribal belt. Occasionally indirect control over the latter was exercised by using economic sanctions, and troops to enforce imperialist policies. The region remained part of the Punjab till 1901, when Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, separated the five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan, joining them to the five agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan, thus forming a separate province: the North-West Frontier Province of India. The formal inauguration of the new province, on 26 April 1902, provided an occasion for the Viceroy to hold a big durbar of three thousand dignitaries in Shahi Bagh, Peshawar. Curzon hoped that the creation of the new province would lead to 'peace and tranquillity and contentment of the Frontier'. The Viceroy added that its direct control by the government would be advantageous both to the government of India and to the people of the Frontier. According to him the system of rule would become efficient, and service would be more quickly rewarded and merit would be ‘better known’. He assured the audience that he would be carefully watching the administration of the new province and would see to it that local patriotism was ‘jealously guarded’, and that the new province should prove itself ‘ever more and more deserving of the interest that has secured for it a separate existence and an independent name’.

Socio-Economic Background

The total population of the province, according to the Census Report of 1921, was 50,76,476. Of these about 93 per cent were Muslims, while the remaining 7 per cent were non-Muslims.
Almost all the Muslim inhabitants were Sunnis, except a very small number of Shias, living mainly in Kohat and Kurram agency. Of the non-Muslims, the Hindus were in the highest proportion, followed by the Sikhs and Christians respectively. There were a few Zoroastrians, Jews, and Jains in the NWFP, but their number was too small to influence social life and politics.

Out of the total population of the province, only 7 per cent were recorded as residing in towns. The non-Muslims, however, usually preferred towns, for specific reasons. The Hindus were mainly traders and suppliers of foodstuffs and other necessities to the military, so they naturally concentrated in cities and towns. In many cases the Sikhs, too, were military suppliers; and they were also urban dwellers. The Christians in the Frontier were nearly all Europeans, employed in the army and in civil administration, whose duties were concentrated mainly in the headquarters of the districts or the cantonments. However, migration to towns in some cases was due to the insecurity of life and property which the non-Muslims felt during any civil unrest, especially in those towns which were adjacent to the tribal areas. There was also some intra-provincial migration, some of it casual and on a temporary basis. Within the province movement was frequent. Factors like drought or the deployment of troops to certain areas contributed to this. Of course, many who gained government employment moved to urban centres.

The Pashtoons had dominated the province numerically. However, in Hazara and in urban Dera Ismail Khan, besides Pashtoon, a mixed population of Awans, Gujars, Jats, and Balochs were also found. Pashto, the national language of the Pashtoons, was spoken by over 56 per cent of the population of the province, followed by Hindko and other languages, together spoken by about 42 per cent of the population.\footnote{Census of India 1911, vol. XIII, p. 15.} Pashto, the national language of the Pashtoons is divided into two great branches, northern Pakhto and southern Pashto. The speakers of Pakhto includes the Afridi, Bangash, Mohmand, and Yusufzai tribes and Pashto is spoken by Khattak, Marwat, Wazir, and other tribes in the south.\footnote{Pashto, the national language of the Pashtoons is divided into two great branches, northern Pakhto and southern Pashto. The speakers of Pakhto includes the Afridi, Bangash, Mohmand, and Yusufzai tribes and Pashto is spoken by Khattak, Marwat, Wazir, and other tribes in the south.}

Hindko, the language spoken by people in the western Punjab as well as non-Pashtoons of the Frontier was termed by Sir George Grierson as \textit{Lahnda} or \textit{Lahndi}—\textit{Lahnda} means the west. According to him it 'has no
cent of the population.\textsuperscript{14} If one includes the tribal territory, however, there is a preponderance of Pashto, as all of the tribal population were Pashto-speakers.

Most of the NWFP rural people were agriculturists. The proportion was highest in Hazara where as many as 76.6 per cent persons out of every 1000 derived their livelihood from agriculture. Next to Hazara came Peshawar with a proportion of 68.7 per cent per mille of population subsisting by agriculture; then Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan with 57.9 per cent, 50.1 per cent, and 53.9 per cent respectively.\textsuperscript{15} Prior to the arrival of the British, there was collective ownership of property amongst the Pashtoons. The distribution of land was according to the rules laid down in the Daftar of Shaikh Milli, a sixteenth Century Yusufzai chief. Land was distributed in accordance with the number of male members of a particular tribe. After every four years the land was reallocated. Those who earlier had less productive lands were given fertile land and vice versa. The British, on their occupation of the NWFP, encouraged individual property holding. As in other parts of the subcontinent, rules were laid down concerning land ownership, rent and revenues. To maintain their authority, the British had created and relied upon an indirect system of administration. A large number of the landed elite were employed to secure political control and the consolidation of imperialism in that part of South Asia. Their services were utilized by the colonial government in the district judicial and revenue administration, military service, and in active work against any political agitation, particularly during the entire twentieth century. In lieu of their services to the Raj, they were given honorific titles such as Khan Bahadurs, and Khan Sahibs and, were granted jagirs, inams (both in term of cash and property), and revenue remissions. Furthermore, the elite were always given preferential treatment in the nomination of their sons and relatives to government posts. These big ‘Khans’,\textsuperscript{16} or the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14} Census of India 1911, vol. XIII, p. 203.
\textsuperscript{15} Census of India 1911, vol. XIII, pp. 196-7.
\textsuperscript{16} Khan is the most common title the Pashtoons like to put after their names as a mark of distinction to show that they belong to one of the established
\end{flushleft}
privileged landed aristocracy, were regarded by the imperialists as the ‘natural leaders’ of the people. They owned large pieces of land (sometimes thousands of acres of land was owned by them e.g., Nawab M. Akbar Khan of Hoti, Nawab Dost M. Khan of Tehkal, and Khan Bahadur Mir Alam Khan of Tangi), and possessed enormous wealth, had great social status and exercised great influence over the villages. Another group of the landed elite, the smaller Khans, though numerically strong, was less favoured by the government. As a group they were not opposed to the British government; in fact most of them wanted to gain recognition by them as well as more favours. Their direct contacts with the peasants and ordinary cultivators provided a firm base for the future development of the province. No details are available on the exact landholding of these Khans. The definition of the ‘big Khans’ and ‘small Khans’, therefore, is based on the position in the local hierarchy they enjoyed, rather than on the relative status of their landholdings.\footnote{Census of India 1921, vol. XIV, pp. 265-7. For more details on the government policy and its patronage of the big landlords see, P. Reeves, \textit{Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh: A study of their relations until zamindari abolition} (Bombay, 1991), pp. 1-29; S. A. Rittenberg, \textit{Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province 1901-1947} (Durham, 1988), pp. 29—41, 43-6; D. Gillmartin, \textit{Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan} (London, 1988), and, Imran Ali, \textit{The Punjab Under the Imperialism} (Princeton, 1988).}

The Khans, both big and the smaller ones, did not cultivate the land by themselves. Under their tutelage were \textit{dehqans}, \textit{hamsayas}, and \textit{faqirs} (peasants who lived on the property of a Khan whose land they cultivated), who simply tendered their allegiance to the Khans and acted on their directives. The bulk of the agricultural population of the province were \textit{khudkasht zemindars}, i.e. cultivators who rented land from the big zemindars in return for a share in the crop. Then came the \textit{Barkhakhor} or \textit{ijaradars}, who got their income from agricultural land, but did not cultivate the land...
by themselves or through their relations or servants. They rented
the land from a zemindar for a fixed term at some fixed cash rates.
They were ‘neither so frugal nor prosperous as the better of the
peasant proprietary class’... and a ‘good 20 per cent of them’,
according to S. S. Thorburn, an ex-Settlement Officer, were
‘deeply involved in debt, and a large majority habitually live
beyond their income’. Only very few of them were ‘shrewd,
careful men, and their holdings and incomes’ were growing. The
tribes falling under the category of landholders included all
Pashtoons, Baloch, Jat, Mishwani, Qureshi, Rajput, Awans, Swati,
and Tanaolis. In the greater part of the province the Hindus were
not found in possession of land; however, in the Dera Ismail Khan,
they were well-known as agriculturists. The principal cash crops
of the province were: in the cold weather, maize and millet; in the
spring, wheat, barley, and gram. Rice, sugar cane, cotton, and
tobacco were the fine crops of the province. Of the total cultivated
area 25 per cent was irrigated by canals and 2 per cent by perennial
rains. A number of people earned their livelihood as employees of
the Department of Forests or as woodcutters and charcoal burners,
but mainly they were concentrated in Hazara. Pastoral work,
fishing, hunting, local cottage industries on a very small scale —
manufacturing of woollen fabrics, weaving blankets, carpet
making, etc. — were also a source of income for the people.

In education the Frontier province, before 1947, was one of the
most backward of the Indian provinces. Muslims and especially the
Pashtoons lagged behind other communities in receiving English
and vernacular education. Of the religious communities, Christians

18 The main causes of sinking into poverty, according to Thorburn were that
the head of the family spent too much on hospitality etc., earning for
himself a reputation through it. Moreover, his sons were brought up in
idleness and were married early. The ‘false pride’ of their family
background compelled them to disdain to work with their own hands; and
all these things finally resulted in borrowing from Hindu baniyas (returning
it double after the harvest) and in some cases even in mortgaging his land.
S. S. Thorburn, Report on the First Land Revenue Settlement of the Bannu
District in the Derajat Division of the Punjab (Lahore, 1879), p. 59.
20 Census of India 1911, vol XIII, p. 65.
were by far the best educated, followed by Sikhs and then the Hindus.

TABLE 1: Education by Religion, Sex, and Locality Number per mille who were literate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Muslims Males - Females</th>
<th>Hindus Males - Females</th>
<th>Sikhs Males - Females</th>
<th>Christians Males - Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>17 - 1</td>
<td>392 - 41</td>
<td>321 - 59</td>
<td>858 - 776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>27 - 1</td>
<td>340 - 124</td>
<td>450 - 180</td>
<td>915 – 616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>28 - 1</td>
<td>330 - 21</td>
<td>578 - 67</td>
<td>818 – 730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannu</td>
<td>22 - 0</td>
<td>351 - 13</td>
<td>572 - 90</td>
<td>603 – 639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ismail</td>
<td>32 - 1</td>
<td>442 - 44</td>
<td>465 - 109</td>
<td>834 - 683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India 1911, vol. XIII, p. 188.

Out of every 1000, according to the Census Report of 1911, only 25 males could fulfil the Census criteria of literacy. During the subsequent decade a significant improvement, i.e. from 25 to 43 was noticed. It seems that the inhabitants were alienated from modern education. As recorded in the Census Report of 1911, the Pashtoons ‘despised education as fit only for Hindus and cowards’, as they had little need for spelling, but much for swordsmanship. Undoubtedly this was in part a colonial construct, arcane, and essentialist: yet it was true that levels of literacy were low. It was also alleged that the Muslims followed agriculture, in which the necessity for literacy was not great compared with trade and business occupations. Mostly they lived in the rural areas where the opportunities and inducements for acquiring proficiency in reading and writing were restricted. Moreover, the secular nature of the school courses, and the absence of adequate incentives for

22 The high proportion of literacy among the Sikhs was probably due to the fact that Sikh picked up rudimentary Gurmukhi for the purpose of reading the scriptures. For the Pashtoon ‘the Hindustani is more or less a foreign language to the people of this province, especially to the Pashto-speaking Mussalmans who take much longer time to acquire a working knowledge of Urdu than those whose mother tongue is Punjabi’. Census of India 1921, vol. XIV, pp. 172-3.

23 Census of India 1911, vol. XIII, p. 175.


the education of children, were also held responsible for the backwardness of education in the area. First, the people were poor and looked upon their children as economic assets, since they could earn a small daily wage or perform tasks for which their families would otherwise have had to hire labour. Second, pre-existing illiteracy contributed to apathy towards education, particularly in the case of girls. Third, the non-utilitarian nature of the courses of study meant that parents were unwilling to risk alienating their children from agricultural pursuits by sending them to school. Fourth, school courses were secular in nature in a society deeply imbued with a Pashtoon understanding of Islam. Finally, factional rivalries among the Pashtoons prevented cooperation in establishing and managing schools.26

The Nature of Islam in the Province

Islam was central to the society of the province. Among the Pashtoons, Muslim clerics were looked upon with high esteem and deference. They participated in almost every aspect of Pashtoon society, and they provided guidance in both religious and personal matters. In tribal areas they exercised judicial and executive powers and even assumed political authority during periods of crisis. The bulk of the population of the province were Sunni Muslims. They were the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa (AD 699-769), the great oracle of Sunni jurisprudence, whose doctrines ‘are distinguished by the latitude allowed to private judgement’ in the importance of law. There were no Maliks (the followers of Imam Malik) nor Hanbalis (the followers of Imam Hanbal) in the Frontier, and a nomadic tribe living in the lower Indus area claimed to be the followers of Imam Shafi.27 In early medieval times, it was permissible to consult all the four schools28 of Fiqh (Muslim jurisprudence). The Shias, scattered in the province, were in a relatively large number in the Kurram agency. There were a few Wahabis (followers of Abdul Wahab), and some Ahmadis29 (followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, who claimed to be

26 Census of India 1931, volume XV North-West Frontier Province (Peshawar, 1933), p. 166; Yusufi, Peshawar (Karachi, 1984), pp. 42.
27 Census of India 1921, vol. XIV, p. 84.
28 M. Mujeeb, The Indian Mussalmans (Delhi, 1985), pp. 57-8.
29 Census of India 1911, vol. XIII, p. 73.
Mehdi or Messiah).

There is no tradition of priesthood in Islam. No caste or family that has some special power can claim it as their right. However, it is obligatory in Islam to obey those who possess sufficient religious knowledge. In the NWFP, there were several kinds of religious specialists. There were *Sufis*, engaged in meditative disciplines, who had direct knowledge of religious truths, and the *Ulema* (plural of *Alim*) who are skilled in theology and are qualified to give an opinion on religious matters, who by their decisions regulate the life of Muslims. The main stream of Sufi influence came to India from the north. Shaikh Ali Hajvairi, Muin-ud-Din Chishti, Baha-ud-Din Zikrya, and Jalal Tabrizi, were among many others who preached Islam in India. These mystics were the main agencies of conversion and it was through the efforts of their selfless services to their faith that so many were attracted to Islam in the subcontinent.

There were various Sufic Orders (according to *A Dictionary of Islam* they were more than thirty-two in number) but the most popular and well-known in that part of South Asia were *Naqshbandiya* (founded by Khwaja Baha-ud-Din Naqshbandi, d. AD 1390); *Qadiriya* (Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani, AD 1078-1166); *Suharwardiya* (Sayyid Mutahar-ud-Din Suharwardi, d. AD 1275); and *Chishtiya* (Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti, AD 1143-1236).

Put simply, Sufism brought Islam to the masses and the masses towards Islam.

The Ulema were trained in Muslim theological disciplines such as *Shariah*—the Islamic way of life, comprising beliefs, rituals, practices, public and personal law, and rules of behaviour in social intercourse. They enjoyed superior status to Imams (who lead public prayers and are appointed by the congregation, or section of the town or village who attend the mosque in which he leads the prayers). The Ulema not only led the prayers but also gave

---

**Khutbas**, the sermon or oration delivered on Fridays at the time of *Zuhr* (meridian) prayer. (Sermons are also delivered on the two Eids in the morning after sunrise.) According to S. Ansari, while a majority of Indian ulema enjoyed a tradition of collaborating with local, often Muslim rulers, supporting and propping up the fortunes of the ruling powers, a significant minority never sought help or recognition from the State. Similarly, while certain Sufis maintained a strict separation from the affairs of the state, others became famous for the good relations which they established with the government of the day.  

Mostly the ulema in the NWFP belonged to that group which kept themselves aloof from the rulers and the state. Unlike the state patronage of the ulema in Sindh, in the Frontier, since the majority of the ulema were anti-establishment, none of them was given any jagir or state endowment for their services to the colonial rulers. Throughout the British rule in India, they opposed it with their full power and strength, and as early as the 1890s many Pashtoon ulema, namely Powindah Mullah, Mastana Mullah, Sandakai Mullah, Syed Akbar Mullah, Adda Mullah, and Fazli Wahid Haji Sahib of Turangzai, had mobilized a religio-political movement against the government. Another category of religious leadership consisted of Astanadars, whose ancestors in remote or recent past acquired the title of Saint by virtue of their reputation for holiness and piety, and left behind mosques or shrines as memorials. They can be further divided into *Sayeds, Pirs, Mians*, and *Sahibzadas*. The *Sayeds* were a priestly class claiming direct descent from the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) through Fatima, his daughter. The *Pirs* and *Mians* were the descendants of Pashtoons, whose social position and privileges in Pashtoon society were hereditary. The *Sahibzadas* ranked after *Pirs* and *Mians* and were not so numerous.

---


but were more wealthy. The religious leaders in some cases possessed substantial material power in terms of land, given to them or to their ancestors by the Pashtoons out of reverence or in return for their services as mediators. On the whole, however, their job was not well-paid; they subsisted, in certain cases on the small piece of land set aside to support their mosque. Mostly they were dependant on the Khans and other rich persons of the Pashtoon community.

The traditional factionalism in Pashtoon society had reconstructed the pattern of politics in the NWFP. The parajamba (taking sides) led many Pashtoons to align themselves with the parties which could safeguard their interests against their rivals. Sometimes it even resulted in shifting of loyalties without giving heed to the ideologies and party programmes of particular political organizations. Tarburwali (enmity between cousins) has always been regarded by scholars as the main reason for factionalism in Pashtoon society, although, as a Pashto proverb has it, a much-hated cousin was likely to help one during a crisis. During the colonial period it was mostly the landed elite, both the big Khans and the smaller ones, who provided a base for the creation of warring factions in the NWFP. For the most part, they led the political organizations in the province and the formation and dissolution of alliances always revolved around them. In the rest of India, the urban politicians dominated at the forefront of every political movement, but in the NWFP, due to the particular nature of its society, the rural political figures and social workers were leaders of the political movements.
CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE PROVINCE

The Khudai Khidmatgars emerged in 1920s, as a political force. They rose from the experiences of previous movements against the British rule, most notably the Khilafat and Hijrat campaigns of the early 1920s. The first Khudai Khidmatgar volunteers came from rural Pashtoon-dominated areas and had links with the reform movement of Haji of Turangzai and with the pan-Islamists. Through the creation of a youth movement, a section of Pashtoon intelligentsia sought to move from mere ‘social reform’ to more obvious political activity. The Khudai Khidmatgar organization was created to collaborate with the Youth League enlisting the support of wider social groups. Both bodies endeavoured to eradicate ‘social evils’ from Pashtoon society, espoused the cause of the Pashto language and literature and consistently struggled against British imperialism. The Khudai Khidmatgars developed non-violence as a political creed in their own terms using the symbols of Pashtoon culture, quite independently of the influence of Gandhi. Deeply religious in their daily life, the cultural basis of Pashtoon non-violence was derived from their understanding of Islam. The fervent anti-imperialism of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the All-India National Congress brought them together and their formal affiliation took place during the Karachi Congress in 1931. Through this alliance, the Congress gained a political base in the NWFP and the Khudai Khidmatgars a major ally. The pressure of the Khudai Khidmatgar mass movement compelled the British to introduce Dyarchy and Responsible Government in the province in 1932.

Political Development

The organized party politics that historians associate with the Indian national movement began to emerge in the NWFP in the first decade of its formation as a separate province. It originated in the Peshawar Valley, where some educated Hindus organized support for the AINC. Amir Chand Bombwal published the
province’s first nationalist Urdu newspaper *Frontier Advocate* in 1905. In February 1907, Ram Chand, another educated Hindu from Peshawar had formed a provincial branch of the Congress.¹ No details are available on its organization and membership. However, due to the strategic position of the NWFP, the colonial government attempted to curb political activities there. The newly organized party was banned and most of its leaders were detained under the notorious Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which provided for suppression of crime in the settled districts.² Others went underground, providing arms and ammunition to the revolutionaries in India and helping political figures wanted by the state to escape to Afghanistan.

The first serious attempt of the Frontier Muslims to enter into the political mainstream was the formation of a branch of the Muslim League in 1912 at Peshawar. Mian Abdul Aziz advocate, a resident of Peshawar city, became its president and Ali Abbas Bokhari, a former student of Oxford University, its secretary. Unlike its parent organization at the all-India level, this nascent branch was anti-British. The provincial Leaguers approached the Muslims of the NWFP urging them to fight the anti-Muslim forces in the Balkan wars. The Frontier authorities could not tolerate these ‘extremists’ while the war was on; the organization was banned, and its leaders arrested. Bokhari, however, managed to escape to Afghanistan. Aziz moved down country and reappeared on the platform of the AIML in the early 1930s.³ Thus the Frontier

---


² It provided for powers of courts and officers; the civil references to *Jirgas* appointed by the government; penalties in shape of fines on communities and tribes; with powers of demolition of buildings used by anti-state elements; power to arrest and imprisonment, giving no right to appeal but a restricted power of civil or criminal revision by the Chief Commissioner. Obhrai, *The Evolution*, p. 118.

³ Very little is known on the early Muslim politics in the NWFP. The above account is based on letters from Mian Abdul Aziz to Wazir Hasan, Secretary AIML, 22 September 1912, F. No. 206, Archives Freedom
Province Muslim League (FPML) remained in existence for only four years. After the expatriation of its first organizers it ceased to function in the NWFP.

With the suppression of the pan-Islamic tendencies amongst the educated urban intelligentsia of Peshawar, the centre of politics shifted to the rural areas. Fazli Wahid, the Haji of Turangzai, who belonged to a saintly family of Charsadda, concentrated on social and religious reforms. He urged the Pashtoons to give up their blood-feuds and improve their social habits, i.e. to avoid spending lavishly on marriage and funeral ceremonies. He advised them to resolve their disputes through Shariah and not according to the English law. He was assisted by a few ‘enthusiasts’ amongst the Pashtoon intelligentsia, including Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a young Mohammadzai Khan of Charsadda, who later on became the most popular figure in Frontier politics. An organized campaign against illiteracy was initiated. Their joint efforts resulted in the establishment of a network of Azad Madrassas in various parts of the Peshawar Valley. Besides religious education, students were instilled with the concept of patriotism. No details are available about the exact number of Madrassas, the number of students, teachers or their source of income. The government decided to put a ban on the activities of Turangzai and his associates. To avoid arrest, at the end of April 1915, Turangzai crossed over to the independent tribal belt. After his escape, the authorities banned the Madrassas and incarcerated the teachers. With the flight of Turangzai to the tribal belt, the movement in the settled districts collapsed.4

To curb possible revolutionary and terrorist activities, the

---

government of India forced the Rowlatt Act through the Central Legislative Assembly (hereafter CLA) during the war. Although the reason for which the Act was ostensibly promulgated ceased to exist after the war, it still remained in operation. The Indian nationalists opposed the Act, and Gandhi, the Congress leader, issued a call for an all-India hartal (strike) on 6 April to protest against the Rowlatt Act. Responding to Gandhi’s call, a complete hartal was observed in Peshawar. Urban political workers, Muslims and non-Muslims participated. Similar protest meetings were reported from other settled districts of the province. Meanwhile, news of firing on innocent citizens at Jallianwala Bagh on 13 April (1919), Amritsar, reached the province. Abdul Ghaffar Khan held a protest meeting at Utmanzai. The participants numbered between 50,000 and 70,000. In the rural area of the NWFP, this was the first meeting of its kind convened to express solidarity with the rest of the subcontinent. The effects of the all-India agitation influenced developments in neighbouring Afghanistan. Amir Amanullah, ascended the throne in February 1919. Influenced by the Indian revolutionaries then residing at Kabul, Amanullah, on 4 May declared war on the British Indian

---


7 During the second decade of the twentieth century, the number of the ‘wanted’ Indian political activists in Kabul exceeded hundred. They had been busy in anti-British activities. To induce the pro-British Amir Habibullah to support Turkey and Germany in the war against the British, an Indian-Turko-German Mission was despatched to Kabul in October 1915. Prominent members of the Mission included Mahendra Pratap, Barkatullah, the Indian revolutionaries; Rauf Bey and Kazim Bey, noted Turkish commanders, and, two Germans, Von Hentig, a diplomat and Captain Neidermayer. The Mission failed in achieving its goal, however, it succeeded in establishing an Indian Provisional Government at Kabul on 1 December. Many members of this mission were present in Afghanistan until 1919. For more details see M. Pratap, *My Life Story of Fifty-Five Years* (Dehra Dun, 1947); M. Hauner, ‘The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan
government. The inhabitants of the NWFP were called upon to reinforce the rebellion against the colonialists. To prevent an uprising Martial Law was declared in the NWFP and on 7 May troops occupied Peshawar. A number of arrests were made; the majority of those arrested were kept in various prisons in the province, while the most ‘dangerous’ ones were deported to the Andamans. On cessation of hostilities between Afghanistan and the Indian government after six months the political prisoners from the province were released.

Khilafat and Hijrat Movements

When the Khilafat movement was launched towards the end of 1919, it received widespread support in the NWFP. Indian Muslims had close religious ties with the Turkish Sultan who was also their spiritual head, the Khalifa. During the First World War Indian Muslims were concerned about the fate of Turkey. To gain the support of the Indian Muslims in the war effort, the British Premier had promised to protect the Holy Places and to safeguard their religious sentiments. However, once the war was over, the victors decided to reduce the Ottoman Empire to a petty kingdom. The Indian Muslims started the Khilafat movement which emphasized the freedom of the Khalifa from any foreign control. The political-minded Hindus decided to support the Muslims in the Khilafat movement.


10 Details can be seen in G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (Delhi, 1982), pp. 67-110;
In the NWFP, the general feeling among Muslims was in favour of supporting the Khilafat movement. A Sarhad Khilafat Committee was formed, and branches were opened in the districts. Following the directives of the Central Khilafat Committee, it was decided not to participate in the official peace celebrations. To show solidarity with the rest of the Indian Muslims, hartals were observed at several places and titles were renounced. Resignations from the police and the civil administration were also reported.\textsuperscript{11}

An offshoot of the Khilafat agitation was the Hijrat movement. The ulema declared India as \textit{Dar ul Harb} (land of war) and issued \textit{fatwas} for migration to \textit{Dar ul Islam} (land of Islam).\textsuperscript{12} Indian Muslims were looking towards Afghanistan, with whom they had religious, cultural, political, and ethnic ties. Amanullah offered asylum to the intending \textit{Muhajireen}. Peshawar became the hub of the movement. In the beginning the government discouraged hijrat, but later on people were encouraged to go to Afghanistan in large numbers. In this the government’s twin objectives were to remove active political workers from the province, and to burden the limited finances of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{13} \textit{The Muhajireen}, who exceeded 60,000 in number, were welcomed by the Afghan government. Amanullah offered them jobs and cultivable lands. They refused his offer and demanded war against the British. Amanullah was
unable to concede to their demand. Differences emerged which resulted in the return of the muhajireen to India. The return journey was miserable. The impoverished and destitute muhajireen were resettled in their home areas. Thus the ‘ill-conceived, miscalculated and ill-organized’ Hijrat movement ended in complete failure. However, it provided the Frontier Muslims with an opportunity to organize themselves politically. After their return from Afghanistan, the Khilafatists of the NWFP, like those of rest of India, had been divided into two camps: those who supported the Congress, and those who joined the AIML.

**Minor Muslim Organizations**

Minor Muslim organizations of the NWFP, provided a basis of support for the Congress and the Muslim League in the NWFP. One of the earliest of such groups was the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam (or the Ahrars), an organization established by some ex-Khilafatists at Lahore in 1929. A largely urban party, they drew support from the middle classes. They wished to safeguard the rights of Muslims, and to create an Islamic state based on the Shariah within the subcontinent. Viewing the colonial state as an ‘evil force’, they participated in the civil disobedience movement of 1930. The Frontier branch of the Ahrars was established on 2 February 1935 at Peshawar. The party programme of the provincial Ahrars remained much the same as that of the central organization. However, criticism of the government’s Waziristan policy provided a crucial provincial issue. In the Frontier, the Ahrars extended support to the Khudai Khidmatgars.

---


15 ‘Note on the Ahrar Movement’, CID Diaries, F. Nos. 900, 904, 905, 907, 506 and 519, Special Branch Peshawar (hereafter SBP); D. Gilmartin, ‘Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab’, MAS.
Another splinter Muslim organization, the Khaksars (established April 1931) also evoked the Shariah and emphasized ‘service to society’ and the promotion of equality. Unlike the Ahrars, however, they were communal and loyalist. The organization was extended to the NWFP in 1933. No exact information on membership details for the province is available. Peshawar city and parts of Hazara became the centre of Khaksar activity, and loyal urban Muslims joined the organization. Due to their pro-British policies, the Khaksars received little response in the rural areas of the province.16

Like its parent organization, the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind (JUH), the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Sarhad (JUS) supported the Khudai Khidmatgars on the provincial level, thus providing them with a religious basis and justifying the Khudai Khidmatgars’ struggle against colonialism. A majority of the province’s ulema supported the Khudai Khidmatgars and were arrested during the civil disobedience movement. A minority of the ulema opposed the Congress and issued fatwas against the Khan Brothers and their followers dubbing them Kafirs.17 In the end, however, many ulema became active members of the Khudai Khidmatgars.18


17  CID Diaries, F. Nos. 753, 929, 934, 935, 939, 944, SBP.

The Emergence of Khudai Khidmatgars

After the bitter experience and ‘failure’ of Hijrat, Abdul Ghaffar Khan concentrated on Pashtoon politics. He revived the old network of the Azad Madrassas and established a school at Khaloono, in Dir state. Fazal Mahmood Makhfi, a famous Pashto poet and a close associate, was put in charge of the school. As it was the first of its kind in Dir state, the response from the people was tremendous. Within a few weeks the number of students exceeded four hundred. The growing popularity of the school alarmed the Nawab of Dir, who acted promptly. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Makhfi were expelled and the school was demolished.\(^\text{19}\)

The individual efforts of Abdul Ghaffar Khan failed and he realized that any reform movement without a proper organization would be impossible. He resumed his social activities in the settled districts, and was joined by a group of educated Pashtoon patriots which included Mian Ahmad Shah, Abdul Akbar Khan, Mian Jaffar Shah, M. Abbas Khan, Mian Abdullah Shah, M. Akbar Khadim, and Maulana M. Israel. They belonged to various social groups, though a majority of them were smaller Khans. Mian Ahmad Shah was a former student of the Aligarh University, who had left the University in response to the nationalist call during the non-cooperation movement. Some of them, like Khadim, were without any western education but were initiated into religious knowledge. Creating awareness amongst the Pashtoons about modern education, freeing the Pashtoon society of evils like blood-feuds and factionalism, prevention of crime, and the use of intoxicants were some of the concerns that brought these intellectuals together.

On 1 April 1921, the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana (Society for the Reformation of the Afghans) was formed with Abdul Ghaffar Khan as its President and Ahmad Shah as Secretary. The aims and objectives of the Anjuman included: the eradication of social evils, promotion of unity amongst the Pashtoons, prevention of lavish spending on social events, encouragement of Pashto language and literature, and the creation of ‘real love’ for Islam among the

Pashtoons. The *Anjuman* engaged in a wide spectrum of activities. Its first step was to educate the Pashtoons. In April 1921 the first branch of *Azad Islamia Madrassa* was opened at Utmanzai, followed by other branches in different areas of Peshawar Valley. No accurate figures are available about the exact number of the Azad schools, but it is estimated at to be about seventy. Most of the schools seem to have been in the Peshawar Valley as no evidence is available about any branch of the Azad schools in any other locality in the province. The curriculum included teaching of the Holy Quran and *Hadith*, *Fiqh*, Islamic history, Pashto, and Mathematics. Some vocational skills like carpentry, weaving, and tailoring were also taught. On 1 December 1923, the school was affiliated with Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi. The students were prepared for the matriculation examination of the Punjab University; the main emphasis, however, remained on the promotion of Pashtoon culture. Some of the *Anjuman*’s founder members, including Mian Ahmad Shah, Mian Maaruf Shah, and Maulana M. Israel, volunteered to teach the children without any remuneration. Maqsood Jan of Bannu, who had left Islamia College during the non-cooperation days, became the first headmaster at the Utmanzai branch. The main source of funding of the *Azad* schools was donations from the *Anjuman* members. Although no figures exists, we are told that they contributed generously to finance them.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan took the initiative by sending his own son, Abdul Wali Khan, to the school. He was followed by other *Anjuman* members. As education was free and the schools were open to all communities, without any prejudice of caste or religion, the *Anjuman* gained popularity within a short span of time. The number of students increased from 140 (April 1921-March 1922) to 221 (April 1922-March 1923); and from 264 (April 1923-March 1924) to 300 (April 1924-March 1925).

---

21 Ibid.
During late 1921, some members of the faction-ridden Provincial Khilafat Committee at Peshawar invited Abdul Ghaffar Khan to become its president which he accepted. The government, however, sought to restrain the activities of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He was arrested on 17 December 1921 and sentenced to three years Rigorous Imprisonment under Section 40 of the FCR.\(^23\) After his arrest the \textit{Anjuman} leadership passed on to Abdul Akbar Khan. The \textit{Azad} system of schools, according to Rittenberg, ‘shrank to no more than a few schools by the end of 1920s’.\(^24\) The main reasons were lack of funds and qualified teachers.

Another important step of the \textit{Anjuman} was to make trade and commerce respectable in the eyes of the Pashtoons. To improve the economic conditions of the Pashtoons and to save them from the ‘high-handedness’ of the ‘middle-men’, who in most cases were non-Muslims, Pashtoons were advised to sell their products directly instead of relying on someone else. In 1927 Abdul Ghaffar Khan started a \textit{Gur Mandi} (sugar depot) at Utmanzai and urged other Pashtoons to join him in the business.\(^25\) To revive Pashto and to promote Pashtoon culture, poetic contests were regularly arranged at the \textit{Anjuman}’s annual meetings.\(^26\) Pashtoon poets were encouraged, and eventually motivated a large number of Pashtoon nationalist poets including Makhfi, Abdul Akbar Khan, Khadim, Khaleeq, Abdul Ghani Khan and a host of others who contributed to the development of modern Pashto literature.\(^27\)

\(^{23}\) Abdul Ghaffar, \textit{Zama Zhwand}, p. 190.
\(^{24}\) Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 66.
\(^{25}\) Khaleeq, \textit{Azadi}, p. 41; Yusufi, \textit{Meet the Frontier Gandhi} (Bombay, n.d.), pp. 11-12.
\(^{27}\) This trend was evident in many other provinces of India in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. In the Punjab, for instance, Singh Sabha ideologues attempted to expand and standardize the Punjabi language. See H. Obhroi, \textit{The Construction of Religious Boundaries, Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition} (Delhi, 1994), pp. 348-50. In Bengal the Swadeshi Movement of 1903-1908 encouraged the use of the Bengali language and inspired considerable linguistic research. This was the period when the folklorists collected Bengali folk songs and brought them together in a popular publication entitled \textit{Thakumar jhuli} (Grandma’s Tales). S. Sarkar, \textit{The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal} 1903-1908 (Delhi, 1973), pp. 495-8.
The Formation of Zalmo Jirga (Youth League)

Initially the *Anjuman* was a social reform movement but soon it developed into a political movement. Its members regarded British rule as the root cause of the pernicious poverty, backwardness, illiteracy, and ignorance of the Pashtoons. The Pashtoons were urged to unite against alien rule and jointly struggle against social evils and put an end to their blood-feuds. The *Anjuman* members undertook tours of various parts of the province and propagated the Pashtoon cause along these lines. The Pashtoons were exhorted to join the *Anjuman* and resist the British imperialism and its supporters in the NWFP. As there was no political journal in Pashto, the *Anjuman* decided to publish a socio-political journal in Pashto. The first issue of *Pakhtun* came out in May 1928. It contained articles on a variety of subjects including Pashtoon patriotism, Pashto language and literature, political essays, dramas, religious writings, and official and non-official news. Initially the circulation was limited to 500 copies but in course of time it rose to 3,000.

Events in neighbouring Afghanistan changed the outlook of the Frontier intelligentsia. Amanullah had been ousted from power and Habibullah (Bacha Saqao), a bandit Tajik, had occupied the throne. The *Anjuman* members were indignant over the overthrow of Amanullah whom they regarded as the ‘ideal Pashtoon king’. They sensed a British conspiracy behind the troubles in Afghanistan.

---

28 It was first published from Rawalpindi, then from Amritsar and finally from Peshawar. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was the editor and Khadim was the co-editor. In 1931 the co-editorship was given to Khaleeq who voluntarily left it in April 1947 and then Nazim Sarfaraz Khan became the co-editor. The journal appeared and disappeared several times. The main reasons were bans on its publication and circulation by the government and the arrest of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Its appearance as a monthly magazine continued until April 1930, then it was banned; it reappeared in 1931 for a short period and again was banned in December 1931. In May 1938 it reappeared (three in a month) and then was banned in 1940. In 1945 it reappeared and was again banned in August 1947. Prominent contributors included Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Jaffar Shah, Ahmad Shah, Khadim, Abdul Akbar Khan, Syeda Bushra Begum, Fazal Rahim Saqi, Kiramat Shah Faulad, Abdul Malik Fida, Abdul Ghani Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, Qazi Ataullah, and many others. No exact figure is available about the total of published copies; it is estimated that about 225 issues appeared.
The main reason for the British dislike of Amanullah was the ‘extraordinary progress of reforms in a neighbouring [Muslim] state would support the demand for similar institutions in the Frontier Province, a demand which it was the policy of the Government to resist’. Anti-government demonstrations were organized by the Anjuman. It was decided to send a medical mission under the auspices of the Anjuman with Dr Khan Sahib, elder brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan who had recently joined the nationalist cause as its leader, to help crisis-ridden Afghanistan. In March 1929 Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Jaffar Shah were deputed by the Anjuman to seek a formal invitation to the mission from Amanullah, who was then residing at Kandahar. To their chagrin they were not allowed to proceed to Afghanistan and their entry into Balochistan was banned. They came back to Peshawar and resumed their pro-Amanullah activities. The Anjuman members toured the province and made a fervent appeal to the intelligentsia and the masses to support Amanullah’s cause against the ‘bandit King’. Simple methods were adopted for propaganda purposes. Mosques served as platforms for the Anjuman members, then the traditional Pashtoon Hujras (meeting places of adults) were used. Kinship and ethnic connections were also utilized.

Before anything could be achieved by the efforts of the Anjuman members, a desperate Amanullah proceeded to Italy, and settled there permanently.

Mian Akbar Shah, an active member of the Anjuman, and a talented student of Islamia College, Peshawar, who had gone as far as the Soviet Union ‘in search of freedom’ proposed the formation of a youth league on the pattern of similar organizations in Afghanistan, Turkey, and Bukhara. A meeting was convened on 1 September 1929 at Utmanzai and the formation of the Zalmo Jirga with its temporary headquarters at Utmanzai was announced.


Abdul Ghaffar Khan, president of the Reception Committee served as host. Abdul Akbar Khan became the president and Ahmad Shah its secretary. No exact age limit was fixed for its membership but the name itself indicated the composition of the organization. Its membership was open to ‘every youth without any discrimination of caste, creed or religion, provided he is literate’, and that he, ‘should not participate in any form of communalism’. Pashto was announced to be the official language of the Jirga’s proceeding. Other objectives included the ‘attainment of independence for Hindustan by all peaceful means’. Elaborating on the need of the formation of the Jirga, Ahmad Shah commented that the NWFP had no organization of its own. The Congress and the Khilafat Committee were ‘Indian Parties’. During the period of the Khilafat and Hijrat movements the inhabitants of the NWFP contributed enormously. ‘Yesterday Afghanistan was in turmoil and flames. The Pakhtuns suffered heavily. We begged from door to door for donation but no one in India has given us a paisa although they have taken thousands from us’. He accused the leaders of the above organizations of failing to support the introduction of reforms in the NWFP and of demanding ‘Dominion Status’ for themselves. The Zalmo Jirga published a booklet in Pashto reiterating their demand for complete independence from colonial rule by peaceful means, and arguing that to achieve this end they would try to bring about harmony between Hindus and Muslims and the political awakening of the youth of the NWFP.

To accommodate the majority of the illiterate sympathizers of the Pashtoon nationalists and the aged members of the community, another organization Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God) was formed in November. This new organization superseded the former and later on became very popular and influential in the NWFP. Sarfaraz Khan became its first president and Hijab Gul the secretary. The party appealed to Pashtoons to join the organization and help them in the eradication of social evils from Pashtoon

32 Pakhtun, October 1929, p. 14; Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhwand, p. 350.
33 Pakhtun, October 1929, pp. 14-16.
34 Pakhtun, January 1930, pp. 25-33.
35 Extracts from the NWFP Secret Abstracts, 22 February 1930, F. No. 75, SBP, p. 3.
society, to forge unity among their rank and file and to struggle for the liberation of their homeland from the foreign yoke. Both of the organizations were working for the promotion of the Pashto language and literature, and were struggling for the ‘purification’ of Pashtoon society and for the independence of the Pashtoon region which they viewed as their Watan (homeland). The leaders were almost the same. A member after joining one organization automatically became a member of the other Organization. The same group of Pashtoon intellectuals who were guiding the Jirga were in the forefront of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Within a short period a network of the Khudai Khidmatgar organization was established in the Pashtoon dominated areas of the province. Its emphasis on Pashtoon identity and values had very little appeal to the non-Pashtoons. No accurate figures are available about the exact number of the Khudai Khidmatgar workers and its branches. Both official and non-official sources are silent about it. However, after consulting various sources, it can be put between at twelve to fifteen hundred. The remarkable feature of the organization was the solid support for it in the rural areas, which hitherto had been neglected by other political organizations. Many reasons contributed to the popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Various sections of the Pashtoon society interpreted the Khudai Khidmatgar programme in their own way. To the Pashtoon intelligentsia, it was a movement for the revival of Pashtoon culture with its distinct identity. To the smaller Khans, it was a movement that demanded political reforms for the province that would enfranchise them and give them a greater role in governance. Its anti-colonial stand suited the majority of the anti-establishment ulema, who always regarded British rule in the subcontinent as a ‘curse’. For the peasants and other poor classes it was against their economic oppressors, British imperialism and its agents—the pro-British Nawabs, Khan Bahadurs and the big Khans.

37 Interviews Mian Akbar Shah, Badrashi (Nowshera), 8 September 1984; Haji Mohammad Asim, Nowshera; 30 October 1984; Fazal Rahim Saqi, Wardaga, (Charsadda), 17 November 1991; Warris Khan, Rashakai
To instil the capability of self-discipline and self-rule in the Khudai Khidmatgars, the leaders had put great emphasis on discipline. The volunteers were organized and drilled in military formation and were given military ranks. Before joining the movement members had to pledge that they would abstain from the use of violence, intrigues, family feuds, and other vices. The volunteers were trained to undertake long marches on foot. Because of the poverty of the people, any special uniform for the volunteers was not possible; therefore, they were advised to have their ordinary clothes dipped in brown or chocolate colour, which was cheap and easily available. They were called ‘Red Shirts’ in government communiques, and the word became so popular that the movement itself was styled thereafter as the Red Shirt movement. The colonial government made extensive propaganda against the Khudai Khidmatgars by equating them with the Bolsheviks and dubbed them Russian agents, a charge always refuted by the

38 The volunteers had to take the following pledge before getting enrolled in the organization: (translation) ‘I call on God as a witness, and solemnly declare on oath that I will abide by the following principles:

1. With sincerity and faith, I offer my name for Khudai Khidmatgarship.
2. I will sacrifice my wealth, comfort and self in the service of my nation and for the liberation of my country.
3. I will never have ‘para jamba’ (party feeling), enmity with or willfully oppose anybody; and I shall help the oppressed against the oppressor.
4. I will not become a member of any other rival party nor will I give security or apologize during the fight.
5. I will always obey every lawful order of every officer of mine.
6. I will always abide by the principle of non-violence.
7. I will serve all human beings alike, and my goal will be the attainment of the freedom of my country and my religion.
8. I will always perform good and noble deeds.
9. All my efforts will be directed to seeking the will of God and not towards mere show or becoming an office-holder’. F. No. 224, SBP, pp. 9-11.

39 ‘The name “Red Shirts” was purposely introduced by the North-West Frontier Province administration as a popular substitute for the name “Khudai Khidmatgaran” or “the Servants of God”, remarked the Viceroy. We obviously could not have used the latter phrase in official references, as it would have implied some kind of admission that we were dealing with
The most remarkable feature of the Khudai Khidmatgars was the adoption of non-violence as their creed and their strict adherence to it. The volunteers were taught not to resort to violence; they bore no arms and carried no weapons. Abdul Ghaffar Khan believed that ‘it is the only form of force which can have a lasting effect on the life of society and man’. Traditional Pashtoon society, like many other tribal societies, was notorious for factionalism and violence. The main emphasis of Pashtoon reformers was on the prevention of blood-feuds. Inspiration was provided by giving examples from the lives of the Holy Prophet and other prophets, including Jesus Christ, of how they faced humiliation and oppression boldly by non-violent means. The accounts of the

an association of the pious and godly. Although it may be true that the Red Shirt movement was not inspired by the Bolsheviks, there was a good deal of communistic doctrine (including the use of sickle and hammer badges) connected with it. So the “red shirt” was not entirely an inappropriate term and I think it served its practical purpose pretty successfully’. Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 August 1930, Halifax Collection, Mss. EUR., C. 152, IOLR, p. 225.


41 Halide Edib, *Inside India* (London, 1937), p. 336. ‘The supreme test for faith in anything, religious or otherwise, must be the willingness of a man to lay down his life’, she further remarked, ‘There were many Indians who have received baton charges or went to prison. Yet some of them must have adopted non-violence because of physical timidity and a temperamental dislike to radical changes. But on the Frontier in general, and in the case of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in particular, there was none of this. The suppression of civil disobedience on the Frontiers was quite different from that in India proper. Men did face death. There was no question of physical timidity, neither any excuse for inaction nor a desire to maintain the status quo in Abdul-Gaffar Khan’s case’. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

42 ‘Congress and Muslims’, Speech of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Mongri Maidan, Calcutta, 4 April 1931, S. No. 1, Tendulkar Papers, NMML, p. 6. The biographers of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, including Tendulkar, Desai, Easwaran, Lalpuri, Korejo, and Zutshi have wrongly attributed it to the non-violence of Gandhi, and argue that Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s non-violence was a variant of the doctrine preached by Gandhi at the all-India level. The emphasis of these authors is misplaced. Gandhian non-violence had very little effect on the Pashtoons. The number of Congress workers in
lives of the holy men had a great impact on the mind of Pashtoons. The Pashtoons were exhausted by recurrent blood-feuds amongst themselves and were keen to remedy this situation. In adopting non-violence they were giving up a tradition that had caused immense sufferings for so many of them. Despite the proximity of the tribal territory to the settled districts of the Frontier, which provided an excellent opportunity for ‘outlaws’ to take refuge in the independent tribal area beyond government control, they could hardly match the government who had arms far superior to theirs. They were taught that although violence could be countered by more violence but in following non-violence the Pashtoons would never be defeated. This sense of pride in registering victories over the authorities gave the Khudai Khidmatgars enormous popularity in the province, and saw their active involvement in the Civil Disobedience Movement.

Civil Disobedience Movement (1930-34) and the Khudai Khidmatgars

In December 1929, at Lahore, under the presidency of J. Nehru, the Congress pledged itself to the attainment of complete independence for India. About two hundred people, Congress members, social workers, and volunteers from the NWFP,


Many of my informants emphasized how people were desirous of ending endemic violence caused by incessant conflicts, particularly property disputes among the *tARBurs* (cousins). Interviews with Abdul Ghani Khan, Charsadda, 13 November 1994; Abdul Wali Khan, Charsadda, 25 October 1994; Mehdi Shah, Peshawar, 4 February 1989; Sarfaraz Khan, Charsadda, 17 November 1991; Umra Khan, Adina (Swabi), 7 March 1992; and Fazal Karim, Pabbi, 14 November 1994.

including prominent Khudai Khidmatgars attended the Congress session. The primary aim of the delegates from NWFP was to attract the attention of Indian leaders to the ‘cramped Frontier atmosphere, caused by the oppressive laws and the humiliation they suffered in consequence of their having been denied even the ordinary reforms’. The Congress leaders were apprised of the latest situation and they promised to send a Committee to enquire into their grievances. On its return from Lahore, a split was reported in the Provincial Khilafat Committee. The majority of members showed their interest in Congress policy, while the other group remained loyal to the Central Khilafat Committee. Later on, the revived branch of the Frontier Muslim League joined the latter.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan endorsed the Congress programme of ‘complete independence’ and non-payment of taxes and revenues. On his return from Lahore he started a whirlwind tour of the province and informed the sympathizers of the Khudai Khidmatgars of events in Lahore and urged them to organize themselves on the Congress pattern. More attention was given to the organization of the volunteers and the enrolment of new workers. No exact enumeration of the members is available; however, their number was estimated as between eight hundred and one thousands. A network of jirgas was established in most parts of the province, followed by committees for tappas (for a cluster of villages). Next came the tehsil and district committees and then the provincial Jirga. All were elected bodies. Abdul Ghaffar Khan at times acted as the Commander-in-Chief. In that capacity he had to nominate certain heads of various units.

In March 1930, Gandhi decided to launch his Civil Disobedience Movement against the government. On 12 March, accompanied by seventy-nine volunteers, he started from Ahmedabad to Dandi, a village some two hundred miles away on the seaside, to offer civil disobedience through the violation of the Salt Law. On 21 March

45 Bombwal, Turbanned Brother of the Frontier Pathans (n.d., n.p.), p. 3.
the Congress Working Committee (CWC) met at Ahmedabad and endorsed Gandhi’s decision. It further hoped that ‘the whole country will respond’ to it and thus ‘bring the campaign for Purna Swaraj to a speedy and successful issue’. It directed all the Provincial Congress Committees to undertake civil disobedience ‘as to them may seem proper and in the manner that may appear to them to be most suitable’.48

A branch of NWFP Congress had been in existence since 1922. Owing to a lack of the numbers required for a Congress Committee, it had been amalgamated with the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee. Bombwal became the secretary of the Frontier wing. Other prominent members included Hakim Abdul Jalil, C. C. Gosh, Lal Badshah, Ali Gul Khan, A. B. Yusufi, and Khan Mir Hilali, Peshawar based urban socio-political workers of the province. Most of them had dual membership of Congress and the Khilafat Committees. No attention was paid to the rural areas, and with the exception of Mian Hamid Gul (Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib), who became famous as a national worker during the non-cooperation days by renouncing his pension, no one extended the organization to the NWFP rural areas. The Punjab Provincial Congress Committee had little time to give to affairs of the Frontier Congress, with the ‘sad result that there has been no Congress work worth the name’.49 The NWFP was not the only province where the Congress organization was weak. At this time the Congress was passing through a difficult phase and its reorganization was in process.50 The Frontier Congressmen resented the neglect by the Punjab Congress and decided to form


49 Paira Khan to J. Nehru, 18 November 1928, R No. G-86 (1928), AICC, NMML, pp. 11-12; Khaleeq, Azadi, p. 74; Bokhari, Bacha Khan, p. 80.

their own Committee. On 17 November, without the approval of the central organization, a Frontier Province Congress Committee (FPCC) with Lal Badshah as president, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdur Rahim, pleader (Dera Ismail Khan), as vice presidents, and Habibullah Khan (Bannu) as secretary was formed.\textsuperscript{51} The Frontier Congress workers were advised by the Congress High Command to function for the time being under the Punjab Congress till ‘they are able to stand on their own legs’.\textsuperscript{52} The AICC treated the NWFP along with Burma as a ‘special province’ and exempted it from the application of the ordinary quota rule. The CWC decided that a provincial Congress must have two thousand members before it could be formally recognized as a separate Congress Committee.\textsuperscript{53}

By June 1930 the Congress members in the NWFP were 108. By the end of July the reported number was 567.\textsuperscript{54}

As directed by its central organization, the FPCC decided to observe 26 January 1930 as ‘Independence Day’. It requested Abdul Ghaffar Khan to utilize his influence and control in the rural areas of the province and to give full support to the Congress’ intended civil disobedience.\textsuperscript{55} The Day was observed but ‘little interest was shown in the proceedings by residents of rural areas’, reported a CID informer, ‘with the noteworthy exception of Utmanzai, and the support given from that direction is attributable to Abdul Ghaffar Khan’.\textsuperscript{56} Until late March, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was busy with the organizational affairs of the Khudai Khidmatgars. However, he made a two-week tour of the southern districts to inform like-minded members of the public of the

\textsuperscript{51} Paira Khan to Nehru, 18 November 1928, F. No. G-86 (1928), AICC, NMML, pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{52} Nehru to C. C. Ghosh, 24 November 1928, F. No. G-86 (1928), AICC, NMML, p. 9; P. Sharma to Secretary AICC, 26 November 1928, \textit{Ibid}, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{53} Supplement to the Congress Bulletin, 27 September 1929, F. No. P-30 [iii], (1929), AICC, NMML, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{54} Paira Khan to Secretary, AICC, 5 July 1929 and 26 July 1929, F. No.P-30 [ii], (1929), AICC, NMML, pp. 55, 151-2.

\textsuperscript{55} Paira Khan to Nehru, 14 March 1930, F. No. P-17 (1930), AICC, NMML, pp. 15-16; ‘Congress-cum-Red Shirt Activities’, Peshawar, F. No. 14, SBP, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{56} Summary of Political Situation in the NWFP, 1 February 1930, CID Diaries, SBP, p. 153.
Congress programme and of the intending visit of the Enquiry Committee by the Congress to investigate the notorious FCR and other ‘obnoxious measures’ of the government which ‘have made the life of the ordinary citizen unbearable’ and to devise means for their early abrogation.\(^{57}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s main emphasis, however, remained on the independence of the country, by which he meant both the NWFP and India, from the foreign yoke. According to him the province and the subcontinent were inextricably linked, and there was no better *jihad* than to get rid of imperialism.\(^{58}\)

On 15 April 1930 the Frontier Congress workers brought special clay from Pabbi and manufactured salt’. No arrests were made.\(^{59}\) The next step was the picketing of liquor shops and 23 April was selected for that purpose. Their object was to invite arrests and thus stimulate public sympathy in favour of Congress.\(^{60}\) The time coincided with the annual meeting of the *Azad* school, Utmanzai, held on 19-20 April 1930, attended by a representative gathering of members of *Zalmo Jirga*, the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, Khilafat Committee and FPCC. There were about twelve hundred participants. After the deliberations of the meeting, they were invited to join the Congress’ Civil Disobedience Movement.\(^{61}\)

\(^{57}\) Dr S. Mahmud, Dr S. Kitchlew and Lala Duni Chand were the members of the Congress Enquiry Committee which was appointed by the Congress to inquire into the oppressive measures in the NWFP. C&MG, 10 January 1930.

\(^{58}\) ‘I belong to that party’, Abdul Ghaffar Khan told the audience in Bannu, ‘which intends to free the country from the clutches of the tyrant English people, who have not only ruined India but almost the whole Islamic world, who are responsible for the destruction of Afghanistan, and whose hands are still red with the blood of innocent Afghan martyrs...Oh Pakhtun brothers, what has happened to you? Your brethren and neighbours, the Wazirs, who live only ten miles away, have shed their blood in guarding their bare hills from foreign interference, yet you can do nothing for your fertile country. You should learn a lesson. There is no better “Jihad” from the point of view of Islam than to free your own country from slavery and a foreign yoke’. Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 96.


\(^{60}\) Circular No. 9, Nehru to Secretaries Provincial Congress Committees, 25 March 1930, F. No. P-I (1930), AICC, NMML, p. 61.

Meanwhile the members of the Congress Enquiry Committee were prevented from entering the NWFP, which aroused more feeling against the government. On the night of 23 April, leaders of the FPCC were arrested. Furthermore, to avoid ‘unrest’ in the rural areas of the province, it was decided that all the prominent members of the Khudai Khidmatgars should also be arrested. However, Allah Bakhsh Barqi and Ghulam Rabbani, two prominent Congressmen from Peshawar city, avoided arrest at night and surrendered next morning. It worsened the already disturbed situation, and led to indiscriminate firing on unarmed Congress volunteers at Qissa Khwani Bazaar, resulting in the deaths of about two hundred on the spot. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Khudai Khidmatgar leaders were sentenced to three years imprisonment and were sent to Gujrat prison in the Punjab. The Qissa Khwani Bazaar, massacre was followed by a second shooting incident at Peshawar on 31 May, twelve persons were killed. On 16 May Utmanzai was ravaged by troops. On 28 May, Takkar, a village in Mardan was attacked by the troops, and the sympathizers of the Khudai Khidmatgars were incarcerated. On 24 August a protest meeting at Hathi Khel (Bannu) was fired upon; seventy persons were killed. Frequent firings on non-violent Khudai Khidmatgars and *lathi-charges* became a routine. The

---

62 C&MG, 24 April 1930.


64 According to the official sources the number of casualties was thirty killed and thirty-three wounded (C&MG) 9 July 1930; and Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 April 1930, Mss. EUR., C. 152/11, IOLR, p. 102; while the Congress Enquiry Committee gave the number of killed as more than one hundred and twenty-five and numerous wounded. *Report [With Evidence] of the Peshawar Enquiry Committee*, (appointed by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress) (Allahabad, 1930), pp. 6-28. However, according to some indigenous and other sources the estimated deaths were about two hundred.

65 Arrest of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Other Agitators of Charssadda Sub-Division, Copy of a Report from AC, Charssadda to DC, Peshawar, 26 April 1930, F. No. 255/V, (Home/Poll.) (1930), Tendulkar Papers, NMML, pp. 1172-1173; C&MG, 28 April 1930.
Khudai Khidmatgars were beaten, their clothes torn to pieces, their property looted and houses set ablaze, the ‘sanctity of four walls’ was violated, many were stripped naked, the worst insult to a Pashtoon, and many more were molested. The Khudai Khidmatgars bore all these atrocities and the worst kinds of humiliation with forbearance, courage, and did not retaliate. The Pashtoon majority areas, Peshawar Valley, Mardan, Bannu, and some parts of Kohat were the worst affected, while in the Dera Ismail Khan and especially in Hazara ‘no disturbance in the proper sense of the word occurred’. A ban was put on the Khudai

66 ‘The caps were taken off, clothes were torn so much so that there were some persons who become absolutely naked, and they had nothing even to hide [sic] their private parts. The Pathans did not retaliate with violence, but quietly bore all this insult with patience. The Frontier Pathans who regard a knife as an ordinary weapon and who have fire-arms in their houses and who are ready to kill even for a piece of bread remained non violent in spite of such provocation and only shouted “Inqilab Zindabad”.’ (Statement of Lok Nath, a dentist from Bannu, before Peshawar Enquiry Committee, p. 86. More details on the repression of the Khudai Khudmatgars can be seen in The Frontier Tragedy (Khilafat Committee Report, Lahore, 1930, rep. Karachi, 1986), pp. 1-57; Jaffar Shah, Abdullah Shah, A Statement of Facts About the Present Situation in the NWFP (Lahore, 1930), pp. 1-12; Report of Devadas Gandhi on the NWFP (1931), F. No. P-16 (1932), AICC Papers, NMML, pp. 165-99; Annual Report of Congress Working Committee, December 1931,F. No. 85 (1931), AICC Papers, NMML, pp. 11-13, 55-63 and 175; Miss. EUR, F.No. 203/80, IOLR, p. 89; Ahmad, Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek, pp. 182-426; Abdul Wali Khan, Bacha Khan Au Khudai Khidmatgari (Peshawar, 1993), pp. 95-105; Warris Khan, Da Azadi Tehreek (Peshawar, 1988), pp. 82-4; G. L. Mallam, ‘The Imperial Frontier’ (unpublished manuscript, CSASC), pp. 88-156; L. Mallam, D. Day, ‘A Pair of Chapliss and a Cassock’ (unpublished manuscript, Mallam Papers, CSASC), p. 54; Interviews with Abdul Aziz, Shewa (Swabi), 7 March 1992; Qadir Shah, Baffu, 1 March 1992; Khaista Mir, Farumil (Swabi), 7 March 1992; Nabat Khan, Yar Hussain (Swabi), 6 March 1992; Ajun Khan, Yaqoobi (Swabi), 6 March 1992; Ghazi Khan, Pabbi, 10 November 1994; Gul Rahman, Abdul Malik, Jalsai (Swabi), 7 June 1992; Mohabbat Shah, Jalsai, 7 June 1992; Muffarah Shah, Asim Khan, Maneri (Swabi), 5 June 1992; Azim Khan, Meharban Shah, Naubat Khan, Dagai (Swabi), 5 June 1992; Fazl Hadi, Ismaila (Swabi), 6 June 1992; Amir Nawas, Shah Mansoor (Swabi), 6 June 1992 and Mohammad Arif, Marghuz (Swabi), 6 June 1992.

67 ‘Report on the Causes of the Recent Disturbances in Peshawar and Other Districts of the NWFP’, Chief Commissioner to Foreign Secretary to
Khudai Khidmatgars, Zalmo Jirga, FPCC, and Naujawan Bharat Sabha (Frontier Branch). On 16 August Martial Law was declared in the province. For the time being the province was cut off from the rest of India; visits to and from the province were not allowed and communications were strictly censored. The government composed proclamations, dropping them by aeroplanes and distributing them among the Khans, Chiefs, and other leading pro-government men in the Frontier through the tehsildars and patwaris, asking them to help the government, and in reward it ‘will consider your demands and remedy your evils’. 68

Khudai Khidmatgars’ Affiliation with Congress

The government repression of the Khudai Khidmatgars increased its popularity. Before 1930 the number of Khudai Khidmatgars was about one thousand but after the ‘unscrupulous’ attitude of the authorities their number exceeded to twenty-five thousand. 69 The government was trying to prove a Khudai Khidmatgar connection with the Bolsheviks. They were accused of being Bolshevik.

68 Following is the literal translation of the Chief Commissioner’s proclamation: ‘To Khans, Chiefs and the leading men of the District and the City: You people have personally witnessed how the Congress has tried and is still trying to upset the system of established Government. If it becomes successful, though there is no hope of success, what would be the consequences? Is the Congress going to leave you with your landed property, Jagirs and Muafisl. Is it going to protect your Frontiers? Will it maintain law and order amongst the people? Are you willing to come under the sway of Congress?

I am sure that you do not want to be governed by the Congress Committees. Now it is high time for you to help the Government, which has ever been benevolent to you and has done justice towards you. What help can you render to the Government? You must prevent Congress volunteers wearing red jackets from entering into your villages.

They called themselves “Khudai Khidmatgars” (Servants of God), but in reality they are the servants of Gandhi. They wear the apparel of the Bolsheviks and they are no other than the Bolsheviks. They will create the same atmosphere of which you have heard in Bolshevik dominations.

You can prevent meetings being held in your areas and can help your officials. Do this work at once. The Government as usual, will consider your demands and remedy your evils’. C&MG, 14 May 1930.

69 Yusufi, Meet the Frontier Gandhi, p. 58.
agents, trained in Russia and sent back to the NWFP ‘to take advantage of the economic or other unrest in the Frontier’.\(^70\) Jaffar Shah and Abdullah Shah, two underground members of the Khudai Khidmatgars, found their way to Gujrat jail, met Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Khudai Khidmatgar leaders, and apprised them of the latest situation. After prolonged discussion in secret, it was decided to affiliate the organization with one of the national organizations of India. Jaffar Shah, being an old Khilafatist, had friends in the Punjab. He contacted Malik Lal Khan and through him Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, one of the prominent members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, and asked for his support. To the utter despair of the Frontier delegates they were refused support against the British government.\(^71\) Their next choice was the Congress, which had already been involved in the affairs of the Frontier since the despatch of its earlier Committees to the NWFP. They welcomed the Khudai Khidmatgars as both were fighting against imperialism and were being suppressed by the government.\(^72\) The Congress paid tribute to Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his associates who were resisting imperialism in that part of the subcontinent and ‘have borne in a spirit of patriotic non-violence all the repression to which they have been subjected’.\(^73\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Khudai Khidmatgars were released in March 1931 under the Gandhi-Irwin Pact.\(^74\) The Khudai Khidmatgar leaders were invited to the Congress’ annual session at Karachi. On 30 March, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was asked to openly

\(^{70}\) C&MG, 21 July 1930.

\(^{71}\) Mian Ata ud Din, ‘Memoirs’ (unpublished), pp. 17-18; Wali, Bacha Khan, p. 105; M. Yunus, Frontier Speaks (Lahore, n.d.), p. 158.

\(^{72}\) Jaffar Shah, Mian Abdullah Shah, Statement of Facts, pp. 11-12.

\(^{73}\) Working Committee Resolutions, Congress Bulletin No. 13, 27 August 1930, F. No. 1(1930), AICC, NMML, p. 11.

\(^{74}\) On 5 March a provisional settlement was reached between the government of India and the Congress known as the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. The government agreed to release the arrested Congress political prisoners arrested during the civil disobedience and to withdraw the Ordinances promulgated in connection with the Congress’ movement. Congress agreed to stop the civil disobedience movement and end the boycott of British goods. For details see Annual Report of the CWC, December 1931, F. No. 85 (1931), AICC, NMML, pp. 11-19; IAR, 1931, I, pp. 83-5; Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, pp. 153-241.
declare his association with Congress, which he did. On 9 August 1931 the *Zalmo Jirga* and the Khudai Khidmatgars were formally federated with Congress, retaining their separate identity. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was made the leader of these organizations in the NWFP.  

Abdul Ghaffar Khan was criticized by a section of the Frontier Muslims for merging the Khudai Khidmatgars with the Hindu-dominated Congress. Some of his close associates, including Abdul Akbar Khan, Khadim and Ahmad Shah, saw the Khudai Khidmatgars losing their separate identity in the merger with Congress. Khadim was indignant over the ‘influence of the non-Muslims’ on the organization. Abdul Ghaffar Khan responded to the allegations and said* that he did it as a last resort because the Pashtoons needed help from outside the province in view of the atrocities and imprisonment that they were subjected to by the colonial government. He could see no harm to the Pashtoon interest in joining with Congress. He cited examples from the life of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.), who made certain alliances with Jews and Christians to safeguard the interests of Muslims. So, according to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, it was not sinful to join with Hindus and others in their joint struggle against British imperialism. The Khudai Khidmatgars, a regional organization, became part of the national stream of politics after its merger with the Congress. It gained popularity on an all-India level and its leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, due to his dedication to the cause of freedom and his adoption of nonviolence as a creed, was bestowed

---

75 ‘ Frontier Congress Affairs’, A Statement by the Secretary AICC, 10 August 1931, S. No. 1, Tendulkar, NMML, pp. 71-3; Nehru to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 2 October 1931, P-17 (1931), AICC, NMML, pp. 159-66; Report of Devadas Gandhi on the NWFP (1931), F. No. P-16 (1932), AICC, NMML, pp. 198-9; Report on Karachi Congress, F. No. 4, SBP, p. 209; Khaleeq, *Azadi*, pp. 100-101.

76 Press Statement of Abdul Akbar Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah, n.d., S. No.3, Tendulkar, NMML, pp. 914-18. The following verse was recited by Khadim on that occasion: *Bacha Imam Za Muqtaadi Wum Gandhi Imam Sho Zaka Zan La Niyat Tarhama* (When Bacha [Khan] was leading the prayers, I followed. Now Gandhi become the ‘Imam’ so I am offering my prayers separately).

77 Abdul Ghaffar Khan ‘Za Au Congress’, *Pakhtun*, June-July 1931, pp. 5-10; 1 August 1938, pp. 22-3.
the title of ‘Frontier Gandhi’. During the second phase of the Congress civil disobedience (1931), Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Frontier remained at the forefront of the national struggle. In December 1931, after the failure of talks between Gandhi and the British in the Second Round Table Conference at London, there was a general crackdown on the Khudai Khidmatgars. The leaders were arrested and their rank and file incarcerated. The Frontier Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars were banned. On 24 December the government of India issued three ordinances, applicable to the NWFP—the Emergency Powers Ordinance, the Unlawful Association Ordinance, and the UnlawfulInstigation Ordinance. These gave the Frontier authorities wide, and, to quote the Khudai Khidmatgars, ‘unchecked’ powers to exercise against political workers opposing the government. They were empowered to arrest, detain or control people, on suspicion.\footnote{Ordinances in the NWFP, 24 December 1931, \textit{IAR}, 1931, II, p. 30. ‘If Government was satisfied’, according to V. Elwin, ‘that there were any reasonable grounds for believing that any person had acted, was acting or was about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety he might be directed not to enter, reside or remain in any specified area. Penalty for disobedience was two years imprisonment, or fine or both. Officials were given powers to take possession of buildings, to control the supply of certain commodities of general use, to establish special courts and to outlaw any association which they might consider dangerous’. ‘What is Happening in the North-West Frontier’, Report of Father Verrier Elwin, [1932], F. No. 11 (1927), AICC, NMML, p. 8.}

Gandhi, on his return to India on 28 December, was informed of the arrest of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his associates and of the firing on unarmed Khudai Khidmatgars. He regarded it as the ‘Christmas presents’ that Willingdon, the Viceroy, chose to send him on his return to India.\footnote{Speech at a Public Meeting, Bombay, 28 December 1931, \textit{CWMG}, 48, (Ahmedabad, 1971), pp. 446-8.} Gandhi, reiterating his solidarity with his Frontier comrades, declared, ‘Last year we faced lathis, but this time we must be prepared to face bullets. I do not wish that the Pathans in the Frontier alone should court bullets. If bullets are to be faced, Bombay and Gujrat also must take their share’.\footnote{Ibid.}

Justifying the promulgation of Ordinances and the arrest of the Khudai Khidmatgars, the Viceroy was unwilling to discuss the
Frontier affairs with Gandhi. ‘No Government’, according to the Viceroy, ‘consistent with the discharge of their responsibility, can be subject to conditions sought to be imposed under the menace of unlawful action by any political organization...’.\(^{81}\)

After the arrest of the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders, the provincial authorities let loose the police and other law enforcing agencies to deal with the opponents of the government in ‘their own way’. The Khudai Khidmatgars were mercilessly beaten on minor pretexts. Burning of houses, looting, and destruction of property, forcible entry into houses, blockading of entire villages, looting of crops, and marching of columns in rural areas were only a few of the many examples of police excesses in Peshawar Valley. Volunteers were fired upon; in one incident in Kohat fifty Khudai Khidmatgars were killed. In Bannu the military was called to help the civil administration to restore order. In Dera Ismail Khan the situation remained under the control of the police. In Hazara, however, no trouble was reported.\(^{82}\) The provincial authorities accepted the responsibility for their brutal acts, but felt they could not go into the question of enquiries into these matters. The police actions were defended by the Frontier Governor, as according to him they were ‘faced with a supremely difficult task in dealing with the Red Shirt movement and it was vitally important to take

---

81 Telegram from Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 2 January 1932, CWMG, 48, p. 503.

no action (against the police) which might undermine their morale. \(^{83}\) By 1933, with the exception of Peshawar Valley, the civil disobedience in the rest of the province had become ineffective. Agitation continued sporadically until the movement was called off by Gandhi in April 1934. \(^{84}\) While the Congress workers in the rest of India were released, astonishingly the Frontier Congressmen and the Khudai Khidmatgars were not released and the organization in the NWFP remained under ban. Their release was demanded by the CWC \(^{85}\) but were informed by the government that, keeping in view the past record of its activities, the government had no intention either of releasing the Khudai Khidmatgars or of withdrawing the ban on the organization. \(^{86}\) Later on a shift in government policy became perceptible. Though the ban was retained, the Khudai Khidmatgars, excluding the Khan Brothers, were released. By the end of 1934, the Congress agreed to take part in the upcoming elections for the Central Assembly. Dr Khan Sahib, then imprisoned in Hazari Bagh Jail, was nominated as the official Congress candidate. \(^{87}\) The Khan Brothers were released from prison on 27 August but were not allowed to enter the NWFP. Abdul Ghaffar Khan delivered a number of speeches, some of which were considered as ‘anti-government and seditious’, and was accused of inciting the public against the government. On 7 December, he was re-arrested, convicted under section 124 of Indian Penal Code (henceforth IPC) and sentenced to two years

---


\(^{84}\) Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, p. 295.

\(^{85}\) J. Bajaj to Secretary Home Dept., 12 June 1934, IAR, 1934, 1, p. 299.

\(^{86}\) Ban on the Khudai Khidmatgars, IAR, 1934, 1, pp. 298-9.

\(^{87}\) The provincial Congress had nominated Dr Khan Sahib as a party candidate to contest the CLA elections held in November 1934. His opponents were Haider Zaman Khan (Hazara), a nominee of Sir A. Qaiyum, supported by pro-government Khans and Ram Das Bagai (Bannu), a Mahasabhite Hindu, assisted by M. C. Khanna. Dr Khan Sahib, won the seat by defeating his rivals securing 2884 votes against 1519 and 1072 votes respectively. For details see, Shad Mohammad, ‘Deed Wa Shuneed’, II, (Peshawar, unpublished), pp. 22-31; Yusufi, *Jaddo Jehad*, pp. 662-5; Khaleeq, Azadi, pp. 123-24, and, Gandhi to Saadullah Khan, 22 November 1934, CWMG, 59, (Ahmedabad, 1974), p. 385.
Rigorous Imprisonment. On 1 August 1937 he was released but was not allowed to enter the Punjab or the NWFP until 29 November. By the time he was allowed to enter the Frontier, there was a significant change in the political atmosphere of the Indian subcontinent. Confrontation had given way to parliamentary politics and of the full participation of the Congress in this process.

The most significant aspect of the whole Civil Disobedience Movement in the Frontier was the strict adherence of the Khudai Khidmatgars to non-violence. Despite the worst kind of repression by the Frontier authorities against the Khudai Khidmatgars they remained non-violent, a fact confirmed by the members of the India League who visited India to collect correct information ‘about the state of affairs’ there. According to them ‘the severity of the repression [in the NWFP] has produced something like a state of war in the Frontier. Yet, though the display of force on the British side is overwhelming, no British official claimed that the movement had been crushed. That non-violence against the persons of British officials still remains the rigidly observed rule of the national movement in an area where arms are so readily obtainable, and in fact are openly, and usually, owned by the villagers, is a tribute to the sincerity with which the creed has been embraced’.

The same characteristic of the movement was also mentioned by the AICC. They lauded the services of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars in the national cause and praised their strict adherence to non-violence; otherwise the NWFP, according to the Congress Bulletin, ‘would by now had witnessed a wholesale massacre of the European population’. The Pashtoons had ammunition in abundance in their houses. Only a few miles

---

89 IAR, 1936, II, pp. 187, 213; F. No. P-22 (1936), AICC, NMML, p. 3.
90 The members of India League (formerly the Commonwealth of India League) included: Bertrand Russell (Chairman), J. F. Horrabin, T. Williams, Anne C. Wilkinson, J. Marley and K. Menon. Conditions of India, pp. 521-2.
91 Conditions of India, p. 27.
away, the arms factories in the tribal belt manufactured all sorts of arms which, if the Pashtoon had desired, they could have easily smuggled into the settled districts. It was strict adherence to non-violence by the Khudai Khidmatgars that they remained non-violent in the whole Civil Disobedience Movement.

**Constitutional Developments**

From the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 until 1901, the Pashto-speaking Frontier districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Hazara, and Dera Ismail Khan remained within the Punjab province. The Punjab government also held control over the adjoining border tracts of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan, styled as political agencies. Curzon, who had an extensive knowledge of the area, believed that the region could be effectively administered only if it was accorded the status of a province. Consequently, as a result of Curzon’s initiative, the North-West Frontier Province came into being in 1901.

Despite gaining a higher constitutional status and presumably greater autonomy, the new province was denied the benefits of the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, and the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. The government viewed the settled districts as inseparable from the tribal territories and firmly believed that it would be inexpedient, almost suicidal, to offer representative...
institutions to the NWFP. In its opinion a large number of the crimes committed in the settled districts were the handiwork of tribesmen, or of their accomplices in the settled areas, who after committing the crimes sought safety from the authorities in the tribal areas. The government regarded the entire region as unstable, prone to crime, and being strategically located, unfit for any form of self-government. As late as 1927, the Simon Commission (appointed that year to re-examine the constitutional development of India and the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms) made these arguments quite forcefully.

The vast majority of the educated population of the province was anxious that they be treated the same as the other provinces of India on the question of constitutional reforms. However, the Hindu minority, feeling insecure, looked for official protection. Not only did it oppose the introduction of constitutional reforms; it asked for further strengthening of the power and authority of the executive. Its leaders also advocated re-amalgamation of the Frontier with the Punjab. By the 1920s the AIML was enthusiastically supporting the demand for reforms, while the Congress was indifferent to the debate. Many Frontier politicians, persuasively and passionately, argued the case for self-
government. They declared that attempts to withhold it from them was tantamount to its believing that the Frontier people were not Indians. During the early 1930s the Khudai Khidmatgars mobilized a massive movement for the purpose. By 1931, having joined the Congress in the anti-imperialist struggle, the latter too was demanding representative government and ‘complete autonomy’ for the province. As a result of the pressure of the

Liaquat Ali, Resolutions of All-India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936 (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 1, 18, 48. Also see, S. S. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, II (Karachi, 1969), p. 26. Sir A. Qaiyum, CLAD, 8 September 1925, pp. 978-80. Also see, Ibid., pp. 1296-1318. While demanding reforms for the NWFP, Sir A. Qaiyum asked the Government members ‘...can the Hon’ble Members occupying the opposite Benches say that we are not Indians’ and ‘that we are not part and parcel of India, that we have our sympathies more with the Afghans than with the peoples of these parts? Have we not fought against the Arabs? Have we not fought against the Turks? Have we not fought more than once against the Afghans themselves? Who defended the borders of India in 1919 and who has got the credit for it? In these circumstances will you not call me an Indian, even if I happen to oppose you? How many lives have we sacrificed for the purpose of defending the frontier of India? Are not the bones of my forefathers lying in the soil of Delhi? Are not the bones of thousand and one Pathans and other tribes lying in Delhi? Have not the Lodhis, Shershahis, Sherwanis and other tribes settled down in India? Then, why cannot a man coming from Peshawar be called an Indian if those people can be called Indians? I claim to be an Indian, and I claim my province to be a part and parcel of India. I have submitted to all your laws including the Indian Penal Code. All that I now ask is this. Why do you not apply another act to our province which is called the Government of India Act. What is there to prevent you from applying it to our province? You call this Act the Government of India Act. Why should you not extend it and apply it to the frontier when you can apply the Indian Penal Code to us?’

Ibid., p. 1310.


‘Memorandum from the Deputy Commissioner Peshawar to the Secretary of Chief Commissioner, NWFP’, No. 976, dated 9 September 1930, F. No. 22/37 KW 1931, ibid., pp. 4-5. Also see, ‘Report on the Causes of Recent Disturbances in Peshawar and the Other Districts of the NWFP’, Confidential Letter from the Chief Commissioner, NWFP to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi, No. 602 PC, dated Peshawar 13 February 1931, F. No. 22/37 KW 1931, NAI, p. 1; ‘Record of a Meeting Between Abdul Ghaflar Khan and Emerson’, 29 August 1931, S. No. 3, Part II, Tendulkar Papers, NMML, p. 876.
mass movement, the British conceded the status of a Governor’s province to the NWFP. On 18 April the Viceroy inaugurated the new Legislative Assembly. Thus a long outstanding demand of the politically conscious people of the NWFP was fulfilled. Henceforth, the NWFP would share the benefits of all future reforms enjoyed by the rest of India.

CHAPTER 3
THE FRONTIER CONGRESS IN OFFICE 1937-39

Elections of 1936-37

The NWFP, like the other Indian provinces, received a new constitution under the Government of India Act, 1935. One of the most important provisions of the Act was the grant of full provincial autonomy. The provinces were to have their own elected legislatures and cabinets were to be responsible to the legislatures. However, the vote was still based on property and minimum educational qualifications. Under the new Act, the Governor was to be the executive head of the province, administering the provincial affairs with the aid and advice of a Council of Ministers. The government announced that the Act of 1935 would come into force on 1 April 1937. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, described it as ‘the first stage towards the completion of that constitutional structure whose natural crown and summit will be the All India Federation...’ He assured the people of the non-interference of government in the intended elections.

The Act aroused mixed feelings among the Indian people. The Congress condemned it, and rejected the proposed constitution. Its attitude to the Act was ‘one of uncompromising hostility and a constant endeavour to end it’. The Congress demanded the election of a Constituent Assembly (CA) through adult franchise. However, as a strategy in the ‘game of political chess’, ‘it decided to contest the elections to the new legislatures’—‘not to co-

---

2 First Broadcast of Lord Linlithgow, 18 April 1936, IAR, 1936, I, pp. 95-6.
3 Ibid.
4 Presidential Address of Jawaharlal Nehru, Lucknow, 12 April 1936, IAR, I, 1936, p. 271.
5 Ibid. p. 272.
7 Lucknow Session of AINC, 12 April 1936, IAR, I, pp. 271-2.
operate in any way with the Act but to combat it and seek to end it.' 8 The All-India Muslim League termed the Act ‘most reactionary, retrograde, injurious, and fatal to the vital interests of India’. 9 However, like Congress, the League also advised the Muslims that the provincial scheme of the constitution ‘be utilized for what it is worth...’. 10 To some extent these criticisms were political postures. Both parties made them because they saw themselves as contenders for the power which was now on offer in the provinces. The only party which whole-heartedly supported the Act of 1935 were the Liberals. They endorsed the government’s view of the Act and pleaded that it should be put into effect both at the centre and in the provinces. 11

In the NWFP, the existing franchise was about 4 per cent of the total population and 12 per cent of the urban. The local government, as was envisaged in the report of Indian Franchise Committee (June 1932), showed no desire in further increasing urban enfranchisement. However, it recommended that 10 per cent of the rural population should be enfranchised. 12 Under the new arrangements, approximately 14 per cent of the total population of the NWFP, or a quarter of a million inhabitants of the province, were given the right to vote. 13

---

8 Congress Election Manifesto, IAR, 1936, II, p. 188.
9 Subjects Committee Resolutions at the Bombay session of AIML, 11 April 1936, IAR, 1936,1, p. 295; Presidential Address of Wazir Hasan at the annual session of AIML, 11-12 April 1936, Bombay, IAR, 1936, I, p. 294; Pirzada, Foundations, II, pp. 234-63.
13 The qualification’s for the electors of the NWFP were:
(a) ‘Ownership of immovable property, not being land assessed to land revenue, but including any building on such lands value Rs 600 or over.
(b) Tenancy of immovable property of annual rental value of not less than Rs. 48.
(c) Payment of rate, cess, or tax to a District Board of not less than Rs 50 per annum.
(d) Assessment to any direct municipal or cantonment tax of not less than Rs. 50.
(e) Income of Rs 40 per mensem or over.
(f) Ownership, or occupancy as occupancy tenant or tenant or lessee under a
On the AICC’s decision to contest the elections, the Congress workers in the NWFP started their election campaign. In the absence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr Khan Sahib took over the Congress leadership in the province. He toured various parts of the NWFP to reorganize the party. Abdul Ghaffar Khan guided him in his endeavours from prison.\(^{14}\) As the FPCC was still ‘illegal’, in October 1935 Dr Khan Sahib called for the formation of ‘Parliamentary Boards’ both at the district and provincial levels.\(^{15}\)

It was resolved to seek the sympathy and assistance of the ulema in the province; other political organizations would also be approached and asked for their support and co-operation in the elections. It was also decided that no general appeal for election expenses would be made to the public, and that all the expenses would be borne by the nominated candidates themselves.\(^{16}\)

Apprehensive of the support of the NWFP Muslims for the Congress, the provincial authorities promulgated Section 144 CPC, prohibiting demonstrations and processions and carrying of weapons within a radius of five miles of Peshawar city. The Congress interpreted this as ‘ridiculous’ and ‘direct interference’ in election affairs.\(^{17}\) The district administration was accused of ‘repressive policy’ and discrimination.\(^{18}\) Under continued pressure of public opinion, meetings were allowed but processions remained banned.\(^{19}\)

Elections for a fifty-member provincial legislature (thirty-eight Muslims, nine Hindus, and three Sikhs) were scheduled for
February 1937. In all 135 candidates were nominated. They represented various groups and classes, and in the main, four political parties and Independents. The parties were the Congress, the Muslim Nationalists, the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party (HSNP), and the Muslim Independent Party (MIP). The provincial Congress reproduced the election manifesto of the AINC. The Congress, according to its election manifesto, resolved firmly to continue its struggle for the independence of India. It promised immediate relief to a peasantry overburdened by various taxes. Furthermore, it disapproved of communal politics at all levels. The Frontier Congressmen observed 21 August as ‘Abdul Ghaffar Day’, demanding from the government permission for him to return to his province and take part in the forthcoming elections. The provincial government argued that, after his return, he might sabotage constitutional developments in the province. Criticism of Nawabs, title-holders, and big Khans was another important theme of the election campaign of the provincial Congress. It also promised to serve the masses and repeal repressive laws including the Public Tranquillity Act. Finally, it condemned the alleged anti-Congress interference of the bureaucracy in the elections.

The Parliamentary Board formed a three member subcommittee of Dr Khan Sahib, Qazi Ataullah, and Ram Singh in November 1936 to allocate party tickets. They selected thirty-seven candidates—twenty-nine Muslim seats and eight general. In the remaining thirteen constituencies including the two ‘landlord’ and three ‘Sikhs’ constituencies the Congress ran no candidate. After the last date of nomination in December 1936, the party suspended its campaign for two more seats—the Hindu urban seat in Peshawar and the Muslim rural seat in Tank—leaving thirty-five active

20 Administration Report North-West Frontier Province 1936-37, pp. ii-iii.
23 CID Diaries, 13 September 1936, F. No. 129, SBP, pp. 127-33 and 5 January 1937, F. No. 60, SBP, pp. 1-15. Full details can be seen in F. Nos. 30, 32, 58, 129, and 130, SBP.
24 Milap, Lahore, 5 January 1937; Prabhat, Peshawar, 8 January 1937.
25 IAR, 1937, I, pp. 68(n)-68(o).
candidates.\textsuperscript{26} It is of significance that the Congress High Command did not interfere in the election campaign of the Frontier Congress and left it to approach the electorate in its ‘own way’. However, in late November, the central organization deputed V. Patel and B. Desai to help the FPCC in its electioneering. They arrived in Peshawar on 28 November 1936.\textsuperscript{27} After completing their tour of the Peshawar Valley, they left for the southern districts of the NWFP, but were not allowed by the government to visit Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan.\textsuperscript{28}

The Muslim Nationalists with Sir A. Qaiyum as their leader were no match for the organized Congress. Though Sir A. Qaiyum had no formal party by his name during the elections, it was due to his personal influence that many retired servicemen and other title-holders, like Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan and Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan, when elected, gathered around him.\textsuperscript{29} They had no formal party organization or programme: their own stature in the Frontier society earned them these legislative positions.

The HSNP, consisted mainly of bankers, businessmen, and rich property owners who had all-India connections with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Akali Dal. They were against the ‘domination of the majority community’ in the legislature. They nominated candidates in eleven constituencies and reached an understanding with an Independent in a twelfth.\textsuperscript{30} The MIP consisted of a few urban lawyers, prominent among them were Pir Bakhsh and Khuda Bakhsh. Their election campaign mainly revolved around promises of early resolution of local problems.\textsuperscript{31} A large number of Khans stood as Independents. Their election campaign revolved around personal jealousies and factional considerations. The great number of the candidates from the Khanite ‘party’, sixty-six for thirty-five

\textsuperscript{26} Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 191; A.K. Gupta, \textit{North-West Frontier Province Legislature and Freedom Struggle, 1932-47} (Delhi, 1976), p. 66.
\textsuperscript{28} E. Jansson, \textit{India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan} (Upssala, 1981), pp. 68-9.
constituencies, was indicative of the disunity of the Khans.

In addition to these parties and splinter groups, the AIML also tried to establish itself in the NWFP. Jinnah, the League president visited the province in October 1936. He stayed there for a week, trying to bring various sections of the Frontier Muslims under the banner of the League. He, however, did not succeed in getting a single nomination from the Frontier Muslims on the League’s ticket.

The elections were held in the first week of February 1937. 72.8 per cent of the registered electorate cast their votes. While the Congress won nineteen seats, the HSNP took seven, the Independent Hindus one, MIP two, and Nationalist Muslims twenty-one. The Congress emerged as the largest party with nineteen members in the assembly. In the Pashtoon-dominated areas, mostly the Congress did well. In Peshawar Valley it proved itself to be the most popular political organization. In the rest of the province, the party managed to get one seat each in Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. In Hazara, unexpectedly it won two seats.

Sir A. Qaiyum’s Ministry: A Brief Interlude

After the polling was over, and the results, giving no party a clear majority, were announced, a scramble for power in the provincial assembly began. Though the provincial Congress, pending the decision of the AINC on the acceptance of ministries, remained out of the power game, others took an active part in it. On 27 February, a meeting of the elected Khans was held at Peshawar and they formed the United Muslims Nationalist Party (UMNP), with Sir A. Qaiyum as the party leader. The Muslim Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) from Hazara formed their own Hazara Democratic Party (HDP). The formation of the new ministry became a ‘serious problem’. The new party position in the provincial assembly was: Congress nineteen; UMNP nine; HSNP eight; HDP six; MIP two, and Independent Muslims six.

32 NWFP Administration Report, 1936-37, p. iii. ; Khyber Mail, 21 February 1937.
33 CID Diaries, 2 March 1937, F. No. 821, SBP, p. 21.
34 Khyber Mail, 28 February 1937.
In the absence of any single large group, on 16 March, Sir George Cunningham, the NWFP Governor, invited Sir A. Qaiyum to form a ministry.\(^{35}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and the FPCC were unhappy over this. They considered Sir A. Qaiyum to be the ‘spokesman of British imperialism’, \(^{36}\) and maintained that any ministry which Sir A. Qaiyum might be able to form would not last for a long time as he lacked popular support in the assembly.\(^{37}\) Cunningham was also doubtful of the popularity and strength of the ministry from the beginning, but justified his support on the grounds that the Congress was still refusing office, and he was left with no other option but to invite Sir A. Qaiyum to form his ministry.\(^{38}\) Cunningham persuaded the non-Congress MLAs to support Sir A. Qaiyum. He summoned Attai Khan, an HDP member, and asked him to muster support for Sir A. Qaiyum.\(^{39}\) But to the chagrin of the Governor, the HDP members made it abundantly clear that they would only support Sir A. Qaiyum if he took one of them into the cabinet.\(^{40}\) Then Cunningham focused his attention on the non-Muslims and succeeded in bringing them to the ministerial party;\(^{41}\) on 29 March, the HSNP conditionally joined Sir A. Qaiyum.\(^{42}\)

\(^{35}\) Khyber Mail, 18 March 1937; CID Diaries, 22 March 1937, F. No. 821, SBP, p. 39.

\(^{36}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Bombay Chronicler, Bombay, 20 March 1937.

\(^{37}\) CID Diaries, F. No. 8, SBP, p. 97.


\(^{39}\) Cunningham Diaries (hereafter CD), 13 March 1937, Mss. EUR., Cunningham Collection, D. 670/3, IOLR, p. 5.

\(^{40}\) CID Diaries, 22 March 1937, F. No. 821, SBP, p. 37.


\(^{42}\) CD, 29 March 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/3, IOLR, p. 9. The conditions on which the alliance was made included the withdrawal of Hindi Gurmukhi Circular (in 1935 an administrative circular made Urdu or English as mandatory language for instruction in government-aided schools; not complying with this would result in forfeiture of the grants. The non-Muslims interpreted it as an attack on their religion and culture since it prevented education in Hindi and Gurmukhi); inclusion of one member in the cabinet as minister and another as parliamentary secretary; 25 per cent quota in admissions and stipends in educational institutions and the same
On 1 April 1937, the ministry of Sir A. Qaiyum as Chief Minister, who also held the portfolios of Home Affairs, Education, Public Works, and Irrigation, was sworn in. The first session of the Frontier assembly was summoned on 14 April at Peshawar. Khuda Bakhsh was unanimously elected as the Speaker of the House, and M. Sarwar (HDP), the opposition nominee, defeated M. R. Kiyani of the ministerial party by getting twenty-nine against nineteen votes, to become the Deputy Speaker. As anticipated, the weakness of Sir A. Qaiyum’s ministry was evident from the first day of its formation. Dr Khan Sahib wanted to move a no-confidence motion against the ministry, but the speaker did not allow him to do so. The House was then prorogued, so the ministry was saved, at least for the time being.

Two important measures of the ministry were the cancellation of a circular that made Urdu or English as mandatory for instruction in government-aided schools, and the lifting of the ban on Congress and its affiliated organizations, thus enabling Abdul Ghaffar Khan to enter the NWFP, after an absence of about seven years on 26 August 1937. As the ministry had ‘neither time nor opportunity’, reported Cunningham, to do more ‘constructive’ work, it lost its credibility and popularity among the majority of Frontier Muslims. The Congress, until the end of the summer 1937, remained busy

25 per cent to the non-Muslims in to their appointments to the public services. M. H. Gazder to Jinnah, 10 July 1937, Quaid-i-Azam Papers (hereafter QAP) National Archives of Pakistan (henceforth NAP), Islamabad, F. No. 261, p. 8.

Other members of the cabinet included Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan as Minister for Agriculture (Public Health, Jails, Industries, and Commerce) and Rai Bahadur M. C. Khanna as Finance Minister (Revenue and Local Self. Government) Khyber Mail, 4 April 1937; CD, 1 April 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/3, IOLR, p. 10.

Khyber Mail, 11 April 1937.

Khyber Mail, 2 May 1937; GR, 17 April 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR, pp. 1-2; CID Diaries, 22 April 1937, F. No. 32, SBP, pp. 156-61.

Adjournment motions discussed on 15 April 1937, PLAD, pp. 7-8; Khyber Mail, 25 April 1937.

GR, 23 August 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR, p. 3. For more details see, Madina, Bijnore, 1 September 1937; Khyber Mail, 29 August 1937 and CID Diaries, 27 August 1937, F. No. 32, SBP, pp. 293-301.

with its manoeuvres against the ministry. These anti-ministerial activities of the opposition led many to believe that the fall of the ministry was inevitable, and it seemed to be a matter of only a few weeks.

The Congress success in the elections in the rest of India made the question of the acceptance of the office urgent, although it had shelved the issue since 1936. The Governors invited the leaders of the majority party to assist them in forming ministries. The Congress wanted an undertaking from the Governors that they would not use the special powers vested in them by section 93 of the India Act of 1935. Furthermore, the Governors were required to seek the advice of their ministers on important issues. No such undertaking was given, and Congress refused to accept office. On 21 June, the Viceroy assured Congress that under provincial autonomy, in all matters falling within the ministerial field, the Governor ‘will ordinarily be guided by the advice of his Ministers’ and that those Ministers ‘will be responsible’ not to the British parliament but to the provincial legislatures. After the formal assurances of the Viceroy were received, the AICC authorized the acceptance of offices in those provinces in which the Congress party was in an absolute majority. Congress ministries were formed in six provinces: Bombay, Madras, UP, CP, Bihar, and Orissa. After the formation of ministries in other Congress majority provinces, the Frontier Congressmen intensified their pressure for the formation of a ministry in the NWFP. They succeeded in winning over eight non-Congress members to their side.

Congressmen showed their willingness to have Abbas Khan, of the

49 GR, 9 June 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR, p. 2.
50 Congress succeeded in becoming a majority party in five provinces, namely Madras, UP, CP, Orissa, and Bihar; in Bombay it won nearly half of the total seats and became the largest single party in Bengal, Assam, and the NWFP.
53 Sitaramayya, History, II, pp. 52-3.
HDP, as one of its ministers, and to retain another member, Sarwar, as the deputy speaker. Khuda Bakhsh was assured of Congress support to retain his speakership; Chimnalal of the HSNP was promised a parliamentary secretaryship; two more were won over by similar methods. Thus, eight members of the Frontier assembly finally decided to give their support to Congress in forming the ministry.\textsuperscript{54}

Sir A. Qaiyum met the Governor in the first week of July and informed him of his intended resignation, but Cunningham insisted that he should continue.\textsuperscript{55} On 20 August, Cunningham received a letter signed by twenty-five members, informing him of the moving of a motion of no-confidence against the ministry.\textsuperscript{56} Sir A. Qaiyum made last minute efforts and met some members of the Khudai Khidmatgar and reminding them of his past services for the welfare of the Pashtoons, tried to dissuade them from moving a vote of no-confidence. To his utter disappointment they simply followed the party line and were not prepared to violate party discipline in any circumstances.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Formation of Dr Khan Sahib’s First Congress Ministry}

The provincial assembly met on 1 September in Abbottabad. On 3 September 1937, Dr Khan Sahib’s motion of no-confidence in the ministry was passed by twenty-seven votes to twenty-two. The twenty-seven comprised nineteen Congressmen, four Democrats, two Independents, and two members of the minority community who recently had resigned from the HSNP. The twenty-two included Sahibzada’s followers, the remaining members of HSNP, and some Independents.\textsuperscript{58} Apart from the mover and Sir A. Qaiyum no one spoke on the resolution. The speeches,\textsuperscript{*} as reported by the Governor, were ‘restrained in tone, and there was no

\textsuperscript{*} For speeches, see Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{54} Gupta, \textit{Freedom Struggle}, pp. 76-7.

\textsuperscript{55} GR, 26 July 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{56} CD, 20 August 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/3, IOLR, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{58} PLAD, 3 September 1937, pp. 93-8; IAR, 1937, II, pp. 277-8; Khyber Mail, 5 September 1937; Madina, Bijnore, 9 September 1937; CD, ibid., 3 September 1937, p. 26.
unpleasantness... Dr. Khan Sahib accused the ministers of following the old autocratic system. ‘The democratic institutions and instruments’, he added, ‘are not the only thing but it is the way to handle the spirit of democracy which counts; and I still further take the courage to say that we have to promote unity of aim and solidarity of sentiments which will help individuals to sink personal as well as group advantages for the common good of the motherland... Sir A. Qaiyum, while defending his ministry pointed out that despite the many obstacles in their way and the paucity of funds at their disposal, they did what was possible under the circumstances. He bemoaned the Khudai Khidmatgars affiliation with the Congress: ‘I for one cannot reconcile myself to the idea of taking any cue from people outside the Province and for that reason I wish, that the organization which is now to guide the destinies of this Province, had been indigenous and of local growth’. On 6 September, the Governor, NWFP, invited Dr Khan Sahib, the leader of the Congress party in the assembly, to form his own cabinet. On 7 September, the new ministers, four in number, were sworn in. The opposition mainly consisted of the Qaiyum party and the HSNP. Sir A. Qaiyum died on 4 December 1937. His death was regarded ‘a great loss’ to the people of the NWFP in general and the Khans in particular, who acknowledged him as their natural leader. His death left the Congress the ‘virtual masters of the province’. After the death of Sir A. Qaiyum, most of the members of his party joined the newly formed Muslim League, electing Sardar

59 GR, 6 September 1937, Mss, EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
60 Dr Khan Sahib’s speech, PLAD, 3 September 1937, pp. 93-4
61 Sir A. Qaiyum’s speech, Ibid., pp. 95-7.
62 Dr Khan Sahib became the Chief Minister and took charge of Political, Home, Public Health, and Public Works; Qazi Ataullah as Minister for Education, Local Self-Government and Revenue; Bhanju Ram Gandhi as Finance Minister and Abbas Khan Minister for Industries and Forests. The former three were Congressites while the fourth belonged to the HDP. CD, 7 September 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/3, IOLR, p. 27.
63 Khyber Mail, 5 December 1937.
64 CD, 4 December 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/3, IOLR, pp. 35-6.
65 Khyber Mail, 5 December 1937.
Aurangzeb Khan as its party leader in the assembly. The Khans and the urban politicians were at logger-heads in the assembly. The HSNP was divided on the question of supporting Congress thus giving an advantage to the latter. Until its resignation in November 1939, the Congress had twenty-four members in the Provincial Assembly.

The Performance of the Ministry: Social and Agrarian Issues

After having assumed office in the NWFP, the provincial Congress started the programme of economic and social uplift which it had publicized during its election campaign. Following the directives of the CWC, the salaries of the ministers were fixed. Travel allowances in various departments were reduced. Two departments, the Directorate of Agriculture and the Publicity Department were abolished. These steps of the ministry resulted in savings of several lakhs of rupees and led to a surplus in the annual budget.

Agrarian unrest was an important issue in politics both at the provincial and at the all-India level during mid-1938. One of the most important issues for the Congress was to improve the dire condition of the peasants. To Congress, the ‘final solution’ of the problem was ‘the removal of British imperialistic exploitation and thorough change of the land tenure and revenue systems and a recognition by the state of its duty to provide work for the rural unemployed masses’. As the agrarian conditions and land revenue system were different in every province, it directed the Provincial Congress Committees to help them in planning a full-fledged future agrarian programme for the subcontinent. The Congress formulated its agrarian policy and confirmed that it stood for a reform of the system of tenure, revenue, and rent; an equitable adjustment of the burden on agricultural land, giving immediate relief to the smaller, peasantry by a substantial

66 According to the CWC (Delhi 15-22 March 1937), apart from free government provisions for residence and conveyance, the salaries of Congress ministers, speakers and Advocates-General should not exceed rupees five hundred per month. Sitaramayya, History, II, p. 52.

67 Proceedings of the 49th session of AINC, Luknow, 12-14 April 1936, IAR, 1936, 1, p. 250.

68 Ibid.
reduction of agricultural rent and revenue paid by them. It demanded tax exemption on uneconomic holdings. It called for a radical change in the existing land revenue system which they considered as an ‘intolerable’ burden on the peasantry.69

During its election campaign, the NWFP Congress had approached the peasantry and sought their help and support. It had promised to reduce the revenue rates and to give the peasants takavi money, which should not be repaid but be utilized by the peasants.

To improve the condition of the poor agriculturists, the Agriculturists Debtors’ Relief Bill was introduced by the ministry in March 1938.70 According to official estimates the agricultural indebtedness of the rural population of India was about Rs 900 crores, out of which Rs.9 crores worth was sustained in the NWFP. The rural classes were annually paying one crore as interest, amounting to about six times the land revenue which they were paying to the government. ‘This state of affairs’, remarked Qazi Ataullah, the proposer, ‘is undoubtedly, most unsatisfactory and calls for immediate redress and relief. Elaborating on the pitiable condition of the peasants in the province, he informed the House that the exploitation of the peasants was by ‘those who are a little more literate or more intelligent and while they all are fed by him, he [the peasant] himself remains starving, half-naked and steeped in ignorance. Under such circumstances the additional burden of agricultural indebtedness on him is so pressing that it is the duty of a civilized Government to come to his rescue and do something for him’.71

Along with the Agriculturists Debtor’s Relief Bill, another bill of the same nature, the NWFP Agricultural Produce Market Bill, was

69 Resolutions passed by the 50th session of the INC, Faizpur, December 1936, G-85 (II) 1936, AICC, NMML, pp. 17-17a.
70 An agriculturists was defined in the Act ‘as a person who holds land as proprietor, under-proprietor, occupancy tenant, tenant-at-will, lessee, mortgagee or is holding any other interest in the land’. The total number of agriculturists in the Frontier Province, according to official estimate, were 640781. Out of them 632253 were Muslims, 8202 Hindus, 324 Sikhs and 2 Christians. Qazi Ataullah to Khanna, 22 November 1938, PLAD, p. 1107.
71 Qazi Ataullah on Agriculturists Debtor’s Relief Bill, 18 March 1938, PLAD, pp. 737-8.
introduced on 18 March by Abbas Khan. This Bill was aimed at protecting the peasants and small Zemindars from the high-handedness of the ‘middle-men’, mostly the mahajans (money-lenders) who dominated the markets. They habitually used all kinds of fraud to deprive the producers of their hard earned money. There were certain deductions from the produce in markets. The mahajans ‘take off a portion of the produce as the allowance of the weighman, another portion as dues of the chaukidar and still another as a cut for Dharamsala, Mosque or, Patshala remarked Abbas Khan. The producers were left with no other option but to accept the meagre amount offered by the mahajans, or else they were advised to take away their produce to another market and face its unknown vagaries. Thus the producers were compelled to dispose of their produce at the price proposed by the mahajan.\(^{72}\)

The Bills had communal implications. The minority community members of the House regarded it as an attack on the minorities in the province, though they were ‘less in number but otherwise well-off in many respects’. Khanna, Ajit Singh, Hukam Chand, Ishar Das, and Bhagai, the ‘communalists’ in the House, felt horrified by the Bills and came out openly in defence of the interests of the mahajans, the majority of whom were Hindus.\(^{73}\) The Muslim members of the House, including Aurangzeb, the opposition leader, Saadullah, representative of the landlords in the assembly, and Pir Bakhsh supported the movers and fully endorsed their views on the bills. The strong support from the opposition Muslim MLAs enabled the ministers to implement their decisions; the Bills were passed on 21 November 1938 and 5 April 1939 respectively, providing relief to the peasants in the NWFP.\(^{74}\)

On 3 March 1938, M. Afzal Khan, moved the Teri Dues Regulations Repealing Bill. He protested over the imposition of ‘inhuman and unjustifiable’ taxes in Teri: Tirni, Bua, and Haq Taluqdar\(^{75}\) by Nawab Baz M. Khan of Teri, himself sitting on the

---

\(^{72}\) M. Abbas Khan on the NWFP Agricultural Produce Market Bill, PLAD, 18 March 1938, pp. 85-7 and 119.

\(^{73}\) For details see, PLAD, pp. 742, 1097-1152. Also see GRs 22 and 23, 21 November 1938 and 9 December 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.

\(^{74}\) PLAD, 5 April 1939, p. 1448.

\(^{75}\) Tirni imposed on cattle-grazing, Bua, a house tax from non-agriculturists
opposition benches in the House. The Jagir of Teri was conferred by the British on Khwaja M. Khan, the grandfather of Baz M. Khan, in recognition of his services to the Raj during the crucial days of 1857, and the Afghan Wars. Baz M. Khan, according to the mover, had no documentary evidence to support his claim as the owner of Teri; thus he had no right to impose taxes on the Khattaks inhabiting the area. This aroused controversy in the House. Aurangzeb believed that the Bill aimed ‘at the deprivations of private property’. Saadullah believed it be ‘merely interference in vested rights to say that these dues should not in future be realized by the Khans’. Syed Jalal and Nawab Zafar Khan expressed similar feelings and supported Baz M. Khan. Justifying the taxes, Baz M. Khan cited their services to the Crown since the advent of the British Raj in the subcontinent. To him, the ‘Bill has been brought on account of pure malice and is intended to punish the Khan’. A. R. Nishtar, an Independent member elected from Peshawar (urban), endorsing the views of Afzal Khan, pointed out that the law which gave the possession of Teri to the Nawab was ‘not the law of the land’, but it was the law of the landlord, and, ‘now the time has arrived that we should pass laws which are laws of the land; laws whereby the interests of the people are to be safeguarded and not the people be sacrificed [sic] for the sake of one or two individuals’. The Bill was put to the vote. The majority of the members gave their verdict against the Nawab, and it was passed. Cunningham, to whom the Bill was sent for his assent, regarded it as ‘the Ministry’s attack on the Khans’ and believed that its ‘passage has caused a considerable impression among all classes and that the Congress are using it as propaganda

---

76 H. Edwards to Financial Commissioner, 3 February 1855, Peshawar, Mallam Papers, I, CSASC, pp. 1, 8.
77 M. Afzal Khan on Teri Dues Regulations Repealing Bill, PLAD, 5 March 1938, pp. 139-44.
78 Aurangzeb, ibid., pp. 168, 245.
79 Ibid., pp. 183, 185, 236, and 237.
80 Nawab Baz M. Khan, ibid., pp. 247-52.
82 PLAD, 5 March 1938, p. 259.
to show that the British can no longer guarantee assistance to their supporters which they had enjoyed in the past’. A prolonged debate began between the Governor and his ministers on whether the taxes, already mentioned, were ‘part of the Nawab’s jagir, in which case their abolition was ultra vires of the provincial assembly, or if they were some other form of due’. Cunningham, giving vent to his feeling in support of the pro-government Khans, decided finally to withhold his assent to the Bill. For Dr Khan Sahib this matter was so significant that he threatened to resign. However, a compromise was reached and the Governor returned the Bill to the assembly to repeal the Teri Dues Regulations ‘with the request that *haq taluqdari* be omitted from the purview of the Bill, for the reason that it represents certain rights of superior ownership and is an integral part of land revenue’. The assembly acceded to the ‘request’ of the Governor; Baz M. Khan was allowed to retain the *haq taluqdari* and relinquish his privileges in respect of *bua* and *tirni*. Thus a ‘satisfactory solution’ of a ‘difficult case’ was reached.

**Unrest in Ghalla Dher and Muftiabad**

The non-Congress Khans, threatened by the pro-peasant policies of the Frontier ministry, viewed these steps as a direct threat to their prestige and position in the province. Moreover, the rent relief provisions passed by the ministry was a financial blow for the big Khans. The peasants, on the other hand, took the promised relief for granted. The election promises made by the Congress led the tenants to believe that once in power, they would no longer have to pay rent.

The Frontier Congress soon found itself in a baffling situation. As it was the Government, it had to protect and sustain law and order, while on the other hand as a self-proclaimed representative of the peasants it could not be expected to harm their interests. In the

83 GR, 10 March 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
85 Telegram Cunningham to Linlithgow, 6 May, 1938, Jansson, *Pakhtunistan*, p. 82.
86 GR, 7 July 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
87 Ibid., 21 November 1938.
NWFP, as in Bihar and the UP, it had to face exasperated Congress workers who were out in the streets against their own governments, demanding that they should fulfil the election promises by giving relief to the workers and the peasants.\(^{88}\) The Frontier Congress ministry, which earlier advocated the case of the tenants, became sceptical of helping their cause when they prevented collection of revenues. By September, collections were four lakh below normal and in Peshawar alone the outstanding revenue and water rates were 60 per cent. The ministers’ attitude changed towards the tenants, and in order to avoid a financial crisis they were compelled to favour stern actions against them in order to collect the revenue area.\(^{89}\)

The most serious agrarian problem which the ministry faced was in Ghalla Dher—a small village in Mardan district. It had a population of about two thousand. The residents were mostly Muslim peasants with a small number of Hindu zemindars.\(^{90}\) Most

---


89 Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 244.

90 Gurudasmal, a wealthy zamindar of Ghalla Dher became prominent by helping the police in restoring law and order in the area. For his services, he was issued licences for keeping fire-arms. His eldest son Jamuna Das, entered politics, joined the Congress and became an MLA on the Congress ticket. Hari Kishan, second of the nine sons of Gurudasmal joined Naujawan Bharat Sabha. On 23 December 1930, he fired on the Governor of the Punjab, at the convocation of Punjab University, Lahore, who escaped death. However, the firing resulted in the killing of Chanan Singh, a sub-inspector of police on the spot and injuring Budh Singh, a CID inspector and Miss Dermitt of Lady Hardinge Women’s College, Lahore. Hari Kishan was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death. On 10 June 1931,
of the lands in Ghalla Dher belonged to Nawab Hamidullah Khan of Toru, who used to collect heavy rents and some ‘illegal’ taxes from the peasants. After the death of Hamidullah, his belongings and wealth, including his land in Ghalla Dher, was divided among his four sons. Azimuthullah Khan, the western educated youngest son of the late Nawab, appointed some of the local men as his agents to look after the estate. In the spring of 1938, Azimuthullah, whom Cunningham had termed as a ‘notoriously bad landlord’ had developed problems with his tenants in Ghalla Dher. The Nawab imposed fines on the whole village. The Ghalla Dheris, Hari Kishan was hanged in Mianwali jail. The third son, Bhagat Ram started his political career by joining the Khudai Khidmatgars and became prominent in escorting Subhas Chandra Bose from Peshawar to Kabul on his escape from India. The remaining six brothers, before Partition had confined themselves to getting education. Bhagat Ram Talwar, The Talwars of Pathan Land and Subhas Chandra’s Great Escape (Delhi, 1976), pp. 3-35; Interviews with Ishar Das Talwar and Manohar Lal Talwar, New Delhi, 24 January 1995.

91 It was a common practice in the area that after the harvest, the crops were divided into two parts: share of the landlord and of the peasant. The agents of the Nawab, abusing their authority, tended to demand as much as possible out of the peasant share in the name of the patwaris and other related revenue officers. Then the peasant had to provide for the guests of the Nawab and for the cattle of the Nawab, and likewise many other deductions were made from his share. Another tax called Tora was levied on both the bride and the bridegroom, irrespective of their social status, on the occasion of their marriage and it was to be given to the Nawab; bigar (forced labour without any wages) too existed; and in cases of disputes and quarrels among the tillers, the Nawab usually exercised his judicial powers, imposing fines and sometimes physical punishments, thus adding to his treasury and striking terror among the peasants. For more details see, Warns, Azadi Tehreek; R. S. Nagina, Surkhposh Kisan or Tehreek Ghalla Dher (Peshawar, 1939) and B. Ram, The Talwars of Pathan Land.

92 A bullock belonging to one Gulzada trespassed into the fields of another tiller in Ghalla Dher. The matter was reported to Azimuthullah Khan who fined Gulzada Rs 40. As he had no other means to pay, to recover the fine, Gulzada’s bullock was carried away by the Nawab’s men and was sold. This aggravated Gulzada, who uprooted the newly planted orchard of the Nawab and threw the plants into the river. The exasperated Nawab fined the entire village of Ghalla Dher. This created a stir among the peasants and sparked off the agitation against the Nawab. B. Ram, The Talwars of Pathan Land, p. 50.

93 GR, 8 August 1938, Mss. EUR., D 670/14, IOLR.
who were politically conscious since their participation in the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, already had their differences with Azimullah. Protesting over the high rates of revenue that they already had to pay, they refused to pay the fines.\(^{94}\) In June, the Nawab obtained eviction orders from the civil court but failed in the execution of those orders. The tenants resisted the evictions; even after being evicted they returned and cultivated some of the resumed lands.\(^{95}\) On 13 June, the district administration, supporting the Nawab, arrested the ring leaders of the tenants. More arrests were made on 15 June.\(^{96}\)

It would be worthwhile to understand, at this point, the quality of leadership, the support from the political parties, and the cause of the initial successes of the movement against the Nawab. The leaders of the movement can be classified into two groups: those who personally suffered because of the socio-economic system, and those who came as members of the Frontier Congress Socialist Party (formed in 1935 at Peshawar) to uphold the peasant cause without any vested interest. In the initial stages it was the local leadership which was more effective. The leaders of the latter group assumed a bigger role as the movement developed and gained momentum.

Local leaders of the Frontier Congress Socialist Party, including Akbar Shah, Mian Mukarram Shah, Mian Mohammad Shah, and Ajun Khan, were approached by the Ghalla Dheris and were asked to help the peasants against the ‘tyrannies’ of the landlords. They agreed to support the ‘just cause’ of the tillers. Under the presidentship of Sahib Shah, president Ghalla Dher Congress Committee, a meeting was convened and attended by most of the villagers of Ghalla Dher. It was resolved to resist the evictions. Copies of the resolutions were sent to Dr Khan Sahib, Ghulam M. Khan, president Provincial Congress Committee, Amir M. Khan, the local MLA, and to some leading newspapers of the province.\(^{97}\) However, no reply was received from the Provincial Congress Committee. Amir M. Khan, argued for a peaceful settlement

---

94  *Tribune*, 30 June 1938.
95  GR, 8 August 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
between the Nawab and the tenants. He was opposed by Amir Khan, secretary, Ghalla Dher Congress Committee who accused him of protecting his own class interests against those of the poor peasants.\footnote{Warris, Azadi Tehreek, pp. 170-71.} Warris Khan, an active participant of the movement, was empowered by the local Congress Committee to enlist volunteers to carry on the Satyagraha against the high-handedness of the Nawab and the apathy of provincial Congress leaders. A ‘War Council’ was formed and a whirlwind tour of the adjacent areas was made.\footnote{The members of the ‘War Council’ included the prominent members of FCSP, local leaders of the movement and Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai (Peshawar). Warris, Azadi Tehreek, p. 177; Nagina, Surkhposh Kisan, p. 19.}

The movement intensified in August 1938, and the Congress Socialists were in the forefront of the demonstrations. The Congress government was facing a complex situation. The Premier, as a custodian of the law, had to prevent any breakdown of order resulting from the agitation, and at the same time had to safeguard the interest of his party workers. Perturbed over the interference of the Socialists, he paid an impromptu visit to Ghalla Dher. The peasants nominated Akbar Shah, Bhagat Ram, and Faqir Mohammad, pleader, to negotiate on their behalf with the Premier. They met Dr Khan Sahib and demanded from him a complete ban on bigar; withdrawal of tora; a ban on the eviction policy of the Nawab; abolition of malba (tax for supporting the guests of the Nawab); restrictions on giving khar dhari (tax collected for the donkeys, horses, and other livestock of the Nawab); a complete restriction on illegal fines and physical harassment of the peasants. The negotiations failed to give any positive results.\footnote{Nagina, Surkhposh Kisan, pp. 35-6.}

The Khudai Khidmatgars were in an awkward situation. The high command accused the Congress Socialists of creating class hatred, thus weakening the Congress organization in the province. Their views were endorsed by the Frontier officials. The Governor also confirmed the role of the Socialists in the movement and expressed his displeasure over the alarming situation.\footnote{GR, 23 August 1938, Mss. EUR., D 670/14, IOLR.} The Mardan District
Congress Committee convened a special meeting to discuss the issue. After condemning all those who had taken part in the ‘disorders’ at Ghalla Dher, it appealed to the Socialists not to create any friction between the landlords and the peasants, for it might lead to endless and dangerous blood feuds, disturbing the ‘peaceful atmosphere’ of the province. The District Congress Committee further warned them of expulsion from the Congress organization if they continued to support the agitation.102 The FPCC, at its meeting, held at Abbottabad, instructed the Congressmen and Khudai Khidmatgars not to take part in the ‘Socialists Satyagraha’103 against the landlords of Ghalla Dher.104 The Congress rank and file, appalled at the behaviour of the ministry towards the peasants, supported the Ghalla Dheris. When most of the tillers in Ghalla Dher were arrested and their crops left unattended, the Khudai Khidmatgars of the adjoining areas came and cultivated the lands of the arrested peasants, giving a moral boost to the peasants’ case against the landlords.105

The Frontier government could not remain a silent spectator for long. It was advised by certain newspaper editorials in the local press that to delay action would be dangerous for the peace and tranquillity of Mardan and the whole of the NWFP.106 It struck out at the root of the peasant movement, arrested the ring-leaders and promulgated section 144 in the Mardan district and the adjoining

102 Tribune, 12 August 1938; CID Diaries, Mardan, 26 August 1938, F. No. 132, SBP, p. 159.
103 An author who used the nomenclature ‘One who knows’ commented that ‘it is a pity that under the advice of their Socialist friends, who, in their search for cheap notoriety and leadership, are ever eager to fish in troubled waters and draw their inspirations from the works of Lenin and Marx instead of looking to their immediate surroundings, they decided to resort to extra-constitutional methods and according, launched upon a campaign of civil disobedience. Several of them have forced the hands of the authorities to arrest them because of their active interference with the lawful and peaceful activity of those of their fellow tenants who would not make common cause with them’. Khyber Mail, 9 September 1938.
104 Khyber Mail, 21 August 1938.
105 Ibid.
areas. On their refusal to furnish security, the arrested leaders were sentenced to six months to two years Rigorous Imprisonment, and sent to Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, and Haripur jails. On 30 August, the Nawab, with the help of the law enforcing agencies, made another attempt to seize the land and hand it over to new tenants, brought from other parts of the province. The old tenants present on the occasion offered resistance but were arrested. Their arrest was followed by the Satyagraha of their womenfolk; their wives, sisters, and mothers—about a hundred in number, with red flags in their hands and Holy Qurans on their heads—came out abusing the Nawab. They resisted the forcible entry of the Nawab’s men by throwing themselves in front of the plough-cattle. To ‘preserve the peace’, the desperate police resorted to lathi charges, causing injuries to twenty women and children. The infuriated ‘invaders’, having failed to gain possession of the land, fell on the standing crop and destroyed it.

On 5 September, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, accompanied by Arbab Ghafoor, Baz M. Khan, Saif-ul-Muluk and Samin Jan, visited Ghalla Dher. He met the peasants and inquired about their grievances. The peasants refused to talk to them until their arrested

---


108 The Socialists are making propaganda out of the incident’, commented Cunningham, ‘to the effect that Dr Khan Sahib, the representative of the poor, is imprisoning those who endeavour to improve the lot of the peasant’ and that ‘Present indications are that the Chief Minister will succeed in securing the support of his party for the action taken, but there is no doubt that the Socialists are trying to disaffect some of the Congress rank and file...’ OR, 3 September 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR. Interviews with Akbar Shah, Badrashi, 8 September 1984; Haji Mohammad Asim, Nowshera, 30 October 1984; Warris Khan, Rashakai, 3 June 1987; Khyber Mail, 28 August and 25 September 1938; Tribune, 25 August 1938.

109 ‘Press Communique issued by the Provincial Government on Lathi Charge on the Women’, Khyber Mail, 18 September 1938; Dr Khan Sahib’s reply to Jamuna Das, PLAD, 5 November 1938, pp. 240-68; Warris, Azadi Tehreek, p. 190; Nagina, Surkhposh Kisan, pp. 64-5.
comrades were released.\textsuperscript{110}

When the news of the Ghalla Dher incidents and the conviction of the political prisoners became known, the supporters of the peasants\textsuperscript{111} came out to champion the cause of the arrested Congress workers, noted Khudai Khidmatgars, and Socialists, accusing the ministry of insolence towards them. Some moderate local Congress leaders offered their services in negotiating an honourable accord between the ‘warring parties’. Meanwhile, Bakhshi Faqir Chand, one of the ringleaders of the movement, managed to reach Delhi. He appeared before the Political Prisoners Conference, held on 23 September, which was attended by the Congress Premiers, including Dr Khan Sahib. In an acrimonious manner he told the whole story of the happenings in Ghalla Dher and the insolent behaviour of the Frontier ministry towards the peasants there. His speech created a stir among the members, some of whom\textsuperscript{112} accused the Frontier ministry of high-handedness. Dr Khan Sahib, denouncing the ‘organisers of the agrarian trouble at Ghalla Dher, asserted that the basic principles of the law must be sustained’.\textsuperscript{113}

The All-India Socialist Party deputed N. Dev, Munshi Ahmad Din, and M. R. Masani to inquire into the grievances of the peasantry against the Congress ministry in the NWFP and to work out a solution. In October, the delegation arrived in Peshawar and met Dr Khan Sahib who assured them that the problems would be

\textsuperscript{110} Nagina, \textit{Surkhposh Kisan}, p. 68; Pakhtun, 11 September 1938.

\textsuperscript{111} Hazara Congress Committee; Peshawar Naujawan Sabha; Sweepers Union, Bannu; Kohat Congress Committee; Rawalpindi Congress Socialist Party; Municipal Employees Union, Rawalpindi; Socialist Party, Lahore; Socialist Party Amritsar and Kisan Sabha Bihar were few among those who demanded from the Congress high command to give their special attention to Ghalla Dher. The Socialists from Dera Ismail Khan, Khanpur, Rawalpindi, Amritsar, Patna, and many other parts of the country resolved to send volunteers to participate in the movement. Nagina, \textit{Surkhposh Kisan}, pp. 71-2; \textit{Khyber Mail}, 4 September 1938.


\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Khyber Mail}, 2 October 1938; GR, 7 October 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
solved within a few days. However, they were not allowed to visit Ghalla Dher, as the Frontier Premier was against ‘outside interference’. In November 1938, all the convicted persons in the Ghalla Dher agitation were released unconditionally. Dr. Khan Sahib put a ban on the illegal taxes levied by the Nawab, and promised to improve the general conditions of the peasantry in due course.

The movement had some remarkable characteristics. The peasants adhered totally to non-violence. Furthermore, despite the fact that the communal card was used, it did not involve Hindu-Muslim division, and religion was kept completely out of the picture. Forcible evictions of peasants were stopped.

Finally, most of the ulema, who belonged to the Khudai Khidmatgars, supported the peasant movement and used Islamic and Pashtoon symbols without making it a communal issue. This was in strong contrast to contemporary Bengal. In fact there was no scope for giving this peasant agitation a communal colour because both peasants and the landholding groups were almost exclusively Muslims.

Another case of agrarian unrest, though not on as large a scale as in Ghalla Dher, occurred in the summer of 1939, in Muftiabad, a village in Charsadda. Land measuring about 650 jaribs (bigas) belonged to the Muftis of Peshawar (K.S. Mufti M. Yaqub Khan, and Mufti Taj M. Khan) who leased it to one Zardad, a Mohmand, at Rs 121- per jarib. For some time the lessee was regular in payment, but later on defaulted and eventually refused to pay anything. The owners, who were absentee landlords, secured ejectment orders from the court, and with the help of police ejected Zardad from his house and land. Under the court order the house was locked up. Ubaidullah, the eldest son of Dr Khan Sahib, intervened at this stage and after breaking the locks urged Zardad

---

114 Nagina, Surkhposh Kisan, p. 88; Gupta, Freedom Struggle, p. 96.
115 Dr Khan Sahib’s reply to Khanna, 16 November 1938, PLAD, pp. 797-8.
118 Khyber Mail, 1 July 1939.
to reoccupy the house, which he did.

Dr Khan Sahib, himself in charge of law and order, took stern action against Ubaidullah and his associates. Ubaidullah was charged with obstructing government officials in carrying out ejectment orders against a certain tenant.\(^{119}\) He was arrested and tried under section 454/186 IP Code and was sentenced to eighteen months Rigorous Imprisonment.\(^{120}\) His arrest was followed by a general crackdown on his sympathizers and friends, most of whom were Socialists. The number of arrests exceeded two hundred.\(^{121}\)

The Khudai Khidmatgars were directed by the organization to remain aloof from the agitation sponsored by the ‘anti-Congress elements’ in the province. It was decided to expel every member from the organization who joined the agitation against party directives.\(^{122}\) Ubaidullah was accused of helping the Mohmand peasants for personal motives—to further his aspiration of assuming leadership.\(^{123}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan denounced Ubaidullah and his group and held them responsible for creating disunity among the Khudai Khidmatgars.\(^{124}\) The FPML initially supported the agitation and endorsed Ubaidullah’s views.\(^{125}\) But it ‘soon became apparent’, reported the Governor that ‘as landlords they cannot afford to encourage disrespect for law among tenants’,\(^{126}\) and they withdrew their support. As there was no ideological basis for it, the motivation of the people subsided and the movement came to an end. On 14 July, about two hundred and fifty prisoners arrested during the agitation were released, followed by the release of their leaders a few days later.\(^{127}\)

\(^{119}\) *The Bombay Chronicle*, 23 May 1939.
\(^{122}\) CID Diaries, 5 June 1939, F. Nos. 48, 49, SBP, pp. 403-407 and 23.
\(^{123}\) Ibid. 26 June 1939, F. No. 49, pp. 49-55; Interview Abdul Ghani Khan, Charsadda, 1 February 1987 and 3 February 1989.
\(^{124}\) *Pakhtun*, 21 July 1939, pp. 5-9.
\(^{125}\) CID Diaries, 3 June 1939, F. No. 770, SBP, p. 135.
\(^{126}\) GR No 11, 9 June 1939, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR.
\(^{127}\) *Pakhtun*, 21 July 1939, p. 17.
Curtailing the Privileges of the Notables

The next target of the Congress ministry was the curtailment of certain privileges ‘misused’ by the notables in the NWFP. Its first target was the abolition of the institution of the Honorary Magistrates. In the NWFP their number was about three hundred, and in most cases, they were big Khans, Khan Bahadurs title-holders, and Jagirdars, authorized by the colonial government to exercise judicial powers on its behalf. It was a hereditary post; the only requirement being ‘service’ to the Raj. In September 1937, Arbab Ghafoor, Congress member from Peshawar, moved a resolution in the assembly demanding the abolition of the institution of Honorary Magistrates. His argument was that in most cases they were ignorant of law. With no formal court premises, they were unable to pay much attention to cases and were preoccupied with their own domestic problems. Moreover, as the institution became hereditary, personal likes and dislikes and party feeling were rampant. The resolution created mixed feelings. Nawab M. Zafar Khan, an opposition member, himself an Honorary Magistrate, refuted the allegations of Arbab Ghafoor and remarked that ‘we serve the people more than those who have orderlies at their doors’, and that ‘when the question of justice comes in we do justice’.

Mian Zia-ud-Din, and Aurangzeb, two other opposition members, representatives of the Muslim intelligentsia, supported the resolution and regarded the system as having ‘outgrown’ its utility. Abdur Rab Nishtar also vehemently criticized it and declared that ‘this system cannot be mended, and, therefore, it should be ended’. The motion was carried in the assembly and the Honorary Magistrates ceased to function from 7 October.

130 Nawab Zafar Khan, Ibid., pp. 142-3.
131 PLAD, pp. 144-150.
132 Nishtar, ibid., pp. 152-5.
133 Ibid, p. 158; Khyber Mail, 10 October 1937.
He anticipated ‘a good deal of heart-burning among some of those who have been most loyal to the Government in the past’. However, he was convinced of the merit of the case and claimed that the ministry’s move was ‘right’.

Another measure of the Congress ministry which added to its popularity was the abolition of the Zaildari and Lambardari system. The duties of zaildars included helping officials in the collection of revenue, and assisting and supervising the lambardars, the semi-hereditary official revenue collectors. Besides performing their duties as tax and revenue collectors, in some cases the lambardars also performed police duties and acted as village head-men, extracting 5 per cent of the land revenue and 3 per cent of the water rate as payment. According to the revenue minister the number of lambardars were 7425. Cunningham was not happy with the abolition of the lambardars, whom he considered active supporters of the government. Apart from the collection of revenue, the services of the lambardars were utilized by the government in the suppression of the Khudai Khidmatgars in the 1930s. In February 1938, Cunningham reported that the Congressites were planning to throw the whole system of lambardari open to elections. “This would probably mean’, noted the Governor, ‘the disappearance of several thousands of these village headmen, whose office is largely hereditary, in favour of people who in many cases would probably have little influence in the village either for the collection of revenue (their chief duty) or for the prevention of crime’. He was determined to save these allies of the British Crown. ‘Such an upheaval might cause widespread tumult, and would probably attract my special responsibility’. The zaildari system was abolished; but the lambardari could not be removed for the time being, as the Governor NWFP put every possible obstacle in the way of the ministry, and side-tracked the issue whenever it came up for

134 Summary of Events, Mss. EUR., D. 670/17, IOLR, p. 10.
135 GR, 9 October 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
136 Summary of Events, Mss. EUR., D. 670/17, IOLR, p. 10.
137 Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 239.
138 Qazi Ataullah, PLAD, 28 March 1939, p. 851.
139 GR, 9 February 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
140 Ibid.
discussion, until the ministry had resigned.

Next to go were the Inamkhors. The inamkhors were appointed under the Punjab Revenue Act of 1887, and were given remuneration in the form of either cash or land under the inam scheme. In March 1938, a Bill recommending the forfeiture of the jagirs and inams of big Khans was moved by the treasury benches. In the NWFP, the total number of such inams was about seven hundred. They were granted for ‘good services’ to the Crown—helping the government in times of ‘crisis’, and associated with transborder affairs. The duties of the inamkhor included assistance in the district administration; sometimes they performed the duties of zaildars.\(^{141}\) The Governor, though not pleased with the abolition of the inams, especially in the trans-border regions, reluctantly allowed the passage of the Bill in March 1938.\(^{142}\) After the abolition of the above institutions, the ministry relieved the villagers of their unpaid duties of naubati chaukidari. Under this system, introduced under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, the villagers were required to serve as night watchmen in rotation, and of course, without any remuneration. It had become unpopular among the villagers, as the Khans, and, at certain places, the police and other officials were exploiting their position and misusing their authority. The main reasons put forward in support of its abolition are that it is abused by the police and other officials to punish villagers for failure in the performance of duty and, secondly, villagers who have worked all day in the fields, cannot be expected to perform watch duty by night’, remarked Cunningham.\(^{143}\)

The ministry also suspended the practice of nominating sons and near relatives of the Khans to important administrative jobs, and stressed that all government posts in the future would be filled in by competition. The FPML took it as a blow to the prestige of the Khans and other influential Muslims and criticized the orders of the Congress government. The orders, according to Mian Zia-ud-Din, would result in the majority of posts being given to Hindus,

---

141 Qazi Ataullah, 9 March 1938, PLAD, pp. 433-4.
142 Forfeiture of Inams and Jagirs, F. No. 59, SBP, pp. 59-61; Pakhtun, 11 October 1938, pp. 8-9.
143 GR, 10 January 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR; Pakhtun, 11 October 1938, pp. 6-9.
The Frontier Congress in Office 1937-39

who were better educated than the average Frontier Muslim. The steps of the Frontier Congress government aroused ambivalent reactions in political circles. While most of its supporters inside and outside the legislature welcomed them and viewed them as a great achievement by a popular ministry, it was condemned in several quarters. By abolishing the office of the Honorary Magistrates, the Congress government was accused of depriving itself and the district officials of the active support and help of local dignitaries in the suppression of crime. Moreover, zaildenafil had been used by the police in the maintenance of law and order, and they helped the revenue collectors in the collection of revenue from certain localities. By abolishing the institution of zaildenafil, the Congress government ‘over burdened’ the civil authorities. Moreover, after the abolition of jagirs, and forfeiture of inams, the jagirdars and inamkhors were not morally bound to help the government. The ministry was accused of being ‘too rash, hasty, and idealistic in its reforms’. The FPML, having recently re-appeared on the political scene of the NWFP, was the main beneficiary. It capitalized on the grievances of the Khans against the ministry; every anti-Khan step of the ministry was exploited by the Leaguers. The ministry, which, according to Cunningham, ‘had no difficulty in finding the vulnerable points in the Khans armour’, was accused of being an anti-Muslim and an anti-Khan ministry. The Khans considered the Muslim League to be the only bulwark against the attacks of Congress. They joined the League in large numbers, thus providing a base, for their future manoeuvres against Congress and the nationalists.

Educational Reforms

Aware of the educational backwardness of the Frontier Muslims, the ministry paid due attention to education. In September 1937, a debate initiated by Jaffar Shah on the introduction of Pashto as medium of instruction in primary schools took place. Jaffar Shah highlighted the importance of primary education in one’s mother

144 CID Diaries, 10 January 1938, F. No. 766, SBP, p. 21.
146 GR, 24 June 1938, Mss. EUR., D 670/14, IOLR.
tongue and not in an unfamiliar language—the ‘study of which entails so much waste of their time’. He compared the NWFP with other provinces of the subcontinent such as Bengal, Sindh, and Gujrat, where children were educated in their mother tongues.\footnote{Jaffar Shah, 28 September 1938, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 604-605; \textit{Pakhtun}, 1 May 1938, pp. 5-9.} Amir M. Khan, after supporting the views of the mover, demanded that Urdu should not be enforced in schools where only three students out of eighty spoke Urdu.\footnote{Amir M. Khan, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 60460-5.} Surprisingly, Aurangzeb also supported the resolution and said, ‘What a peculiar position it is that you have to ask a Pashto-speaking infant to start learning Urdu first and then learn mathematics or geography through a language which he himself does not know’.\footnote{Aurangzeb, ibid., 28 September 1937, pp. 606-608.} Mian Zia-ud-Din advised the non-Pashtoons to learn Pashto. ‘Those who want to live with us’, he declared, ‘must learn our language. We cannot go into a country and expect that the country will change its language for us.’\footnote{Mian Zia-ud-Din, ibid., pp. 619-20.} This emphasis on the need for primary education in Pashto was part of the nationalists’ efforts in promoting the use of various provincial languages. Sarwar (Hazara), Ishar Das (Hazara), and Khanna (Peshawar, Urban) opposed the resolution and urged the government not to enforce Pashto on non-Pashto speaking people. They demanded that it should be left to the option of the people and not be enforced as a compulsory subject or medium of instruction. Dr Khan Sahib and Qazi Attaullah opined that it should be introduced in those areas which ‘are predominantly Pashto-speaking’.\footnote{For more details see, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 605-614, 621-2; \textit{Khyber Mail}, 21 November 1937.}

The ministry intended to introduce compulsory primary education, and allocated funds in the 1938-9 budget for fifty new primary schools for boys, and ten new schools for girls.\footnote{Ibid., 2 March 1938, \textit{PLAD}, p. 61.} Communal schools were discouraged and it was decided to have one school in each village, under the direct supervision of the education ministry,
open to all the three communities of the area.\textsuperscript{153}

Another step, which the FPML regarded as a disservice to Islam and against the interests of the Frontier Muslims was the discontinuation of \textit{Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam}\textsuperscript{154} books in the schools by the Frontier government. The books were introduced by the education department in 1936 on the recommendation of the Text Book Committee.\textsuperscript{155} The books contained details of the life of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and other important Muslim personalities, and, therefore were objected to by the Hindus and Sikhs on religious grounds. A representative delegation of the minorities met Dr Khan Sahib during his visit to the southern districts and demanded its withdrawal from the District Board Schools, to which the Premier agreed. The ministry notified teachers that they should not enforce these books on non-Muslims, and thus provided ‘an excellent opportunity for propaganda’ to the FPML.\textsuperscript{156} This step, it was alleged, would injure the feelings of the whole Muslim community.\textsuperscript{157} The local Leaguers organized public meetings and protested at the exclusion of the \textit{Anjuman} books from the schools.\textsuperscript{158} Qazi Ataullah made it clear that they ‘should be replaced by the other books of the \textit{Anjuman}’ and they ‘can be taught where there are no Hindu or Sikh boys’.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{Introduction of ‘Goondas Bill’}

During the Congress ministry in the Frontier, there was an increase

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{153} \textit{Khyber Mail}, 8 May 1938; Qazi Ataullah, 8 March 1938, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 417-18.
\item \textsuperscript{154} In 1884, in Lahore, some notable Muslims established the \textit{Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam} (Society of the Supporters of Islam) to promote the modern education among the Punjab Muslims. As the NWFP was then a part of Punjab, the activities of the \textit{Anjuman} were also extended to the NWFP. They prescribed certain books carrying details of the life history of the Holy Prophet and other Muslim divines for the inclusion into the curriculum of the primary education. I. H. Malik, ‘Identity Formation and Muslim Party Politics in the Punjab, 1897-1936: A Retrospective Analysis’, \textit{MAS}, 29, 2 (1995), pp. 293-323.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Qazi Ataullah, 14 November 1938, \textit{PLAD}, p. 646.
\item \textsuperscript{156} GR No. 12, 24 June 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Saadullah, 3 November 1938, \textit{PLAD}, p. 101.
\item \textsuperscript{158} \textit{Khyber Mail}, 26 March 1938.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Qazi Ataullah, 27 March 1938, \textit{PLAD}, p. 725.
\end{footnotes}
in the growth of crime. There were 664 cases of murder during 1937; 702 murders in 1938, and 491 till August 1939 as compared with 558 in 1936; 576 in 1935, and 514 in 1934. Kidnapping, looting, and arson combined to have a very high incidence, especially in the southern districts of the NWFP. The sufferers in most cases were members of the minority community; however, in some cases Muslims were also victims. Most of the cases were attributed to the forward policy of the central government in Waziristan. Nehru condemned government Frontier policy and regarded it as a complete failure. ‘It is ultimately one of advancing and occupying more territory,’ remarked Nehru, ‘so as to remove the theatre of war a little further away from their present base’.

Congress, according to Nehru, had repeatedly declared that it had no quarrels with its neighbours and that it desired to cultivate friendly and co-operative relations with them. He was sure that if the people of the tribal belt were approached in a humane way, they would fully co-operate in maintaining law and order rather than challenging it.

During his visit to Bannu in August 1938, Abdul Ghaffar Khan also criticized the policy of the central government towards Waziristan and the Frontier tribes. He was of the firm opinion that the tribal raids were organized with the connivance of the

---

160 PLAD, 20 September 1939, p. 422; Pakhtun, 21 May 1938, pp. 5-8.
161 Bhanju Ram to Asaf Ali, 5 May 1937, P-16 (i) 1937, AICC, NMML, pp. 32-3.
162 Khanna, in a debate on constituting an Inquiry Committee on increase of crime in the province informed the House that how three Muslims, Jamal, Jamshed, and Adil Mir resisted the offensive on Nizam Bazaar, Bannu. Adil Mir was shot dead in cold blood and, Jamal and Jamshed were sent outside the province by the authorities to escape death. PLAD, 20 September 1939, p. 477.
163 Details on Government’s Waziristan policy can be seen in R. I. Bruce, The Forward Policy and Its Results (London, 1900); T. L. Pennel, Among the Wild Tribes of Afghan Frontier (Karachi, 1975); Laiq Shah, Waziristan (Lahore, 1993); Andrews, The Challenge of the North-West Frontier, Davies, The Problems of the North-West Frontier, L. Shah, Mullah Powindah (Lahore, 1994); Gul Ayub Saifi, Bannu Au Da Waziristan Tarikh (Bannu, 1969); Swinson, North-West Frontier.
government officials in order to defame the ‘national government’ and to provide grounds for their continuing with the forward policy on the Frontier. To win over the sympathies of right wing Hindu leaders in the assembly and to mould public opinion in their favour, the central government itself, according to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, organized the raids on Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The Frontier officials, according to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were telling subordinates to follow their instructions and not those of the Congress ministers, who had held office for a very brief period.

The Asaf Ali Commission, appointed by the Congress to probe into the riots in the southern districts, also suspected the latent hostility of certain executive officers against the Congress ministry. Cunningham, reported that at the inception of the Congress ministry there was a general fear of victimization among the bureaucrats. As they had shown favouritism to anti-Congress circles, they were afraid of reprisals by the Congress ministers. But Dr Khan Sahib assured the officials of their cooperation and friendly behaviour. Towards the end of the Congress ministry these apprehensions disappeared and, to the satisfaction of the Governor, no case was reported to him ‘in which the ministry tried to victimize an official unjustly, or take action against anyone who was doing his work honestly and efficiently’.

The tour of Abdul Ghaffar Khan to the southern districts had restored a good deal of confidence amongst the minority communities. After assurances were given to them by the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders, a significant number of the rural population who had migrated to the big cities returned to their areas.

---

166 Abdul Ghaffar Khan on non-cooperation of the officials with the Congress ministers, Pakhtun, 21 November 1938 and ‘Alleged Non-Cooperation of officials with the Ministry’, PLAD, 17 March 1938, pp. 14-15 and 23.
168 GR, No. 11, 24 September 1937, No. 15, 23 November 1937, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
169 Summary of Events in NWFP, (September 1937-November 1939), D. 670/17, IOLR, p. 12.
However, the raids were soon resumed, and the issue came up for discussion in the provincial assembly. The non-Muslim MLAs asked the government to give priority to the matter as the lives and properties of non-Muslims in the southern districts were threatened by tribal ‘raiders’. Dr Khan Sahib, after accepting the responsibility of the Congress government to redress the sufferings of the minority communities in the Frontier, informed the House of the various steps the government was taking for the protection of their life and property.\footnote{For details see, Debate on Committee of Inquiry into Increase in Crime in North-West Frontier Province, \textit{PLAD}, 20 September 1939, pp. 475-504.} Dr Khan Sahib’s personal interest in the matter was regarded as ‘reasonable’. His frequent visits to the southern areas and his advice to the local people to assist the police in the maintenance of law and order had restored confidence in the border villages.\footnote{GR No. 14, 9 November 1937, Mss. EUR., D 670/14, IOLR.} 

But Dr Khan Sahib himself was not satisfied with the steps taken by the ministry in that regard. Eventually, on 25 September 1939, the Frontier Congress ministry ‘very reluctantly’ decided to introduce ‘a special piece of legislation’ known as the ‘Goondas Bill’.\footnote{Dr Khan Sahib, \textit{PLAD}, 14 September 1939, p. 112.} It was meant to deal with those undesirable and recalcitrant elements who were a threat to the peace and tranquility of the province. It empowered the government to intern or expel any ‘miscreant’ without giving any reason, and it provided no opportunity for the accused to seek redress in a court of law. Under the bill the trials were to be held \textit{in camera}; the accused was not to be given the right to be represented by a counsel; the names of the witnesses against the accused were not to be disclosed so that there would be no cross examination. The Bill aroused mixed feelings in the assembly. Khanna termed it a ‘black law’, aimed at the opponents of the government.\footnote{Khanna, 28 September 1939, \textit{PLAD}, p. 671.} To Saadullah the aims and objectives of the Bill were to curb the activities of the members of the opposition.\footnote{Saadullah, ibid., p. 684.} Nishtar, after condemning the Bill, accused Dr Khan Sahib of following in the footsteps of British imperialism and pursuing its ‘hated traditions’ of ruling through repressive
laws. The FPML, according to the Governor NWFP, ‘have taken strong exception to this measure and are said to be organizing some form of civil disobedience in protest’. To the Leaguers, the act, although meant for the badmash, would be used to stifle the opposition. Despite the opposition of the Hindu communalists, the Leaguers, and some Independents, the Bill was carried on 25 September 1939. To the great satisfaction of the FPML, the Governor withheld his consent. The Khyber Mail appreciated the action of the Governor and welcomed it as a gesture of good will by the administration towards the people of the Frontier.

**Constitutional and Electoral Issues**

The question of ‘Federation’ was another issue which attracted the attention of the provincial Congress ministry during its tenure of office. In March 1938, a resolution was moved by C. C. Ghosh against the ‘imposition of the Federal Scheme upon India’ considering it as a ‘bulwark against India’s freedom’. He criticized the active participation of the Princes and the Federating States who had no democratic institutions in their states. It was pre-planned, remarked Ghosh, ‘to have a conservative element in the Central Legislature which would be well established by means of more numerical representation of the States in the Federal Assembly’. The important role of the Governor-General then came under criticism. The special powers of the Governor-General and his influence over financial matters were considered ‘as to

---

177 GR, 9 October 1939, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR. On 25 September, the day of its passage in the assembly, the local Leaguers organized an ‘absolutely peaceful’ demonstration against ‘the most obnoxious and retrogressive piece of legislation passed by any assembly’, outside the assembly hall. The demonstrators were dispersed by the police and ten Leaguers were arrested. The arrested persons were released unconditionally by the Congress ministry during the first week of November 1939. Mian Zia-ud-Din to secretary AIML, 3 November 1939, F. No. 206, AFM, pp. 68-9; CID Diaries, 28 September 1939, F. No. 771, SBP, pp. 221-37; Khyber Mail, 5 November 1939; Pakhtun, 21 November 1939, p. 15.
178 Ibid.
179 Khyber Mail, 10 December 1939.
181 Ibid., p. 467.
over-ride the popular wishes'. Nishtar, endorsing the views of Ghosh, proposed to the central government that ‘nothing less than a federation of free India comprised of democratic units with adequate safeguards for all minorities can satisfy them’. There was no controversy and the resolution was passed unanimously.

Another controversial matter brought before the House was the introduction of joint electorates in the elections to the local bodies in the NWFP. The ministry decided to introduce this with the reservation of seats for the minorities in the elections.

This act of the ministry was termed as an ‘outstanding achievement’ and was regarded ‘well ahead of the rest of India’. The Leaguers in the assembly were perturbed over the new developments taking place in the Frontier. They condemned the Frontier ministry for infringing the Communal Award, thus acting against the interests of Indian Muslims. Aurangzeb insisted that any decision on such a vital issue should be discussed between the Muslims and Hindu representative bodies—AIML and the AINC. But Qazi Ataullah bluntly refuted Aurangzeb’s verbosity about the League’s status as the ‘true representative of the Mussalmans’ or the Congress as merely a ‘Hindu body’. The FPML exploited the ‘wrong steps’ taken by the Congress ministry giving the latter a religious colour, and tried to incite public feeling against the ‘anti-Muslim’ measures of the Frontier Congress and thereby ‘breed bitterness’.

Resignation of the Ministry

On 3 September 1939 Britain declared war on Germany and asked her Dominions to follow her. The Dominion Parliaments met

---

182 Ibid., p. 468.
183 Nishtar, ibid., p. 469.
184 PLAD, 9 March 1938, pp. 466-97; CID Diaries, 10 March 1939 and 21 March 1939, F. No. 34, SBP, pp. 207, 221-39; Gupta, Freedom Struggle, p. 84.
185 Khyber Mail, 30 October 1938, 21 November 1938 and 29 January 1939.
186 Aurangzeb, 14 November 1938, PLAD, p. 648.
187 Qazi Ataullah, quoted in Gupta, Freedom Struggle, p. 89.
188 Arbab Ghafoor, ibid., p. 209; 1AR, 1938,1, p. 210; Khyber Mail, 6 November 1938.
189 IAR, 1939, II, p. 21; Gazette of India, 3 September 1939.
The Frontier Congress in Office 1937-39

and endorsed the decision. In India, the Viceroy, without consulting public opinion, declared that India too was at war with Germany. It was at this stage that Congress demanded constitutional concessions in return for assistance in the war on the British side. The British refused any concessions to the Congress demands and asked for unconditional support, which the Congress rejected. On 22 September the Congress called upon its ministers to resign.\textsuperscript{190}

The CWC advised its ministry in the NWFP to follow the rest of the Congress ministries and tender its resignation.\textsuperscript{191} The ministry called a special session of the assembly on 6 November and introduced the war resolution in it. Dr Khan Sahib, the mover, protested at the declaration of war by the British government without consulting the peoples’ representatives in the country. He demanded that the British should treat India as an independent nation entitled to frame its own constitution.\textsuperscript{192} Jaffar Shah moved an amendment declaring the disassociation of the ministry from British war aims.\textsuperscript{193} Aurangzeb, on behalf of the FPML, urged the British government not to make any commitment concerning a future constitution ‘without the approval and consent of the All-India Muslim League which alone represents and can speak on behalf of the Mussalmans of India...’\textsuperscript{194} The League leader repudiated the charges against the AIML of being opposed to the independence of India. ‘All-India Muslim League is as much anxious as you are for a free India’, he added, ‘but I am certainly not for a free India in which I am to continue as a slave’.\textsuperscript{195} The Congress claim to represent the entire country was challenged by Aurangzeb as, according to him, it did not represent the Muslims, ‘untouchables’, and a sizeable number of Hindus and Sikhs. He was of the opinion that the interests of Muslims could not be safe in Congress hands. In the Leaguer’s opinion\textsuperscript{196} it was improper for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Sitaramayya,\textit{ History}, II, pp. 124-44.
\item Resolution moved by Dr Khan Sahib, 6 November 1939, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 4-7.
\item Jaffar Shah, 6 November 1939, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 8-13.
\item Aurangzeb, ibid., pp. 14-21.
\item Ibid.
\item Raja Abdur Rahman, 7 November 1939, \textit{PLAD}, pp. 82-3. To inquire into
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the Congress to bargain with the British at such a critical time when they were engaged in a war of life and death. Apart from the FPML, the Hindu communalists and Sikhs in the NWFP also supported the British stand. Khanna advised his community to give their whole-hearted support to the British and regarded it as the duty of Indian people to fight for the Crown. Ishar Das and Ajit Singh endorsed the views of Khanna and urged the Congress to help Britain in time of war, which would put Britain under obligation which it would be bound to honour at the end of the war.

The Congress MLA criticized the League’s pro-British role. They denounced and challenged the Leaguers’ claim to be the only Muslim representative organization in the subcontinent. Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Ahhrs, the Khaksars, apart from the nationalist Muslims, according to them, were all out of the League fold, thus proving its claims of Muslim representation on an all-India level to be frivolous. The debate resulted in the passing of the Congress resolution. On 7 November 1939 Dr Khan Sahib’s Congress

the Muslim grievances in the Congress majority provinces, the AIML appointed three Committees. The first one was The Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces. The report, also known as the Pir Pur Report after its chairman Raja Syed Mohammad Mahdi of Pir Pur, was published at the end of 1938. The Report includes a summary of injustices meted out to the Muslims in all Congress majority provinces excluding the NWFP. Second one was the Report of the Enquiry Committee appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to enquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar, published in March 1939 was also known as Shareef Report after the name of its draftsman S. M. Shareef. It explains in detail the atrocities perpetrated by Hindus in various places in Bihar. The third one was about the allegation of Fazl-ul-Haq, known as Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule, published in December 1939. It also accused the Congressites of suppressing the Muslims in the Congress majority provinces. For more details see, Coupland, Indian Politics, pp.185-9; J. Ahmad, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Lahore, 1970), pp. 258-332.

197 Sardar Bahadur Khan, 7 November 1939, PLAD, p. 106.
198 Khanna, 6 November 1939, ibid., p. 27.
199 Ishar Das, 7 November 1939, ibid., p. 116.
200 Qazi Ataullah, Arbab Ghafoor, 7 November 1939, ibid., pp. 103, 133.
ministry resigned.\footnote{IAR, 1939, II, p. 40; Pakhtun, 11 November 1939, p. 11; Pakhtun, 11 February 1940, p. 7.} On 11 November, Cunningham, seeing no possibility of an alternative ministry in the Frontier, assumed full administrative and legislative powers under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and prorogued the assembly indefinitely.\footnote{Notification of Gazette Extraordinary quoted in, Khyber Mail, 12 November 1939; GR, 24 November 1939, D. 670/15, IOLR.}

On the resignation of the Congress ministry, the provincial League, following the directives of its president Jinnah, celebrated 22 December 1939 as a ‘day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress regime at last ceased to function’.\footnote{M. H. Sayyid, M. A. Jinnah (A Political Study), (Lahore, 1945), p. 655; Khyber Mail, 24 December 1939; CID Diaries No. 51, 22 December 1939, F. Nos. 792, pp. 179-85 and F. No. 772, pp. 211-17, SEP.} The League celebrations had embittered communal feelings locally. The HSNP, reported Cunningham, ‘has countered the scheme by submitting a resolution for consideration at the Hindu Mahasabha Conference, proposing that a committee should tour India to enquire into the difficulties and injustices from which Hindus have suffered as the result of the pro-Muslim policy of the Congress and non-Congress Ministries’.\footnote{GR, 9 December 1939, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR.}

The resignation provided a chance for the British government to manage its war affairs through the Governor NWFP without the slightest hindrance to legislative control or disturbance from any quarter. The FPML hoped that the resignation of the Congress ministry would mean that they would be able to rise to power. Eventually the Khudai Khidmatgars came to consider its own ministry as inimical to their interests since it had curbed their radical politics. They felt that the time was now ripe to revive it. With the resignation of the ministry, Congress abandoned the ‘constitutional’ path which it had adopted since 1934, and once again plunged into politics of protest.
CHAPTER 4
REVIVAL OF THE FRONTIER MUSLIM LEAGUE

Although Jinnah was able to establish some contact with sections of the Muslim intelligentsia and other elite groups of the NWFP, at that time the Muslim League enjoyed only limited support. During his visit to the province in 1936, Jinnah failed to elicit mass support for the League. Consequently the League was unable to field even a single candidate in the 1937 elections. However, since some of the big Khans lent support to the Muslim League after the death of Sir A. Qaiyum, it registered some success in the by-elections of 1938. In popular perception, the League was viewed as a party of the elite—of Khan Bahadurs, jagirdars, various other title-holders, some big Khans—and, as pro-British in its politics. Therefore, it was never able to gather mass support in this period. The League members carried out ‘communal’ propaganda against the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Congress. Its leaders sought to mobilize the people with tales of ‘Hindu atrocities’, but failed because there was no sense of ‘Islam in danger’ in the NWFP. The majority of the NWFP Muslims were not interested in the communal ideology of the League, as their foremost concern was to get rid of British imperialism.\(^1\)

On the announcement of the elections to the provincial assemblies, like other political leaders, Jinnah, the newly elected president of the AIML, initiated an election campaign. He transformed a practically ‘dead organization’ into an organized body. Jinnah was authorized by the League to organize the election boards at central and provincial levels.\(^2\) The main task before Jinnah was to unite and bring together heterogeneous Muslim political organizations on one platform. He started from the Punjab, one of the Muslim strongholds in the subcontinent. Though he knew that Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Sikandar Hayat, who dominated the political scene in the Punjab, were opposing the AIML, he invited Sir Fazl-i-Hussain

---

to preside over the League’s annual session. The ‘Grand Old Man of Unionism’ opposed the Muslim League and warned Jinnah to ‘keep his finger out of the Punjab pie’ as he would get nothing by using the name of the Muslim League there. In contrast to the Punjab, the AIML found a favourable situation in Bengal. After the elections the AIML played a key role in the ministry-making game and became the backbone of the Fazlul Haq ministry. In Sindh and the NWFP the Muslim League failed to perform well.

**Jinnah’s First Frontier Visit (1936)**

Jinnah was eager to learn more about the NWFP—the only Muslim majority province that had very strong connections with the AINC. He contacted Yusufi, an old Khilafatist of Peshawar about general conditions in that province. He also informed Sir A. Qaiyum of his planned visit to the NWFP and asked him for his help and support in this regard. As a government servant, Sir A. Qaiyum

---

3 ‘...at this moment’, Jinnah wrote to Fazl-i-Hussain, ‘no one can give a better lead to the Mussalmans of India than yourself. We want a man of your calibre and experience, and nobody can well, at this critical moment as far as I can see, perform that duty and render that service to the community as you would be able to’. Jinnah to Fazl-i-Hussain, 5 January 1936, Hussain Collection, Mss. EUR., E. 352/17, IOLR, pp. 23-4.

4 A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 21; and A. Hussain, *Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, A Political Biography* (Bombay, 1946), pp. 297-321. ‘Why Jinnah has not done’ remarked Fazl-i-Hussain, ‘what any ordinary practical man would have done—revive the Provincial League and give it a good start and stress the need of opening its branches in all the districts. He has done seemingly nothing except talk and talk and talk. He apparently believed that he was so clever that he will get people to agree to become his nominees and serve on the Central Board and then they will be responsible for running the elections in the province. So the scheme is purely a paper one’. Fazl-i-Hussain to Sikandar Hayat, 6 May 1936, Mss. EUR., E. 352/16, IOLR, pp. 43-4. For more details see, I. Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi, 1988), pp. 86-7, and, A. Jalal and A. Seal, ‘Alternatives to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars’, *MAS*, 15, 3, (1981), pp. 432-54.


6 For a detailed discussion of Muslim League’s failure in Sindh see S. Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power*, pp. 115-17.

7 Jinnah to Yusufi, 12 September 1936, Yusufi Personal Collection, Karachi.

8 Shad, ‘Deed’, II, p. 77.
could not send a formal invitation to a politician. However, he introduced Jinnah to prominent members of the Muslim Independent Party, including Lal Badshah, Pir Bakhsh, and Khuda Bakhsh. Moreover, Sir A. Qaiyum offered his residence to Jinnah during his stay in Peshawar, which he accepted. The Muslim Independent Party leaders sent a formal invitation to Jinnah, then at Lahore.

While discussing Jinnah’s Frontier visit, mention must be made of the rivalries of local Peshawar urban politicians. Nishtar, and Pir Bakhsh, both lawyers, nursed considerable hostility towards each other. The main reasons were personal—the aspiration for leadership. When Nishtar was informed that his rival had invited Jinnah to visit the province, he felt this would benefit the election campaign of Pir Bakhsh and his group. Nishtar sent Yusufi, one of his close associates, whom Jinnah knew, and Rahim Bakhsh, to dissuade him from his visit to the Frontier. The local leaders, according to Nishtar, were at loggerheads with each other and would definitely pay no heed to Jinnah, and thus his mission to the NWFP would fail. But Jinnah refused to listen to their advice and remained insistent. Nishtar tried again, met Jinnah at Nowshera railway station on his way to Peshawar, and urged him to postpone his visit, at least for the time being. But Jinnah remained adamant, and told Nishtar that his visit to the NWFP was part of the re-organization of the Muslim League in that province for the forthcoming elections.

Political circles in the NWFP were looking forward to Jinnah’s visit to the Frontier with great excitement and interest. On 9 October 1936, at a meeting of Congress workers, it was resolved to meet Jinnah at the railway station, and request him not to deliver speeches against the Khudai Khidmatgars in the NWFP as it would

---

9 Ibid., pp. 77-8.
12 Yusufi, Siyasiyat Sarhad Key Irtaqai Manazi (Karachi, 1972), pp. 72-3.
certainly lead to an unpleasant situation.\textsuperscript{13}

Jinnah arrived at Peshawar railway station on 18 October, and was greeted by prominent leaders of the Muslim Independent Party and other Muslim notables including Sir A. Qaiyum.\textsuperscript{14} He was taken in a procession through the city to the residence of Sir A. Qaiyum in Yakatut.\textsuperscript{15} That evening Jinnah met some prominent Congress members of the NWFP. Under the leadership of Ghosh, the team included Dr Khan Sahib, Qaim Shah, and Qaiyum. They remained with Jinnah for an hour, but nothing is known of what transpired.\textsuperscript{16}

On 19 October, under the auspices of the MIP, Jinnah addressed a political meeting at Shahi Bagh, attended by about a thousand people. The meeting was presided over by Lal Badshah, and Pir Bakhsh acted as the secretary. He translated Jinnah’s speech from English to Urdu. The general tone of Jinnah’s speech was chiefly confined to the organization and party programme of the AIML. However, he briefly stated the changes that would take place in the administration on the introduction of the new constitution and advised the Muslims to organize themselves under a strong party, the AIML—representing the Muslims in the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{17} On the same day, addressing the students of Edwardes’ College, Peshawar, Jinnah elaborated on the policy and programme of the AIML,\textsuperscript{18} and, he advised the students to advance themselves politically and academically.\textsuperscript{19}

On 20 October, Jinnah visited the Islamia College, Peshawar and made a ‘stirring’ speech at the Khyber Union. His main emphasis was on the unity of Muslims. ‘Today your province’, said Jinnah, ‘is in the grip of outside influences and internal divisions, and it is an irony of fate that those who opposed the progress and constitutional advance of your province are still able to exercise

\textsuperscript{13} CID Diaries on Jinnah’s Frontier Visit, 12 October 1936, F. No. 30, SBP, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{14} For more details see, Shad, ‘Deed’, II, pp. 83-7; Anwar, ‘First Visit’, pp. 316-17.
\textsuperscript{15} Shad, ‘Deed’, II, pp. 86-7.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p. 87.
\textsuperscript{17} CID Diaries, 27 October 1936, F. No. 765, SBP, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Anwar, ‘First Visit’, p. 318.
sufficient influence to prevent the creation of solidarity of Mussalmans in your province’. ‘Islam expects every Muslim to do his duty’, added Jinnah. ‘You, my young friends, show the way by your own example, lead your province and go forward united on a single platform, under one flag and to speak with one voice’.\textsuperscript{20}

During his stay in Peshawar Jinnah was permitted by the authorities to visit Landi Kotal and Torkham. This was a deliberate ‘concession’ to Jinnah, as in the past political activities of every kind in the tribal territory, including the visits of politicians, were strictly forbidden, and no one, not even Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had been allowed to go there. A delegation of leading tribal chiefs met Jinnah and apprised him of the injustices of the government, particularly the snatching of Khajuri Maidan in 1930 as a punishment for their taking sides with the Congress Civil Disobedience Movement, and other humiliations. They asked Jinnah to raise his voice in their favour on the all-India level, to which Jinnah agreed.\textsuperscript{21}

On 23 October, Jinnah held a private meeting with certain local political figures. These included Sir A. Qaiyum, Hakim Abdul Jalil, Kuli Khan, and Abdur Rahim, however, no details of the meeting are available. It is probable that they discussed the formation of the Muslim League in the NWFP.\textsuperscript{22} On Jinnah’s suggestion a branch of the Muslim League with Khuda Bakhsh as president, Pir Bakhsh as secretary, and Hakim Abdul Jalil, Lal Badshah, Rahim Bakhsh, Syed Ali Shah, and Abdul Latif as members of the executive council, was formed.\textsuperscript{23} On the evening of 24 October 1936, Jinnah left Peshawar by train for Lahore. He was seen off at the railway station by the MIP workers including the members of his newly formed Muslim League.\textsuperscript{24} According to the \textit{Khyber Mail}, Jinnah was entirely satisfied with his Frontier visit and ‘cherished strong hopes of a bright future’.\textsuperscript{25} But S. Sabir

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Khyber Mail}, 22 October 1936.
\textsuperscript{21} Shad, ‘Deed’, II, pp. 91-2.
\textsuperscript{22} CID Diaries, F. No. 30, SBP, p., 382
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Shad, ‘Deed’, II, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Khyber Mail}, 25 October 1936.
conjectures that Jinnah’s mission to the NWFP was a failure.\(^\text{26}\) Yusufi, a contemporary of Jinnah, held the same view.\(^\text{27}\) Shad regarded the personal infighting of the urban Muslim political leaders of Peshawar as the main cause of the failure of Jinnah’s Frontier visit.\(^\text{28}\)

As is evident from the candidates’ list, and the subsequent results of the elections of 1937, no member of AIML took part in the elections to the utter disappointment of the League’s high command. The faction-ridden groups of Peshawar Muslims either fought the elections in their individual capacity or associated themselves with Sir A. Qaiyum’s party. This was considered a setback to the Muslim League, who were claiming themselves to be the genuine representatives of the Muslims with not even a single member in the Muslim majority province of the Frontier. Thus initially Jinnah failed to get the required support of the Frontier Muslims in reorganizing the AIML in the NWFP. The main reasons were the lack of interest on the part of Frontier Muslims in the ‘communal’ ideology of the League. Moreover, local issues were given priority in the election campaign, limiting the contest mainly to the indigenous parties and splinter groups.

**Reorganization of Muslim League in the North-West Frontier Province**

As a party the Muslim League had been non-existent in the NWFP for more than two decades. Its earlier organizers, Abdul Wali, Aziz, Bokhari, and Mir Ahmad, were either in exile, or no more on the political scene. During the election campaign of 1936-7, there was no official League candidate in the contest. After Jinnah’s failure to reorganize the Muslim League in the Frontier Province, an attempt was made in February 1937 by Muzaffar Ali, of Peshawar Cantonment, to start a branch in the NWFP. He asked the secretary of the Punjab Muslim League to send him a copy of the rules and regulations of the AIML. He invited prominent League leaders from the Punjab to come to the NWFP and deliver

---

the message of Muslim League.\(^{29}\) There is no further information concerning what happened to this request.

The first organized attempt to start a branch of the Muslim League in the NWFP was made in May 1937 by a few educated Muslims of Nowshera. It was unanimously resolved to affiliate the nascent branch with the AIML and to open other branches in the rural areas of the province. Tila Mohammad, a prominent social worker of Nowshera, became the president, Abdul Wahid advocate, a former Congress activist, took over as the secretary, and Ali Ahmad Khan, another social worker, as the treasurer. Abdul Wahid was the ‘moving spirit of this branch of the League’ and his jubilation at the formation of this branch of the AIML was regarded by the CID as ‘possibly caused by the fact that Congress refused to accept him as a candidate for the recent Assembly elections’\(^{30}\). The NWFP Muslims were urged to support the party programme of AIML, and to join it in large numbers.\(^{31}\)

On 25 August, a number of anti-Congress Muslims of Peshawar met and discussed the formation of another branch of the Muslim League. Their main object was to ‘safeguard the rights’ of the Muslims of the NWFP, and to counteract the propaganda of the Khudai Khidmatgars. It was proposed to start branches of the AIML in Peshawar, Bannu, and Abbottabad. On 29 August, another meeting was convened at Abbottabad for the same purpose.\(^{32}\) A conference of FPML, attended by about one thousand pro-League Muslims from Rawalpindi, Mardan, Peshawar, Nowshera, and Abbottabad with Maulana M. Ishaq in the chair,

\(^{29}\) CID Diaries, 23 February 1937, Peshawar, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 43, 47.

\(^{30}\) Ibid. 7 June 1937, F. No. 765, p. 65.

\(^{31}\) Before the ‘discovery’ of this two-page handwritten letter of Abdul Wahid Khan, addressed to the president AIML, in the QAP, and the CID Diaries dated 7 June 1937, all previous writings on the area including Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 255, Jansson, Pakhtunistan, p.108 and Talbot, Provincial Politics, p. 10, seems to be misinformed on the matter. All of them are of the opinion that the first branch of the FPML was started in Abbottabad in September 1937. But as is evident from these documents the first branch of the NWFP Muslim League was the one started in Nowshera on 16 May 1937. Abdul Wahid to President AIML, 16 May 1937, F. No. 865, QAP, pp. 64-5.

\(^{32}\) CID Diaries, 30 August 1937, F. No. 765, SBP, p. 79.
was held at Abbottabad.

Several resolutions were passed on the occasion, including condemnation of the government’s forward policy in Waziristan; a declaration of no confidence in Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry; a request to the government to enforce the Shariat; support for the Communal Award; appeal to the Frontier Assembly to take measures to reduce the land revenue in order to give some relief to the zamindars of the province; a demand for the restoration of Shahid Ganj Mosque to the Muslims; a protest against the partition of Palestine; and an expression of full confidence in the leadership of Jinnah.\(^{33}\)

The Ulema played a key role in the formation of the Muslim League at Abbottabad. Maulana Shakirullah, president, JUS, presided over the session and Maulana M. Shuaib (Mardan), its secretary, was made the president of the nascent Muslim League.\(^{34}\) The activities of the Abbottabad branch of the Muslim League were confined to a limited area. It was considered more a district than a provincial organization, as it failed to keep full contacts with Muslims in Peshawar and other parts of the NWFP.\(^{35}\) In December, a branch of the Muslim League was formed at Bannu with Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan as president, and Nasrullah Khan as general secretary.\(^{36}\) During the first week of March 1938, a branch of the Muslim League was opened at Dera Ismail Khan with Sardar Haq Nawaz, Municipal Commissioner, as president, and Maula Dad as secretary.\(^{37}\) On 4 March, the Muslim League Kohat with Pir Saeed Shah as president and Ghulam Haider Akhtar as secretary was formed.\(^{38}\)

Subsequent to the organization of the district branches of the League, a meeting, attended by only eighty persons, the majority

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 7 September 1937, F. No. 750, p. 39.
\(^{34}\) Jansson, Pakhtunistan, p. 108.
\(^{35}\) Khyber Mail, 24, 27, and 31 October 1937; CID Diaries, Peshawar, 29 October 1937, SBP, F. No 765, p. 107.
\(^{36}\) CID Diaries, Bannu, 4 December 1937, 7 February 1937, SBP, F. No. 787, pp. 11, 41.
\(^{38}\) Ehsan, Lahore, 10 March 1938; CID Diaries, 10 March 1938, SBP, F. No. 799, p. 3.
of whom, according to the CID reporter, were ‘Chief Khans’ of the
NWFP, was held at Nowshera on 10 March. They elected the
office-bearers of the FPML, but did not have any grass root level
organization. Until 1945 the League was to remain without any
mass support.

Sir A. Qaiyum was succeeded by Aurangzeb as the leader of the
Opposition in the Frontier assembly. The big Khans were divided
amongst themselves. Always engaged in faction-fighting, they
found very little time to organize themselves as political body.
Alarmed by the anti-Khan measures of the Congress ministry in
the Frontier, in the absence of any strong front to combat Congress
attacks, they rallied around the banner of the Muslim League,
which they had earlier regarded as an organization of a few ‘un-
influential people’. Perturbed by the anti-Khan measures of Dr
Khan Sahib’s ministry, the Khans looked to the Governor to
safeguard their interests. They blamed him for doing nothing to
help them and ‘for failing’ as they put it, ‘to break the Congress’.

Probably, they were unaware of certain restrictions under the
Government of India Act, 1935, on the powers of a Governor. It
was neither wise nor ‘tactful’, remarked Cunningham, ‘to remind
them that their own class is largely to blame, through allowing
their own private jealousies to ruin their prospects at the
elections’.

During the first week of April 1938, a deputation of the
‘influential’ Khans of Charsadda, under the leadership of

39 The office-bearers were Maulana M. Shuaib as president; Mian Zia-ud-
Din, vice president; M. Ismail, general secretary, Abdul Wahid, secretary;
Sajjad Ahmad Jan, assistant secretary; Arbab Shamsuddin, treasurer and
Qazi Abdul Hakim as propaganda secretary. CID Diaries, 18 March 1938,
F. No. 750, SBP, p. 65; Khyber Mail, 13 March 1938.
40 CID Diaries, 1 November 1937, F. No. 765, SBP, p. 117.
41 According to Reeves, in UP, like the NWFP, it was the collaboration of the
landlords with the provincial and district administration which provided
the essential basis for local political control after the 1860s. For details see,
Reeves, Landlords and Governments, pp. 1-3; Presidential Address of
Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai at District Kisan Conference 25-26
42 GR, 9 February 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
43 Ibid.
Saadullah, met Cunningham and apprised him of their grievances against the Congress party. They were perturbed by the introduction of the Agriculturist Debtor’s Relief Bill, especially its two clauses dealing with the cancellation of inams and of tenant debts. They appealed to the Governor to interfere in the matter and save them from the ‘tyrannies’ of Congress. Clearly, the Governor could hardly conceal his pleasure and satisfaction at their united front. ‘The Khans now appreciate the necessity for united action to protect their position’, remarked the jubilant Governor, ‘there are concrete examples of feuds having been settled and of Khans, who have hitherto failed to realise their responsibilities, taking a prominent part in public life’. Cunningham warned the British officers, then employed in various administrative units of the provincial administration, that in no way should they undermine the prestige of the Khans. ‘It is most important to remove from the minds of Khans’, advised the Governor, ‘any feeling that we no longer consider them of any importance... We cannot afford to neglect a class of people who still have a strong sentimental loyalty to the British Crown’.

After the death of Sir A. Qaiyum, the big Khans found themselves vulnerable to Congress attacks. They were left with no other choice but to join the League. ‘The old-fashioned Khans’, reported Cunningham, ‘who had hardly heard the name of the League six months ago, now refer to it freely as an ordinary topic of conversation...’ Some former members of the UMNP announced in the Frontier assembly their support for the League cause. Apart from the members of the UMNP, a few Independents, some members of HDP, a large number of Khans and deserters from Congress also found it a very useful alternative platform from which to express their feelings and grievances against the Congress. Their joining with the League was not because of their sympathy with its all-India ideals, i.e. to safeguard the Muslim interest, which in any case was something of an issue only in the

44 Ibid. 9 April 1938.
45 Ibid. 23 August 1938.
46 Ibid. 9 May 1939, D. 670/15.
minority provinces and in the centre, but because this was the only political platform which offered them protection.\textsuperscript{49}

The adherence of the big Khans had given a stimulus to the FPML. The Khans, according to Rittenberg, brought with them their ‘core group of personal retainers and traditional factional followers’, which was an additional source of League power in the province. Furthermore, in Hazara, the majority of non-Pashtoons saw it as an anti-Pashtoon party. It was rumoured that Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry was favouring the Pashtoon dominated rural areas of the NWFP—the stronghold of the Khudai Khidmatgars.\textsuperscript{50} The Leaguers succeeded in winning over public opinion in Hazara and exploited every opportunity to dub the Congress ministry a pro-Pashtoon ministry, championing the cause of their own community at the expense of the non-Pashtoons of the province. The development of ethnic tension in Hazara can best be seen in the results of the subsequent elections, which culminated in the success of the League candidates, and provided a base for the organization of the Pakistan movement.

The joining of the big Khans in large numbers gave rise to mixed feelings in League circles. While many welcomed it and regarded it as the best course for counteracting the Congressite activities, some felt alienated. Nishtar was about to leave for Calcutta to participate in the League’s annual session, to be held in December 1937, when he heard that Aurangzeb and Saadullah, who had recently joined the League, had left Peshawar to take part in the same session. Nishtar considered them as pro-Government men, whose activities were ‘neither in the interests of Muslims nor the Muslim League’.\textsuperscript{51} In protest, he cancelled his visit, declaring that it was because of such people that the incipient NWFP League was said to be a party created by the British government, and the Leaguers there were regarded as British agents and self-seeking politicians.\textsuperscript{52} The Leaguers were accused of being responsible for the perpetuation of colonial rule in that part of South Asia.\textsuperscript{53} The

\textsuperscript{49} Talbot, \textit{Provincial Politics}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{50} Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, pp. 259-60.
\textsuperscript{52} Nishtar, \textit{Azadi Ki Kahani}, pp. 52-3.
\textsuperscript{53} Interview Haji Mohammad Asim, Nowshera, 30 October 1984.
big Khans used to travel in motor cars. Such a large number of big Khans with their motor cars earned for the organization the title ‘Motor League’, and it was often referred to as the ‘drawing-room organization of some important Muslims’. The main task of the leaders seemed to be ‘travelling by car to the places where the meetings are convened, taking tea, and returning to their houses’.

The League tried its best to gain support from the Muslim intelligentsia in the Frontier. To contact directly the majority in the countryside was a difficult task, as the concept of the League in their minds was that of a party of the Khan Bahadurs, pro-British Khans, and toadies. Soon the rift in the organization resurfaced. Maulana Shuaib, president of the FPML, informed Jinnah of the indignation of the ‘educated Muslims’ at the growing influence of the big Khans—actually the representatives of the feudal class—in the FPML. The Ulema, according to Shuaib, were neglected, a fact resented by the Frontier Muslims. He requested Jinnah to include some prominent ulema in the council of the AIML, or else be ready to witness the downfall of the Muslim League in the NWFP.

The rural-urban tussle went on, the Khans, with their rural support and background, and the urban educated Muslims, with their greater political experience, were at loggerheads for control of the leadership of the provincial organization. The Khans were numerically strong and were in a better position to use their influence in League affairs by every ‘possible means’, while their counterparts, the urban educated Muslims, though few in number, possessed experience in modern politics, which could not be easily ignored. ‘Strong objection has been taken’, reported the Governor NWFP, ‘to the tendency to make the League exclusively representative of the Khans and of rural interests, whereas the urban followers have worked hard, particularly in Peshawar City, to popularize the movement’.

This rift continued for some time, resulting in the resignation of

54 Yusufi, Siyasiyat Sarhad Key Irtaqai Manazil, pp. 80-81; Asim, ibid.
56 GR, 26 May 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
57 Maulana M. Shuaib to Jinnah, 22 May 1938, F. No. 867, QAP, p. 197.
58 GR, 9 December 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
Maulana Shuaib from the presidency of the NWFP Muslim League in November 1938. In a lengthy press statement the following month, the exasperated Maulana gave the main reason for his resignation as the pro-British attitude and behaviour of the Muslim League, and the goading influence of the Khan Bahadurs and the ‘toadies’ in the League organization. ‘I cannot allow myself, said Maulana Shuaib, ‘to be associated with a political party which has any connection with the [Muslim] community’s enemies. When the League was formed in the Frontier last year’, added Shuaib, ‘I asked the members to do their best for the cause of the freedom of India, and for this purpose to establish cordial relations with Congress. It is regrettable that some members have lost sight of this objective. The result is that inside the League today a “toady company” has been formed whose sole aim desire [sic] is to further British Imperialist aims and interests. I tried my best to reform them but without success…”  

After the resignation of Maulana Shuaib from the organization, a meeting of the FPML for the selection of new office-bearers was convened on 20 November.  

After a few days, the differences within the party became so acute that some of the recently elected office-bearers and members of the Muslim League council, including Ghulam Hussain, Yusufi, and Rahim Bakhsh, all from Peshawar, tendered their resignations, protesting against ‘the capture of the Muslim League by the Khans’. The ‘deliberate attempt of the Khanite Party to overshadow its deliberations and not allow poor Muslims and especially urban interests to work for


60 The new League office-holders included: Saadullah, president; Mian Zia-ud-Din, vice president and M. Ismail as the general secretary. Members of the Executive Committee district-wise were as under; K.B. Mir Alam Khan (Peshawar); Fateh M. Khan pleader (Nowshera); Arbab Madad Khan (Peshawar); Yusufi (Peshawar); Hamidullah Khan, Bahram Khan pleader and Fida M. Khan pleader (Mardan); Syed Jalal (Kohat); Ghulam Haider Khan (Bannu); Faqira Khan, Abdul Rashid Khan, Abdul Majid Khan (Hazara); Aurangzeb, Yusufi and Badshah Sahib of Bamkhel were nominated as the members of the Working Committee. CID Diaries, 25 November 1938, F. No. 751, SBP, p. 305.  

61 CID Diaries, 5 December 1938, F. No. 745, SBP, p. 365.
the League properly’, commented the *Khyber Mail*, caused the resentment of the urban Leaguers. It highlighted the tensions arising from the ‘tendency of some members to make the League exclusively representative of the Khans or rural interests although urban workers since its inception have striven hard to popularise it and make it a living force’.\(^{62}\) Despite the pressures and the criticism of many League workers, no further organizational changes occurred in the party. Saadullah remained the president of the FPML, and Aurangzeb, despite strong opposition from the Khanite class, performed his duties as the leader of the Opposition in the Provincial Legislative Assembly.

**Ideology and Party Programme of the Frontier Province Muslim League**

The formal affiliation of the FPML with its central organization took place on 17 April 1938 at the Calcutta session of the AIML.\(^{63}\) A resolution, moved by Zia-ud-Din, was passed urging upon the Muslims of India ‘to take special steps to combat the Congress Anti-Muslim activities in the Frontier Province’.\(^{64}\) A large number of prominent pro-League Muslims of the NWFP participated in the Calcutta meeting of the AIML. Jinnah advised them to take the League propaganda to the rural areas and to intensify it in the name of religion. He promised active support from the central organization in that connection.\(^{65}\)

The Frontier delegates on their return from the Calcutta session started a vigorous propaganda campaign for the popularization of the League in the NWFP. In May 1938, Mir Alam Khan informed Jinnah of the intensification of League propaganda in the NWFP. ‘Since our return to our province’, said Mir Alam, ‘we have set ourselves tooth and nail to the propagation of the Muslim League and gradually its radiant rays are going to shine upon the darkness of Congress and remove its effects from the minds of the Muslims.

---

\(^{62}\) *Khyber Mail*, 11 December 1938.

\(^{63}\) Calcutta Session of AIML, F. No. 206, AFM, p. 91.


\(^{65}\) CID Diaries, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 63-73.
altogether’. In a long letter to Liaquat, Saadullah gave details of their visit to Peshawar and Mardan districts in connection with the League’s organizational work. According to Saadullah, they enrolled hundreds of new members, a figure still to be confirmed, and established rural committees. In Hazara, they reorganized the Muslim League and decided to hold a district political conference at Abbottabad to popularize the ideology and party programme of the AIML. Jinnah expressed his satisfaction over the work of Frontier League and said that he was very glad that they ‘are meeting with success everywhere and the work is going on well in support of the Muslim League’.

As there was no fear of ‘Islam in danger’ in the NWFP, initially the League failed in gathering the majority of Muslims into its fold. In the Frontier, it lacked a specific ideology and programme and came into existence in reaction to the Congress ministry; it benefited from the so-called wrong steps of the ministry and exploited every move of the ministers in its own interests. The FPML was critical of the Frontier Congress ministry for following the policies of the AINC and repeated their allegations against them of suppressing the Muslims and acting against the interests of the Muslim community to please their Hindu friends. Every step of the Congress Ministry which could be given a communal colour was exploited by the Leaguers, and whenever the Ministry took a step to suppress ‘communalism’ in the Frontier, it was regarded as the Ministry’s pro-Hindu leanings. The Muslims of the NWFP were reminded time and again that they ‘should receive their orders from Madina and not from Wardha’. The Congressites were accused of denigrating the ‘Muslim turban which was the sign of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.)’ and of replacing it with a Gandhi cap. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was accused of introducing the

66 Mir Alam Khan to Jinnah, 11 May 1938, F. No. 867, QAP, pp. 133-5.
69 GR, 24 June 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
71 Maulana M. Shuaib speech at Pabbi, 3 April 1938, CID Diaries, 5 April
Congress flag with its *charkha*, to replace the Islamic flag with the ‘crescent and star’.72 Furthermore, to prove their allegations against Abdul Ghaffar Khan of leaning towards Hinduism, photographs of him were shown to the people in which he was sitting with the members of the Congress Working Committee at Wardha taking food in ‘Hindu utensils’ and, in what was constructed, as their manner.73 Time and again the Leaguers gave their clarion call to defend the ‘bastion of Islam’—the NWFP—which they considered to be at stake because of the collaboration of the Khan Brothers with the Hindu-dominated Congress. They appealed to the ministers to work according to the wishes of Frontier Muslims and not to act under the dictates of the down country Hindu leaders.

As noted, a group of prominent Muslims in the FPML, including its founder president, Maulana Shuaib, was against the domination of the organization by the pro-government Khans. The Muslim League, according to Maulana Shuaib, was fighting the British for the freedom of their country and those within the Muslim League who were opposing it were the friends of British imperialism.74 This anti-British propaganda on the Muslim League side was ‘surprising but it did not really reflect any anti-British sentiments in the Muslim League leadership’.75 Privately, leading Leaguers met Cunningham and told him that ‘this is done purely for propaganda purposes’ and ‘that such sentiments are not in accord with the creed of the League but are essential to attract public attention’ in the NWFP.76 To Cunningham, the most popular method of attracting public attention in the NWFP was to deliver anti-British speeches, but on the part of the Muslim League, he was confident that ‘a large portion of this abuse is only surface propaganda, and that below the surface the real force behind the League movement is anti-Hindu feeling’.77
Probably, the importance of the NWFP to the Muslim League was due to the fact that it was the only Muslim majority province which had a Congress Ministry. The Governor NWFP confirmed this. ‘The NWFP provides the only evidence’, said Cunningham, ‘that the Congress can adduce in support of their contention that they represent Muslims as well as Hindus’. This fact was disturbing for the Muslim League: despite a 93 per cent Muslim majority, the NWFP stood firm behind Congress in its struggle for independence of the country from colonial rule, rather than with their co-religionists of the Muslim League, who claimed to be the only representatives of the Muslims in India. They continued their propaganda and missed no opportunity of dubbing the Khan Brothers the ‘agents’ of Gandhi and Congress, who were bent upon the enslavement of the Pashtoons.

The importance of the NWFP to the League has already been stated. The Muslim League high command was interested in establishing a firm hold in the NWFP to refute the Congress claim of representing the Muslims as well as the Hindus. It was considered essential that steps should be taken to increase the strength of the party’s propaganda in the NWFP. The FPML, on the occasion of the Calcutta session in 1938, had requested Jinnah to pay a visit to the NWFP or send some prominent League leaders there. Jinnah was unable to go there in person and promised to send Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Zafar Ali in the near future. In June 1938, Zafar Ali and Shaukat Ali were directed by the League high command to go to the NWFP to propagate the League’s ideology and party programme there.

Shaukat Ali and Zafar Ali were both highly respected in the NWFP. The former and his younger brother Maulana Mohammad Ali had been known in the Frontier since the early second decade of the twentieth century. Their active participation in the pan-Islamic movements had earned them reverence and popularity in the NWFP. Zafar Ali’s Zamindar was one of the few popular newspapers in the NWFP. To send these two to the NWFP was

---

78 GR, 24 June 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
79 CID Diaries, 27 April 1938, F. No. 745, SBP, p. 71.
80 Liaquat, Resolutions, p. 32.
probably good thinking by the central League leadership.

It was not difficult for such noted orators to appeal to Frontier Muslims on religious grounds. Shaukat Ali, accompanied by Abdul Hamid, MLA (Central), and Habib Ahmad, his private secretary, reached Peshawar on 1 July.\(^{81}\) He remained in the province for three weeks, visited most parts of the NWFP in connection with the propaganda for the League, but was not allowed to go to Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan owing to the ‘disturbed’ conditions there.\(^{82}\) The object of his visit was to ‘awaken’ the Muslims against Hindu domination. He condemned the Khudai Khidmatgars for their alliance with the ‘Hindu Congress’.\(^{83}\) If the Khan Brothers, according to Shaukat Ali, were to sever their connections with Congress and ‘to form a Muslim party in this province’, the Muslim League would be first to support them.\(^{84}\)

Shaukat Ali’s efforts resulted in a slight increase in the number of Muslim League members. However, in Doaba (Charsadda), it caused an adverse effect—an increase in the number of the Khudai Khidmatgars.\(^{85}\) The outcome of Shaukat Ali’s speeches, according to Cunningham, ‘is likely to be the acerbation of communal relations. In every speech he stressed vehemently the communal aspects of the present position in the Province...’\(^{86}\) In contrast with the situation in the rest of India, due to the peculiar conditions in the NWFP, Hindu-Muslim relations there were cordial, and there was no harm to the interests of any community in the Pashtoon dominated Muslim majority province on India’s North-West Frontier. The very name of the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God), accentuated its relations with Islam. Since the inception of the movement, the ulema had taken an important part in it, so on religious grounds, at least for the time being, the FPML failed to mobilize the Muslims against the Frontier Congress. The League circles, however, were satisfied with the visit. Aurangzeb, the FPML leader, requested Jinnah to send more missions to their

---

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 16 August 1938, p. 359.
\(^{83}\) Ibid., p. 223.
\(^{84}\) CID Diaries, Peshawar, 22 July 1938, F. No. 766, SBP, p. 653.
\(^{85}\) CID Diaries, Peshawar, 20 August 1938, F. No. 745, SBP, p. 339.
\(^{86}\) GR, 23 July 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
province to bolster the League organization.\footnote{CID Diaries, Peshawar, 16 August 1938, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 213-15.}

After Shaukat Ali’s ‘successful’ visit to the province, the FPML decided to hold a League conference on 10-11 September at Abbottabad. It was the first major gathering of the FPML. Besides all noted leaders of the FPML, it was attended by twelve prominent\footnote{They included Ch. Khaliquzzaman (UP); Raja M. Mahdi of Pir Pur (UP); Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni (UP); Jamal Mian of Firangi Mahal (UP); Hakim M. Akram Jalis (UP); Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (Punjab); Prof. Inayatullah Khan (Punjab); M. Maula Bakhsh (Punjab); Mustafa Shah Gilani (Punjab); M. Ishaq (Punjab); Nafis Khalili (Punjab) and Maulana Abdul Majid (Sindh). F. No. 794, SBP, p. 217.} Muslim League leaders from ‘down country’. The audience present, as reported by the CID, was between nine and ten thousand. Most of the people, according to the same source, came from outside the district to hear the speakers with an all-India reputation. The proceedings of the conference were ‘strongly anti-Congress and anti-Hindu’; although references were made to the anti-Muslim policy of the British in Palestine and in Waziristan.\footnote{Muslim League Political Conference, Abbottabad, 10-11 September 1938, CID Diaries, F. No. 794, SBP, pp. 221-43.}

Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, in his presidential address, pointed out that the NWFP was governed from Wardha and that the Muslims of the NWFP were being misled by their own Congress leaders.\footnote{Presidential Address of Ch. Khaliquzzaman at Hazara Muslim League Conference, Abbottabad, 10 September 1938 (Lucknow, 1938), pp. 1-24.}

Zafar Ali, another League orator, highlighting the importance of the NWFP, said that it was a province on which the eyes of India had been centred and hoped that this province would turn to the Muslim League.\footnote{Maulana Zafar Ali Khan’s Speech, 10 September 1938, Abbottabad, F. No. 794, SBP, p. 227.}

The Abbottabad conference was followed by another one of its kind in Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib [Nowshera]. The Conference was held on 16 September 1938, with Abdul Majid Sindhi in the chair.\footnote{Other prominent speakers included Aurangzeb, Mian Zia-ud-Din, Mir Alam Khan, Arbab Madad Khan, Rahim Bakhsh, Arbab Shamsuddin Khan, Yusufi, K.B. Mian Aftab Gul, Hidayatullah Khan, Saadullah and Mian Ahmad Shah. Interview Mian Ahmad Shah, Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 16 July 1985.}
warned the audience of falling into the ‘trap’ of the Congress, whose real aim, according to Sindhi, was the establishment of ‘Hindu Raj’ in India. To counter the activities of the Hindus he advised them to open branches of the Muslim League and strengthen it by joining it in large numbers. The tone of speeches delivered at the occasion remained the same. Fateh M. Khan, president of the reception committee, reminded that the Pashtoons had come into the field to remove the shackles of slavery from the whole of India, but the charmer of Wardha [Gandhi] had captivated the hearts of their simple-minded brother Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgars, and he with his comrades had taken shelter under the Hindu organization—Congress. It was really shameful for a Pashtoon, remarked Fateh, to ‘believe in Gita instead of Quran’. Zafar Ali, in his presidential address argued that there were cultural and religious differences between the Muslims and the Hindus. The Muslims wanted to lead a free life, added Zafar Ali Khan, and for that purpose they needed a freer atmosphere, independent of the domination of Hindus. The freedom of India, said the Maulana, was also their objective and they would surely free it by force but not in a manner that Hindus should form the majority and the Muslims be wiped out.

In May 1939, the AIML sent a high level League deputation to the NWFP. The main objective of the deputation was to inform the

---

93 Muslim League Conference at Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, CID Diaries, 19 September 1938, F. No. 767, SBP, pp. 99-121.
94 Muslim League Conference at Mardan, CID Diaries, F. No. 791, SBP, p. 305.
95 Presidential Address of Fateh M. Khan at District Political Muslim League Conference, Mardan, 22 October 1938, F. No. 791, SBP, p. 301.
97 They were Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan, MLA Central [Nagpur]; Mufti Burhan ul Haq, president district Muslim League [Jubbulpore]; Mohammad Asghar Vakil, president Muslim League Burhanpur [CP]; Ch. Akhtar Hussain, MLC, Lucknow, [UP]; Prof. M. Inayatullah [Punjab]; Zakir Ali, Barrister [Agra]; Haji Karam Ali [UP]; Maulana Mazhar Imam [Patna]; Maulvi Qamar-ud-Din [Patna]; Nawab M. Ismail [Patna], and Maulvi Hussain Mian [Patna], F. No. 745, SBP, p. 407.
Frontier Muslims of the atrocities committed by Hindus against the Muslims in the Congress governments. Unlike the previous visits of the Muslim League delegations to the Frontier, the visit seemed to ‘have been a failure’ as reported by the CID authorities. The only exception was Mardan, where it was ‘enthusiastically’ received. The delegation created some adverse effects on Hindu-Muslims relation in the NWFP. Dangerous appeals to religious fanaticism were made by violently anti-Hindu speeches describing communal incidents ‘down country’. ‘Such speeches’, reported the CID, ‘are particularly dangerous because the local public have no knowledge to refute what are probably wild exaggerations’ and that, coming to the positive side of the delegation’s tour, no reference was made to any constructive policy, other than the blatant promises of Muslim ascendancy in all matters.

Before concluding this discussion of the ideology and party programme of the Frontier League during the late 1930s, a reference must be made to the ‘League’s Week’, organized by the FPML in July 1939. The meetings of the Muslim League held

98 CID Diaries, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 407-35. The accounts of the zulm on the Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces as given by the deputation members included: the Muslim children were asked to respect the Congress flag and to recite Bande Mataram—seen widely as a Hindu song; on the birthday of Gandhi [2 October] they were asked to worship the photo of Gandhi; on two occasions in Nagpur pork [forbidden in Islam] was thrown into the mosques. (Taken from Sadiq Ali’s Speech at Bannu on 22 May 1939, CID Diaries, 26 May 1939, F. No. 745, SBP, p. 601). In Bihar, according to Mazhar Imam, when the AINC gained power, it prevented Muslims from giving Azan (Call to the Prayers); the slaughter of cows had been stopped; their homes were burnt and their children had become orphans. In Talokari village, said the speaker, a Muslim brought five seers of beef for his daughter’s marriage, which was objected to by the Hindus who put pork into his mouth, shaved his moustache and then poured urine into his mouth. (Maulana Mazhar Imam’s speech at Kohat on 21 May 1939, CID Diaries, 27 May 1939, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 625-31). The details of Hindu-Muslims riots at Tanda [UP] were narrated and the Frontier Muslims were informed how helpless the Muslims were. (Inayatullah’s speech at Shabqadar, 18 May 1939, CID Diaries, 26 May 1939, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 575-97).

99 For details see, CID Diaries on Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 621-3; 721; 723; 755, and, 759.

100 CID Diaries, 26 May 1939, F. No. 745, SBP, pp. 621-3.
between 15-21 July, were confined to Peshawar city. Apart from the
local leaders, some League orators from Punjab including
Inayatullah, Yusuf Salim, and M. Bakhsh Muslim were invited to
speak on the occasion. The speeches were typical: general criticism
of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry; ‘subordination’ of the inhabitants of
the province by the Congress, and Congress atrocities in the
Muslim minority provinces.\footnote{More details on ‘League’s Week’ can be seen in Shad, ‘Deed’, III, pp. 1-6; CID Diaries, Peshawar, F. No. 770, \textit{SBP}, pp. 283-305; 315-35.}

\section*{By-elections and the League’s Success}

In the general elections of 1937, there was no Muslim League
candidate in the NWFP to contest on behalf of the party there.
After the revival of the FPML, in 1938, it contested the by-
elections and performed well by getting two out of the total of five
seats. The area contested by the League candidates included the
Muslim-Rural Constituencies of Mardan, i.e. Razaur and Amazai.
The candidates were Zia-ud-Din, Bar-at-Law, Ka Ka Khel Mian of
outstanding calibre, and Shah Pasand, a big Khan. Kamdar Khan
and Allahdad Khan, small Khans with a sound political
background, were the Congress nominees. As the Congress was
popular in the area, it won both the seats, getting about 80 per cent
of the votes. The organizational ability of the Congress as
compared to the League was ‘perfect’ reported the Governor
NWFP, ‘whereas the efforts of the Muslim League were spasmodic
and ineffective through the usual personal differences between the
Khans’.\footnote{GR, 10 March 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.}

Next came the by-elections in Hazara—the strong ho
d of the Muslim League in the NWFP. The FPML directed all its
prominent workers to pay special attention to showing people
outside the province that all the Muslims of the NWFP were not
solidly behind Congress. In the Haripur North Muslim Rural
Constituency, Abdur Rashid, the local League’s candidate,
defeated his rival Mehdi Zaman Khan, the Congress nominee, who
was notorious for changing sides, by a margin of only thirteen
votes.\footnote{\textit{Khyber Mail}, 1 July 1938.} In the Southern Hazara Muslim Constituency the contest
was between Sardar Bahadur Khan, a prominent landholder, who
was the League nominee and M. Aslam Khan, an ordinary
Congress worker. Sardar Bahadur defeated his rival and became a member of the Frontier Assembly. The main reason for the Muslim League’s success in the by-elections in Hazara was its anti-Ministry propaganda. The Congress Provincial Ministry was portrayed as a Pashtoon ministry, and was accused of doing nothing for the welfare of Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan, and other non-Pashtoon dominated areas.

The success of the League candidates in the by-elections encouraged the provincial Leaguers to work towards moving a vote of no-confidence against Dr. Khan Sahib, and forming a Muslim League Ministry in the NWFP. The Frontier Premier took it very lightly and remarked that if the opposition succeeded in producing twenty-five signatures [out of a House of fifty], he would resign from office without waiting for the vote of no-confidence. But, according to the Governor NWFP, the Leaguers were ‘very unlikely to succeed’. Cunningham gave several reasons for that: the chief disadvantage of the Muslim League, according to him, ‘is the lack of a real leader; until one is found there is little hope of unifying the various small parties, among whom there are at least eight aspirants to Cabinet rank’; ‘too many selfish, ambitious and private feuds. Saadullah would bitterly contest the premiership with Aurangzeb; the Hindus would be shy of joining a party tainted with the name of Muslims...’ Furthermore, the Leaguers in the provincial assembly relied ‘solely on making the most of unpopular decisions made by the Ministry and on magnifying communal differences’.

104 Khyber Mail, 13 August 1939; Shad, ‘Deed’, III, pp. 7-25; Shah, Muslim League, pp. 39-40.
105 GR, 21 November 1938, Mss. EUR., D. 670/14, IOLR.
106 Ibid., 9 November 1938.
107 Ibid., 9 January 1940, D. 670/15.
108 Ibid., D. 670/14.
CHAPTER 5

POLITICS DURING THE WAR YEARS

The war years saw two major developments in Indian, as well as Frontier politics. One was the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution by the Muslim League at its Lahore session in 1940, and the other was the ‘Quit India’ movement launched by the Congress in 1942. The Congress government of Dr Khan Sahib was replaced by Governor’s administration in 1939 which worked to the disadvantage of the Congress. But the situation changed dramatically with the installation of the Muslim League ministry, led by Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, in May 1943.

The ‘Quit India’ movement had little impact in the NWFP. The provincial authorities successfully recruited the support of the Frontier Province Muslim League, the Khaksars, and the big Khans for the war effort. In this they were also assisted by a number of mullahs, who, abandoning their traditional anti-establishment ideas, supported the government arguing for the destruction of fascism which was termed anti-Islam. The League’s call for Pakistan did not gain support in the province despite the Muslim League ministry, as is evident from the fact that Sardar Aurangzeb ‘shelved the issue’ tactfully every time he was asked by the League workers to declare his stand on the demand of Pakistan. But the incessant communal propaganda of the League over a period of more than five years produced some impact on sections of the urban Muslim population and of the Muslim intelligentsia.

The War and All-India Politics

With the outbreak of War in 1939, the foremost concern of the Delhi Government was to enlist Indian support for the war. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, approached the leaders of the major political parties and asked them to lend their support to Britain. He invited Gandhi to Simla on 4 September and asked him for his views on the war. Gandhi favoured full and unconditional Indian support for Britain. He told Linlithgow that he contemplated the war with an English heart, and could not view with indifference the
bombing of London and the possible destruction of the House of Parliament and Westminster Abbey.¹

After Gandhi, the Viceroy met Jinnah. In this Jinnah seemed to have achieved a certain measure of success, because it was the first time that the Viceroy had invited him to discuss an all-India matter.² The Viceroy thus accepted his claim that the Muslim League was the only representative organization for Muslims in India.³ Moreover, it is probable that Linlithgow had already decided to prop up the League as a counter-weight to Congress.⁴ ‘It was only then’, remarked Jinnah, ‘that he realized that the Muslim League was a power’.⁵ The League demanded from the government that the ‘Federation should be definitely dropped’ and that the Muslims’ interests should be safeguarded. It sought an assurance that no declaration or constitutional advance relating to India would be made without the consent and approval of the AIML.⁶

The Viceroy then called on Prasad, the Congress President, and Nehru, its General Secretary, and asked for their views. Prasad was of the opinion that Indian help would be possible only if the Government made a declaration envisaging the complete freedom of India. Nehru was adamant in reiterating the Congress demand for absolute freedom for India after the war and the right of India to draft her own constitution through a Constituent Assembly. Linlithgow made it clear to both the Congress leaders that it would

² Jinnah’s Address at Islamia College, Peshawar, 25 November 1945, F. No. 753, SBP, pp. 375-83.
⁶ ‘India and the War’, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to War Cabinet, 25 September 1939, Zetland Collection, Mss. EUR., D. 609/26, IOLR, p. 19.
be difficult to accommodate their views, and the meeting ended in failure.

On 17 October the Viceroy’s statement was issued reasserting Dominion Status for India as Britain’s aim after the war and the willingness of the government to consult the representatives of various communities, parties, and interests groups over the framing of such modifications to the Act of 1935 as might ‘seem desirable’. The Viceroy’s declaration aroused mixed feelings in the country. The Muslim League’s reaction was ‘polite but equivocal’. It sought a clear answer to its earlier demands that, without consulting with, and without the agreement of the League, there would be no change in the constitution of India. To Gandhi, the declaration was ‘profoundly disappointing’ and meant a continuation of the ‘old policy of divide and rule’. Gandhi had no doubt in his mind that ‘the Congress [had] asked for bread and it has got a stone’. The Congress, according to Gandhi, would ‘have to go into the wilderness again...’ The Viceroy’s statement was considered by the Congress as ‘wholly unsatisfactory’ and ‘merely an unequivocal reiteration of the old imperialist policy’. In the circumstances, the Congress declared that it ‘cannot possibly give any support to Great Britain for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialist policy which the Congress has always sought to end’. Thus another confrontation between the government and the Congress became inevitable.

After the resignation of the Frontier Congress ministry, a ‘sudden lull’ was reported in the political atmosphere of the province. The main reasons, according to Cunningham, were that ‘the rank and file of the various parties are tired of the daily meetings and constant wrangling and that in the international crisis they find a welcome excuse to give up their normal activities, while they wait

---

9 Resolutions of the AIML WC, Delhi, 18 September 1939, IAR, 1939, II, pp. 350-52; AIML WC Meeting, Delhi, 22 October 1939, ibid., pp. 352-3.
10 Gandhi’s Press Statement, 18 October 1939, CWMG, 70, pp. 267-8.
to see what policy will be adopted by their Central organizations.\(^\text{12}\) In March 1940, in its Ramgarh session, the Congress’ stand was restated: its refusal to participate in the British war effort.\(^\text{13}\) Gandhi was empowered by the Congress to undertake responsibility for civil disobedience\(^\text{14}\) and Congress Committees throughout the country were converted into Satyagraha Committees.

Meanwhile, in the Frontier the administration enlisted Indian public support for the British war aims. The provincial authorities were confident of mustering support for war recruitment in the province, and their impression was that ‘no political advice will stop Pathans from taking an opportunity of securing employment’.\(^\text{15}\) In the absence of the Congress playing an active role in the politics of the province, various vested-interest groups took advantage of the Congress-British impasse to offer their full-fledged support to the war effort. The majority of the Frontier Hindus, under the leadership of Khanna, resolved ‘to give unstinted support to the Government in this great war for democracy’.\(^\text{16}\) The loyal Khans also reaffirmed their old loyalty to the Crown and were hopeful of restoring their lost authority. The Governor assured them of the government’s support, as he was confident of their instinctive loyalty towards the British Empire.\(^\text{17}\)

**The Frontier’s Response to the Pakistan Resolution**

While the Congress was busy trying to reach a resolution of Indian problems with the British government, the AIML tried its level best to represent itself as the party working to safeguard Muslim interests. Jinnah was firm on his stand regarding the deserving position of the Muslims.\(^\text{18}\) The twenty-seventh session of the

---

\(^{12}\) GR, 14 September 1939, Mss. EUR., F. 125/74, IOLR.
\(^{15}\) GR, 20 April 1939, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR.
\(^{16}\) C&MG, 26 February 1941.
\(^{17}\) CD, 30 May 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, pp. 16-17.
AIML was held on 22-3 March 1940 at Lahore. Resolutions were moved demanding, from the British Government, the grouping together of the Muslim majority areas of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, and the NWFP in the North-West, Assam and Bengal in the East, and the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The rest of India would be Hindu federation.\(^{19}\)

The supporters of the partition scheme argued that the Muslims had a different historical heritage, different heroes, and different memories of defeats and victories from the Hindus. To them, India was a land of diverse races, cultures, and civilizations and the only bond which kept it united was the British yoke. ‘The moment it ceases, India will revert to its old normal component parts’.\(^{20}\) ‘The only way out of the impasse therefore seems to be to divide India into two federations’, argued Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (a Lecturer at the Muslim University, Aligarh), to consist of a federation of Muslim majority provinces and states and, another of Hindu majority provinces and states. He regarded the creation of two such federations as being in the best interests of both Muslims and Hindus.\(^{21}\)

The Lahore resolution aroused widespread opposition and controversy. To Linlithgow, it seemed merely a bargaining strategy, but a dangerous one:

> the effect of Lahore has been to a remarkable degree to increase Jinnah’s prestige and to consolidate his position as an all-India Moslem spokesman...unsound as [the] partition idea may be, it is one which will get into the heads of very large numbers of Moslems and may prove increasingly difficult to dislodge.\(^{22}\)

Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, was convinced of the ‘great force in Jinnah’s arguments that the circumstances of India are unsuited to the form of democracy which we have

\(^{19}\) IAR, 1940, I, pp. 485-95; Muslim League Activities, 30 March 1940, No. 13, F. No. 752, SBP, pp. 37-41.


\(^{21}\) J. Ahmad, ‘The Problem of Nationalities in India’, F. No. 96, QAP, p. 126.

\(^{22}\) Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 6 April 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 609/26, IOLR, p. 67.
evolved in this country’.\textsuperscript{23} Gandhi regarded it as a ‘baffling situation’, but he was confident regarding the reaction of the Muslims to the ‘vivisection’ of India. To him, the ‘two-nations’ theory was ‘untruth’, as the vast majority of Indian Muslims, according to Gandhi, were converts to Islam and they ‘did not become a separate nation as soon as they become converts’\textsuperscript{24} V. D. Savarkar, president of the Hindu Mahasabha, regarded the Pakistan demand and the partition of the country as ‘the wild demand of cutting the mother into two’.\textsuperscript{25} Pakistan, to the extremist Hindus, was not based on facts or principles, but on the romance of a battle cry and all the ‘potentialities of a crusade’\textsuperscript{26}

Despite severe criticism by several organizations and individuals, the League’s idea of Pakistan received support from the Communist Party of India and a few well-known individuals. P. C. Joshi, secretary of Communist Party of India, had favoured the idea of granting Pakistan to ‘the Muslim peoples like the Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans, Western Punjabis, Eastern Bengalees who have the necessary characteristics of nations’. He further added that the Pakistan movement, under the banner of the League ‘is the national movement of these nationalities’.\textsuperscript{27} To M. N. Roy, Pakistan offered ‘a solution of the constitutional problem of the country’.\textsuperscript{28} According to B. R. Ambedkar, the Scheduled Castes’ leader, ‘it would be neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has behind it the sentiment, if not the passionate support, of 90 p.c. Muslims of India’\textsuperscript{29} Master Tota Singh, (president, All India Adhhdharam Mandal, Lyallpur) regarded Pakistan as the only solution to the communal problem.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] Secretary of State to Viceroy, 5 April 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 609/12, IOLR, pp. 96-7.
\item[25] Pakistan, foreward by K. M. Ashraf, (Delhi, 1940), pp. 40-41.
\item[26] B. M. Chaudhri, Muslim Politics in India (Calcutta, 1946), p. 47.
\item[27] Chaudhri, Muslim Politics, p. 70; Interview, Qalandar Mohmand, Peshawar, 25 October 1988.
\item[28] Khyber Mail, 1 December 1941.
\item[29] B. R. Ambedkar, Some Thoughts on Pakistan (Bombay, 1941), p. 2; Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India (Lahore, 1967), p. xvi.
\end{footnotes}
The Pakistan scheme also aroused mixed feelings in the NWFP. The FPML delegates participated in large numbers in the Lahore session of AIML. Aurangzeb seconded the historic resolution demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. He assured the Muslims living in the Hindu majority provinces of their full support. After their return from Lahore, the members of the FPML explained to the people of Frontier the new policy and the future programme of the AIML. The Muslims, according to the Leaguers, were not ready to concede Hindu majority rule under a Hindu Raj. They urged the inhabitants of the Frontier to join the League and give full support to Pakistan.

Until then the FPML was simply regarded as an organization formed as a reaction against the Frontier Congress, but after adopting the Lahore resolution as its creed, the future course of action became clear to its members. Apart from criticizing the Congress, they began to approach the Muslim masses directly in pursuit of a separate homeland for the Muslims. As most of the provincial Congress leaders were away from the political scene, either in prison or outside the province, it was the best opportunity for the FPML to popularize itself amongst the Muslims of the NWFP using the idea of Pakistan.

The few Congress leaders who were out of prison started a well-organized programme against the League’s demand for Pakistan. To Hakim Abdul Jalil, a Hindu minority under a Muslim Federation or a Muslim minority under a Hindu Federation ‘will always remain as a stranger’. Qaiyum condemned the Pakistan scheme and termed it impracticable, accusing the Leaguers of creating communalism. According to Qaiyum, while the patriots

---


32 Mian Zia-ud-Din Speech at Peshawar, 19 April 1940, F. Nos. 273, 773, 784 and 788, SBP.

33 CID Diaries, 6 April 1940, Peshawar, F. No. 37, SBP, pp. 15-18.
were busy getting rid of imperialism, the AIML was helping the British to prolong their rule in the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{34} Abdul Karim viewed Pakistan as the domination of Punjab over Sindh, Balochistan, and the NWFP. According to him it would be impossible for Sindhis, Balochis, and the Pashtoons to stay under the ‘oppression and tyranny’ of Punjabis. He was very annoyed that the financially well-off Hyderabad State was excluded, but the bankrupt state of Kashmir was included in the proposed scheme. Moreover, he was worried about the desecration and destruction of the historical heritage of Muslims in India at the hands of extremist Hindus, if Pakistan was granted.\textsuperscript{35}

Despite the vehement criticism and anti-Pakistan propaganda of the non-League Muslims, the Muslim League stuck to its programme and insisted on the formation of Pakistan. Khaliquzzaman, disposing of all the fears of the other communities, made it clear that their Pakistan ‘aims only at making the Muslims of India free and no more’.\textsuperscript{36} Jinnah, elaborating on the demand for Pakistan, appealed to the opponents of the scheme to approach the problem besetting the country with a fresh mind and to ‘get away from all old ideas’. That was the only way to tackle it. ‘In this fast moving world’, said Jinnah, ‘there was the greatest need for scrapping old pacts and drawing up new agreements’.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{The Khudai Khidmatgars and ‘Quit India’}

Unlike other Congress provinces, for the time being, the NWFP remained calm and peaceful. The inhabitants of the province were not very interested in a distant theatre of war. However, the provincial Congress continued to occupy itself in keeping its workers engaged in organizing public meetings, though on a very small scale. The main theme of the Congress meetings remained anti-British—urging the Congress workers not to cooperate with British war aims. The Congress Poona Offer (September 1939) of conditional support to the British war effort had caused confusion

\textsuperscript{34} Qaiyum Khan, 8 April 1940, Peshawar, F. No. 37, SBP, pp. 26-7.
\textsuperscript{35} Pakhtan, 1 June 1940, pp. 5-11.
\textsuperscript{36} Khyber Mail, 14 December 1941.
\textsuperscript{37} C&MG, Lahore, 12 January 1941.
within the Congress ranks. To Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the offer was not a ‘light-hearted’ issue, he was pledged to non-violence and the purpose of the Khudai Khidmatgars was to serve all humanity alike. ‘We have been condemning wars and their horrors’ he remarked, ‘and now is the time to prove our sincerity and resist all attempts to be dragged into any wicked combination for that purpose’.38 Informing Gandhi of his resignation from the CWC, Abdul Ghaffar Khan wrote:

> Some recent resolutions of the Congress Working Committee indicate that they are restricting the use of non-violence to the fight for India’s freedom against constituted authority… I should like to make it clear that the non-violence I have believed in and preached to my brethren of the Khudai Khidmatgars is much wider. It affects all our life, and only this has permanent value. Unless we learn this lesson of non-violence fully we shall never do away with the deadly feuds which have been the curse of the people of the Frontier. Since we took to non-violence and the Khudai Khidmatgars pledged themselves to it, we have largely succeeded in ending the feuds. Non-violence has added greatly to the courage of the Pathans...Khudai Khidmatgars must, therefore, be what our name implies—pure servants of God and humanity—by laying down our lives and never taking any life.39

Abdul Ghaffar Khan also informed the Congress High Command of his resignation from the CWC on 8 July 1940, stating the AICC’s confirmation of the Wardha and Delhi resolutions of the Working Committee as the main reasons for this.40 The resignation aroused mixed feelings. By deciding not to follow the Gandhi and Congress’ line favouring participation in the British war effort, Abdul Ghaffar Khan proved himself to be a firm believer in non-violence. For the time being he was isolated from the rest of his colleagues in the AICC. However, this was a clear proof that, despite being a very close associate of Gandhi, he was a man of strict principles. Furthermore, this can also be cited as the best

---

38 Pakhtun, 11 March 1940, pp. 4-9; M. Yunus, Frontier Pathans and Freedom Struggle (Delhi, 1985), p. 169.
40 Abdul Ghaffar Khan to Secretary AICC, quoted in The Bombay Chronicle, 1 August 1940, Tendulkar Papers, NMML.
example of his independence to those who regarded Abdul Ghaffar Khan as a ‘blind follower’ of Gandhi. On occasions like this, he and his Khudai Khidmatgars proved to be a separate organization, only collaborating with Congress in their joint nationalist struggle for the independence of India. Cunningham viewed his resignation as ‘trying to detach his volunteers from the Congress organization’ and an attempt to reorganize his own non-violent Khudai Khidmatgars. Gandhi appreciated Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s adherence to non-violence. However, Nehru thought the decision hasty and wished Abdul Ghaffar Khan had waited and not taken that decision, because, ‘in any event we have to face conflict and we shall of course face it all together’. His resignation had created a ‘great deal of consternation in people’s mind and confusion prevails as to where everybody is’. The average Pashtoon ‘sees that Badshah Khan [the name given to Abdul Ghaffar Khan by his people as a mark of gratitude, deference, and acknowledgement of the services he rendered to the cause of the freedom struggle] has resigned from various Congress Committees and he thinks there must be something wrong somewhere...’

Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s decision to resign was endorsed by most of his colleagues and followers in the NWFP. The Frontier Province Congress Committee in its meeting on 7-8 April 1940, presided

---

41 GR, 9 August 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15; and, 8 March 1941, D. 670/16, IOLR.
42 ‘In the storm that shook most of the members of the Working Committee’, Abdul Ghaffar Khan ‘stood firm as a rock’, said Gandhi. He added that ‘Being so clear about his own faith and that of the Khudai Khidmatgars, there was for him no escape from resignation of his membership of the Congress Working Committee. His continuing on it would have been anomalous and might have meant an end of his life’s work. He could not ask his people to join as recruits in the army and at the same time forget the law of tribal retaliation. The simple Pathan would have argued with him—and the argument would have been irresistible—that the present war was a war of retaliation and revenge, and that there was no difference between it and their blood feuds’. To Abdul Ghaffar Khan, according to Gandhi, the matter of non-violence was ‘not of intellectual conviction but of the intuitive faith’. ‘Khan Sahib’s Ahimsa’, 16 July 1940, CWMG, 72, pp. 277-9.
43 Nehru to M. Yunus, 6 August 1940, SWJN, 11, (Delhi, 1978), p. 229; Yunus, Frontier Pathans, p. 170.
44 Nehru to Azad, 4 August 1940, SWJN, 11, p. 228.
over by Jaffar Shah, gave its whole-hearted support to the decision. To them the matter was very simple: the Congress had said that it would fight against Britain’s enemies if India attained independence, and this very idea of fighting was against the non-violent principle of the Khudai Khidmatgars. However, there was a row amongst his followers including Pir Shahnaz, Kamdar Khan, M. Jan, Jaffar Shah, and Ali Gul Khan. They tried their utmost to persuade Abdul Ghaffar Khan to reverse his decision for the welfare of the provincial organization. Abdul Ghaffar Khan stood firm and insisted on serving humanity as a whole through the Khudai Khidmatgar organization. On 11 August, the FPCC met at Abbottabad, ratified the decision, and reaffirmed its full support to, and expressed confidence in, the Pashtoon leader. His opponents, however, took his resignation otherwise. They accused him of going against the Islamic injunctions and the Quranic principle of Jihad and adopting instead an ‘effeminate cult of non-violence’ under all conditions.

After the AICC resolution at Ramgarh and the resumption of Congress leadership by Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan rejoined Congress and was immediately authorized by the central organization to guide and direct the Congress’ Individual Satyagraha movement in the NWFP. The main object of the individual Satyagraha launched by Gandhi was to voice anti-war views by individuals, specially selected for the purpose, in violation of wartime ordinances and orders of the government. It was not a campaign for gaining independence, rather it was a campaign for freedom of speech—because the ‘absence of such a basic freedom was symbolic of India’s present servile status. It was also of course a demonstration of their commitment to non-

45 Pakhtun, 21 April 1940, pp. 16-21.
46 Pakhtun, 1 May 1940, pp. 12-15.
47 A. Qaiyum Swati, G. Secretary FPCC to Secretary AICC, 15 August 1940, F. No. 63 (II), Nehru Papers, NMML, pp. 7-8; P-15 (1940) AICC, p.13.
48 Khyber Mail, 21 July 1940.
50 G. L. Puri, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Delhi, 1985), pp. 163-5.
violence’.  

Following the instructions of the Congress High Command, the FPCC was transformed into the provincial Satyagraha committee. Abdul Ghaffar Khan began a whirlwind tour of the province to enrol volunteers and to organize training camps to impart the true spirit of Satyagraha in the provincial workers. Such camps were organized at Sardaryab, Sherpao, Umanzai, and Bannu. The main theme in the speeches remained non-participation in the war effort of the British, anti-recruitment and opposing the British government for not solving the Indian problem. However, as reported by the CID, there was a lack of ‘local interest’ in the affairs of the camps.

While the FPCC was busy organizing its members for the intended civil disobedience, the provincial government did not sit idle. Unlike, previous occasions (1930-34), the Government of the NWFP decided to treat the agitators leniently. Cunningham was of the firm opinion that harsh treatment prompted more violence. ‘If disturbances arise’, remarked Cunningham, ‘I am convinced that our policy ought to be to confine arrests to the fewest possible number...’ On 2 April [1940] a circular of the same kind was issued by the Inspector General of Police to the authorities, instructing them on how to deal with the Congress civil disobedience in the NWFP. He directed the officials to avoid repression, as it resulted in provocation, and to deal only with those who were actually involved in the agitation. He believed

---

51 Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope, p. 329.
52 Pakhtun, 21 April 1940, pp. 16-21; Rikhtinai Khudai Khidmatgar, Peshawar, 9 April 1940; Zamarud Diaries, 6, p. 30; Secretary, AICC to Secretary, FPCC, 5 April 1940, F. No. 343, SBP, pp. 35-9.
53 IAR, I, 1940, p. 248.
54 For further details on such camps see, Pakhtun, 11 May 1940, p. 17 and 1 June 1940, pp. 19-23; F. Nos. 88, 89, 91, 92 and 137, SBP; GR, No. 10, 23 May 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR; F. M. Barr, ‘A “Red Shirt” Camp’, The Modern Review, January 1942, vol. LXXI, No. 1, pp. 54-6
55 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Zama Zhwand, pp. 647-51; CWMG, 75, (Ahmedabad, 1979), pp. 85, 95, 143-5.
56 CID Diaries, F. No. 92, SBP, p. 15.
57 GR, 9 March 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR.
ordinary laws were enough to deal with any such emergency and opposed promulgation of special ordinances in the province. Acknowledging the influential position of pro-British Khans and other persons from various walks of life, the IGP promised the full and strong support of the government to ‘all those who continue to show loyalty to the British Government and who show willingness to help in stamping out the agitation’.  

The leniency of the provincial government, however, did not apply to the Forward Bloc members in the NWFP. The real way to Indian freedom, according to the Forward Bloc workers, was through a violent struggle against British imperialism, and the war had provided them with the best opportunity to get rid of the British yoke. They tried their best to dissuade the people from helping in the British war effort, either with men or through ‘material’. On 22 June 1942, the Government of India declared the Forward Bloc an unlawful association. Some of its Frontier leaders were arrested, while the remaining went underground for the time being.

In order to muster public support, the Frontier government formed the District War Committees. Cunningham himself toured the province to persuade notables to enlist themselves as members of these committees. Besides the loyal Khans some pleaders and other professionals also joined them. The main purposes behind the formation of the committees were to stabilize public opinion in favour of the government; counteract false rumours; and to assist the government in the collection of war funds.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan remained busy in propagating the intended Satyagraha; the Frontier government was worried about his activities, but for the time being he was left untouched. To the authorities, everything depended on the way in which Abdul

57 Confidential Letter of IGP, NWFP, F. No. 34, SBP, pp. 41-7.
58 For details see, F.Nos. 36, 39, 89, 135, 343, SBP,-’Extracts From Home Department War Histories, Indian Police Collection, Mss. EUR., F. 161/148, IOLR; GR, 23 June 1940 and 9 July 1941, D. 670/16, IOLR; Khyber Mail, 26 June 1942.
59 CD, 30 May 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, p. 17; Khyber Mail, 21 June 1940.
Ghaffar Khan ‘himself chooses to direct the movement...’

Gandhi launched his individual Satyagraha on 17 October 1940. According to his programme, only selected individuals had to offer Satyagraha. V. Bhave, whom Gandhi called one of those ‘who believe in pure ahimsa’, offered Satyagraha at Paunar, a village near Wardha. His arrest was followed by that of Nehru and other satyagrahis. In the NWFP, there was speculation about the intended satyagrahis. The general forecast was for Abdul Ghaffar Khan but ‘this does not seem’, remarked Cunningham, ‘to be in keeping with Gandhi’s selection of a comparatively obscure person to set the ball rolling in the rest of India itself’.

Eventually the long awaited decision of the FPCC about the launching of the campaign was taken in a meeting at Peshawar on 11 December 1940. The first batch of twenty satyagrahis would start the civil disobedience on 14 December by shouting approved slogans at selected places in the NWFP. Notices were sent to the Deputy Commissioners giving details of the time and place of Satyagraha actions in their respective jurisdictions.

The Satyagrahis started shouting anti-war slogans on schedule, but the provincial government, restricting itself strictly to its policy of ‘not to arrest straightaway’, desisted from making any arrests. Only the two Satyagrahis in Hazara were arrested, but they were released on 24 December after a short imprisonment. The slogan shouters were ‘quite nonplussed’ at not being arrested and were told by the authorities to disperse and go home. The lenient treatment of the agitators was disliked by the Central government. Objections were raised concerning Cunningham’s policy, which was viewed by Delhi as creating embarrassment for other provincial governments. It was demanded that stern action should
be taken against the agitators. Cunningham resisted the interference of the Centre and remained firm in his policy.\(^{67}\) To Congress workers, the government policy of ignoring the Satyagrahis was meant to prove that the Muslims who dominated the NWFP had no interest in the Congress struggle.\(^{68}\)

Actually, there was a lack of public interest in the movement. It did not arouse public sympathy to the same extent as in the early 1930s. By mid-February, the jubilant Governor had no doubts in his mind that ‘unless some entirely new method is devised by Mr. Gandhi, the movement will quickly die’.\(^{69}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan tried some new tactics by sending Khudai Khidmatgars to the rural areas to raise slogans, but without much response from the people. The logical outcome of all these endeavours was that the individual Satyagraha was suspended never to be revived again.\(^{70}\) In December 1941, the government and the Congress no longer seemed to be at loggerheads. On 3 December, Nehru and Azad were released, followed by others in batches.

One of the main reasons for lack of public interest in Individual Satyagraha was that the theatre of war was far away. The men in the streets and fields were more concerned with their daily affairs than with developments in a distant war. They were minimally interested in such slogans as ‘freedom of speech’ or ‘resisting all wars with non-violent resistance’. The provincial government’s lenient treatment restricted the movement largely to the active workers of the Congress party, their rank and file and, the Khudai Khidmatgars were left undisturbed. The half-hearted participation of the Khudai Khidmatgars proved fatal to the movement. On the resignation of Abdul Ghaffar Khan from the Congress, the Khudai Khidmatgars assumed that they would have nothing to do with the violent struggle of Congress, and that they should concentrate on the social uplift of the Pashtoons.

\(^{67}\) CD, 16 December 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, p. 39.
\(^{68}\) M. Yunus, *Qaidi Key Khaat* (Delhi, 1969), pp. 15-16; Qaiyum’s Speech at Peshawar, 19 August 1942, F. No. 66, SBP, p. 199.
\(^{69}\) Cunningham to Linlithgow, 13 February 1941, Mss. EUR., F. 125/76, IOLR, p. 9.
\(^{70}\) CID Diaries, F. No. 65, SBP, p. 41.
As they were the dedicated followers of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and not the Congress party, they wholeheartedly supported his programme and policy, and not that of the AINC. More attention was given to aspects of the constructive work of the organization, such as training and education of the newcomers in the Khudai Khidmatgar organization, sweeping the village lanes, and doing other kinds of community work.

Pressed by public opinion at home and abroad, the British Cabinet decided to take some immediate steps to win over Indian public opinion and to protect the subcontinent from an imminent Japanese invasion. A ‘deal’ was hurriedly prepared by the War Cabinet, and Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, announced, on 11 March 1942, a mission by Sir Stafford Cripps, a Cabinet Member, to deliver a message personally to India. Cripps, with a draft declaration, arrived in Delhi on 23 March. He was to explain to the Indians the British government’s proposals for India’s attainment of full self-government after the war, in the event of their full co-operation in the war. The draft declaration conceded to the Congress demands partially by recognizing India’s right to frame a constitution through a Constituent Assembly after the war. The demand for Pakistan, was also met, though in vague terms, to the satisfaction of the League, by giving the provinces, which did not want to join the new constitution the right to frame their own, which would enjoy the same status as the Indian Union.\footnote{IAR, 1942, 1, p. 60. Also see, R. Coupland, The Cripps Mission (Bombay, 1942), p. 5; Sitaramayya, History, II, pp. 310-31; R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-45 (Oxford, 1979), pp. 67-8.}

Both the major parties in India, the Congress and the AIML, rejected Cripps’ proposals. Congress reiterated its former stand that ‘no other status except that of independence for the whole of India could be agreed to or could meet the essential requirements of the present situation’. The AIML, while expressing its gratification at the possibility of the recognition of Pakistan by ‘implication by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India’, regretted ‘that the proposals of His Majesty’s Government embodying the fundamentals are not open to any modification and therefore no alternative proposals are
invited...” The outcome of all these endeavours was that Cripps’ mission failed. In April, Cripps cut short his discussions and left for London. The general feeling in the NWFP about the failure of Cripps’ Mission was of great ‘relief. The local Congress workers regarded the main purpose of the Cripps Mission as the obstruction of the actions of the Congress in the pursuit of achieving freedom.

After the failure of the Cripps Mission, which widened the existing gulf between the Congress and the Government, the Congressites prepared themselves for another battle with the Government. The Working Committee of AINC met at Wardha on 14 July and demanded that British rule in India ‘must end immediately...’ It was followed by another resolution passed on 8 August at Bombay, (known as the ‘Quit India’ resolution) calling on the British to quit India, and authorizing Gandhi to lead a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest public scale. The authorities were prepared to combat the Congress civil disobedience. On 9 August, Gandhi and other members of the Congress Working Committee were arrested and the AICC, CWC, and PCCs were proclaimed illegal. The arrest of the leaders was followed by widespread disorder in the country, resulting in attacks on government installations and the law courts. Many cases of looting, arson, and derailing were reported. This was followed by a general crack-down on the Congress workers.

The AIML termed the ‘Quit India’ movement an insidious attack.

---

73 CID Diaries, 18-19 August 1942, F. No. 66, SBP, pp. 83, 197.
74 ‘Prepare to Face the Challenge’, Nehru’s speech at a public meeting at Lucknow, 31 May 1942, SWJN, 12 (Delhi, 1979), pp. 333-8.
76 Sitaramayya, History, II, pp. 343-54; Brown, Gandhi, pp. 338-9.
on Muslim India and called upon the Muslims to ‘abstain from any participation in the movement’. Jinnah considered it a splendid opportunity to fill the vacuum created by the temporary disappearance of the Congress from the political scene.

While the situation in the rest of India was complicated and difficult, in the NWFP it was calm at the beginning of the movement. The Frontier Governor had rightly remarked on the province being the ‘only pleasant part’ of the subcontinent. In order to stir up some excitement among the general public and to popularize the Congress’ programme beyond the settled areas, in July 1942, Abdul Ghaffar Khan sent Khudai Khidmatgar delegations to various areas in the tribal territory. Except for the arrest of one group, sent to Waziristan, the government did not interfere with their activities, because propaganda by pro-government mullahs and the tribal Malik had already turned a ‘vast majority’ of the tribal population against Congress. In most places, to the satisfaction of the Frontier Governor, they were even treated as unwelcome guests. In Malakand, reported Cunningham, the local Malik staunchly opposed the Khudai Khidmatgars and they had to ‘come back without achieving anything’. In Bajaur, they were denied traditional Pashtoon hospitality. The Afridis, under the leadership of Nawab Zaman Khan, warned the Khudai Khidmatgars to leave their territory. They were not allowed to enter Kurram and were stopped by the Kurram Militia at the entrance to the Valley.

On 14 August, the provincial Congress workers launched their

---

79 J. Ahmad, Speeches and Writings, II, p. 457.
80 CD, 7 February 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, p. 76.
81 Sarfaraz Khan, Abdul Malik, Kamdar Khan, Pir Shahzada, and Syed Akbar were sent to Bajaur, Faqir Mohammad and Abdul Majid to Tirah, Abdul Hakim Khan and Abdur Rehman to Waziristan, Taj Mohammad Khamosh to Faqir of Ipi and Fazal ur Rahim Saqi and Abdus Samad Khan to Mohmand Territory. For more details see, F. R. Saqi, Zhwandoon (Peshawar, 1977), pp. 60-133; Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhwand, pp. 658-64; Interviews with Fazal ur Rahim Saqi, Wardaga (Charsadda), 17 November 1991; Sarfaraz Khan, Boobak (Charsadda), 17 November 1991.
82 OR, 10 September 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR, p. 95.
83 Ibid.
Politics during the War Years

civil disobedience by picketing liquor shops in Peshawar. The authorities did not interfere as ‘it hurts nobody and is a good face-saver for Congress’, according to Cunningham. He added that the people were getting ‘what they want at the back door’, so the agitators were left undisturbed, at least for the time being.\textsuperscript{84} The next stage, which started in the first week of September, was the picketing of schools. Attempts were made to organize student \textit{hartals} but with very little success. Only in Bannu did the situation get out of control and 450 arrests were made. The third stage was the occupying of government offices and ‘raids’ on the law courts. With the exception of Peshawar and Mardan, this did not materialize. The provincial leadership failed to mobilize the public to the extent which it had in the early 1930s.\textsuperscript{85}

Several factors contributed to the success of the authorities in dealing with the Congress movement. The provincial government, following the success of its policy during the campaign of Individual \textit{Satyagraha}, decided to avoid the arrest of Congress volunteers for as long as possible. Cunningham was urged time and again by the Central government to arrest all prominent Congress members capable of leading any agitation, and to regard all activities related to Congress as unlawful. But Cunningham resisted this, convinced that he should not arrest the provincial Congress leadership; and he proposed to ‘ignore hot air and arrest only if force or violence is shown’.\textsuperscript{86} ‘If we had done so’, he remarked, ‘a bond would automatically have been created between the Red Shirts and Congress proper, and this would have attracted a certain amount of sympathy to Congress which, has in fact, not been forthcoming...’\textsuperscript{87} The provincial authorities were not in favour of declaring the FPCC an unlawful organization immediately and only favoured prosecuting those individuals who were directly interfering with recruitment, the collection of taxes, and transport systems, or were preaching sedition or advocating the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{84} CD, 19 August 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{85} For details see, Zamarud Diaries, vols. 6-7; Wali Khan, \textit{Bacha Khan}, pp. 329-8.
\textsuperscript{86} CD, 29 July and 12 August 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, pp. 92, 94-5.
\textsuperscript{87} Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 280.
\end{flushright}
breach of some law. The FPCC was the only Provincial Congress Committee which was never declared unlawful during the war years. The government’s hesitation in not arresting the top leadership of the provincial Congress proved the best protection against the agitation turning to violence.

However, with the intensification of the movement in the fourth week of October, the provincial government abandoned its earlier policy and for the time being resorted to the same tactics as were adopted by the government in other parts of India. Congress volunteers were brutally lathi charged and their demonstrations were fired upon. Abdul Ghaffar Khan himself was not spared; he was mercilessly beaten and arrested on 27 October, at Mir Wais Dheri, a suburb of Mardan. Following his arrest, other prominent leaders of the Khudai Khidmatgars in Mardan, Charsadda, and Peshawar were also arrested. For a short while there were signs of a strong protest from Congress volunteers. The Khudai Khidmatgars were induced by those leaders who were still outside prison not to pay their revenues; government servants were asked to leave their jobs; and army men were requested to desert the army. But, contrary to the expectations of the Congressites, the general public had lost interest in civil disobedience. During January 1943 batches of four or five volunteers offered themselves daily for arrest, which was regarded by Cunningham as ‘annoying having to accept this small daily offering’ but he was satisfied that it ‘attracts no public attention now and is looked upon as something of a joke’. By May 1943, the movement dwindled away, causing no further threats to the provincial authorities. The lenient policy and tactful treatment of the provincial authorities proved the best bulwark against attempts by the Congress to arouse

---

89 CD, 15 September 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, p. 100.
90 Details can be seen in Wali Khan, Bacha Khan, pp. 338-9; Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhwand, pp. 666-76; H. B. Joshi, Badshah Khan (Hyderabad, n.d.), pp. 154-6; Pakhtun, Peshawar, November 1991, pp. 9-35; F. Nos. 18, 40, 67, 68, 92, 93, 142, 144, 180, 181, SBP; Khyber Mail, 30 October 1942.
91 Cunningham to Linlithgow, 23 January 1943, Linlithgow Collection, Mss. EUR., F. 125/78, IOLR, p. 3.
the people to the same extent as on earlier occasions. If large scale arrests had been made, the government might have faced a more ‘unpleasant situation’. However, the ‘majority’ of the people did not see themselves as involved and regarded it as merely a political contest between the Congress and the government.

There were also other reasons which contributed to the ability of the authorities to deal with the movement. As the provincial government anticipated, certain organizations and individuals sided with it during the war days. The Khans professed their loyalty to the Crown. The Khaksars also offered their full support to Britain and the Ahrars, in most cases, proclaimed their neutrality. The FPML, waiting for such an occasion since the resignation of Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry, considered it as the best opportunity to move close to Cunningham. They were very helpful to the Government in making ‘the right sort of propaganda’.

Then there were several maulvis who had been working for the British interest for a long time, and ‘have come out with strong anti-Congress speeches in mosques’. The first noted contact with the maulvis of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Sarhad (JUS) was made through Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan. On 5 August 1939, Cunningham summoned Kuli Khan and urged him to convince the maulvis of JUS to emphasize that British interests were almost identical with that of Islam’s, which he duly did. Cunningham continued with his modified plan. A network was established through the Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents, and, in addition, some prominent private individuals were employed to work for the

---

92 Editorial on the Civil Disobedience Movement in the NWFP, Zamindar, 18 September 1942.
93 GR, 23 September 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
94 GR, 23 September 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR; and, CID Diaries, F. No. 775, SBP, p. 65.
95 GR, 8 August 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR. A very interesting and detailed account of the cordial relationship between the British and several prominent and influential clerics and other notables, along with the subsidy list they were getting from the Government in lieu of their services to the Crown, can be seen in Cunningham’s Correspondence with the External Affairs Department regarding Propaganda through Mullahs etc. in Cunningham Collection, Mss. EUR., D. 670/19 and CD, D. 670/4-5, IOLR.
Crown. Initially, the attention of the subsidized clergy was diverted towards the ‘atheist Bolsheviks’, with particular reference to their treatment of Muslims in Central Asia. The Germans were denounced as the collaborators of the Russians. But, with the Russian entry into the war on the Allied side, the whole situation changed. ‘Mullahs have been sending me questions through Kuli Khan’, reported Cunningham, ‘as to what propaganda they should now do... This is not too easy, as up to June last year I was encouraging them to preach anti-Bolshevism more than anti-Nazism. Most people seem to take it for granted that, although we don’t particularly like Bolsheviks, we are only too glad to have them killing the Germans’. Cunningham felt puzzled when asked whether they really were helping their old enemies, the Russians. His reply was simple: that for the common purpose of the destruction of Nazism, they could co-operate with the Russians, without accepting the ideas of Communism or the Soviet system.

The government succeeded in switching over the propaganda from the Bolsheviks to the Germans and the ‘Mullahs seem to look quite naturally to the Nazis as being the principal enemy of Islam and Britain alike’. It was not very difficult for the authorities to direct their propaganda against the Congress. The Congress were denounced as the collaborators of fascism, who were trying to drag Islam into a war which was none of its concern. The services of the JUS were always at the disposal of the government, fatwas were issued against the Khudai Khidmatgars for their close association with the Hindu Congress, and, in particular, the Khan Brothers were criticized for their friendship with Gandhi.

---

97 CD, 1 July 1941, ibid., pp. 56-7; GR, 9 July 1941, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
98 GR, 9 July 1941, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR. Cunningham narrated how at a big Jirga in the Kurram Agency, the Turis—‘the most rabid of all our Shias’—asked him whether it was true that they were helping their old enemy, the Russians. Cunningham replied that ‘if a mad dog got loose in the Parachinar Bazaar, Shias, and Sunnis would combine to shoot it’. ‘This remark’, noted Cunningham, ‘has been repeated along the border and is accepted as a reasonable statement of the case’. GR, 8 August 1941, Mss. EUR., F. 125/76, IOLR.
99 GR, 9 October 1941, Mss. EUR., F. 125/76, IOLR.
The internal feuds within the provincial Congress also contributed largely to the successful dealing of the civil disobedience by the provincial authorities. The in-fighting in the provincial organization distracted the attention of Congress volunteers from civil disobedience. G. M. Khan Lundkhwarh was expelled from the party in November 1940. On the intervention of the Congress high command, he was readmitted, but drifted away again from the party. Jaffar Shah and Arbab Ghafoor had their own differences with each other, resulting in their resignations from the offices of the FPCC president and secretary respectively. Rab Nawaz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Khudai Khidmatgars, had his own views on the non-violent struggle of the Khudai Khidmatgars during the war years, which led to his resignation from the organization. Finally, an important factor (previously neglected by scholars) was the mobilization of and, increase in the police force in the NWFP during the war period. At the outbreak of war, the strength of the Frontier police was 6500 men, by 1941 it increased to 7500. It was further increased to 21,000 plus levies of 9000. The police were equipped with modern weapons (such as sten guns and mortars), provided with adequate motor vehicles and ambulances, and made into a fully mobile force. The wireless network was improved and the CID was expanded. According to A. F. Perrott, the Inspector General Police, NWFP, ‘it is largely owing to the conduct, efficiency, and the bravery of the police, that the province has remained quiet during the war years’.

**Formation, Working, and the Weaknesses of the Muslim League Ministry**

During the war period, it was a feature of British policy to set up as many non-Congress ministries in the provinces as possible, to prove to the outside world that despite non-cooperation of the Congress, the general public was contributing to the Allied war effort. In Sindh, Bengal, and Assam, non-Congress ministries were formed. The same formula was tried in the NWFP. With the resignation of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry, the Governor called on

---

101 Ibid., pp. 290-92.
Aurangzeb, the Opposition Leader in the assembly, and asked him to form an alternative ministry. However, Aurangzeb showed an inability to command a majority in the provincial assembly. Jinnah was informed of the Frontier Governor’s invitation to Aurangzeb, and of his refusal. Jinnah pressed Aurangzeb to ‘form Ministry [at] any cost, even Interim Ministry, waverers, and others will come afterwards’. When told that a ministry with a working majority was impossible, he insisted on forming a ministry anyway and reprimanded Aurangzeb for his ‘Great mistake’ of ‘missing [the] opportunity’. He advised Aurangzeb to ‘form a Coalition Ministry, make every sacrifice, let others be Ministers’. In the absence of the Congress, neither Aurangzeb nor any other leader was capable of commanding the loyalty of more than twenty members in a House of fifty. The Governor, at least for the time being, opposed a ministry with no majority support in the assembly. But he was optimistic of Aurangzeb’s success in the formation of the said ministry within four months ‘if outside Muslim League leaders lend a hand to rally the necessary support’. In March 1940, the AIML deputed Sikandar Hayat, the Punjab Premier, and Sir Akbar Hydari, Member for Information and Broadcasting in the Viceroy’s Executive Council, to the NWFP to help the local Leaguers in the formation of a ministry. They reached Peshawar on 9 March, remained there for a couple of days and held detailed discussions with the non-Congress Muslims of the provincial legislature. Sikandar Hayat thought that if Khuda Bakhsh, Pir Bakhsh, and Nishtar, the three Independents, could ‘be induced to join the Muslim League, it ought to be possible to obtain a coalition with a bare majority in the House’. But their efforts failed and they returned empty-handed.

Despite the endeavours of the League High Command, the situation remained unaltered. There were personal jealousies in the FPML leadership; Saadullah could not see eye to eye with

103 Governor’s Tel. to Viceroy, 10 November 1939, Mss. EUR., F. 125/74, IOLR, p. 99.
104 Jinnah to Aurangzeb quoted in GR, 12 November 1939, Mss. EUR., F. 125/74, pp. 101-102.
105 Ibid.
106 GR, 23 March 1940, Mss. EUR., F. 125/75, IOLR, p. 24.
Aurangzeb and both of them were rivals for the premiership. The feuds within the provincial leadership convinced the Governor that there was no chance of any alternative ministry. According to Cunningham, ‘There are too many selfish, ambitious, and private feuds. Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan would bitterly contest the premiership with Aurangzeb Khan; the Hindus would be shy of joining a party tainted with the name of Muslim; among the Hindus themselves, two Rai Bahadurs are inveterate rivals and would split the Hindu group; the two independents..., would, I think, vote with Congress in a crucial division.’

To him the best solution was to end the internal feuds within the party and to persuade the Hindus to join the Muslim League, if the latter were to call themselves Unionists and give certain written understandings assuring the Hindus that there would be no discrimination against them’. The Governor willingly offered his services. ‘The extent to which I could go to help them’, added Cunningham, ‘would be, firstly, to try and persuade individuals to sink personal ambitions and combine for the good of the Province, and secondly, to assist in forming an agreement between the Muslim and Hindu groups in the event of their coming to the stage of such negotiations’.

Aurangzeb remained engaged in manoeuvring towards a League ministry under his own premiership. 10 September 1941, he further discussed the matter with Jinnah in Delhi, who after much consideration gave his approval. On his return from Delhi, Aurangzeb made a whirlwind tour of the province. He had the backing of the Governor NWFP and two senior bureaucrats, Iskandar Mirza and Shaikh Mahboob Ali. The ‘trio’ intensified their activities and sought the support of provincial MLAs. A well-organized propaganda campaign in favour of Aurangzeb developed; he was presented as the ‘Champion of Islam’ and the ‘natural leader of the Muslim intelligentsia and poor’ alike.

---

107 GR, 9 January 1940, Mss. EUR., D. 670/15, IOLR.
110 Muslim League in the NWFP, F. No. 775, SBP, p. 75.
112 Khyber Mail, 17 July 1942.
Central Government was also interested in the formation of a League ministry in the NWFP. Feroz Khan Noon, Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, was sent in September 1942 to discuss it with Cunningham. Personal jealousies and internal feuds among the League leaders, however, remained the main hurdle. Furthermore, there was no visible majority for the Aurangzeb group, essential to forming a ministry.\textsuperscript{115} By November, the situation remained unchanged. Aurangzeb tried his level best to get the support of the required number of MPs but without any positive results. When asked by the Governor about the latest developments, Aurangzeb informed him there would be a ‘bathroom majority’. When asked to explain, he said it meant that ‘if one member retired to the WC during a division they would probably be in a minority’.\textsuperscript{114}

In January 1943 the position in the assembly was such that the total strength of the existing members was forty. Five members were by then dead, three had accepted service under the Crown and two were in prison. Keeping in view the latest figure of forty, the support of at least twenty was necessary for the formation of a ministry.\textsuperscript{115}

Aurangzeb intensified his activities towards his cherished goal of establishing a ministry, and with the help of the ‘trio’ he succeeded in getting support from Ajit Singh of the Akali Party. As Khanna was out of the country (as a delegate to the Pacific Conference), the party’s secretary Ajit Singh acted as the spokesman of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party. Aurangzeb’s negotiations with Ajit Singh, which began in Peshawar, progressed in Delhi and came to fruition in Amritsar. The Akali Party offered support in return for a promise to give one ministerial position to Ajit Singh. Moreover, it was resolved to safeguard rights of the minority. Due consideration was to be given to the minority communities in the province in the matter of their shares in services and in educational grants.\textsuperscript{116} Nishtar (Independent), Raja Abdur Rahman (Hazara Democrats), and Samin Jan (Congress deserter) were also promised portfolios

\textsuperscript{113} GR, 28 September 1942, Mss. EUR., 70/L/P&I/5/2/19, NDC.  
\textsuperscript{114} CD, 9 November 1942, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, p. 104.  
\textsuperscript{115} Khyber Mail, 22 January 1943.  
\textsuperscript{116} IAR, 1943, II, p. 306; Sitaramayya, History, II, p. 528.
in the intended Cabinet under Aurangzeb.\footnote{117} By the end of April, Cunningham still stood firm in demanding the names of twenty-two Aurangzeb supporters.\footnote{118} But the Viceroy, who also was looking for the formation of a League ministry in the NWFP, directed Cunningham to act on the desire of Jinnah, i.e. the formation of a League ministry at any cost.\footnote{119} Cunningham, on getting approval from the Centre,\footnote{120} changed his mind and agreed to be content with sixteen firm supporters for Aurangzeb—with the hope of five more MLAs joining his side in due course.\footnote{121}

Eventually the Governor invited Aurangzeb to form the ministry. On 24 May 1943 the Governor had a detailed meeting with Aurangzeb. He was asked about his policy regarding the war effort, to which he assured the Governor of his wholehearted support. To the satisfaction of Cunningham, he promised to accept the already authorized budget, and further said that on general administrative questions he would be doing nothing to embarrass the Governor or other government officials, and would fully rely on bureaucrats for technical advice.\footnote{122} On 25 May, Section 93 was revoked and the Governor formally invited Aurangzeb to form a ministry in the NWFP. The ministry was sworn in on 25 May.\footnote{123} Thus with the formation of the Muslim League ministry in the NWFP, the AIML, at least for the time being, succeeded in weaning the Frontier from the Congress fold to its side. Jinnah rightly remarked that all of the Muslims were with the League.\footnote{124} The pro-government newspapers regarded it as ‘a new ray of hope

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[117] Zia-ud-Din, Memoirs, p. 65; Shad, ‘Deed’, III, pp. 167-8.
\item[118] GR, 23 April 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
\item[119] Linlithgow to Cunningham, 26 April 1943, Mss. EUR., F. 125/78, IOLR, p. 15.
\item[120] Linlithgow to Cunningham, 2 March 1943, Mss. EUR., F. 125/78, IOLR, pp. 7-8.
\item[121] GR, 4 May 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
\item[123] It consisted of Aurangzeb as Chief Minister; Nishtar as Finance Minister; Ajit Singh, Minister of Public Works; Raja A. Rahman, Information Minister and Samin Jan as the Education Minister. CD, 25 May 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/4, IOLR, p. 130; Khyber Mail, 28 May 1943.
\end{itemize}}
for Muslim India in general and the Frontier Muslims in particular’. The provincial Congress accused the authorities of ‘conspiring’ against the people of the NWFP by installing the League ministry without popular support. It was termed as a ‘reactionary’ and ‘puppet’ ministry.\textsuperscript{126}

After the assumption of power, the foremost concern of the ministry was the forthcoming by-elections to the seven vacant seats of the provincial legislature. Of the seven seats, elections were held for six—four Muslims and two Hindus—the polling in the Sikhs’ seat was postponed for technical reasons.\textsuperscript{127} The AIML deputed Khaliquzzaman and Jamal Mian to help the FPML in its election campaign. The main theme of their speeches centred on the treatment of Muslims by the Congress in its majority provinces and the new ideals of the Pakistan scheme versus Akhand Hindustan.\textsuperscript{128} In order to infuse more life into the election campaign, Jinnah sent a message to the Muslims of NWFP exhorting them to support the League candidates in the by-elections.\textsuperscript{129}

The provincial Congress split into two groups on the question of participation in the by-elections. One group led by Dr Khan Sahib, including B. R. Gandhi and Ali Gul Khan, had favoured contesting them ‘to expose the hollowness of the Constitution’; while the other, led by Sher Ali Khan, thought that, after its declaration of complete independence during ‘Quit India’, the Congress should not take part in such things. But the latter group was voted down,\textsuperscript{130} and Congress participated in the by-elections.

The elections were held on 6-7 August. To the utter surprise of

\textsuperscript{125} Sarhad, Peshawar, 31 May 1943, (Yusufi Collection).
\textsuperscript{126} CID Diaries, 11 June 1943, F. No. 69, SBP, pp. 181-2.
\textsuperscript{127} GR, 9 July 1943, Mss. EUR., F. 125/78, IOLR, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{128} CID Diaries, 21-2 July 1943, F. No. 777, SBP, pp. 55-9.
\textsuperscript{129} ‘All Muslim India’s eyes are today towards you’ remarked Jinnah. ‘If you fail in duty you will shock all Mussalmans of India. The Mussalmans of India have great faith and hopes in you and believe that you will be unconquerable soldiers of Islam like your unconquerable rocks and through you Islam in India will be able to revive the glorious past’. Khyber Mail, 23 July 1943.
\textsuperscript{130} Gupta, Freedom Struggle, p. 136.
political circles, all the four contested Muslim seats were won by the FPML, while the two Hindu seats went to Congress.\textsuperscript{131} The Congress accused officials of canvassing for the League candidates and helping them to win the elections. Dr Khan Sahib met the Governor and informed him of vote-rigging and malpractices by returning officers, officials, and ministers at the polls.\textsuperscript{132} Cunningham acknowledged the complaints of the ex-premier and saw ‘some truth in all this’,\textsuperscript{133} though he regarded the Muslim League successes as ‘a victory for the British Government over the subversive elements’. According to him, it was through the organized propaganda of the Government against the Khudai Khidmatgars that the League candidates had succeeded in defeating their rivals.\textsuperscript{134}

Thus, with official patronage and blessings, the Frontier League ministry started its career. Cunningham, however, was not happy with the attitude of his ministers. Soon after their assumption of power, Cunningham complained of the ministers’ partiality towards their partymen. He was not happy with the abuse of power and authority, particularly by the Chief Minister, who allowed party and personal considerations to colour his actions.\textsuperscript{135}

Aurangzeb, according to the Governor, ‘seems to have forgotten that the function of a Minister is to advise the Governor. Nearly every file comes from him with a note: “I solicit the advice of H.E. the Governor!”’.\textsuperscript{136} The manipulation of the ministers in administrative appointments, promotions and postings, discrimination in allocating government funds, interference in police investigations, tampering with the judicial processes, and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{131} The Information, Peshawar, 1 September 1943, Yusufi Collection. The League’s successful candidates were Ghulam Hussain, Arbab Sher Ali Khan, M. Ayub Khan, and Nasrullah Khan. The two successful Congress candidates were Kewal Ram and Lala Hans Raj. Khyber Mail, 13 August 1943.
\textsuperscript{132} CD, 16 August 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/5, IOLR, p. 8; CID Diaries, F. No. 72, SBP, pp. 39, 77.
\textsuperscript{133} CD, 16 August 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/5, IOLR, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{134} CD, 10 August 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/5, IOLR, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{135} CD, 20 October 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/5, IOLR, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 4.
\end{flushleft}
nepotism in jobs, compelled Cunningham to warn the Chief Minister that if they continued with such practices, ‘either I must give up the Governorship or I must get new Ministers’.  

Pakistan was another sensitive question for the ministry, as it was certainly bound to cause problems with the minorities. From the outset Aurangzeb was warned by the Governor to ‘keep Pakistan in the background as much as possible’; as the demand for Pakistan had rallied Muslims very successfully in the provinces where they were in the minority, ‘so the cry of no Pakistan may unite non-Muslim elements most effectively against him in the majority provinces’. But he did not succeed in keeping it away for long from the assembly discussions.

Saadullah, the prominent Leaguer, demanded that a resolution on Pakistan be moved immediately. He asked the Frontier premier to declare a policy on the issue. Aurangzeb assured him that ‘all the Muslim members of the Government are committed to Pakistan’, and thus shelved the issue without antagonizing the minorities in the Frontier.

From September 1943, Aurangzeb’s ministry released more than one thousand Congress members detained in various prisons in the province. However, the Congress MLAs were not released. The reason, probably, was to ‘maintain itself comfortably in office’. Cunningham was urged by some loyal notables of the Frontier to release the Congress MLAs. To keep the number of the opposition less than the ministerial party (total twenty-three) in the legislature, the government decided to release the detainees in stages. The release of six Congress MLAs added strength to the previous

---

137 GR, 24 September 1943, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR; A. Qaiyum, secretary Muslim League, Lundkhwarh to Members, Committee of Action (AIML), 22 June 1944, F. No. 343, AFM, p. 94.
139 GR, 9 August 1943, Mss. EUR., F. 125/78, IOLR, p. 42.
140 Linlithgow to Cunningham, 17 August 1943, ibid., p. 25.
141 Saadullah, PLAD, 24 August 1943, pp. 5-7.
142 Aurangzeb, ibid.
144 Khyber Mail, 24 September 1943.
Politics during the War Years

fourteen, bringing the total number of the opposition members to twenty. The Governor was requested by the opposition members of the assembly to convene a session of the assembly, which he declined on the plea that there was not enough legislative business to be carried out. It was the first time, since 1932, that the Frontier assembly did not meet for the autumn session. The obvious reason was, of course, to save the ministry from defeat, as the Governor was sure of a no-confidence motion by the opposition, supported by some of the League members who were not happy with Aurangzeb.\textsuperscript{145}

A strong segment of the provincial Leaguers was critical of the way the ministry functioned. Saadullah accused the Chief Minister of paying no heed to the party and the organization. The ministers, including the Chief Minister, according to Saadullah were involved in corruption, thus giving a bad name to the League organization. He informed Jinnah that in such circumstances, he ‘cannot tolerate any more to work with Sardar Aurangzeb because of his treacherous attitude and hypocritical habit’ and that he would vote against him, whenever a chance came.\textsuperscript{146} Shahzada Fazalddad, the most prominent Leaguer from the southern districts, termed the ministry ‘corrupt, nefarious and anti-Muslim’.\textsuperscript{147} Some of the League supporters became so disgusted with the ministry that they decided to leave the organization and join Congress, but were requested to ‘have patience and not to be led away by personalities’.\textsuperscript{148} The ministry’s misuse of power and authority, and greediness, annoyed some of its staunch supporters and they withdrew their support from the League ministry.\textsuperscript{149} Taj Ali Khan, president of the FPML, also could not remain a silent spectator to the corruption of the ministry, especially as it related to the management of wartime rationing. He informed Jinnah that ‘different elements of the Ministry as far as I know are not functioning practically for the Muslim League, but for mercenary

\textsuperscript{145} GR, 9 October 1944, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
\textsuperscript{146} Saadullah to Jinnah, 7 November 1944, NWFP-I, Shams ul Hasan Collection, Karachi, (hereafter SHC), pp. 74-74(E).
\textsuperscript{147} Shahzada Fazalddad to Jinnah, 10 July 1944, F. No. 519, QAP, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{148} Liaquat to Ziarat Gul, 5 August 1944, NWFP-I, SHC, pp. 5-5(a).
ends of their own or of their relatives...". Jinnah replied that he himself would have to put the house in order: The Centre is doing its best to help and guide, but the root is in the province itself, and it is therefore up to you all to work selflessly for the cause and establish solidarity amongst those who understand better, to begin with, and create complete unity and discipline amongst our people. Jinnah summoned Sardar Bahadur, Speaker, NWFP assembly, and the Muslim ministers to Delhi to find a solution to the grave situation in the NWFP, which he regarded as ‘not only painful but calculated to damage the prestige and honour’ of the League in the NWFP. While Jinnah remained occupied in seeking a favourable outcome, anti-ministry Leaguers in the province decided that it would be of great advantage to the League organization as a whole if the ministry was wrecked. Some of them finally decided to save the FPML from further deterioration and supported the Congress in its move of no-confidence against Aurangzeb’s ministry.

Cunningham informed Wavell of the weak and insecure position of the League ministry, which was likely to be defeated during the forthcoming budget session. Wavell’s personal observation on the fall of the ministry was that there would be no difficulty in replacing the Aurangzeb ministry. However, his main concern was the support of the would-be new ministry for the British war effort.

Despite the best efforts of the bureaucracy to keep the League ministry in office, another session of the provincial legislature could not be postponed any longer. The spring session of the assembly was called in March 1945. On 9 March, the assembly met for its budget session, and following the presentation of the

---

153 Saadullah to Convenor, Committee of Action, 8 August 1945, NWFP-I, SHC, pp. 60-60(A).
155 Wavell to Amery, 30 January 1945, TP, V, p. 490.
156 Wavell to Amery, 13 March 1945, TP, V, p. 680.

* Full letter of Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan can be seen in Appendix V.
Politics during the War Years

budget for 1945-6, a no-confidence motion was tabled against Aurangzeb’s ministry.157 The motion was admitted and discussed on 12 March [1945]. Dr Khan Sahib, the mover, accused the ministry of deliberately keeping the Congress MLAs in prison to perpetuate their minority government, and he charged it with gross mismanagement and corruption.158 Aurangzeb refuted the charges levelled against him. About corruption he remarked ‘corruption started with Adam and will end on doomsday’. He reviewed the work done during their tenure in detail and said that the government had deeds and not words to justify their existence.159 The no-confidence motion was carried in the assembly by twenty-three votes to eighteen, supported by three Muslim League members of the House.160 Aurangzeb and his colleagues formally tendered their resignation and on 16 March the Governor invited Dr Khan Sahib to form his ministry.161

The FPML came to power in May 1943, and managed to stay in office for about two years, mainly because of the deadlock which existed between the Congress and the government. The bureaucracy supported the weak ministry of Aurangzeb to their utmost, but due to certain malpractices, such as corruption, misuse of power, and nepotism, the ministry earned a bad name for the provincial organization of the League which widened the already existing rift within the party leadership. The ousting of the League ministry was a real setback for the AIML. The central organization responded quickly and expelled Saadullah, Khan Bahadur Faizullah, and M. Afzal Khan, the three who voted against the

---

158 Dr Khan Sahib on No-Confidence Motion, 12 March 1945, PLAD, pp. 43-6.
159 Aurangzeb, ibid., pp. 46-53.
161 The second Congress ministry in the NWFP consisted of four members: Dr Khan Sahib, the Chief Minister, also in charge of Home, Public Works and Public Health; Qazi Ataullah as Education, Revenue and Local self-government, B. R. Gandhi as the Finance Minister, and Abbas Khan as the Minister for Industries and Forests. CD, 16 March 1945, Mss. EUR., D. 670/5, IOLR, p. 65; IAR, 1945, I, pp. 210-11. For more details on the working of second Congress ministry see, Gupta, Freedom Struggle, pp. 162-71.
League ministry, from the party.\textsuperscript{162} The FPML, a faction-ridden body, was dissolved by Jinnah as it was the ‘logical outcome of the faction feeling within the Provincial League which has been its greatest weakness’.\textsuperscript{163} Nishtar was instructed by Jinnah to ‘boldly give a lead to our people in the NWFP, you will find 99 per cent of the Mussalmans behind you, provided that the Muslim League organization will adhere solemnly to its policy and programme, that its leaders are selfless, sincere, and servants of the nation, and that you put forward a definite, well-considered parliamentary programme in the form of a manifesto’.\textsuperscript{164}

**Second Congress Ministry**

This was the first Congress ministry to accept office, of course with the approval of Gandhi,\textsuperscript{165} during the war years. Despite some improvements in Congress-Government relations, till July 1945, it had not resumed its former ministerial responsibilities anywhere else in the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{166} The NWFP Governor regarded it as a victory for the government as the Congress ‘now had to go back on their resolutions of ‘39 and ‘42’. He was satisfied to pursue his own policy, despite the opposition of the Central government. ‘It is also clearly a vindication of the line I took in 1942’; remarked Cunningham. ‘It is quite clear now that if we had declared Congress an unlawful association straightaway we would have been in the same sort of trouble as other Provinces, and Congress would certainly not have formed a Ministry here’.\textsuperscript{167}

**Simla Conference (1945) and its Repercussions on the Provincial Politics**

As the war situation improved, the solution of the Indian problem was sought with new vigour and hope. It was decided by the British government to convene a Round Table Conference of the Indian political leaders. As a gesture of good will, on 15 June
1945, the detained members of the AICC, were released. A conference was convened at Simla which started its deliberations on 25 June. Besides the presidents of AINC and AIML, the conference was attended by twenty-two delegates, including the representatives of the Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs, and premiers and ex-premiers of the British Indian provinces. Right at the beginning of the deliberations, differences between the Congress and the Muslim League came out in the open. By the second day agreement was reached on certain issues such as the representation of minorities, whole-hearted support towards the war effort, and continuance of the reconstituted Executive Council till the end of the war. Differences, however, emerged regarding the composition of the Executive Council. Jinnah took the stand that the Congress would include only Hindu members in its quota on the Executive Council. He argued that if Master Tara Singh and others could choose their own men, the Muslim League was right "in insisting on its right to choose all the Muslim representatives". The Congress rejected Jinnah’s stand as it could not accept the Muslim League as the sole representative and authoritative organization of the South Asian Muslims. Azad rebutted the League’s claim by citing the examples of the NWFP, Bengal, Punjab, and Assam, Muslim majority areas with non-League ministries. Moreover, the Congress reiterated its stand on complete independence for India, while the League could not agree to a constitution on any basis other than that of Pakistan. For Jinnah, acceptance at that stage might ‘shelve’ the Pakistan issue for an indefinite period ‘whereas the Congress will have secured under this arrangement what they want, namely, a clear road for their advance towards securing Hindu national independence of India...” Thus the deliberations


171 Statement of Jinnah at a Press Conference, 14 July 1945, J. Ahmad, Speeches and Writings, II, p. 186; Jinnah to Wavell, 7 July 1945, TP, V,
at Simla ended in complete failure. They marked a watershed in Indian political history.\textsuperscript{172} Henceforth, the Congress realized the importance of the League, without whose consent no long-term settlement of the Indian problem could be brought about.\textsuperscript{173} In the NWFP, Cunningham reported that communal feelings had grown worse since the failure of the talks at Simla. Well-educated Muslims, according to Cunningham, were becoming anti-Hindu and pro-Muslim League.\textsuperscript{174}

The Governor’s views were confirmed as prominent political figures now joined the League organization, which infused new life into the feud-ridden body of the provincial League. The new entrants included Amin ul Hasanat, the Pir of Manki Sharif, a prominent sajada nashin of Nowshera, who also brought a large number of his disciples to the League fold. Then there were Qaiyum, former Deputy Leader of the Congress in the Central Legislative Assembly; Arbab Ghafoor, former Congress MLA; G. M. Khan, ex-president of the FPCC; Rab Nawaz, the one time Salar-i-Ala of the Khudai Khidmatgars, and M. Abbas Khan, a former minister in the Congress ministry.\textsuperscript{175} The deserters from Congress and the new entrants brought with them organizational skills, a large number of their own followers and a plan of action against the Congress programme, particularly in the rural areas. This gave an impetus to the League organization in the NWFP.

The political developments during this period inexorably brought

\textsuperscript{172} Wavell to Amery, 13 July 1945, \textit{TP}, V, pp. 1239-41; Minutes of the Final Meeting of Simla Conference, 14 July 1945, ibid., pp. 1243-6; \textit{IAR}, 1945, II, pp. 128-30.


\textsuperscript{175} For more details on the desertions from Congress and of the deserters joining the League see, Shah, \textit{Pir of Manki Sharif Syed Amin ul Hasanat Aur Unki Siyasi Jaddo Jehad} (Islamabad, 1989); Jinnah-Amin ul Hasanat Correspondence, \textit{Manki Collection}; Files on Jamiat ul Asfia, Manki Collection; Shad, ‘Deed’, III, pp. 205-207; Jinnah-Qaiyum Correspondence, NWFP-II, SHC, and GRs for September 1945, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR; \textit{Khyber Mail}, October 1945, and Talbot, \textit{Provincial Politics}, pp. 24-5.
the politics of the province into the vortex of the all-India politics. As the issue of Pakistan acquired centrality the status of the NWFP in the new political configuration became a matter of controversy and strife. Though the NWFP was a Muslim majority province it was not as yet sympathetic to the idea of Pakistan. Pakistan was not relevant to the aspirations of the Pashtoons. Yet they could not escape its logic, they resisted it, developing in the process the idea of an autonomous status for the Pashtoons, unfortunately in the end without success.
CHAPTER 6
MOVING TOWARDS COMMUNALIZATION OF POLITICS

During the elections of 1946, in the NWFP, the contest was mainly between the Congress and the Muslim League. Congress had to prove that the NWFP Muslims were supporting both it and the ideology of Indian nationalism, while the League was eager to show that the influence of the Khan Brothers and the Congress had waned and that the Muslims of the Frontier wanted Pakistan.

The Elections of 1946

The Labour Party won the British general election in July 1945, and formed a new government under Clement Attlee. It decided to give priority to the Indian problem. One of its first actions was to announce elections for the central and provincial legislatures.1 The Indian elections were to lead India to a more democratic government, and pave the way for independence. The declaration by Whitehall, however, was not welcomed in the political circles of the subcontinent. Congress, as reported by the Viceroy, was indignant at the lack of consultation, and apparently wanted more time to organize itself.2 The Muslim League reiterated its position that no solution without Pakistan as a basis was acceptable.3 But, in spite of their reservations, the politicians committed themselves to the election campaign so as to secure a role in the legislatures. The Congress claimed that it stood for equal rights and opportunities for every citizen of India and for the unity of all communities and religious groups. It envisaged a free democratic state, with fundamental rights and liberty for all citizens, guaranteed in the constitution. Moreover, it advocated for a federal constitution with autonomy for its constituent units, and demanded that the elections should be fought on the basis of adult franchise.

1  Broadcast of C. Attlee, London, 19 September 1945, IAR, 1945, II, p. 150.
2  Moon, The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 164.
3  J. Ahmad, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore, 1947), II, pp. 386-9; Hodson, The Great Divide, p. 130.
The Congress further declared that it would fight elections principally on the issue of keeping India united.\(^4\) The AIML approached the voters and asked them to cast their votes for the Muslim League to bolster the cause of Islam and Pakistan.\(^5\) Moreover, it had to prove that the Muslim League was the only representative organization of the Muslims of India.\(^6\) Campaigning on the platform of Pakistan, the Muslim League became the ‘overwhelming favourite’ of many Muslims as there was now no chance of diverting the Pakistan movement.\(^7\) Many pro-League Muslims saw in Pakistan a chance of not only restoring the physical but the moral authority of Islam, which was lacking in the India of 1945.\(^8\)

In the NWFP the elections were expected to be contested mainly between the Congress and the AIML. There were some smaller organizations, such as the Khaksars, Ahrars, JUH, and the Akalis, but their activities were confined mainly to particular localities in the province. It was a test case for the Congress to prove that the Muslims of the NWFP were under the banner of the Congress and were struggling against British imperialism. It also had to disprove the claims of the Muslim League that it was the sole representative organization of the Indian Muslims, demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia.\(^9\) The Muslim League, on the other hand, had to prove that the influence of the Khan Brothers and the Congress had waned in the NWFP, and that the Frontier Muslims were flocking to the League to safeguard their interests and eliminate Hindu domination in the subcontinent.

Confident of its success in the forthcoming general elections, the Frontier Province Muslim League decided to contest all the thirty-eight Muslim seats including two Landholders’ seats. It was sure to win twenty-four of the thirty-six Muslim seats plus the two Landholders’ seats, in a House of fifty—provided the big Khans

---

6 Ibid., pp. 396-7.
were not allowed to contest on the League ticket.\textsuperscript{10} In spite of the fact that the FPML had gained the support of the Muslim intelligentsia, there was disunity among the party’s provincial leadership.\textsuperscript{11} According to Cunningham, the League’s chances of success in the elections depended on the efforts their Central Command is now making to improve the local organization.\textsuperscript{12}

The central organization responded quickly. Jinnah appealed to Muslims to ‘give up their personal quarrels’ for the sake of the ‘sacred and noble cause’ of Pakistan. He urged them to ‘take a solemn oath that you would not falter or fail to make all sacrifices for the establishment and achievement of our National goal of Pakistan’.\textsuperscript{13} On 27 September, the League High Command sent two of its prominent members, M. Ismail and Khaliquzzaman, to the NWFP to formulate plans for the forthcoming general elections.\textsuperscript{14} They toured the province and on their recommendations the Parliamentary Board of the AIML constituted three Boards for the province, namely: (i) the Muslim League Selection Board, to choose candidates; (ii) an Election Board, for organizing and making arrangements for the elections; and (iii) a Finance Board, to collect funds and maintain regular and proper accounts.\textsuperscript{15} The League candidates were selected by the Muslim League Selection Board. Though Mamdot was the president of the Board, the real powers were vested in Qaiyum, who played a crucial role in the distribution of party tickets. Interestingly, six of the Board’s nine members were themselves nominated as League candidates.\textsuperscript{16} The prominent Leaguers who were excluded from the award of party tickets included Aurangzeb,

\textsuperscript{10} CID Diaries, 1 August 1945, F. No. 754, SBP, p. 23; GR, 9 September 1945, L/P/J/5/222, NDC.
\textsuperscript{11} Ziarat Gul to Liaquat Ali, 30 August 1945, F. No. 344, AFM, pp. 98-9; Saadullah Khan to Jinnah, 1 September 1945, SHC, NWFP-I, pp. 59-59(a).
\textsuperscript{12} GR, 9 October 1945, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
\textsuperscript{13} Jinnah’s Pakistan Day Message, 22 March 1945, F. No. 1020, QAP, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{14} Khyber Mail, 28 September 1945.
\textsuperscript{15} Extracts from the proceedings of the Central Parliamentary Board’s meeting held at Delhi, 8/9 October 1945, Nishtar, I, AFM, pp. 137-8; CID Diaries, 26 October 1945, F. No. 754, SBP, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{16} They included Qaiyum, Noor M. Khan, Kiyani, Jalal, Habibullah, and Zakori. Jansson, Pakhtunistan, p. 114.
Mian Zia-ud-Din, Taj Ali Khan, Bakht Jamal, and Saadullah. They were accused of creating a rift in the League organization; they appealed to the central organization, but only Mian Zia-ud-Din succeeded in getting a ticket for himself.\textsuperscript{17}

The demand for Pakistan remained the focus of attention during the League’s election campaign. Appeals were made to the Frontier Muslims to vote for the League candidates, as ‘Every vote for a Muslim League candidate is a vote for Pakistan’.\textsuperscript{18} The Muslims of the NWFP were warned against Hindu domination in India and reminded of the treatment meted out to the Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces during Congress rule. The Muslim League, according to the League orators was safeguarding the interests of the Mussalmans.

During the Frontier elections, Muslim students campaigned for League candidates and appealed to the Muslim electorate to cast their votes for Pakistan. On the occasion of their Frontier visit, Mamdot and Khaliquzzaman visited Islamia College Peshawar. They appealed to Muslim students to support the League and to carry out its programme in the rural areas of the province.\textsuperscript{19} Similar requests to the students of Aligarh Muslim University and other Muslim institutions had already been made by the League High Command. Responding to the appeals, fifty students from the NWFP studying at Aligarh resolved to work for League candidates in the elections. They proceeded to the NWFP to participate in the election campaign, and were joined by more students from the same institution some days later.\textsuperscript{20} Islamia College Peshawar and a few other Muslim institutions in the province were closed, obviously to enable the students to canvass for the League candidates.\textsuperscript{21} Activities by pro-League students were reported from Hazara, Charsadda, Nowshera, Bannu, and other parts of the southern districts of the NWFP. Muslims were exhorted to give

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] CID Diaries, 13 December 1945, F. No. 753, SBP, p. 307.
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] CID Diaries, F. No. 754, 778, 779, SBP; Khyber Mail, 26 October, 9 and 30 November 1945.
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] CID Diaries, 4 October 1945, F. No. 754, SBP, p. 115.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Abdul Ghaffar Khan, \textit{My Life and Struggle} (Delhi, 1969), pp. 174-5.
\end{itemize}
their wholehearted support to the League candidates to enable them to achieve Pakistan.22

**Jinnah’s Second Frontier Visit (November 1945)**

To give further boost to the League election campaign, Jinnah himself visited the Frontier, arriving in Peshawar on 19 November.23 During his stay, Jinnah participated in the Muslim League Conference held on 20 November at Shahi Bagh, Peshawar. In his address Jinnah elaborated on the representative character of the AIML and its role as the main bulwark against the Congress onslaught. He regarded the forthcoming elections as the ‘first step towards the achievement of Pakistan’. If they succeeded, half of their work would be done; if they failed they would be wiped out from the political scene.24 Jinnah argued that the only solution of the Indian problem was to concede Pakistan. He made a fervent appeal for support for the League candidates in the elections. ‘If you win’, remarked Jinnah, ‘you will make them believe that you want Pakistan and if not, you would be helping that false propaganda of the Congress’.25 He warned the Congress leaders to keep their hands off the Muslims, and to treat them equally to make the country happy, prosperous, and great.26 Jinnah appealed to the Frontier Muslims to vote for the League candidates as ‘Every vote in favour of a Muslim League candidate means Pakistan. Every vote against a Muslim League candidate means Hindu Raj’.27 Jinnah’s visit gave a major stimulus to the election campaign of the League in the NWFP. Cunningham also shared the opinion that Jinnah’s visit had strengthened the Muslim League cause and provided it with ‘fairly effective propaganda’.28

---

22 CID Diaries, F Nos. 754 (p. 779), 789 (pp. 211-15) and 797 (p. 289), SBP.
23 CID Diaries, 20 November 1945, F. No. 754, SBP, p. 225.
24 Jinnah’s address at the Muslim League Conference, Peshawar, 20 November 1945, F. No. 753, SBP, pp. 349-53; Khyber Mail, 23 November and 14 December 1945.
26 CID Diaries, 26 November 1945, F. No. 753, SBP, pp. 385-9; Shah, Muslim League, pp. 84-5.
27 Khyber Mail, 30 November 1945.
28 GR, 8 December 1945, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.
The FPML soon became overconfident of its success in the elections. The defections from the Congress gave added strength to its poor organization. The League tried its best to exploit the anti-Pashtoon feelings of the majority of the non-Pashto inhabitants of Hazara, Kohat, and Dera Ismail Khan, and its ascendancy became clear in the urban centres of the province. The successful visit of Jinnah in November 1945 convinced many people that the tide had turned in favour of the League. But such speculations proved short-lived, for, soon the number of new adherents to the League cause decreased and the League had to confront the more organized Congress.

The FPCC, in contrast to the FPML, nominated its candidates only for those seats where there was some chance of winning, and contested twenty-seven out of thirty-eight Muslim seats, mostly in the Pashtoon-dominated regions. The Congress, however, contested all twelve minority seats. In some areas, where there was no chance of success for a Congress candidate, it supported non-Congress candidates. The Congress candidates were chosen through a two-part procedure. First, the Tappa Congress Committee had to send the name of its nominees. The final decision then rested with a six-member executive subcommittee of the FPCC. A. K. Azad was the representative of the Congress High Command, but he had very little say, and the distribution of tickets was mainly conducted by the above mentioned Committee. In contrast to the League, there was little dissent on the distribution of tickets. Only four unsuccessful candidates deserted the party.

From the outset, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was against taking part in the elections. He was not satisfied with the performance of the former Congress ministry and the MPs, and he accused the Congress

---

29 Rittenberg, 'Independence Movement', p. 323.
30 They included Paira Khan (Dera Ismail Khan), Amir Alam Awan (Hazara), Mian M. Shah (Nowshera), and Ibrahim Khan (Peshawar). The former three ran as independent candidates in Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, and Nowshera, without harming Congress but Ibrahim Khan’s desertion from Congress and support of the League, defeated the Congress candidate in the Bara Mohmand Constituency. After the elections were over the above mentioned were accused of indiscipline and of opposing Congress nominees in the election, and were expelled from the organization. The Frontier Mail, Peshawar, 10 March 1946.
legislators of giving attention to their personal interests rather than paying heed to the electorate who they were representing in the assembly. Soon, however, he found himself compelled under ‘special’ circumstances to start canvassing for the Congress nominees. The active participation of large numbers of students from Aligarh, Calcutta, and other parts of India, who thronged the NWFP to promote the League election campaign, and the covert support of the Frontier bureaucracy for the FPML, changed his mind. One month before the elections, he decided to tour the province and urge the Pashtoons to vote for the Congress candidates. He deemed it necessary not only for the prestige of Congress in the NWFP, but also for the freedom of India. The Congress workers urged the voters to support the Congress nominees and to bolster the nationalist movement against British imperialism. To them the real issue was neither Pakistan nor United India but gaining freedom. Moreover, emphasis was given to social and economic questions—safeguards for and protection of the peasants and the ordinary, Khudai Khidmatgars from the exploitation of the big Khans, who in most cases were allies and active supporters of the Muslim League. The big Khans and others who were like-minded were charged with being more interested in the protection of their ‘class’ interests than in the advancement of the Pashtoon cause. The pro-League clergy was also accused of playing into the hands of the British government and its supporters. According to the Khudai Khidmatgars, religion was always being exploited by vested interests to deceive the simple-minded Pashtoon. The voters were warned of the activities of the ‘sold-clerics’—the so-called religious leaders of the masses in the NWFP.

A noteworthy feature of the elections of 1945-6 was that the two

31 ‘Elections and the Khudai Khidmatgars’, Pakhtun, 17 October 1945, pp. 4-5.
32 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle, pp. 174-5; CID Diaries, 29/30 December 1945, F. No. 41, SBP, p. 129.
33 Abdul Ghaffar Khan quoted in Hindustan Times, 23 January 1946.
34 For more details of the Congress election campaign in the NWFP see, CID Files Nos. 74, 118, SBP; Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, pp. 327-30; Gupta, Freedom Struggle, pp. 175-6; Jansson, Pakhtunistan, pp. 149-50.
parties which had previously played a crucial role in the Frontier politics had faded away. The Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party now being confronted with the prospect of Pakistan, most of its members, including the party’s provincial president Khanna, had joined Congress. The other party was the Independent Party. Nishtar, one of its prominent members, had joined the Muslim League, and the other members, Khuda Bakhsh and Pir Bakhsh, were no more active in politics. Other smaller organizations, parties, and groups such as the Ahrars, Khaksars, JUH, and the Independents were also contesting the elections, but the real contest was virtually between the Congress and the Muslim League.

The qualifications for franchise were the same as in 1937. Over 20 per cent of the province’s population was enfranchised as compared to the 10 per cent in 1937. Few women were included in the voters list.\(^{35}\) Polling took place between 26 January and 14 February 1946. The Congress won an absolute majority, taking thirty seats out of fifty; the Muslim League was victorious in seventeen; JUH got two seats and the Akali got one. The results of the Frontier elections showed that the Congress swept the minority seats, winning eleven out of a total of twelve, losing only one seat to the Akali Dal in Peshawar. It captured nineteen out of the twenty-seven Muslim seats it contested, while of its allies, JUH won two more seats in Dera Ismail Khan. The Muslim League won the remaining fifteen Muslim and two Landholder constituencies. The Congress did well in the Pashtoon-dominated areas of the province, i.e. Peshawar, Kohat, Mardan, Bannu, and Tank tehsil of the Dera Ismail Khan, where it won in sixteen constituencies out of the nineteen contested. The Muslim League, on the contrary, emerged as the representative of the urban middle class Muslims and of the non-Pashtoon Muslims, winning eight out of the nine seats in Hazara and two out of three urban seats and both Landholder constituencies. However, out of 347,632 Muslim votes, the Muslim League polled a ‘slightly larger number’ than

\(^{35}\) GR, 24 December 1945, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR; A. S. Dhawan, Report on the General Elections to the Central Assembly (NWFP Constituency) and to the NWFP Legislative Assembly in 1945-46 (Peshawar, 1946), p. 10.
Congress. 145,510 went to the Muslim League; 143,571 to Congress. The remainder went to other contestants such as Ahrars, Khaksars, Jamiat and the Independents.\(^{36}\) The remarkable victory of Congress in the NWFP was interpreted as a victory of nationalist forces over British imperialism. The Muslim majority province of the Frontier, according to Congress, had rejected the communal ideology of the Muslim League and Pakistan, and had given its verdict in favour of Indian nationalism.\(^{37}\)

The Leaguers considered the undue interference of the Congress ministers during the polls as one of the main reasons for the failure of the League. The Congress ministers were accused of making false election promises for grants of money, sugar, and other essential commodities, which were scarce in the open market.\(^{38}\) The Congress was charged with approaching the electorates in the name of the Khudai Khidmatgars and not the Congress party. The personal influence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan was utilized for the success of Congress candidates in the provincial elections.\(^{39}\) But the Governor of the NWFP refuted all these charges.\(^{40}\) The reasons for the League’s failure, according to Cunningham, ‘were not, I think, what many people said, that Congress Government was in office. Against this one has to put the strong League sympathies of most Muslim officials’. According to him the main reasons for the League’s failures were lack of the organization it desperately needed, internal feuds, and factionalism in the party.\(^{41}\) Then ‘the Pakistan cry’, Cunningham added, ‘has little reality to the average Pathan villager, to whom the suggestion of Hindu domination is

---

\(^{36}\) GR, 23 March 1946, Caroe Collection, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 10.


\(^{38}\) CID Diaries, 21 March 1946, F. No. 151, SBP, p. 237.

\(^{39}\) *Khyber Mail*, 5 April 1946.

\(^{40}\) When the Governor was informed by some prominent Leaguers of Qazi Ataullah’s undue interference in the elections and of his forcing of subordinate officials to enter bogus names in the electoral list, Cunningham asked them to produce even one name entered ‘in this way, and they have so far failed to do so. Until they do’, remarked Cunningham, ‘I remain sceptical’. GR, 9 November 1945, Mss. EUR., D. 670/16, IOLR.

\(^{41}\) Summary of Events in NWFP 1937^6, 17 March 1946, Mss. EUR., D. 670/17, IOLR, p. 44.
only laughable'.\textsuperscript{42} Qaiyum was accused of undermining the influence of Nishtar, another nominee of the League for the dual constituency of Peshawar.\textsuperscript{43} Qaiyum was also accused of distributing the League tickets to the wrong people,\textsuperscript{44} ignoring deserving party workers and giving them to his own loyal supporters in the League.\textsuperscript{45}

The outcome of the Frontier elections was a test case for the ideological struggle of Congress and the Muslim League. It can be rightly argued that the Pashtoon’s ethnic loyalties proved stronger than their religious identity during the elections. The Muslim League tried its best to provoke the feelings of the Muslims of the NWFP by repeating stories of repression and atrocities committed on Muslims in Hindu majority provinces during Congress rule. But the Pashtoons, at least for the time being, cared little about those stories. By pleading the cause of Pashtoon nationalism, the provincial Congress for the time being succeeded in hindering the spread of the Muslim League’s ideas on separatism. The Frontier Congress, by getting a ‘landslide victory’ in the elections, disproved the claims of Jinnah that the influence of the Khan Brothers and Congress had waned in the province. Furthermore, it was a real setback for the AIML, who had earlier claimed that the League was the sole representative organization of the Muslims in the subcontinent.

**The Third Congress Ministry**

On 7 March 1946, Dr Khan Sahib accepted the Governor’s invitation to form a new ministry. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was consulted before the ministers took oath of office. He consented

\textsuperscript{42} Cunningham to Wavell, 27 February 1946, *TP*, VI, pp. 1085-6.
\textsuperscript{43} Sardar Bahadur to Jinnah, 27 November 1945, F. No. NWFP-I, SHC pp. II-II(c); Inayat Kibrya to Jinnah, 10 January 1946, F. No. NWFP-II, SHC, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{44} Asad-ul-Haq, advocate, a prominent Leaguer regarded it as ‘perfect farce’. ‘Where Nawabs were available’, he remarked, ‘Khan Bahadurs were rejected, where Khan Bahadurs were to be found, Khan Sahibs were ignored, where Khan Sahibs were the applicants, Khans had no chance and in the presence of the Khans, commoners were of course a dirty lot!’ Asad-ul-Haq to Jinnah, 20 December 1945, SHC, F. No.NWFP-I, pp. 90-90(e).
\textsuperscript{45} Mian Zia-ud-Din to Liaquat Ali, 6 June 1946, F. No. 366, AFM, pp.
and willingly offered his co-operation, provided the ministers promise to serve selflessly the poor majority of the population. The Congress parliamentarians agreed to follow the guidelines of the Khudai Khidmatgar organization, and the Congress ministers took office on 9 March. Another important change during the first week of March was the arrival of Sir Olaf Caroe as the new Governor of the NWFP, in place of Cunningham, on 2 March.

The first act of the third Congress ministry was the abolition of Tora—a particular tax which the peasants and the artisans had to pay to landholders to hold a wedding. Then certain other anti-Khan measures, like the abolition of lambardari were introduced. There were discussions on the language issue—the Congress workers insisted on Pashto while Leaguers pressed for Urdu. Corruption charges against the Congress ministers were levelled by the opposition MLAs. The Leaguers utilized every measure which they considered appropriate to label the Provincial Congress as Hindu agents working for the establishment of a Hindu Raj. The Congress, on the other hand, championed the cause of Pashtoon nationalism and of the peasants, criticizing the big Khans, the majority of whom were in the FPML, for helping the British to prolong their stay in the subcontinent. Furthermore, the League was accused of creating communalism in the province, thus

46 Pakhtun, 9 March 1946, pp. 5-6.
47 It included Dr Khan Sahib as Chief Minister and in charge of Law and Order, Parliamentary Affairs and Public Works; Qazi Ataullah as Minister of Revenue, Supplies, Medical and Jails; Yahya Jan as Minister of Education and Local-Self Government, and Khanna as the Minister of Finance, Information, Agriculture and Industries. The Frontier Mail, 10 March 1946; Madina, 13 March 1946. CID Diaries, 7 March 1947, F. No. 41, SBP, p. 181.
50 The Governor opposed the abolition of lambardari on the grounds that he regarded them as the ‘root of the administration in the rural areas’. The abolition would certainly ‘attract my special responsibility for peace and tranquillity’, remarked Caroe, ‘for on the lambardars hinges the police administration and the land revenue’. GR, 23 March 1946, F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 11; For more details see, Gupta, Freedom Struggle, pp. 180-91.
encouraging anti-social elements to play with the lives and properties of the NWFP’s minorities.

Also significant was the introduction and passing of the Peshawar University Bill, introduced by Yahya Jan, the Education Minister, on 21 March 1947. Since its separation from the Punjab in 1901, the NWFP had no university of its own and educational institutions in the Frontier were affiliated to the Punjab University. NWFP students often found it difficult to gain admission to higher educational institutions in the Punjab. Yahya Jan announced the establishment of a university in Peshawar, at an estimated cost of Rs 20 to 30 lakhs with a recurring expenditure of Rs 8 to 10 lakhs annually.⁵¹

The Governor was apprehensive about his ministers, and particularly with the way the Chief Minister was criticizing the bureaucracy publicly. Certain acts of Dr Khan Sahib were regarded as a ‘blow to the prestige of the Service’, and the Governor was bent upon protecting his subordinates from open public criticism.⁵² Both Congress ministers and the opposition members remained busy in levelling charges and counter-charges against one another. None of this rhetoric was new, nor did it affect the overall political life of the province, for legislative politics were beginning to have less importance than the rapid changes developing on the all-India scene.

Cabinet Mission Plan and the Formation of an Interim Government

The general elections had been contested on the theme of whether India should remain united or be partitioned between Hindus and Muslims. But the results were contradictory. True to its claims, the AIML swept the polls in the Central Legislative Assembly (CLA) Muslim seats, and the Congress became the representative of the Hindu majority. On the provincial level, however, the situation remained ambiguous. In the provinces the League claimed for

---


⁵² GR, 9 March 1946, p. 7; Caroe to Wavell, 23 April 1946, p. 17 and Caroe to Wavell, 8 May 1946, pp. 19-20, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR; Jansson, *Pakhtunistan*, p. 154-5.
Pakistan, Assam, and the NWFP; the Congress won a clear majority and formed its own government. In the Punjab, the League failed to muster the support of the majority of assembly members and a Congress-Sikh-Unionist coalition ministry under Khizar Hayat was formed. However, in Bengal the League won a landslide victory, and formed a ministry under H. S. Suhrawardy. In Sindh, the League also formed a ministry but mainly depended on the support of Europeans. In the Hindu majority provinces, the Muslim League got a majority of the Muslim seats: in the UP fifty-four out of sixty-six seats; in Bihar thirty-four out of forty; in Orissa all four; in Madras all twenty-nine; in CP thirteen out of fourteen, and in Bombay all the thirty seats.

Soon after the election results were made public, Attlee announced in the House of Commons on 19 February, that a team of three Cabinet Ministers were being sent to India to seek an agreement on the principles and procedures to be followed in framing the future constitution. The members of the Mission were Lord Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State for India), Sir S. Cripps (President of the Board of Trade), and A. V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty). The Mission arrived in Delhi on 24 March and started negotiations with important political organizations. As the proclaimed objectives of the Congress and the League were diametrically opposite, the Mission’s task of bringing them to a negotiating table was extremely difficult. The Congress stood for a united India, while the League wanted partition. The discussions with the political parties of India concluded without reaching any agreement. Thereupon it was decided by the members of the Mission to put forward their own proposals, which they considered as the best arrangement for providing a new constitution for an independent India.

On 16 May, the members issued a statement concerning the future constitution of India, and the formation of an interim government. It called for a three-tiered de-centralized government. Under the proposed arrangements, the Central Government would deal with foreign affairs, defence, and communications. All the remaining powers were vested in the provinces, which were to be merged into groups. The proposed groups were: Section A: Madras, Bombay, UP, CP, Bihar, and Orissa; Section B: Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh; Section C: Bengal and Assam. The new arrangements would be reconsidered initially after ten years and at ten-yearly intervals thereafter. Then there would be a Constituent Assembly whose task would include the implementation of the above plan. The composition of the proposed Assembly reflected the party strength in the provincial legislatures and also included representatives of the Princely States and the Chief Commissioner’s provinces.\(^{56}\)

The scheme aroused mixed feelings in the political circles of the country. The Congress was in no mood to reconcile itself to partition; while the Muslim League showed its willingness to accept the plan. The AIML expressed its hopes that ‘it would ultimately result in the establishment of a complete Pakistan’.\(^{57}\)

The Congress showed concern at the grouping system and reiterated its earlier demand for complete independence of India. However, they were willing to accept the proposals for an interim government. ‘Hopes rose high’, commented Moon, ‘but were dashed by the last-minute intervention of Gandhi’. Gandhi insisted on the inclusion of a nationalist Muslim in the interim government, which was unacceptable to Jinnah.\(^{58}\)

The AIML had earlier accepted the statement of 16 May, as it perceived the seeds of Pakistan in the compulsory grouping of six Muslim majority provinces in Section B and C,\(^{59}\) but rejected the


\(^{57}\) J. Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings*, II, pp. 521-3; Moon, *Divide and Quit*, p. 51.


latest developments in regard to the formation of an interim government, no parity, liberty for Congress to nominate a Muslim, equity rather than equality in portfolios, and no communal vote. After withdrawing its acceptance of the Plan, the AIML expressed its indignation and protested at the formation of an interim Central Government without its consent. The League Working Committee was authorized to draw up a plan for ‘Direct Action’ against the inclusion of Congress in the interim government. Jinnah was critical of the Cabinet Mission members, who according to him had ‘played into the hands of Congress’.

He bluntly declared: ‘Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything, except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into this position. This day we bid good-bye to constitutional methods.’ Liaquat, the League’s Secretary, urged the Muslims to ‘resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan...’

16 August was fixed as the ‘Direct Action Day’. On this day protest demonstrations were organized on a large scale throughout the country. In Bengal, the League ministry declared 16 August to be a public holiday. The day started in Calcutta with rioting, looting, murder, and arson, which lasted from 16 to 20 August, resulting in some twenty thousand people being killed or seriously injured. The Muslims, despite provoking of the carnage, were the worst victims, as they were in a minority there. The authorities were unable to control the frenzy. The riots spread to East Bengal. In Noahkali more than two hundred Hindus were massacred. The news of the atrocities committed in Noahkali reached Bihar, where, in revenge, serious rioting broke out. The Muslims suffered terribly, the number of dead men, women, and children were between five and eight thousand. There were still more riots in UP. The total number of victims ranged between ten and twenty thousand.

60 J. Ahmad, Speeches and Writings, II, pp. 407^19.
61 Ibid.
On 24 August, while the affected cities were ‘still clearing up the mess, the whiffs of putrefaction issued from hitherto unfound bodies shoved down drains or trapped in burnt-out houses’, the composition of the interim government was announced. It was also announced, that the intended ministers, had to take the oath on 2 September. The ministers included six Hindus, three Muslims, a Sikh, a Parsee, and an Indian Christian.

For the time being the Muslim League was kept away from participating in the interim government. Two more Muslim seats were held vacant. Jinnah regarded this as the Viceroy’s ‘double betrayal in going back on his solemn word and in ignoring and bypassing the Muslim League’. Meanwhile the Viceroy visited Calcutta, and after seeing the horrors there, he was convinced that he should secure the co-operation of the Muslim League in the interim government. After great loss of life and property, the Viceroy invited Jinnah for talks since he realized that no solution of the ensuing problems could be possible without the League’s participation in the interim government. Jinnah, also considered it fatal to the interests of the Muslims to leave the entire administration to Congress, and accepted the invitation. On 26 October, the League joined the interim government, nominating Liaquat Ali, I. I. Chundrigar, Nishtar, J. N. Mandal, and Ghazanfar Ali to be included in the Cabinet.

One of the main issues during the Cabinet Mission deliberations remained the procedural question involving the NWFP and Assam. From the very beginning, the Congress insisted on voluntary grouping, while the League demanded that the grouping should be compulsory. In the NWFP, the provincial Congress leaders were opposed to the compulsory grouping for various reasons. One of

---

the main reasons was that compulsory grouping negated the electoral victory which they had recently won, and pushed them to forever remain under the domination of the Punjab, to which they had previously never given thought. In fact the Frontier Congress leaders were ‘vague’ about the future of their province.69 Till then they had been following Congress and reiterating the demand to keep India united, while successfully retaining their separate identity. The Frontier Congressmen demanded maximum provincial autonomy within the Indian context, so that the Pashtoon could control their own affairs after independence. The provincial Congress sought the merger of the tribal areas with the settled districts of the NWFP, as the inhabitants of both places belonged to a common ethnic group and kept aloof from the rest of the Pashtoons.

As soon as the views of the Cabinet Mission regarding compulsory grouping of provinces were known, Abdul Ghaffar Khan opposed it. He considered it to be a compulsion by the British government to join the Punjab. At the same time, he had no doubts in his mind that the Khudai Khidmatgars would never join the Hindu majority provinces hundreds of miles away. The Frontier Congress Muslims showed their willingness to join Group B, provided Punjab gave them assurances of better treatment.70 They demanded discussion with the Punjab on points of mutual understanding. The other alternative, according to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was to ‘leave them alone: we are happy in framing our own destiny by ourselves’.71

The main concern of the provincial Congress leaders seemed to be

---

69 ‘Note of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Wavell and Dr Khan Sahib’, 1 April 1946, TP, VII, pp. 74-6. Dr Khan Sahib, the Frontier Premier, was the first Indian leader interviewed by the Mission members. He was invited on 1 April and was asked about his views. He spoke on the issue, but according to the Viceroy, ‘He had obviously not really thought out the problems of Pakistan and refused to consider its possibility’, Wavell further remarked that ‘Nor had he considered what Hindu domination at the Centre might entail. He talked in fact entirely from the Provincial angle, as if the Pathans were a separate nation living in Pathanistan’. Moon, The Viceroy’s Journal, pp. 232-3.

70 Caroe to Wavell, 23 July 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 36.

71 Abdul Ghaffar Khan on compulsory grouping under Cabinet Mission Plan, Pakhtun, 17 July 1946, pp. 6-8; also see, 9 June, pp. 4-9 and 9 September 1946, p. 17.
the protection of Pashtoon identity at any cost.\(^{72}\)

The FPML interpreted the statements of the Congress leader in its own way. It exploited the Muslim character of the NWFP and criticized Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other prominent Congress leaders. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was accused of inciting the Muslims to join hands with the Hindus, ignoring their Muslim identity. The Leaguers asserted that in view of the position of NWFP, it could not stand alone and had to join some group.\(^{73}\) Qaiyum accused Abdul Ghaffar Khan of chanting a hymn of hate by rousing Pashtoon against the domination of Punjabi Muslims. ‘...He conveniently forgets that if there is a danger of sixteen million Punjabi Muslims dominating the six million Pathans in the tribal areas, the NWFP, and Balochistan, the danger of domination by the Hindu group is much more real as their population is something like hundred times the population of this province...’\(^{74}\)

The League leaders reiterated that the NWFP would never join the proposed *Akhand Hindustan* and that the Frontier Muslims would fight to the last for preserving the integrity of Pakistan.\(^{75}\)

The charges and counter-charges went on for a long time. The Leaguers continued to criticize the Frontier Congress ministry and its leaders. The Khudai Khidmatgars were, however, prevented by their leaders from responding to the League charges and told not to pay any heed to the ‘false propaganda’ of the Muslim League.

---

72 Allah Nawaz Khan, Speaker of the provincial assembly argued: ‘Pathans and Punjabis are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation and the idea and the very thought of grouping the NWFP with the Punjabis is revolting to the Pathan mind. We are a nation of three million, and what is more, we, the Frontier Pathans, are a body of people with our own distinctive culture, civilisation, language, literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature and sense of values and proportion, legal and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, and aptitudes and ambitions. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and by all canons of international law a Pathan is quite separate from a Punjabi’. Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 337.

73 Handbill issued by Abdul Hamid, president Muslim League, Peshawar (Khalil Branch), n.d., F. No. 366, AFM, p. 16; More details can be seen in CID Diaries during May/June 1946, F. No. 779, SBP, pp. 245, 283-91,321.

74 *Khyber Mail*, 14 June 1946; *C&MG*, 16 June 1946.

75 *Khyber Mail*, 13 December 1946; *Dawn*, 26 December 1946.
Abdul Ghaffar Khan reiterated that the main objectives of their organization were to do constructive work such as the eradication of social evils and growing factionalism in Pashtoon society; and to avoid any direct confrontation with the Muslim League, as the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was for peace and non-violence.\(^{76}\)

So, for the time being, Abdul Ghaffar Khan remained busy in his two-fold work—urging the Pashtoon to maintain unity; and searching for a place worthy of respect for themselves in the future political shape of the subcontinent.

**Communal Strife**

Following the directives of the Muslim League High Command, a ‘Committee of Action’ with the Pir of Manki as its leader was constituted to lead the ‘Direct Action Day’ campaign in the NWFP. The Day was observed with **hartals** and peaceful demonstrations throughout the province.\(^{77}\) The outbreak of communal violence in various parts of India changed the outlook of the majority of the pro-League Muslims in the NWFP. Earlier, they were thinking in terms of Pashtoon first and Muslim later, but Hindu-Muslim riots led them to think otherwise. With every new outbreak of violence and rioting in the country, their sense of belonging to a greater Muslim community became stronger, and their minds changed and they began to consider themselves as Muslims first. The League had waited for such an opportunity for a long time and exploited it to its fullest advantage. The FPML ensured that the news of the outburst of communal violence and atrocities against Muslims were publicized in the province at the highest possible pitch. While on an all-India level, the massacres of 1946 destroyed the last hopes for communal harmony and of any peaceful political settlement which could avoid partition. In the NWFP it provided the League with its best weapon for winning over the sympathies of a large segment of the Muslims. It achieved within months successes which otherwise it could not have thought of achieving in years. Public opinion changed in favour of the League, and its demand for a separate homeland for Muslims.

---

\(^{76}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan on Muslim League Propaganda, *Pakhtun*, 17 July 1946, pp. 3-4.

\(^{77}\) Jansson, *Pakhtunistan*, p. 177.
Once the rioting started, the conflict between the religious and political loyalties of the Pashtoon became acute and they adapted themselves to the larger framework of Muslim identity.\textsuperscript{78}

The FPML did its best to propagate details of the atrocities committed in Bombay, where a large number of Pashtoon transient labourers were residing. Teams were sent to investigate the details of massacres in the riot-affected areas and brought back accounts of rape, murder, torture, destruction of mosques, and desecration of the Holy Quran. Three medical missions, consisting of doctors, volunteers, and party workers, were sent to help the Muslims in that great hour of suffering. A majority of the Frontier Muslims resented the atrocities against Muslims in the riot-affected areas. They condemned the slaughter of the Muslims in various parts of the subcontinent, and requested Jinnah to take special measures to stop it.\textsuperscript{79} The pitiable condition and the plight of the riot-affected Muslims was deplored. Jinnah was urged to request the government to stop the slaughter of the Muslims at the hands of ‘Hindu Congress’, and to ‘afford adequate protection to Muslims and bring the offenders to jail and dismiss the incompetent Ministers; otherwise the responsibility will be entirely yours’ if the Muslims also were to lose control, as these things could no longer be tolerated.\textsuperscript{80}

**Nehru’s Frontier Visit (October 1946)**

In the midst of the communal frenzy, Nehru, in charge of External Affairs and the Commonwealth Relations in the interim government, decided to visit the tribes in NWFP in his official capacity to apprise himself of the deplorable condition of the tribesmen. Moreover, according to Nehru, such a visit was essential to enlist support of ‘some properly elected representatives’ of the tribes to join the intended Advisory Committee on the tribal affairs of the Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{81} The

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Khyber Mail, 3 January 1947; Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 345.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Muslim Leaguers of Nowshera to Jinnah, 9 November 1946, F. No.NWFP-II, SHC, p. 75; Khyber Mail, 8 November 1946.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Qudratullah Khan to Jinnah, 8 November 1946, F. No. NWFP-II, SHC, p. 73; Shah, \textit{Muslim League}, pp. 108-110; Khyber Mail, 20 December 1946.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Pakhtoon, 24 October 1946, p. 7; Nehru to Dr Khan Sahib, 14 September
\end{itemize}
provincial Congress approved the visit, obviously because they wanted to use Nehru’s official position to gain access to the tribal areas, from which they had been barred by the permanent administration.

But there were other motives also, behind it. Azad mentioned that Nehru was receiving official reports that a large segment of the Muslims in the NWFP had turned against the Khan Brothers and the Congress. Defectors from Congress were joining the League in large numbers. The authorities were of the view that a change had taken place and the Frontier was divided equally between the Congress and the Muslim League. Nehru did not believe this, and regarded it as a fabrication by British officials. In order to acquaint himself with the latest situation in the Frontier, Nehru decided to visit the province personally. The trip aroused mixed feelings elsewhere in the country. Two prominent Congress leaders, Azad and Patel, opposed the visit. In view of the latest communal situation, such a trip, according to them, might harm party interests and give an extra advantage to the Muslim League in the NWFP. On 28 September, Caroe, the new Governor, was informed of the intended week-long visit of Nehru in October, and that he would like to be accompanied by the Khan Brothers and some senior British officials. The Governor was asked to prepare a tentative programme for the visit. Caroe was disturbed over the proposed visit to the tribal areas. He advised the Viceroy of undesirability and regarded it as a ‘deliberate partisan approach to the tribal problem at a most critical juncture’. Caroe warned Wavell, the Viceroy, that, ‘If this plan is carried out at this moment and before the League comes to terms I am convinced that serious tribal reactions must be expected and that any hope of securing coalition is likely to be wrecked’. Abell, the Private Secretary of the Viceroy, took it to be ‘an exaggerated view’ on the part of the

---


Frontier Governor. He suggested that it would be very awkward that the Member in charge of External Affairs should be prevented from visiting the tribal areas. Wavell informed Caroe of the firm intention of Nehru to visit the tribal areas of the Frontier and advised him to suggest to Nehru that he should confine his visit to Peshawar.

Caroe went to Delhi to dissuade Nehru because his visit would result in the weakening of the Congress ministry, as ‘the flags of Islam would be unfurled’. If he wanted a United India, he ‘should play a waiting role’. But Nehru remained adamant. The Viceroy advised Nehru to take a Muslim member of the Cabinet with him ‘to show a united front’, but he politely declined the offer and remained firm on taking only the Frontier Congress leaders with him.

Caroe, when sure of Nehru’s visit, requested the Viceroy to ask Jinnah to prevent the League followers in the NWFP from staging hostile demonstrations on the eve of Nehru’s visit. The Viceroy acted promptly and asked Jinnah that, though the League was looking at Nehru’s visit to the Frontier with contempt and displeasure, in the larger interests of the coalition government in which the League was shortly to participate, the FPML should refrain from organizing anti-Nehru demonstrations. Jinnah replied that as ‘the people of the Frontier look upon Pandit Nehru’s visit with disfavour’, it would be advisable if it could be postponed to a later date. He informed the Viceroy that the central organization of the League had issued no instructions to stage hostile demonstrations on the eve of Nehru’s visit. However, contrary to his assurances to the Viceroy, it is evident from the Jinnah-Pir of Manki correspondence that Jinnah had approved of

---

89 Caroe to Wavell, 11 October 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 52.
90 Wavell to P. Lawrence, 9 October 1946, *TP*, VIII, p. 685.
such demonstrations. While the Khudai Khidmatgars and the provincial Congress welcomed the visit, the FPML expressed its resentment concerning the proposed visit of Nehru to the tribal areas. It was alleged that Nehru was coming to the Frontier to bring the tribesmen under Congress domination. The FPML resolved to stage a demonstration on his arrival at Peshawar and to receive him with black flags. Nehru was warned by them and pro-League tribes, not to visit the Frontier against the wishes of the people. If he insisted, the responsibility for the disturbances which might take place would rest on him. Confidence was expressed in the leadership of Jinnah, and assurances were given to the League high command that the Muslims of the NWFP and of the tribal territory were ready to obey their orders. At that stage, some prominent League leaders, including the Pir of Manki and Mian Zia-ud-Din, opposed the demonstrations which were to be staged on that occasion, on the grounds that they might harm the League organization in the NWFP, but they were outvoted. The Pir of Manki later changed his mind on the popular demand of his party. He started a tour of the adjacent tribal territory, visited Malakand and Khyber Agencies, and the Mohmands and there exhorted a large number of his disciples and other tribesmen to oppose with their full strength the proposed visit. Significantly, ex-Congress workers were in the forefront of organizing all these demonstrations. They included Qaiyum, Arbab Ghafoor, Mian Abdullah Shah, and Ibrahim Khan, who had recently defected from Congress and had joined the League. The Leagueurs, who had been waiting for a long time, decided to stage a hostile demonstration at

95  CID Diaries, 2 October 1946, F. No. 756, SBP, p. 117.
96  CID Diaries, F. Nos. 758, 815, SBP, pp. 17, 95; Resolutions sent to Jinnah, NWFP-II, SHC, p. 46.
Peshawar airport.

Nehru commenced his visit on 16 October. On his emergence from the plane, the Leaguers, about five thousand in number, most of whom were armed with long lances, spears, and staves, started chanting anti-Nehru and anti-Congress slogans. The situation became so ‘ugly’ that Nehru had to be slipped out through a back way. The reception became an entirely one-sided affair because the Frontier Congress, in order to avoid any clash with the Muslim League, had refrained from demonstratably receiving him at the airport.\(^98\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan accused the Political Department of engineering the demonstration with the connivance of the Muslim League. ‘All that you saw in this morning’, he remarked, ‘and anything else that you may see when Pandit Nehru goes into the tribal area and all that you have been hearing during the past few days, is engineered and manoeuvred by the Political Department’. Elaborating on the purposes behind these manoeuvring, Abdul Ghaffar Khan added that, as the Political Department and the Frontier Governor had tried their best and failed to dissuade Nehru from undertaking a visit to the tribal areas, they wished to teach Nehru a lesson for disobeying their orders.\(^99\)

Next day, Nehru accompanied by the Khan Brothers and Creighton, the Secretary for External Affairs, flew to Miranshah. The Waziri tribal Jirga made it clear to Nehru that the Waziris

---

\(^98\) The Times, London, 17 October 1946; CID Diaries, 16 and 17 October 1946, F. No. 758, SBP, p. 384; Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, p. 384. When asked to comment on why a rally of Khudai Khidmatgars was not arranged for Nehru’s welcome at the airport, Abdul Ghaffar Khan replied that Nehru was visiting the Frontier in his official capacity as a Member of External Affairs and, therefore, the Agent to the Governor-General (Sir Olaf Caroe) was responsible for making arrangements for his reception. He left the official agencies free to organize the sort of reception they wanted to give him. He further added that he was responsible only for his programme of 21 October, when Nehru would be visiting Sardaryab Markaz. ‘I invite you all’, concluded Abdul Ghaffar Khan, ‘to see the reception we Pathans can give him there’. Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Press Conference at Peshawar, 16 October 1946, Tendulkar Papers, S. No. 4, NMML, p. 1404.

\(^99\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s press conference at Peshawar, 16 October 1946, Hindustan Times, 18 October 1946. For full details see, S. No. 4, Tendulkar, NMML, pp. 1384-1529.
would never tolerate any interference with their independence. They recognized neither Congress nor the League but wanted to be left alone to lead their own lives as they thought best. The tribesmen exchanged some hot words with Dr Khan Sahib and left the meeting without hearing Nehru. From Miranshah the party flew to Razmak and stayed there for a night. Next morning, the ‘hand-picked’ Maliks invited for the occasion by the Political Agent to meet Nehru were introduced to him. The Maliks reiterated their rhetoric of independence and showed indignation at the atrocities committed on the Muslims in the Hindu dominated areas. The Jirga representatives, prominent amongst whom were Khan Bahadur Mehr Dil, Malik Khaisor, Malik Khandan, and Shah Pasand, refused to be ruled by an outsider. However, all the Mahsuds were not hostile to Nehru and Congress. While he was at Razmak, Nehru received an invitation from Musa Khan, Shahzada Fazal Din, Parmana Khan, Dilbaz Khan, Akhti Khan, and other noted anti-government Mahsuds to see them separately at Shakar Kot, near Makin, five miles away from Razmak. The political authorities heard of the pro-Congress tribal gathering there, a majority of whom were the Shabi Khels, to express their gratitude to Nehru for his stopping of the bombing raids on the Shabi Khels. The authorities did not allow Nehru to go outside the Razmak Cantonment and meet the tribesmen, as the security arrangements outside the cantonment were ‘insufficient’. From Razmak they came back to Miranshah and from there flew to Wana. The Ahmadzai Wazir meted out the same treatment to Nehru as had faced him in Miranshah and Razmak. There were hostile demonstrations and waving of black flags, prepared especially for the occasion. Without addressing the Ahmadzais,

101 Record of meeting of Nehru with the tribals at Razmak, S. No. 1, Tendulkar, NMML.
103 For bombing of the Shabi Khels and the resentment of the nationalists see, Pakhtun, 24 September 1946, pp. 7-8; Madina, 17 September 1946.
104 Interview with Khair Mohammad, Razmak, 1 November 1994.
Nehru had to go to Tank. Here, there was a fracas between the local Leaguers and the Congress workers, resulting in minor injuries on both sides. From Tank the party paid an impromptu visit to Jandola. Surprisingly, they were warmly received by the Bhittanis and offered the traditional Pashtoon hospitality.

On 20 October, they motored through the Khyber Pass. After receiving the Khyber Rifles at Jamrud, the party proceeded to Torkham, on the Afghan frontier. On their way back near Landi Kotal, the pro-League Afridis and Shinwaris protested against the ‘forcible’ visit of Nehru to Landi Kotal against their will and consent and stoned the team. The same afternoon they proceeded to Malakand. Unlike the previous occasions, there was no demonstration at the airport. They spent the night at Head Aman Darra. On 21 October, on their way back to Peshawar, the party was stoned twice, at Malakand and again at Dargai. With great difficulty they escaped via an unfrequented route through the Abazai Canal and reached Peshawar.

Before the culmination of his visit to the Frontier, Nehru was invited to the Khudai Khidmatgar Centre at Sardaryab. On 21 October, the last day of his visit, Nehru went to Sardaryab. The government offered to guard the convoy and the premises of the camp, but Abdul Ghaffar Khan turned this down on the excuse that Nehru was coming to the camp in his private capacity, and

---

105 Interviews with Shah Gul, Wana, 2 November 1994; Mohib Ullah, Wana, 2 November 1994; Maulana Noor Mohammad, Wana, 2 November 1994; Telegram from Ahmadzai Wazirs to Jinnah, 19 October 1946, SHC, NWFP-II, p. 56.
106 Abdul Ghaffar, My Life and Struggle, p. 186; Nehru to Caroe, 26 October 1946, TP, VIII, p. 820; Interview with Muntazir Bhittani, Tank, 3 November 1994.
108 Interviews with Naik Khan, Abul Hasan Khan, Sakha Kot (Malakand), 21 October 1994; Caroe to Wavell, 23 October 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 56; Nehru to Caroe, 26 October 1946, TP, VIII, pp.814-15, 817-19; Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhwand, pp. 711-15; Shah, Muslim League, pp. 120-21.
therefore the Khudai Khidmatgars would themselves be responsible for his protection. The Leaguers, who had earlier planned a hostile demonstration on the occasion, desisted at the last moment. The Khudai Khidmatgars staged a ‘show of strength’ on Nehru’s arrival at the centre. About two thousand five hundred Red Shirts and Congress volunteers were on the road on protection duties; in addition, there were mobile columns of horsemen and cyclists. Nehru was given a befitting reception on his arrival at the Markaz. Speeches were made, the general tone of which was criticism of the Political Department, the Frontier Governor, and the FPML for staging hostile demonstrations against Nehru. Nehru in his speech reiterated his support for the Khan Brothers. Abdul Ghaffar Khan also spoke on the occasion. According to him, the British had changed their strategy from ‘using the iron rod’ and instead were relying on the ‘green flag’ of the Muslim League. The main rhetoric of his speech remained the same. He accused the Governor and Political Department of maligning the fair name of the Pashtoons, known for their traditional hospitality, and of giving an impression to Nehru and through him to the Congress High Command, that the influence of the Khan Brothers was waning in the NWFP.

The provincial Congress leaders and Nehru himself charged the Political Department and the FPML of being responsible for staging the hostile demonstrations. These charges were time and again

---

109 Pakhtun, 9 November 1946, p. 12.
110 ‘Up to the last moment’, informed Caroe, ‘the League had been intending to make a counter-demonstration. For some reasons unexplained the League luckily called this off at the last moment. Either they felt that they would not be numerically strong enough at this point to deal with the Red Shirts demonstrations, or perhaps Jinnah had done something from Delhi to call them off. Caroe to Wavell, 23 October 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 57.

111 Pakhtun, 9 November 1946, pp. 4-12; 22-55; ibid. 17 November 1946, pp. 3-4; Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhward, pp. 715-18; Interview with Sarfaraz Khan, Boobak (Charsadda), 17 November 1991; CID Diaries, F. Nos. 101 (67-9, 75, 76, 91-5, 97), 758(33)815(99), SBP; The Bombay Chronicler, 23 October 1946.

112 Jansson has given some details of the justification of the Congress charges against the Political Department of instigating the tribesmen to stage hostile demonstrations on the eve of Nehru’s Frontier visit. Jansson, Pakhtunistan, pp. 184-6. During my research field trip to Miranshah, Razmak, Wana, Jandola, Tank, Khyber Pass, and Malakand (all those
repudiated by Caroe, who laid responsibility only on Nehru. According to Caroe, if Nehru had gone round himself quietly and without losing his temper and told the tribes that he was their guest, he would have been politely received. But it was fatal to take a party politician like Abdul Ghaffar Khan around. If he meant to take them, he should have attempted to induce men from all parties to go with him.\footnote{113 Caroe to Wavell, 23 October 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 57.}

G. L. Mallam, another senior Civil Servant, viewed it differently. To him ‘no political issue, not even a class war, could withstand the power of religion in the tribal mind’. Mallam argued that Nehru’s visit was interpreted by the tribesmen as a danger signal for Islam. They regarded it as a preparation of the ground for Hindu rule in the subcontinent, which was totally unacceptable to them. They had no doubts in their minds that if the Pashtoons had to have a ruler he must be a Muslim. ‘From that moment’, according to Mallam, ‘the common people of the Frontier began rapidly to switch their allegiance from Congress to the Muslim League, preferring for the time being the company of the hated Khans to the worst of all evils—Hindu domination’.\footnote{114 G. L. Mallam, ‘Imperial Frontier’, (unpublished manuscript), Mallam Papers, CSASC, p. 242.} Moreover, the tribesmen generally approved the reception given to Nehru because they ‘have been incensed by the riots in India’.\footnote{115 I. Stephens, ‘Nehru’s Frontier Visit’, The Statesman, Delhi, 2 January 1947.}

Nehru’s Frontier visit provided the Muslim League with an opportunity for effective propaganda. On the conclusion of his visit, the authorities noticed a swing amongst the Frontier Muslims in favour of the Muslim League. According to League circles, it showed that the real sympathies of the Frontier Muslims were closely linked with their co-religionists in the rest of the subcontinent.\footnote{116 Khyber Mail, 25 October 1946.} Nehru’s visit ‘has unwittingly turned him into an effective instrument of Muslim League propaganda’, and ‘happily Pandit Nehru has done what the Muslim League could not do in its long campaign of four places which Nehru visited in October 1946) I interviewed several persons, some of whom were eye witnesses to the hostile demonstrations, and some themselves took active part in them. I was informed that they had the blessings of the officials. Interviews with Ali Zar Khan, Razmak; Gul Mazar Khan, Razmak; Khair Mohammad, Razmak; Mohibullah, Wana; and Shah Gul, Wana.

113 Caroe to Wavell, 23 October 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 57.
Moving Towards Communalization of Politics

years of intense political activity’. 117 Qaiyum shared this view. He informed Jinnah that ‘what we could not hope to achieve in several years, was in fact achieved within about a week’. 118 Hence the visit had some far reaching effects. According to Caroe, when Mountbatten visited the NWFP and discussed having a referendum there, Nehru consented without any hesitation. His only condition was the replacement of Caroe, to which Mountbatten agreed. This was ‘very largely’ according to Caroe, ‘due to Nehru’s mistake in coming up on that occasion, which I think put partition much nearer than it was...’. 119 Another result of Nehru’s Frontier visit was that the tribes, who hitherto were very little interested in Indian politics, plunged into it actively. The Muslim League was given a free hand to approach the tribesmen in the name of Islam and Pakistan. By the end of 1946, the tribesmen were aware of the complex situation at the centre and were looking forward to the establishment of Pakistan. According to Nehru, the brief visit was undertaken for the understanding of problems and the development of a policy for the welfare of the tribesmen. He recommended that free education and necessary health facilities should be provided for the tribesmen. He condemned the system of paying allowances to a few selected Malik, thus creating groups of ‘have’ and ‘have nots’; regarding it as ‘blackmail’. Nehru pleaded for the free association of the tribesmen with their own brethren of the settled districts who shared the same ethnicity. The Muslim League was accused of treacherously organizing the demonstrations in spite of the fact that they had been given a share in the interim government. The Political Department was in league with those demonstrators; in the case of Jandola, which they visited without any pre-planned programme, they were greeted in a most befitting manner. Elaborating on the Malakand incident, which caused the most acrimonious controversy, Nehru accused Mahbub Ali, the Political Agent, of incompetence and gross neglect of duty, and demanded his immediate removal from office. 120

117  Ibid., 1 November 1946.
119  Record of Oral Interviews of Caroe, Tape Thirteen, Mss. EUR., F. 203/80, IOLR, pp. 104-105.
120  Nehru to Caroe, 26 October 1946, TP, VIII, pp. 814-15 and ‘Note on my tour in the Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier, October 16 to 21, 1946, ibid., pp. 816-25. For details of Shaikh Mahbub Ali’s case see: Caroe to Nehru, 7 November 1946, TP, IX, pp. 20-22; Nehru to Caroe, 16
In November, Wavell decided to visit the NWFP personally ‘to obliterate the impression left by Nehru’, and to restore ‘the morale of the Political officers’, shaken by the accusations against them by the pro-Congress politicians. Wavell was amused by Nehru’s suggestion that the ‘wild’ tribesmen of the Frontier would be won over by a mere ‘love’, and favoured the continuation of the allowances to the tribal Maliks. Wavell arrived at Peshawar on 14 November. On 15 November, he was driven to Landi Kotal where he saw a Jirga of Afridis and Shinwaris. They demanded that if the British were leaving India, the Khyber Pass should be given back to them. They expressed their resentment over Nehru’s Frontier visit, and made it clear to the Viceroy that they would oppose Hindu rule in that part of the subcontinent. Wavell met another Jirga at Wana, the Ahmadzai Wazirs, whom he found ‘more communal’, wishing to align themselves with the Muslim League. Wavell advised both the Jirgas ‘not to ally themselves with any particular party, but to wait on events, and remain united to negotiate new arrangements with the future Government of India when the time comes’. The Viceroy assured them that their freedom would be safeguarded.
CHAPTER 7
MUSLIMS OF NWFP AND PAKISTAN

The emergence of the League as a massive force of Muslim nationalism in opposition to the nationalism of the Congress throughout India brought into question the survival of the idea of a single successor state to the British Indian Empire. The political fortunes of the Pashtoons were closely bound up with that idea on account of their intimate association with the Congress. Unfortunately during the course of the negotiations leading up to the transfer of power the idea was abandoned by the Congress, leaving the nationalists Pashtoons to face the wrath of the Muslim League and the state it established. For the Pashtoons the best alternative, in the absence of a United India, would have been independence. This option was not given to them by the departing British power. The Congress, having accepted the Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947 could do nothing to safeguard the interests of the Pashtoons. A plebiscite offering them a choice between joining India or Pakistan was meaningless in the context of the division of the country, and therefore the nationalists in the NWFP boycotted it, with the result that the League won an easy victory for the incorporation of the province in the new state of Pakistan. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, rough, often unconstitutional, methods were employed to remove Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry from power, and to suppress the Khudai Khidmatgars as a force in the province.

The Growth of the Frontier Province Muslim League

A majority of the Muslim intelligentsia was against the role of the Khan Bahadurs, other title-holders, and the big Khans in the League organization, which gave the Muslim League a poor image in the eyes of the public. Jinnah was informed that the Frontier Muslims were ‘tired of such type of people and they have no faith in these Jagirdars and Khan Bahadurs and Nawabs’ and was
requested ‘to bring the movement to the masses’. It was argued that, to counter the well-organized NWFP Congress, the provincial organization of the League needed an ‘overhaul’. On 21 February a meeting of the FPML was convened at Peshawar and Qaiyum was appointed as the League’s Leader in the provincial assembly; a new organizing Committee was formed with Samin Jan as the Chairman and M. Ali Khan Hoti as Secretary. After the preliminary task of the formation of the provincial organizing Committee was completed, District Committees were formed.

A comprehensive programme of meetings and conferences was undertaken. It was decided to hold ‘Pakistan Conferences’. Pakistan was explained as being the only solution which would provide a peaceful settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims. It was demanded that, in the greater interest of the communities living in the subcontinent, the demand for Pakistan should be conceded. Criticism of the provincial Congress ministry was another topic at these Conferences. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was also not spared. He was criticized for his friendship with the Congress leaders and of following policies laid down by ‘Wardha’. Confidence was expressed in the leadership of Jinnah and the

1 Dost Mohammad Khan, Bannu, to Jinnah, 2 October 1945, F. No. 881, QAP, pp. 3-5.
2 Khyber Mail, 15 March 1946; Muslim League Peshawar, CID Diaries, 28 February 1946, F. No. 779, SBP, p. 117.
4 M. Ali Khan to Secretary AIML, 24 June 1946, F. No. 366, AFM, pp. 18-18(a).
Muslims of NWFP and Pakistan

Muslim clerics were approached in the name of Pakistan. The Ulema were promised a more prestigious place in Pakistan. After the Hindu-Muslim riots in North India, where a number of mosques were damaged and the Holy Quran desecrated, a considerable number of the Frontier ulema were apprehensive about the future of Islam in a Hindu-dominated India. The League orators created a sense of ‘Islam in danger’ and appealed to the ulema to support Pakistan. The League thus succeeded in winning over the sympathies of a significant number of the ulema to its side. This added more strength to the demand of Pakistan in the NWFP.

Organizing for Pakistan: The League’s Civil Disobedience Against the Frontier Congress Ministry

Since any change within the legislative assembly was impossible, and the next elections were at least four years away, the FPML started preparations to devise ways and means for unconstitutional methods to be used against the Frontier Congress ministry. The defection to the League of some Congress workers, mostly for personal reasons, i.e. aspiration for leadership, including Ghulam M. Khan, M. Ramzan, Mian Abdullah Shah, Arbab Ghafoor, Mian M. Shah, and Khan Mir Hilali, had added new dimensions to the League programme. The Congress deserters brought with them a significant number of their followers and also used their familial connections, which proved beneficial to the Muslim League.

5 For further details of the various Pakistan Conferences at Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat, Mardan, Dera Ismail Khan, and Hazara, see, F. Nos. 755 (5-21), 797 (101-17), 800 (263-7), 789 (379, 347-9), SBP; Khyber Mail, 15 November 1946.

6 The list included Maulana Shakirullah and the Pir of Manki (Nowshera); Syed Abdullah Shah (Peshawar); Qazi Shafiuud Din, Maulana Usman (Kohat); Maulana Lutfullah (Bannu); Maulana Yahya, Maulana Ghani (Hazara); Maulana Shuaib, Maulana Midrarullah, Shaista Gul, Badshah Sahib of Bamkhel (Mardan); Pir Sahib of Zakori, and Makhdum Abdul Sattar of Balot (Dera Ismail Khan). CID Diaries, 29 October 1946, F. No. 757, SBP, pp. 185-7. For more details see, Jinnah-Maulana Midrar Ullah Correspondence in Midrar Ullah Personal Collection, Mardan.

7 Mian Mohammad Shah, an ardent Congress worker from Pabbi, was denied a Congress ticket during the elections by the Congress Parliamentary Board. Mohammad Shah left the organization and contested the elections as an ‘Independent’, but did not get elected. Indignant at the
However, it did not always serve the purpose of the League. Sometimes changing of loyalties were purely on a *parajamba* basis without giving any consideration to the ideologies and party programme of the various organizations.\(^8\) With their joining the league the general tone of the speeches changed. The FPML leaders began talking of using ‘swords and knives’ if the demand for Pakistan was not granted.\(^9\) The provincial League workers were instructed not to deposit licensed arms with the government, and that they should purchase and keep licensed arms for the ‘critical time to come’.\(^10\) The Pir of Manki toured the southern districts and the adjacent tribal areas, and instructed his disciples to arm themselves to face the new challenges.\(^11\) He met various tribal Maliks at Tank and exhorted them to a combined *Jihad* against the non-Muslims. The government was warned that if the riots in other parts of Hindustan were not stopped, they would start a *Jihad* against the non-Muslims in Dera Ismail Khan.\(^12\)

By the end of autumn 1946, there were no reports of communal violence emanating from the NWFP. The situation was made worse by events in Bihar and other Hindu-dominated areas of

---

\(^8\) An interesting account of the changing of loyalties without giving any heed to ideologies or party programme occured in Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib. In November 1946, Sultan Mohammad, president of the local Khudai Khidmatgar organization had contrived a dispute with his brother Anwar. Indignant at the behaviour of Sultan, Anwar decided to join the Muslim League as a protest. The local Leagues publicized the desertion of Anwar from the Congress and arranged a reception in his honour. Meanwhile Sultan was reconciled with Anwar, who immediately announced his return to Congress. Interview with Sultan Mohammad, Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 1 December 1990.

\(^9\) Qaiyum’s statement in *Khyber Mail*, 29 March 1946; *Dawn*, Delhi, 11 April 1946 and CID Diaries, 11 April 1946, F. No. 779, SBP, p. 177.

\(^10\) CID Diaries, 8 July 1946, F. No. 756, SBP, p. 79.

\(^11\) CID Diaries, 9 September 1946, F. No. 780, SBP, p. 115.

\(^12\) CID Diaries, 16 November 1946, F. No. 815, SBP, p. 17.
India. In December the situation deteriorated rapidly in Hazara. On the night of 7 December, the tribesmen from the adjacent Black Mountain area, either incensed by the provocative propaganda of the Muslim League and the maulvis to avenge the killing of the Muslims in Bihar, or in search of loot and plunder, attacked Battal and burnt the bazaar. The Oghi bazaar was also attacked and burnt, causing severe damage to the property of non-Muslims. The Hindus and Sikhs, fearing an attack on their lives, started moving to Abbottabad, Kohala, Muzaffarabad, Haripur, and Hassanabad. They were attacked and a number of them were killed. The reported deaths, according to the official estimates, were about one hundred, while some sources gave the figures as two hundred killed and many displaced. Many were kidnapped and forcibly converted to Islam. The government responded promptly by promulgating the North-West Frontier Province Public Safety Ordinance under Section 89 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Ordinance provided for punishment up to three years or a fine for any person who delivered speeches or statements prejudicial to peace and maintenance of public order, or to harm any citizen thereby.

The Nandihar tribe was fined for their incursion into Hazara district, the murder of innocent villagers, and the destruction of the bazaars of Battal and Oghi. They were asked to pay (a) a cash fine of seventy-five thousand rupees; (b) a fine of seventy-five rifles; and, (c) surrender forty members for a certain period as security for good behaviour. They were given a period of one week to comply with the government terms, or otherwise to prepare for a punitive expedition.

In early January 1947 a pregnant Sikh woman, Basanti, (Pesari in some accounts) was abducted by Muslim gangsters from a village in Hazara. The members of her family including her husband were killed. She was forcibly converted to Islam, renamed Aasia, and married to a Muslim, M. Zaman. She was recovered by the

---

14 Caroe to Colville, 23 December 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 73.
15 C&MG, 9, 12 and 14 January 1947.
Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism

authorities but her conversion became a serious issue. The Muslims claimed her conversion to be voluntary, while the Sikhs believed that she was forcibly converted and demanded that she be handed back to them. To investigate whether her conversion was voluntary or not, it was decided to send her to Peshawar to ‘give an unbiased statement’, and she was put in Dr Khan Sahib’s custody.\(^\text{16}\) At the end of her stay in the Premier’s House, in the presence of her Sikh relatives and her Muslim husband she stated that she wanted to be sent back to her relatives and to return to Sikhism. The rumour quickly spread that the Sikh woman accepted Islam of her free-will but was compelled by Dr Khan Sahib to revert to Sikhism.

On 18 February a League deputation consisting of Qaiyum, Fida M. Khan, Mian Abdullah Shah, and M. Ali Khan met Dr Khan Sahib, and were satisfied by the Premier that no such coercion or compulsion was used. But the Leaguers ‘distorted the incident into a justification for civil disobedience’.\(^\text{17}\) Dr Khan Sahib was accused of unduly interfering in religion, and of forcing the Sikh woman to re-convert to Sikhism. As the FPML needed some immediate cause to manifest its strength, the Hazara disturbances had proved to be ‘a heaven-sent opportunity to drive home its argument that the fate of the Pathans is linked with the Muslims of India’.\(^\text{18}\)

A similar movement was launched in the neighbouring Punjab against the Khizar ministry. Moreover, exclusion from power at a most critical time when there were plans for the partition of India presented more frustrations for the League.\(^\text{19}\) In both cases the Muslim League resorted to civil disobedience against elected governments to prove that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim population was supporting the League demand for

\(^\text{16}\) Caroe to Wavell, 23 January 1947, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 79; ibid., 8 February 1947, p. 82.


\(^\text{18}\) Khyber Mail, 3 January 1947.

Pakistan.

Prominent Leaguers were sent to Hazara to observe the latest situation there. On 17 December, Qaiyum and M. Ali Khan visited Mansehra, Baffa, and Shinkiari. They advised the Muslims not to pay fines or to furnish securities as, according to the League leaders, there was an enormous loss of lives and property of Muslims in Bihar, but nobody had fined the Hindus there. Criticizing the ‘harsh measures’ of the Congress ministry, Qaiyum predicted a ‘very serious danger ahead’ if the ministry continued its repressive policies. The Congress ministry was accused of taking revenge on those areas which had elected the League candidates to the Legislative Assembly, and Hazara, being the stronghold of the Muslim League, was its first target. A deputation of three prominent Leaguers was sent to Delhi to apprise the Muslim League ministers in the interim government of the latest situation in Hazara, which then came up for discussion in Central cabinet. A decision was taken that if the terms laid down by the government were not fully complied with, troops would cross into tribal territory and exact punishment. The League members, as was expected, showed their resentment against the proposed punitive expedition against the Nandihar tribe. ‘Since this was dictated’, said Wavell, ‘I have heard that the terms have been accepted’. So the idea of the punitive expedition was dropped.

The FPML observed 17 January as ‘Hazara Day’. Resolutions were adopted criticizing the Congress ministry for its ‘Black Laws’ against a ‘large number of respectable Muslims’. The government

20 CID Diaries, 21 December 1946-7 January 1947, F. No. 797, SBP, pp. 253, 259. Yusuf Khattak, J. Secretary, FPML, issued the following press statement: ‘In Bihar more than 40,000 unarmed Muslims were butchered in cold blood but by this time no fines have been inflicted on any village in Bihar. In Hazara on the other hand where only about twenty Hindus were killed, the whole Government machinery has been set in motion to punish the miscreants and enormous fines have been inflicted on innocent villages lying on the Hazara border’. Khyber Mail, 10 January 1947.
21 Ibid., 10 January 1947
22 Ibid., 24 January 1947.
23 Ibid., 10 January 1947; C&MG, 12 January 1947.
24 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 14 January 1947, TP, IX, p. 503.
was threatened with direct action if the restrictions were not withdrawn. In aid of the ‘suffering Muslims’ of Bihar, the Mardan Districts Muslim League held a Pashto Khooni Mushaira (an assembly of poets) on 12 January. Poems were recited on communal violence exhorting the Muslims to shed their blood for the innocent victims of Bihar. This was followed by a large procession, defying Section 144. The authorities, however, ignored this provocation and the day passed off without any ‘untoward’ incident.

The FPML temporarily concentrated all its energies on a by-election scheduled for mid-February in Mardan. The party leaders were aware of their strength in Mardan, so they did not want to jeopardize the chances of their success. M. Ishaq Khan, the League nominee, defeated Mian Shakirullah, the Congress candidate, by 8941 to 8353 votes. Once the polling was over and the result announced, the final constraint on the Muslim League was lifted, and within a week it came out openly against the Congress ministry by defying the district authorities.

The quality and dynamics of the leadership, the support from local Muslims, and the initial successes of the movement against the Congress ministry need to be understood. The leadership of this movement, can be distinguished into two groups: local leaders who suffered personally; and those who were sent by the AIML to guide and support it. In the initial stages the local leadership was more effective. The leaders of the latter group assumed a bigger role when the movement developed and gained momentum. It is interesting to note how local League workers utilized methods used by the Congress of picketing and boycotting of the Civil Courts against the Frontier Congress ministry. The civil

---

26 Prominent poets who took part in the gathering included M. Aslam Khan, Pir Gohar, Maulana Shakirullah, Fazl Mahmood, Qazi Abdul Halim Asar, and Khan Mir Hilali. For full details see, Sarhad, Peshawar, 30 January 1947.
28 Khyber Mail, 1 February and 14 February 1947; CID Diaries, 17 February 1947, F. No. 761, SBP, p. 155.
disobedience itself occurred in two phases. Initially it was noisy, but later on peaceful, with little incidence of sabotage and communal violence. During the second phase, particularly after the resignation of the Khizar ministry in the Punjab, violence occurred, probably due to the fact that the provincial Leaguers were given guidance from the Punjab workers to try the techniques which brought about the fall of the Khizar ministry.

The Pir of Manki remained the moving spirit behind the whole agitation. He provided a large number of his murids, whose services were utilized during the movement, and he was assisted by Mian Abdullah Shah, Sher Bahadur Khan, and other local organizers. The ‘War Council’ tried to direct the agitation from Peshawar, but failed to do so. The obvious reason was the decentralized nature of the agitation. The Council delegated its authority to the district leaders, periodically touring the province only to advise and sustain the movement. Fida M. Khan organized the rallies in Peshawar; after his arrest the leadership passed into the hands of several people. M. Ali Khan was in charge in Mardan, assisted by Bakht Jamal and others. Malik Damsaz and Habibullah were nominated for Bannu; M. A. Kiyani for Kohat; Jalal-ud-Din for Hazara, and Dera Ismail Khan was entrusted to Ramzan Khan, Pir of Zakori, and Qutubud Din. While some of the League organizers were arrested as soon as the movement started, some enjoyed full freedom of speech and movement till the end and the government did not interfere with their activities. Normally, whenever the League workers were arrested, the authorities would send them a few miles from the urban areas in order to break the movement by removing them from the scene of the agitation. However, in most cases prior information about their destinations were provided by Muslim officials to the Leaguers, so in no time they were safely taken back in the cities.29

There are some exaggerated accounts of the alleged atrocities of the Congress ministry against the League prisoners. In fact, it was routine for the arrested Leaguers to go to their homes secretly at night, and return to prison early the next morning with the

29 Maula Dad, *Dera Ki Kahani*, p. 106.
connivance of the prison authorities.\textsuperscript{30} There was no traditional bigar (forced labour) enforced upon the prisoners during Dr Khan Sahib’s tenure of office.\textsuperscript{31} The government avoided severe treatment, and the Premier told Leaguers that if they had any complaints against his government, the best way was to meet him and put their demands to him in a non-antagonistic way and not in the confrontational manner which they had adopted.\textsuperscript{32}

While the agitation was still going on, one of the foremost concerns of the ministry was its annual budget. They were apprehensive that if they took any drastic action against the agitators, the Governor might take the extreme step of dissolving the Assembly.\textsuperscript{33} Also, during the entire movement, most of the Muslim officials in the government sympathized with the League and provided secret information to the organizers. Some of those officials even helped to arrange the sabotage activities of Muslim League National Guard volunteers.\textsuperscript{34}

On the afternoon of 19 February a well-attended meeting of the FPML was held at Mardan. The usual anti-Congress and anti-Ministry speeches were made. Indignation was expressed at Dr Khan Sahib’s attitude in dealing with the case of the abducted Sikh woman, and the government was warned of serious repercussions if their demand was not fulfilled. The demonstrators on their way back turned to violence, damaging several shops belonging to non-Muslims, and their leaders were arrested.\textsuperscript{35}

On 20 February, Qaiyum reached Mardan, defying Section 144. He was also arrested and put into jail.\textsuperscript{36} An urgent meeting of the FPML was called in Peshawar on the same day to discuss the latest developments, particularly the Mardan arrests, and to draft a

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{31} Interview with Mian Aminul Wahab, Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 17 January 1986.
\textsuperscript{32} Pakhtun, 1 March 1947, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{33} G. D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning (Delhi, 1989), pp. 266-7.
\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Alam Khan, drill instructor at the Police Training School, Hangu, quoted in Jansson, Pakhtunistan, pp. 195-7.
\textsuperscript{35} Special CID Diary, 20 February 1947, F. No. 760, SBP, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{36} The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 22 February 1947; C&MG, 21 February 1947; CID Diaries, 21 February 1947, F. No. 760, SBP, p. 25.
programme of future action against the Congress ministry. The Pir of Manki and a strong group of other Leaguers pleaded for the commencement of a civil disobedience movement against the provincial Congress ministry immediately. Samin Jan, the former education minister in the League’s ministry, did not approve the idea and opposed the launching of any movement on communal lines. He suggested that the government should be harassed by cutting telegraph lines, burning post offices, etc., but was vetoed. After heated discussion, a resolution was adopted urging the Muslims of the NWFP to support the FPML’s demands for the restoration of civil liberties and the withdrawal of ‘black laws’ from Hazara. A ‘War Council’ was formed to ‘carry on the struggle, which has been forced upon them by the Government, in a strictly non-communal manner’.

Mian Abdullah Shah became the President, and Sher Bahadur its Secretary. Other members included the Pir of Manki, Abdul Malik Khan, Bakht Jamal, and Samin Jan. It was decided to launch the movement from Mardan.

On 21 February, a procession led by Samin Jan was organized at Mardan. Samin Jan was arrested. On the same evening, a huge protest meeting was organized by the Leaguers at Peshawar. The meeting was followed by a procession towards Dr Khan Sahib’s house. To stop the mob from entering the Cantonment, tear gas was used, which proved ineffective. The ‘unruly mob’ reached the Premier’s house and threw brickbats, broke windows, and threw stones into the rooms. ‘The old man [Dr Khan Sahib] was [as] brave as a lion’, reported Caroe, he ‘went out on top of the porch to tell the crowd what he thought of them. He refused to give away any points’ and added that such a defiant attitude on the part of the Leaguers would have no affect on him. The mob dispersed, and prominent leaders of the procession were arrested.

The formal announcement of disobedience was made on 22

---

37 Special CID Diary, 21 February 1947, F. No. 760, SBP, pp. 7-9.
38 CID Diaries, F. No. 760, SBP, p. 11.
February. The League movement became more urgent due to the announcement of Attlee, in the British Parliament, on 20 February that power would be transferred to Indian hands by June 1948 at the latest. This provided a renewed incentive for the Leaguers to topple the Congress ministry in a Muslim majority province which was to be included in their proposed Pakistan.

Soon the movement spread to other districts of the NWFP. During the next few days, protest meetings by the League were reported from Hazara, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. The main themes of the speeches remained the demand for the restoration of Basanti to the Muslims, condemnation of the repressive policy of the government against the Muslim League in the NWFP, the ‘suppression of civil liberties’. The government responded by promulgating Section 144 in most of the towns of the province. Processions, defying prohibition orders, became a routine matter. Non-Muslims felt threatened by the growing communalism in the NWFP and the political atmosphere in the province further worsened. *Khyber Mail* commented:

> While everywhere else in India the Muslims are closing their ranks and achieving greater and greater harmony of aims and ideals, in this land of Pathans there is only disruption and disunity. While in other Muslim provinces the impending political changes, which promise to lead India to a new era of complete independence, have stimulated an active spirit of compromise among the various Muslim political parties, here by a queer tyranny of misfortune we are only drifting away from each other.

The fall of the Unionist Ministry in the Punjab on 2 March put an intolerable strain on the Congress ministry in the NWFP. As mentioned earlier, during the first phase of the movement, the Muslim League High Command did little; rather, it allowed complete freedom to local workers to continue the movement of their own accord. It maintained only sporadic contacts with its

---

41 Press Statement by Ibrahim Khan, President Peshawar District Muslim League, 22 February 1947, CID Diaries, F. No. 760, SBP, p. 15.
43 CID Diaries, 26 February-5 March 1947, F. Nos. 815, 760, 761, SBP.
44 *Khyber Mail*, 7 March 1947.
Frontier organization. Occasional trips by central leaders were made to boost the ongoing agitation against the Congress ministry. After the League’s ‘triumph’ in the Punjab, the NWFP became the main focus of its attention. Since it was the only province of the proposed Pakistan where the League was not in power, it was essential for them to wrest it from the Congress. On the other hand, the Congress still had to prove that it commanded the confidence of the Muslims, so it wanted to retain control of the NWFP within its fold at least for the time being. The stage was set for a final contest between different conceptions of ‘nation’ and national identity.

The League high command sent Nishtar and M. Ismail to the NWFP ‘to study’ the situation created by the League agitation there. They arrived in Peshawar on 25 February and had meetings with the organizers of the movement. Khurshid Anwar, another prominent League leader, whom Caroe regarded as ‘No 2 Organiser’ of the Muslim League National Guards, remained busy in the NWFP imparting training to the League volunteers in the use of explosives and other weapons of assault to be used against the non-Muslims in the NWFP. During the civil disobedience, he operated independently, providing guidance to the war council, and at times acting as an advisor to the Muslim League women agitators.  

To disrupt the budget session of the Provincial Assembly, fixed for 10 March at Peshawar, a large procession was mobilized. The participants were warned by the authorities to desist from disturbing the atmosphere around the Assembly Hall but they refused to comply with the warnings. The troops opened ‘controlled’ fire, killing two and wounding thirteen. The angry mob fell on the non-Muslims in Peshawar. Seventeen cases of stabbing were reported that evening and curfew was imposed in the city.  

A. N. Mitchell, the NWFP Chief Secretary reported: ‘...they turned their anger against Hindus and Sikhs, partly because of the very bad communal rioting in the Punjab, which had rouse  

45 Caroe to Wavell, 11 October 1946, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, p. 51; CID Diaries, 2 October 1946, F. Nos. 756, 757, 760, SBP.  
[aroused] feelings here; partly because they regarded the firing as an attack by the Congress party, which is represented as a Hindu party, on the Muslims’.47 Violent riots spread to other parts of the province. A campaign of communal terrorism against the non-Muslims resulted in the murder of Hindus and Sikhs in various parts of the NWFP. The worst affected areas were Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, the two places where non-Pashtoons pre-dominated and where the League was stronger than in other parts of the province. Sabotage activities, reminiscent of the ‘Quit India’ days, such as bomb explosions, cutting of telegraph and telephone lines, and disrupting the railways, became routine. In Peshawar Valley, the only seriously affected area was Peshawar city. The rural areas remained largely unaffected, because the Congress influence was still unchallenged there. In Peshawar city, commerce and trade were badly affected; the non-Muslims faced threats of closure of businesses. In Hazara the situation worsened, and despite the imposition of curfew in major towns and cities, there were incidents of arson, looting, and stabbing. Gurdwaras were burnt, individual Sikhs murdered, and forced conversions took place. There were demonstrations by the Leaguers at Mardan, Kohat, and Bannu, but there were no casualties.48

Dr Khan Sahib offered ‘stout resistance’.49 He described the League’s agitation as ‘unconstitutional’, and dismissed their demands for his resignation or for fresh elections: ‘I am a representative of the Pathans who have put me in this office and nobody can make me resign as long as my electorate are with me. I am not going to yield to coercive and un-constitutional methods of those who cannot tolerate us in office’.50

Responding to the allegations by the League of suppression of civil

49 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 19 March 1947, TP, IX, p. 991.
liberties in the NWFP, he stated that ‘There has been no greater champion of civil liberties in this Province than the party of which I am the elected leader in the Legislative Assembly’.\(^{51}\) The Congress High Command was also of the view that ‘No government can agree to such demands, whatever the consequences’.\(^{52}\) Abdul Ghaffar Khan suspected a ‘big plot and conspiracy’ behind the League movement in the NWFP. According to him, ‘it is not the love of God, Islam or love of their country, but it is the love of their departing English masters whom their friends do not want to go from India’\(^{53}\) that had led the League to preach hatred.

After the budget session of the assembly was over, the Congress ministry responded by sending a large number of Khudai Khidmatgars from Charsadda and the adjoining areas to Peshawar city. On 19 March, between ten and twenty thousand Khudai Khidmatgars both in uniforms, and in plain clothes, entered the city in the form of a procession. They were called from other parts of Peshawar Valley to help the ministry to restore confidence amongst the minority communities. The presence of such a large number of the Khudai Khidmatgars had a wholesome effect, and the situation improved slightly.\(^{54}\) Next day the CID reported that ‘conditions in Peshawar City and Cantonment show signs of definite improvement, especially in the City, due to the Red Shirts peace efforts by placing their men on duty in the bazaars and streets. This move has been greatly responsible for fostering confidence in the minds of non-Muslims, who have been noticed moving about in different localities’.\(^{55}\) The Leaguers, however, protested against bringing the Khudai Khidmatgars into Peshawar. They considered it an interference with their movement, which, according to them, was peaceful and non-communal and directed

---

51 The Pakistan Times, 4 March 1947.
54 Interview with Abdul Ghani Khan, Peshawar, 1 February 1987; Charsadda, 3 February 1989; Saadullah Khan to Patel, 29 March 1947, Patel’s Correspondence, 4, pp. 230-31.
55 CID Diaries, 20 March 1947, F. No. 812, SBP, pp. 81, 89-95.
purely against the Congress ministry.  Caroe shared the League opinion. To him, bringing Khudai Khidmatgars into Peshawar at that stage might enhance the prestige of the Congress ministry, but it was a 'totalitarian move and as such will bring its revenges'.

Minor scuffles were reported during the next few days between the Khudai Khidmatgars and the League volunteers, but the Khudai Khidmatgars were advised by their leaders to abide strictly by the principle of non-violence even under provocation from the other side, as it might exacerbate the already existing tensions between the two parties. During the first week of April, when the situation became normal in Peshawar, the Khudai Khidmatgars were sent back to their respective areas. ‘Peace Committees’ were formed in various parts of the province, whose main purpose was to protect the non-Muslims from communal strife. Such Committees were formed at Charsadda, Nowshera, Akora, Mardan, and Swabi.

The Ahrars and the Khaksars also decided to protect the lives and property of the non-Muslims, as it was against the Shariat to terrorize Hindus and Sikhs. Anjuman-i-Ghariban, a social organization, condemned the ‘coward’ attacks on Hindus and Sikhs in the name of Islam and sympathized with the non-Muslims.

During the first week of April the centre of communal violence moved to the south and the movement elsewhere subsided. On 2 April some pro-League Muslims killed several non-Muslims at Kohat. After Kohat, on 15 April the communal frenzy flared up in Dera Ismail Khan. Troops were called in from Bannu to assist the police in controlling the situation. The reported death toll was sixteen (ten Hindus, five Muslims, and one Sweeper); about nine hundred shops were gutted by fire. The troubles in Dera Ismail Khan spread to the adjoining rural areas. On 17 April, Tank bazaar was burnt and eight non-Muslims were killed; the same number of

56 Ibid.
59 CID Diaries, F. Nos. 101, 118, 152, SBP; Interview with Mian Shahin Shah, Islamabad, 26 September 1993.
60 CID Diaries, 17 March 1947, F. No. 798, SBP, p. 19.
Muslims were also killed. Mahsud tribesmen came in large numbers to Tank, obviously with the desire for loot and plunder, but also inspired by the League propaganda. The troops fired, killing seventeen Mahsuds on the spot. Non-Muslims were evacuated to Dera Ismail Khan and other safer places. By 25 April death tolls in the Dera Ismail Khan rioting reached ninety-three Hindus and twenty-eight Muslims. In Bannu, however, the situation remained peaceful and under the control of the authorities. In contrast with the worsening communal relations between the communities in other parts of the southern districts, on 12 May, a combined meeting of Congress and League workers was convened at Kakki. It was unanimously decided to adopt measures to protect the Hindus living in very large numbers in Bannu, and to safeguard the villages against the communal disturbances and tribal raids.

With the intensification of the League movement, the Frontier Premier’s attitude changed. ‘I will not let them play havoc any more’, declared Dr Khan Sahib, I cannot see any of our own people being ruined on their score. I have resolved to settle accounts with them. A general crackdown was made on the League workers throughout the province. Accounts of the number of arrests varied. Official accounts gave 2500, while the League sources claimed 35,000 volunteers and workers imprisoned.

A remarkable feature of the civil disobedience by the League was the formation of armed organizations by the Congress and the FPML. During March and early April the League volunteers started harassing and abusing the Khudai Khidmatgars, especially those who were performing their duties in Peshawar City and were posted to guard the minority communities. The murids of the Pir of Manki were in the forefront. The Khudai Khidmatgars were

63 CID Diaries, 12 May 1947, F. No. 814, SBP, pp. 23-5.
64 C&MG, 11 April 1947.
advised by their leaders to remain calm, and not to retaliate, as it might worsen the communal situation. In mid-April some Khudai Khidmatgars including Qazi Ataullah, the Revenue Minister, were passing through Mardan when they were abused and threatened by armed Muslim League volunteers. To prevent the repetition of such incidents, on 24 April Abdul Ghani Khan, the eldest son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, formed Zalmai Pakhtun (Pakhtun Youth). Its goals included the protection of unarmed Khudai Khidmatgars and checking the League’s offensive against the Frontier Congress leaders. As indicated by the name, the membership was restricted to Pashtoon youth. The members were advised to carry arms. The uniform of the volunteers was red with black stripes on their collars and cuffs, and they were required to wear black belts. It was a marked shift from the non-violent principle of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Ghani Khan and Amir Nawaz Jalia were the moving spirits behind the organization. It became very popular amongst the young Pashtoons, with some participants claiming that the membership reached sixty thousand. To counter the activities of Zalmai Pakhtun, the FPML also formed its own militant organization, Ghazi Pakhtun. The duties of the Ghazi Pakhtun included moving armed in large groups with Muslim League processions, thus providing them with moral and physical strength. No exact figures are available about the number of its members. However, official and newspaper accounts reveal them to be about ten thousand. Although both figures seem exaggerated, they do point to the relative popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the League in the province.

**Women and Politics in the Frontier**

Although the League civil disobedience was in most cases highly decentralized, some groups, particularly women, played a remarkable part in it. Mention must be made of the general conditions and status of the females in traditional Pashtoon society, to better understand the part played by Pashtoon women in the

---

66 Interview with Abdul Ghani Khan, 1 February 1987, Peshawar; 3 February 1989, Charsadda; F. No. 153, SBP, p. 151; Pakhtun, 1 July 1947, p. 7 and Madina, 1 August 1947.

national movement. Pashtoon society traditionally is very strict with regard to women. The social roles of women, her habits, her activities, all are determined by a strict code which she is not allowed to break. Any defiance is considered as causing dishonour and disgrace for the family, leading to her chastisement. As in many other societies, there is a common belief among the Pashtoons that the more sons a man has, the better he can withstand his enemy.

During the early decades of the twentieth century, according to the *Census Report of 1911*, the proportion of the female population in the NWFP, was 817 women per 1000 males. It reached 843 females to 1000 males in 1931. Literate males of all religions were 58 per 1000 and literate females only 6 per 1000. The main causes of their backwardness were the observance of strict purdah (seclusion); the ‘secular nature’ of school work; and the absence in the curriculum of subjects helpful in organizing the affairs of their households. The local prejudices against female education were so great that the government also gave very little attention to it.

68 *Census of India 1911, NWFP*, vol. XIII, p. 124.
69 Ibid., 1931, vol. XV, p. 77.
70 Ibid., 1911, p. 177.
71 Ibid., 1921, vol. XIV, p. 182.
72 In 1901-1902 there were only eight government-recognized primary schools for girls in the entire province, with a total number of 491 students, mostly non-Muslims belonging to the families of government servants and businessmen. There was no secondary school for girls until 1906, when Arya Kanya School of Dera Ismail Khan was raised to the status of a middle school. The number of girls primary schools reached twenty-four in 1920-21 and middle schools increased from one to four. There was a further increase: primary schools from twenty-four to forty five; middle schools from four to twenty-three and high schools from zero to two. Both girls’ high schools, Church of England Zenana Mission High School at Peshawar, and Gobind Girls High School at Abbottabad, were non-governmental institutions. The demand for a government girls high school was fulfilled in 1933. On 15 May Lady Griffith High School for Girls started its classes for the female students of the province. The curriculum, besides reading and writing, consisted of needlework (knitting and embroidery). There was no college in the province, and in 1930-33 one female from the NWFP passed her B. A examination from the Punjab. For more details see, *Census of India 1921, NWFP* vol. XIV, pp. 181-2; *Census of India 1931, NWFP* vol. XV, p. 166; *CLAD*, 15 July 1930, pp.
The Khudai Khidmatgars from the beginning stressed the need for female education. According to them, an educated woman could take care of herself better than an inexperienced and uneducated one. The columns of Pakhtun were open for women to write about their problems. While in the rest of India, Gandhi and other regional leaders guided and encouraged women to participate actively in nationalist politics, in the NWFP inspiration was provided by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other noted Khudai Khidmatgars. In January 1929, an article contributed by Jaffar Shah appeared in the Pakhtun on women and their services to the community and nation. He considered it ridiculous on the part of the Pashtoons that they regarded their females as their ‘mean of entertainment’ only. Women, according to him, shared many responsibilities, both in peace and war. Abdul Ghaffar Khan also stressed the need for education for females and urged the Pashtoons to give their women the best modern education. He emphasized that ignoring their plight would definitely result in prolonging their slavery.

During the Congress Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930-34, the participation of women was on a limited scale. The main reason was the observance of strict purdah. However, the attendance of females in large numbers, of course behind walls or on the roof-tops of their houses wrapped in chadars, became a common feature of Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s meetings. In Swabi and Nowshera, during the campaign, elderly women actively participated, and in Pabbi, Dur Marjan and Noorun Nisa of Tarru Jabba, two prominent women Khudai Khidmatgars, became popular for leading the processions. The central leadership of the

---

74 Pakhtun, January 1929, pp. 16-19.
75 Ibid., p. 20.
76 Presidential Address of Abdul Ghaffar Khan at Hangu, Pakhtun, June-July 1931, pp. 53-61; Pakhtun, October 1938, pp. 4-6.
Congress helped them to organize the women of the Frontier on the pattern of educated Hindustani, Bengali, and Maharashtrian women, who were sharing the burden with their men in every walk of life. In 1939 Bibi Amtus Salam and Mirabehn, two prominent Congress women, were sent by the Congress High Command to the NWFP to assist Abdul Ghaffar Khan in female education and social reform among the women. In 1946 female writers belonging to the Khudai Khidmatgars, began writing directly and prominently about the pressing political issues of the day, not confining themselves to the earlier themes of ‘social reform’ and the ‘ideal women’. Most of the articles that appeared that year and in the subsequent one carried the political messages of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars. The main focus was on Indian unity and resistance to the League’s Pakistan scheme. The League’s ‘Direct Action’ day and its repercussions in the other part of India was criticized. The grouping clauses of the Cabinet Mission Plan also came under criticism. Alaf Jan Khattaka, a Khudai Khidmatgar, advised the Pashtoons to follow their own leaders rather than follow the Punjabis or Hindustanis. The Khudai Khidmatgars responded positively to the call of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and started sending their daughters and other female relations to schools. Abdul Malik Fida, Sarfaraz Khan and Amir M. Khan were among the many who sent their daughters to school to acquire modern education.

During the year before Partition, the League women, also took a prominent part in the politics of the NWFP. As there was no female college in the province, a few students from the NWFP, including Qanita Bibi, sister of Mian Ziaud Din, and Nazir Tila M. Khan, went to Lahore and joined the Jinnah Islamia College of

---

78 Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, p. 289; For more details see, Pakhtun, March 1929, April 1929, June-July 1929, 1 November 1938, 11 December 1938, 11 December 1939, 11 January 1940, 11 August 1940, 21 August 1940, 11 October 1940, 21 October 1940, 15 August 1945, 17 October 1945, 24 October 1945, 4 December 1945, 1 February 1946, 17 February 1946, and 21 February 1946.

Fatima Begum. They came under the direct influence of Fatima, who imbued them with the ideas of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. After completing their studies in Lahore, they came back to the province and started taking an active part in politics.

The first branch of the Women Muslim League in the NWFP was opened in April 1939. On 19 April a meeting under the presidency of Qanita Bibi was held at Peshawar; Begum Habibullah (UP) was the main speaker. She appealed to the Muslim women of the Frontier to join the League in order to combat the Hindu women who had formed their own societies.

Begum Mufti Abdul Wadud was made the President of the nascent branch of the Frontier Women Muslim League and Qanita became its Vice President. No details are available about the other office holders. Nothing was heard of this branch of the League for a year. In April 1940 some activities by women Leaguers were reported from Peshawar, but on the whole the branch remained dormant for a long time. The first serious foray of the women’s League was their participation in the elections of 1945-6. In October 1945 the AIML send a delegation to the Frontier under Lady Abdullah Haroon, President All India Zenana Muslim League. The delegation reached Peshawar on 17 October. Meetings were addressed at Peshawar and Mardan, exhorting Muslim women to vote for the League candidates in the elections and to contribute generously to the League’s election funds. When the meetings were over, a ‘large number of purdah women’ were reported as enrolling themselves as the founder members of the Women’s Muslim League. Another branch of the Women’s Muslim League was formed at Peshawar with Begum Qazi Mir Ahmad as President and Begum Abdul Wahid as Secretary. The

---

80 Khyber Mail, 23 April 1939; CID Diaries, F. No. 769, SBP, p. 75.
81 Khyber Mail, 28 April 1940; CID Diaries, F. No. 803, SBP, p. 3.
82 Other members of the delegation included Begum Salma Tassadaq, Begum Hakam, Fatima Begum, Miss Zubeda Shah, Begum Karim Dad, and Begum Syed Habibullah. CID Diaries, 17 October 1945, F. No. 754, SBP, p. 125(a); Khyber Mail, 12 October 1945; Sarfaraz H. Mirza, Muslim Women’s Role in the Pakistan Movement (Lahore, 1969), p. 76.
83 Khyber Mail, 19 October 1945.
Women’s Muslim League supported the official League candidates during elections.\(^{84}\)

On 2 March 1947, a small procession of women Leaguers was organized at Abbottabad by Mrs Kamalud Din, the Hazara League leader. She appealed to Muslim women to join the civil disobedience against the Congress ministry.\(^{85}\) On 12 March another procession of women set out in Peshawar. The procession, consisting of twenty-five ladies in burqas, marched through the main bazaars of the city and left a ‘deep impression’ on other Muslim women.\(^{86}\)

During the League’s civil disobedience in the Frontier, processions by women in Peshawar became routine. Other towns affected by women were Mardan, Kohat, and Abbottabad, none reported from Bannu or Dera Ismail Khan. The women of the rural areas of the province also remained unaffected. The main reasons were the popularity of and support for the Khudai Khidmatgars in rural areas, and the observance of a strict purdah system there. Since it is a significant Pashtoon value that no physical force must ever be used against women, the women Leaguers were left free to organize meetings and processions, and they enjoyed full freedom of expression and movement. After the fall of the Unionist Ministry in the Punjab, where there was a notable presence of women Leaguers, mostly from the elite, they tried to build a similar base in the NWFP.\(^{87}\) The women workers of the League

\(^{84}\) Interview with Qanita Bibi, Peshawar, 7 October 1984.

\(^{85}\) CID Diaries, 3 March 1947, F. No. 803, SBP, p. 67.

\(^{86}\) Khyber Mail, 14 March 1947. The members of the procession, according to The Pakistan Times, were the educated young ladies of Peshawar. ‘A certain number [of people] was angry while others amused but most of the people were too stupefied to say anything. As the procession marched through the streets, shouting League slogans, the public stood and stared. The women of Peshawar watched from their housetops and gazed at their veiled sisters in the streets below. When the procession returned to the League office in Egerton Road, these brave women were exhausted physically, but their spirits were undaunted. They made history for the women of the Frontier Province’. The Pakistan Times, 29 March 1947.

came in large number from the Punjab\textsuperscript{88} to assist the Frontier Women’s Muslim League against the Congress ministry. The Chief Minister’s policy was not to arrest women, so there was no restriction on the women Leaguers, and they acted freely against the ministry. Women agitators disrupted the government machinery to a great extent. On several occasions the provincial Secretariat was stormed and the ‘Pakistan’ flag hoisted. Picketing government installations, including schools, were routine. ‘Pakistan Tickets’ were issued at railway stations. To check the advance of the women agitators, usually the police linked arms to block them, and, when their lines were broken, they retreated and re-formed their passive barricades. The first serious injuries to women protesters were incurred on 14 April when the women Leaguers attempted to impede the 58 Down Bombay Express coming from the Peshawar Cantonment. The protesters sat down on the railway track and the engine driver did not stop the train. Five women were seriously injured while another thirty received minor injuries. Following this incident, they were prevented by the FPML from exposing themselves to serious physical danger.\textsuperscript{89}

Thus the League successfully exploited the traditional Pashtoon values to its advantage by usefully bringing out their women workers against the Congress ministry. The women protesters were given complete freedom of speech and movement throughout the agitation; in very rare cases expulsion orders were served by the authorities asking them to leave some particular locality. No women agitator was arrested, physically assaulted, or tortured by the Congress ministry, as it was against Pashtoon codes to cause harm to females.

\textsuperscript{88} Prominent women Leaguers from Punjab and other parts of India who assisted the Frontier Women Muslim League against Congress ministry during the civil disobedience movement included Fatima Begum, Nasira Siddiqi, Zubeda Shah, Begum Karim Dad, Mumtaz Shahnawaz, and Hassan Ara. \textit{The Pakistan Times}, 1 April 1947

Mountbatten’s Visit to the Frontier

The Central government did not remain idle for long with regard to the happenings in the NWFP. It had its own plans for the ‘troublesome’ Frontier, based on the information and the pro-League stance of the provincial bureaucracy and the Governor. Caroe was convinced of the ‘waning influence’ of the Khan Brothers and a rise in the popularity of the Muslim League in the Frontier.\(^{90}\) By December, he had no doubts that Jinnah would ‘shortly turn most of his energies in this direction in an endeavour to put things right from his point of view up here’.\(^{91}\) Caroe warned Dr Khan Sahib of the growing influence of the Muslim League and advised him to release the opposition members, allow public meetings, announce holding of fresh elections, and accommodate the Leaguers in the ministry. However, to Caroe’s chagrin, Dr Khan Sahib refused flatly to accede to his advice.\(^{92}\) Caroe remained insistent. He foresaw the fall of the Congress ministry within days.\(^{93}\) Presenting a gloomy situation in the NWFP, Caroe informed the Viceroy that ‘large processions are daily parading in all cities in defiance of the ban and have begun invading cantonments. Jails are overcrowded and further arrests will compel release of ordinary criminals. Police are tired and inadequate, and aid by troops may well lead to firing on demonstrations. Tribes are restive and further firing incidents may cause them to raid’. He further added that his advice to the Premier regarding an attempt at conciliation or to aim at a coalition was turned down point-blank by the former.\(^{94}\) Lord Ismay, an old friend of Caroe was sent by the Viceroy to the Frontier to apprise him of the latest situation. After prolonged discussions with the Governor, Ismay came to share Caroe’s views. He recommended to the Viceroy that the Governor should be allowed to use his Special Powers, by dissolving the Frontier ministry and declaring Governor’s rule in the NWFP.\(^{95}\)

\(^{90}\) Caroe’s Judgement on Nehru’s Frontier Visit, Mss. EUR., F. 203/1, IOLR, pp. 4-5.

\(^{91}\) Caroe to Colville, 23 December 1946, ibid., p. 72.

\(^{92}\) Caroe to Wavell, 8 March 1947, ibid., pp. 89-91.


\(^{94}\) Caroe to Mountbatten, 31 March 1947, ibid., p. 2.

\(^{95}\) Notes on an interview between the Governor of NWFP and Ismay, 2 April 1947, ibid., p. 4.
Ismay also suggested to the Viceroy, that to obtain a peaceful resolution of the Frontier imbroglio, either a coalition government of the League and Congress should be formed, or an announcement should be made by the Governor for the holding of fresh general elections before the transfer of power.\textsuperscript{96} Mountbatten then summoned Lt.-Col. de la Fargue, the former Chief Secretary for the NWFP, and asked for his confidential opinion. Col. la Fargue opined that in the case of fair and free elections in the Frontier, Congress would be successful.\textsuperscript{97} However, Mitchell, the newly appointed Chief Secretary, assessed the situation differently. He and other senior bureaucrats were convinced that unless the Congress could offer some substantial proof of change in policy to accommodate the Leaguers’ demands, there would be no end to communal violence. Dr Khan Sahib’s adamant refusal to yield to League pressure had upset Caroe.\textsuperscript{98} According to him, the Premier ‘entirely fails to appreciate the strength that lies behind the League movement’. To Caroe the best course would be ‘if Khan Sahib would make overtures for a coalition under him on a guarantee that the Ministry would be a Pathan one and severed its connection with Congress’.\textsuperscript{99} During the second and third weeks of April, a deadlock between the Governor and his ministers was reported. The Leaguers thought that it would result in either the resignation of the ministers or the dismissal of the ministry by Caroe.\textsuperscript{100} The Governor was warned to weigh both pros and cons before taking such an extreme step.\textsuperscript{101}

One of the most important tasks before Mountbatten was to peacefully transfer power to Indian hands. On his arrival in India he found the ‘troublesome Frontier’ to be a battleground between the Congress and the Muslim League. The Governor of the NWFP,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} Joint Report to the Viceroy by Ismay and E. Mieville, 16 April 1947, ibid., p.18.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Record of interview between Mountbatten and Lt.-Col. de la Fargue, 11 April 1947, \textit{TP}, X, pp. 196-7.
\item \textsuperscript{98} ‘We are not going to be cowed down by the present civil disobedience of the Muslim League’, remarked Dr Khan Sahib, ‘so long as my people want me to stay on, no body can shake this Ministry’. \textit{C\&MG}, 15 April 1947.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Caroe to Mountbatten, 7 April 1947, L/P\&J/3/224, IOLR, p. 62.
\item \textsuperscript{100} \textit{The Pakistan Times}, 10 April 1947.
\item \textsuperscript{101} \textit{C\&MG}, 15 April 1947.
\end{itemize}
who had a soft spot for the Muslim League, was convinced of the swing of support towards the League. However, only fresh general elections would prove that the majority of the Muslims were behind the League and that they supported Pakistan. Caroe pressed his case personally in the Governors’ Conference, held in Delhi on 16 April. He presented a gloomy picture of the latest situation in the NWFP, where the administration, according to Caroe, was ‘nearing the breaking point’, and, inspired by the Muslim League’s civil disobedience, the tribes were also ‘organizing themselves on a scale which he had not seen in all his experience in the Frontier’. His proposed solution was an announcement of the holding of fresh general elections in the Frontier.\(^{102}\) Nehru had earlier concurred in principle with the Viceroy’s suggestion of holding fresh elections in the Frontier to obtain the real views of the electorate on whether to join a Hindustani or a Pakistani Group.\(^{103}\) He now objected to the method of conducting the proposed elections, and demanded that impartial elections be conducted by the permanent staff of an election commission rather than by the Governor. He further added that it was not the proper time for the proposed announcement, as it would appear that the government was yielding to the pressure of Muslim League agitation.\(^{104}\) However, the next day, Nehru changed his mind. He informed the Viceroy that in fact the proposal for fresh elections by the Governor of the NWFP had been the demand of the FPML. It would certainly be regarded as a ‘triumph’ for the Muslim League and as ‘an open rebuff to the present Ministry’. Nehru suggested that no such statement should be made, and that a joint appeal for peace be made by Gandhi and Jinnah to stop the accelerating communal violence in the NWFP.\(^{105}\)

A joint peace appeal was issued by Gandhi and Jinnah condemning the acts of violence and lawlessness. They denounced ‘the use of force to achieve political ends’ and called upon Indians to refrain

\(^{102}\) Minutes of the Viceroy’s Third Miscellaneous Meeting, 16 April 1947, Delhi, *TP*, X, pp. 286-92.
\(^{103}\) Record of interview between Mountbatten and Nehru, 8 April 1947, *TP*, X, p. 154.
\(^{104}\) Minutes of Viceroy’s Third Miscellaneous Meeting, 16 April 1947, ibid., and of Fourth Miscellaneous Meeting, 18 April 1947, ibid., pp. 315-19.
\(^{105}\) Nehru to Mountbatten, 17 April 1947, ibid., pp. 304-307.
from violence of any kind resulting in the increase of hostilities between the communities. \textsuperscript{106} As a gesture of goodwill towards reaching a peaceful settlement of the issue, the Frontier government also announced the release of those League prisoners who were not charged directly with violence. \textsuperscript{107} The Viceroy held another meeting with Caroe, Liaquat, and Nehru; the situation in the NWFP was the main issue on the meeting agenda. No solution was reached. Mountbatten refused to yield to the League’s pressure, and said that the Muslim League ‘will make it impossible for me to give a decision in favour of fresh elections while the programme of agitation (usually leading to violence) in the Province is allowed to continue’. \textsuperscript{108}

To obtain a first hand assessment of the situation in the Frontier, termed by the Viceroy ‘the greatest danger spot in India and the bone of contention’ between Congress and the Muslim League, he decided personally to visit the NWFP. \textsuperscript{109} Jinnah was requested by Mountbatten to ask his followers in the NWFP to refrain from violence. \textsuperscript{110} Jinnah informed the League workers in the Frontier of the intended visit of the Viceroy to study the situation personally, and of his ‘determination to remove the root-cause of the serious trouble and situation that has arisen in the Province’. Jinnah was convinced of Mountbatten’s sense of ‘fair’ play, and appealed to his followers to ‘maintain peace, law and order so as to give the Viceroy every opportunity to fully understand the situation’. \textsuperscript{111} Jinnah proposed to the Viceroy that he should meet an ‘orderly procession’, but Mountbatten refused on the grounds that this might provoke Dr Khan Sahib. However, he agreed to meet a League delegation in the Governor’s House, Peshawar. \textsuperscript{112}

The FPML with the full support of the central organization of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106} \textit{Khyber Mail}, 18 April 1947.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 4, 24 April 1947, \textit{TP}, X, pp. 404-405.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., Report No. 5, p. 534.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Minutes of Viceroy’s Seventh Miscellaneous Meeting, 23 April 1947, ibid., pp. 378-9.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Shahid, \textit{Jinnah: Speeches, Statements, Writings, Letters}, pp. 57-8; \textit{The Pakistan Times}, 27 April 1947.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Mountbatten to Caroe, 27 April 1947, \textit{TP}, X, p. 471; Mountbatten to Jinnah, 27 April 1947, F. No. 22, QAP, p. 231.
\end{itemize}
League, decided to stage a huge demonstration on the occasion of the Viceroy’s visit. The main purpose was to convince the Viceroy that the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of NWFP were behind the League’s demand for the dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry and the inclusion of their province in Pakistan. A large number of League workers and supporters from all over the province assembled in Peshawar. At the League’s call, on 28 April, a hartal was observed in Peshawar. To show solidarity with the Muslim League, green flags were hoisted on top of houses, shops, bicycles, and tongas. A huge protest meeting was organized in Cunningham Park, with the Badshah of Bamkhel in the chair. Other speakers included Nishtar, Noon, and Khurshid Anwar. Resolutions were passed accusing the Congress ministry of interference in their religion and demanding from the Central Government the immediate dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry.

The Viceroy, on his arrival to Peshawar on 28 April, was driven straight to the Governor’s House. Mountbatten found Caroe in a state of anxiety and agitation. He seemed to be perturbed about the demonstration by the League, less than a mile away, which intended to place its grievances before the Viceroy. ‘Although the leaders of the meeting had undertaken not to break the law by forming a procession’, it was reported, however, that they ‘would insist on seeing the Viceroy even at the cost of breaking the law’. Mountbatten had a brief ‘Council of War’ with Caroe and Dr Khan Sahib. It was agreed that the Viceroy should show himself to the League demonstrators, estimated at above fifty thousand, from the top of the nearby embankment. Dr Khan Sahib informed the Viceroy that, to avoid the possibility of a direct clash between the Leaguers and the Khudai Khidmatgars, he had called off a simultaneous Khudai Khidmatgar demonstration on the occasion. As any sort of speech was out of the question, Mountbatten, accompanied by Caroe and other local civil and

114 CID Diaries, 28-9 April 1947, F. No. 813, SBP, pp. 143-57.
military authorities just stood there waving to the crowds for a few minutes. The Leaguers greeted him by raising the slogans of ‘Mountbatten Zinda Bad’ and ‘Pakistan Zinda Bad’.\textsuperscript{116}

In Peshawar, Mountbatten held meetings with the Leaguers, the Governor, the Ministers, and the tribal delegations. Out of twelve Leaguers who met him, six were from the meeting and six, including Qaiyum, Samin Jan, and the Pir of Manki had been among those who had been in prison, but were out on parole. Qaiyum began with a tirade against the ministry and demanded its dismissal. For him, the only solution to preserve peace was to divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan. Mountbatten promised that within two months time they would receive details of the procedure for the transfer of authority, but, until a decision was announced, the Leaguers should withdraw their ‘unconstitutional pressure’ against the Frontier ministry.\textsuperscript{117}

During his conversation with the Ministers, the Viceroy argued that since the installation of the interim government at the Centre, the Frontier Muslims foresaw a Hindu-dominated future government of India; this provided the Muslim League with a chance to seize the NWFP. Furthermore, the Muslim League demonstration was a sign of doubts about the popularity of the Congress in the Frontier. The Ministers, repudiated the claims of the League leaders about its popularity in the province, by giving the example of the last general elections, which were fought on the Pakistan issue and in which the Leaguers faced a humiliating defeat. To this the Viceroy pointed out that the situation was different then: the Cabinet Mission had not come and there was no date fixed for the British departure from India. They accused Caroe of being the patron-in-chief of the FPML. According to the charges, the bureaucracy, following the Governor, was also not cooperating with the Ministry. Mountbatten promised to investigate the matter. He then informed them of the possibility of


\textsuperscript{117} Meeting between Mountbatten and twelve Muslim League leaders at Peshawar, 28 April 1947, F. No. 22, QAP, pp. 26-7.
fresh elections. According to the Viceroy, it was not yielding to the pressure of the Muslim League, but following the directives of the British government to ‘transfer power in the manner which the Indian peoples themselves wanted’.\footnote{Viceroy’s meeting with the Governor, NWFP and Four Ministers, 28 April 1947, \textit{TP}, X, pp. 492-5; Mss. EUR., F. 200/96, IOLR, p. 61(A).}

On 29 April, the Viceroy met an Afridi \textit{Jirga} at Landi Kotal, and on the same day another of Waziris in Peshawar. Both Jirgas showed concern regarding their future, and made it clear that in no way were they prepared to contemplate submitting to a State likely to be dominated by Hindus.\footnote{Mountbatten to Nehru, 30 April 1947, \textit{TP}, X, pp. 491-2.} Some writers have rightly termed the Viceroy’s visit of the NWFP a ‘turning point’\footnote{H. V. Hodson, ‘The Role of Lord Mountbatten’, Philips and Wainwright, \textit{The Partition of India}, p. 120.} in the history of the province, as it was during this visit that the Viceroy was convinced of the Muslim League’s popularity and decided on a referendum on the issue of Hindustan and Pakistan.

After his visit to the Frontier, Mountbatten sent Ismay to London with his partition plan, including fresh elections in the NWFP. On 2 May the Viceroy had a meeting with Jinnah and Liaquat. They were informed of his decision to hold fresh elections and of his waiting for its approval from London. The proposed elections, according to Mountbatten, would be held on ‘Pakistan or Hindustan’. He appealed to Jinnah to restrain his followers in the NWFP from using force to promote communal strife. Liaquat did not agree with the Viceroy, making the point that if civil disobedience had been called off immediately after the Viceroy’s visit, the League would have been accused of following the British line. Mountbatten’s next suggestion was to summon some prominent Frontier Leaguers to Delhi to advise them to stop taking out processions and to keep their meetings peaceful.\footnote{Record of interview between Mountbatten, Jinnah and Liaquat, 2 May 1947, \textit{TP}, X, pp. 566-9.}

The FPML refused to call off its movement and vowed to continue until the demands for the dismissal of the Congress ministry were conceded, or the election was officially announced. Four League leaders, Qaiyum, Samin Jan, Arbab N. Mohammad, and the Pir of
Manki, were paroled, and along with Abdullah Shah were sent to Delhi to discuss the situation with Jinnah. Throughout this period, Jinnah was engaged in persuading the Viceroy to dissolve the Congress ministry, but the Viceroy refused bluntly. Mountbatten was aware of the Congress pressure on him if he dissolved the ministry without any valid reason. He considered dissolution not only ‘wrong morally and legally’ but also, according to him, it would ‘shake the confidence of Congress’ in Mountbatten’s impartiality and might ‘well invite violence in other parts of India leading to further attempts to overthrow legally constituted and popularly elected Governments’. Mountbatten’s own choice was for a referendum, conducted under the direct supervision of the Viceroy, instead of a new election, as this would cost the government less and need less time and energy. Nehru consented to the holding of a referendum on the simple issue of Pakistan or Hindustan. Jinnah was at first upset, but when informed that ‘the referendum would abolish the heavy weightage (twelve seats in fifty) which the Hindu-Sikh minority have had in the NWFP, he began to prefer the referendum to an election’. Jinnah, after getting assurances from the Provincial League leadership that they could win a referendum, reaffirmed his support for the civil disobedience, but urged his followers to desist from communal violence in the province.

However, the FPML continued its civil disobedience until 4 June when the partition plan of 3 June was officially announced, which included the referendum. The League circles expressed their jubilation at the announcement of Her Majesty’s Government’s partition plan, and the ‘War Council’ formally called off its civil disobedience, with immediate effect. The League prisoners were directed to avail themselves of the amnesty ordered earlier by the Frontier ministry.

122 The Pakistan Times, 4 May 1947.
123 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 6, 8 May 1947, TP, X, pp. 681-8; Mountbatten to Earl of Listowel, 1 May 1947, ibid., p. 530; Mountbatten to Ismay, 6 May 1947, ibid., pp. 633-4.
125 CID Diaries, 3-5 June 1947, F Nos. 814 (177-9) 783 (69-71), SEP.
The Reality of Pakistan: Third June Plan, Pashtoonistan, and the Referendum

The government’s plan of 3 June announced an immediate transfer of power into Indian hands. 15 August was chosen as the earliest possible date for that purpose. It also recommended the holding of a referendum in the NWFP on the issue of joining Hindustan or Pakistan. On 2 June Mountbatten summoned the representatives of the Congress, the AIML and the Sikhs and asked for their comments. Nehru, speaking on behalf of the Congress, confirmed acceptance of the plan. Baldev Singh showed his willingness and accepted the plan. Jinnah informed the Viceroy that he would put the plan before the AIML Council and then would be able to give the exact response of his party. However, he promised his help and support in getting the plan approved by the Council. The AIML Council met in Delhi on 9 June and resolved that ‘although it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition, it has to consider HMG’s Plan for the transfer of power as a whole’. Jinnah was authorized by the Council ‘to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise’, leaving it to him, ‘with full authority to work out all details of the Plan in an equitable and just manner with regard to carrying out the complete division of India’ on the basis and fundamental principles embodied in it. The AICC met at Delhi on 14 June and approved the proposed partition plan. Mountbatten next met Gandhi who was vehemently preaching against partition in his prayer meetings. The Viceroy used tact to persuade Gandhi not to act against partition as such an action would certainly lead to violence. ‘To have secured the assent, however unwilling, of Mr. Gandhi, the Congress leaders and Mr. Jinnah to partition of India’, Mountbatten had achieved a ‘diplomatic triumph’.

The drastic changes in Delhi aroused mixed feelings in the NWFP. While the League was jubilant, and satisfied by the announcement of the holding of a plebiscite on the choice of India or Pakistan, the

127 The Pakistan Times, 12 June 1947.
128 IAR, 1947, I, pp. 122, 133.
Khudai Khidmatgars were indignant. The Frontier Congress was left with no other option but to adjust itself to the changing circumstances.

With the announcement of the British withdrawal from India, one of the main objectives of the Khudai Khidmatgars seemed to be fulfilled. To recapture the loyalties of its electorate and the population, it had to present a somewhat modified programme. Since the inception of the movement in 1921, the party leadership had been advocating the preservation of Pashtoon identity and cultural values based on Pashtoonwali and their historical heritage, which they had always put in an all-India context. From the beginning they had favoured a United India. With the new developments taking place, i.e. division of the subcontinent into Hindustan and Pakistan, the Frontier nationalists started re-thinking their own future. During the latter half of May and early June the Khudai Khidmatgars started an organized campaign for an autonomous Pashtoonistan. To their chagrin, the Congress had accepted the partition plan, including a referendum in the NWFP, without even consulting the Frontier leaders. There was only a token protest from Kripalani, the Congress President, who showed his dissent and protested at the holding of a referendum without the Frontier Congress being given the choice to offer a third option, i.e. an autonomous Pashtoonistan. He informed the Viceroy of the growing demand for Pashtoonistan in the province, and demanded that the proposed referendum should also provide for this. Mountbatten flatly rejected it and replied that it was at Nehru’s request that a proposal to allow every province to vote for Pakistan, Hindustan, or independence had been dropped, and that they could hardly expect him to reintroduce it at this stage.

---

130 On 13 May Qazi Ataullah’s following statement appeared in the press: ‘First of all we want to have an independent sovereign State of Pathans and then we will visualise a joint Jirga (Council) of [the] whole Pathan nation which will ultimately negotiate on equal footing either with Hindustan or Pakistan, whichever offers us better terms...we will never agree to sacrifice Pathan’s interests at the altar of Pakistan. When there is no political or moral obligation, why should we sell ourselves to Hindustan or Pakistan’. Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, p. 386.

Rittenberg has argued that this was simply to show the Frontier Congress leaders that the Congress High Command had tried its best to convince the central government of the validity of their demand and exhausted 'every avenue of recourse' on behalf of the Frontier Congress.\textsuperscript{132} Actually, they regarded the Viceroy’s proposals as the best available under the circumstances, and they were not going to risk the future of India on the Frontier issue.\textsuperscript{133} On the Viceroy’s negative reply regarding the inclusion of a third option, Congress withdrew its suggestions without the slightest protest and dropped the issue for ever. One of the main reasons, probably was that Patel and Nehru, two important leaders of Congress, were convinced that until the demand for Pakistan was conceded, there would be no peace.\textsuperscript{134} Justifying the acceptance of the partition plan, a Congress historian has put it in the following words:

\begin{quote}
The Congress was anxious to get rid of the British. The League was anxious to get power without the constant fear of Congress hegemony. Attlee was anxious that his vexed question should be settled rapidly and once for all. The Indian people wanted to be free of foreign rule. The British people were tired of war and were in no mood to send soldiers to keep under control an unwilling and hostile country. When all the parties were thus anxious for an early settlement, it was perhaps not surprising that Mountbatten’s formula should be readily accepted.\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

Probably the Congress was weary of ‘almost a hopeless fight’\textsuperscript{136} with the Muslim League and thus was more inclined towards a separate India, of course, free from the fear of the League’s interference. Moreover, the Congress leaders ultimately accepted Partition because they wanted a strong unitary state, not a loose

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Rittenberg, ‘Independence Movement’, pp. 388-9.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Minutes of Viceroy’s Tenth Misc. Meeting, 8 May 1947, \textit{TP}, X, pp. 670-5.
\item \textsuperscript{135} H. Kabir, ‘Muslim Politics, 1942-7’, Philips and Wainwright, \textit{The Partition of India}, p. 402.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Pathan Regionalism’, \textit{South Atlantic Quarterly}, LXIII, 4, Autumn 1964, p. 496.
\end{itemize}
federation which would be difficult to govern.

However, Gandhi, who could not bear to see Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s ‘agonies and grief’, 137 opposed the referendum. He regarded it as ‘dangerous’, 138 and held that it might lead to violence amongst the inhabitants of the NWFP. Gandhi suggested that the Viceroy should advise Jinnah to proceed to the NWFP and explain Pakistan there. 139 According to him it would be unfair to ask the Pashtoons to choose between Hindustan and Pakistan ‘without knowing what each is. They should at least know where their entity will be fully protected’. 140 Differences thus emerged between Gandhi and the Congress High Command on the issue of the referendum. Nehru and Patel were supporting it while Gandhi was against it. 141 The differences in ‘outlook and opinion’ between Gandhi and the other Congress leaders increased to such an extent that Gandhi regarded his presence in Delhi as unnecessary, and decided to go to Bihar, to spend more time in the rehabilitation and relief of the victims of communal strife. 142 Nehru’s replies to these letters are not available. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was summoned to Delhi so that the whole affair could be discussed with him before any final decision was reached. 143

The CWC and AICC ratified the decision regarding the partition of the subcontinent and a referendum in the NWFP. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was ‘stunned’ at the decision of the CWC as the Congress leadership had always assured the Khudai Khidmatgars that it would not accept partition of India under any circumstances. 144 Reminding the members of the long affiliation of the Khudai Khidmatgars with the Congress, Abdul Ghaffar Khan regarded it as an act of treachery that the Congress had accepted the plan without even consulting their Frontier colleagues. ‘We Pakhtuns

---

138 Gandhi to Mountbatten, 8 May 1947, TP, X, p. 667.
139 Gandhi’s suggestion to the Viceroy, 6 June 1947, CWMG, 88, pp. 126-7.
140 Gandhi to Mountbatten, 10/11 June 1947, CWMG, 88, pp. 94-5.
141 Gandhi to Nehru, 7 June 1947, CWMG, 88, pp. 94-5.
142 Gandhi to Nehru, 9 June 1947, ibid., p. 113.
stood by you and had undergone great sacrifices for attaining freedom’, complained Abdul Ghaffar Khan, ‘but you have now deserted us and thrown us to the wolves’. Speaking on the referendum issue, he stated that ‘we shall not agree to hold referendum because we had decisively won the elections on the issue of Hindustan versus Pakistan and proclaimed the Pakhtun view on it to the world. Now, as India has disowned us, why should we have a referendum on Hindustan and Pakistan? Let it be on Pakhtunistan or Pakistan’.\(^{145}\)

Besides Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Sahajananda, Lohia, and J. P. Narain also spoke against the acceptance of the partition plan, but failed to reverse the decision of Nehru and his associates.\(^{146}\) On 14-15 June the AICC met in Delhi and endorsed the CWC decision. P. Tandon, C. Gidwani, Hifzur Rahman, and Kitchlew showed their resentment and termed it a surrender to communalism. Neither Abdul Ghaffar Khan nor Dr Khan Sahib was invited from the NWFP. By one hundred and fifty-seven votes to twenty-nine, with thirty-two remaining neutral, a resolution endorsing the CWC step was passed.\(^{147}\)

Abdul Ghaffar Khan was authorized by the CWC and the FPCC to negotiate with the Muslim League for a ‘honourable settlement’ of the Frontier issue.\(^{148}\)

On 18 June a meeting\(^{149}\) was arranged between Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Jinnah. Abdul Ghaffar Khan informed Jinnah of the readiness of the Khudai Khidmatgars to join Pakistan provided Jinnah accepted: (a) complete provincial autonomy; (b) the right for the province to secede from Pakistan if it so desired; and (c) the right to admission to the NWFP of contiguous territories inhabited

---


147 *IAR*, 1947, I, pp. 131-7. Interview Ansar Harvani, Delhi, 13 January 1995. Harvani was then a member of the CWC. He also cast his vote against the partition of India.


149 ‘Do not please build any great hopes on this’, remarked Gandhi. ‘But we can certainly hope that the wound that we have received in the shape of Pakistan can be prevented from becoming still deeper’. Speech at Prayer Meeting, Delhi, 18 June 1947, *CWMG*, 88, p. 174.
by Pashtoons. Jinnah asked them first to join the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, and then to decide all these matters there with mutual understanding. Abdul Ghaffar Khan replied that after attending his party meeting at Bannu on 21 June he would inform Jinnah of the outcome.  

On 21 June a joint meeting of the FPCC, the Congress Parliamentary Party, Khudai Khidmatgars, and Zalmai Pakhtun was held at Bannu. The members were informed of the acceptance of the partition plan by the AICC. It caused deep disappointment and resentment amongst them. They were asked for their opinion on the matter, and it was unanimously agreed that after holding the last general elections a year before, there was no need of fresh elections on the issue of Hindustan and Pakistan. However, if Delhi insisted upon new elections, they should be on the issue of Pashtoonistan versus Pakistan. The establishment of a separate Pashtoon State was demanded, which would have its own constitution, based on the traditional Pashtoon culture and values, and would be framed on the basis of an Islamic concept of democracy, equality, and social justice. It was further decided to boycott the referendum because it did not include the option for Pashtoonistan. Jinnah reacted sharply to the decision of the FPML and regarded it as ‘a direct breach of the acceptance by the Congress of HMG’s Plan of 3 June’. According to Jinnah, after the AICC acceptance of the 3 June Plan, which provided for a referendum in the NWFP, the FPCC was bound to honour the agreement. ‘This is a new stunt’, remarked Jinnah, ‘recently started, and slogans are being invented to mislead the people of the NWFP’. He appealed to the Muslims of the NWFP to work

---

wholeheartedly for and support the referendum in favour of Pakistan, as they were Muslims first and Pashtoons later.\textsuperscript{153}

The Muslim League leaders called upon the Frontier Muslims to cast their votes in favour of Pakistan. Jinnah was confident that ‘the people of the Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly’.\textsuperscript{154} They were asked not to oppose the Muslim League at that critical juncture, as it might provide a chance for the Congress to harden its opposition ‘to legitimate Muslim demands’ and thus pave the way for intensified mutual strife and discord. ‘The Frontier can prosper only’, the Leaguers opined, ‘as a free partner in a progressive, democratic State as we are sure Pakistan will be’.\textsuperscript{155} A Frontier Committee was appointed by the League High Command to supervise the activities of the Leaguers in connection with the referendum.\textsuperscript{156}

The AIML directed its workers and activists from other parts of the country to help the Frontier Muslims to win the referendum in favour of Pakistan. On the directives of the League leaders, delegations and individuals thronged to the province to work for the cause.\textsuperscript{157} Propaganda was spread through public meetings and posters. The NWFP Muslims were reminded of their duty to vote for Pakistan and establish their own government. The anti-colonial sentiments of the Pashtoons were aroused by telling them that on 15 August the Union Jack would be hauled down and it ‘lies now for the Pathans to decide whether they will like to replace it with the League’s green and crescent, which stood for Muslim brotherhood and independence, or the Congress tri-colour, which stood for Hindu domination’.\textsuperscript{158} Promises were made to appoint

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153} Press statement of Jinnah, 28 June 1947, Delhi, \textit{The Pakistan Times}, 1 and 4 July 1947.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Text of Broadcast by Mr. Jinnah, 3 June 1947, \textit{TP}, XI, pp. 97-8.
\item \textsuperscript{155} \textit{The Pakistan Times}, 13 June 1947.
\item \textsuperscript{156} The members of the Committee included the Pir of Manki, I. I. Chundrigar, Syed Wajid Ali, and Ghazanfar Ali, \textit{The Pakistan Times}, 18 June 1947.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Prominent among those who came to the NWFP for the referendum campaign included Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, Siddiq Ali Khan, M. H. Gazdar, Noon, Shaukat Hayat, Ghulam Nabi, Begum Jahan Ara Shahnavaz, and Salma Tassaduq. For more details see, \textit{The Pakistan Times}, June, July 1947; F. No. 366, AFM; F, Nos. 762, 763, 779, 782, 783, 786, and 804, SBP.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ghazanfar All’s speech at Abbottabad, 29 June 1947, \textit{The Pakistan Times},
\end{itemize}
Muslim Governors after the formation of Pakistan. The League orators told the people of the Frontier that they had recommended to Jinnah to rename the province Pathanistan. Posters were issued exhorting the Frontier Muslims to vote for Pakistan as it 'is a vote for Islam'.

In pursuance of its policy of boycotting the referendum, the provincial Congress leaders started a whirlwind tour of the province. They urged their followers to support Pashtoonistan and boycott 'peacefully' the referendum. As a protest against the exclusion of the Pashtoonistan question from the referendum, the FPCC decided to observe 7 July as 'Pashtoonistan Day'. More than five thousand Khudai Khidmatgars assembled at Peshawar. Large processions were taken out and the Pashtoons were exhorted to abstain from voting in the referendum. Mountbatten was anxious to avoid violence at any cost and considered this harmful to the existing peace and tranquillity of the Frontier. He requested Gandhi to ask Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his followers to curtail their activities and not to interfere with the referendum. Gandhi advised Abdul Ghaffar Khan that there should be no demonstrations against the Muslim League and any clash with them should be avoided. 'It was to be shown by cheerfully meeting blows or even meeting death at the hands of the opponents without the slightest sort of retaliation', remarked Gandhi. 'Boycott would certainly result in a legal victory for Pakistan, but it would be a moral defeat if without the slightest fear of violence from your side, the bulk of Pathans refrained in a dignified manner from participating in the referendum'. Abdul Ghaffar Khan informed Gandhi of the provocations from the League side and the forbearance of the Khudai Khidmatgars. 'We have been working under very difficult and trying circumstances', replied Abdul

1 July 1947.
159 Feroz K. Noon’s speech at Dera Ismail Khan, 1 July 1947, The Pakistan Times, 3 July 1947.
162 Madina, 13 July 1947; F.Nos. 37 and 42, SBP.
164 Gandhi to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 5 July 1947, CWMG, 88, p. 276.
Ghaffar Khan, ‘but have adhered to non-violence in thought, word and deed. How long a state of affairs like this can last it is not easy for me to say’.  

One of the important tasks for Mountbatten before the holding of the referendum was to decide on the position of the Frontier Governor. Caroe, who had replaced Cunningham as Governor of the NWFP in March 1946, was notorious in Congress circles for having used force against the Khudai Khidmatgars in 1930, in his capacity as the Deputy Commissioner Peshawar. During the latter half of 1946, relations between Caroe and the Frontier Congress ministry deteriorated. He was accused of taking side with the Muslim League and of a bias against the Congress. In October, on the eve of Nehru’s Frontier visit, relations further worsened. The Political Department, under Caroe’s direct supervision, was held accountable for all the hostile demonstrations against Nehru. During the League’s civil disobedience, Caroe was criticized once again for his sympathies with the League and for acting against the advice of his Premier. The Frontier Congress was convinced that on the instigation of the Governor the bureaucracy was undermining the influence of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry. In March 1947, the Viceroy was informed by Nehru of the lack of co-operation between the Governor and the Premier, and of their growing mutual distrust and lack of confidence in one other. The solution, according to Nehru, was the removal of Caroe.  

The same demand was repeated by Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Mountbatten confidentially asked the Chief Secretary of the NWFP for his comments, and he ‘very courageously’ confirmed the above accusations. The official view of the Congress on the matter was conveyed to the Viceroy by Nehru and Azad. Mountbatten

---

165 Abdul Ghaffar Khan to Gandhi, 12 July 1947, Mirza Shamsul Haq Personal Collection, Islamabad.  
166 Nehru to Wavell, 19 March 1947, TP, IX, pp. 988-9.  
167 Record of interview between Mountbatten and Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 4 April 1947, TP, X, pp. 120-21.  
168 Record of interview between Mountbatten and Lt.-Col. de la Fargue, 11 April 1947, TP, X, pp. 196-7.  
169 Record of interview between Mountbatten and Maulana Azad, 12 April 1947, TP, X, pp. 215-17; Mountbatten to Nehru, 10 April 1947, ibid., p. 182.
summoned Caroe and apprised him of the Congress allegations. Caroe accepted that he had many friends in the Muslim League, but informed the Viceroy that he had many other friends who were non-Leaguers. To other charges he replied that he was trying to stop the Premier from using ‘totalitarian methods’ against his political opponents. Mountbatten warned Caroe of Congress’ insistence on his removal, and told him that the Viceroy’s ‘principal duty is to arrange for the peaceful and happy transfer of power to Indian hands, and that I cannot let anything or anybody stand in the way of this being achieved’. In May the Congress intensified its propaganda against Caroe. Mountbatten informed Nehru that he was not yielding to pressure by the Congress. However, Mountbatten conveyed his apprehensions to Ismay, who was then in London, and asked him to apply to the India Office for a change of Governor. His own choice was for Lieutenant-General Rob McGregor Macdonald Lockhart, former Military Secretary at the India Office and the then Army Commander, as the new Frontier Governor. In early June, the demand was renewed, and the matter once again absorbed the attention of the Congress High Command and the Viceroy. The Muslim League defended Caroe and showed resentment at his replacement. The intended removal of Caroe by the Viceroy was termed ‘extraordinary’ and ‘dangerous’. At last, however, Mountbatten had decided to remove him. On 6 June the Frontier Governor was informed of the continued insistence by the Congress on his removal, and the Viceroy’s determination on a fair and impartial referendum. ‘The time has come’ Caroe was informed by Mountbatten, ‘when I must, for the moment at any rate, replace you as Governor of the NWFP’. Mountbatten regarded this as the ‘best solution for a

170 Record of interview between Mountbatten and Caroe, 14 April 1947, ibid., pp. 234-5.
172 Mountbatten to Ismay, 6 May 1947, TP, X, pp. 635-6.
175 Mountbatten to Caroe, 6 June 1947, ibid., pp. 172-3.
Caroe, however, suspected his removal to be a ‘package deal’ between the Viceroy and Nehru. Thus he was ‘sacrificed’ in the larger interest of a peaceful transfer of power. On 18 June Lockhart replaced Caroe as the Governor of the NWFP.

Under the supervision of the army, the referendum was held between 6 and 17 July, and the referendum results were announced on 20 July. As the Congress did not take part in the polling, according to the official results the valid votes for Pakistan were 289,244 and for India 2874. According to this estimate the votes polled in favour of Pakistan were 50.49 per cent of the total electorate. Lauding the ‘victory’ of the Muslim League in the Frontier referendum, The Pakistan Times regarded the results as clear proof of the Pashtoon support for Pakistan. The Khan Brothers were advised to accept the ‘verdict of the people and work shoulder to shoulder with the leaders of the Muslim League to build a democratic Frontier Government which will not just talk about the people but genuinely look after their welfare’. The Frontier Congress leaders were advised to give up their ‘alliance with the Patels and Gandhis, to join hands with the Muslim League and shoulder the tremendous tasks of reconstruction facing the Pathans’.

The Khudai Khidmatgars, however, regarded the referendum as a ‘farce’ and a ‘one-sided’ affair. ‘As we took no part in the referendum’, remarked Abdul Ghaffar Khan, ‘the Muslim League had no hurdles to cross’. According to Dr Khan Sahib bogus votes were cast. Votes of Congressmen and their family members were cast in their absence. As the electoral roll had not been revised for a long time, even votes of those persons who were

---

176 Mountbatten to Earl of Listowel, 12 June 1947, ibid., pp. 299-300.
178 The Pakistan Times, 19 June 1947.
180 The Pakistan Times, 22 July 1947.
181 The Pakistan Times, 30 July 1947.
182 Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, p. 448.
already dead had been recorded. Surprisingly, the allegations of rigging and other fraudulent methods exercised by the Leaguers were confirmed by some prominent League leaders four decades after the actual event took place. In the absence of any scrutiny by the Congress, they were free to do so, which they did, in most cases with the support of the Muslim polling staff. To deceive the general public, at each big polling booth a few votes were cast in support of India and the remainder went to Pakistan. Some former members of the Congress criticized Abdul Ghaffar Khan for his boycott of the referendum. They were sure of their success even in the case of a referendum fought on the question of Pakistan versus Hindustan. But according to political circles in the NWFP, Abdul Ghaffar Khan could never agree to any step which might lead to violence among the inhabitants of the NWFP.

The League’s success in the Frontier referendum was regarded as an expression of the willingness of the people of the NWFP to join Pakistan. The FPML circles were jubilant at the results, but the Khudai Khidmatgars, who were the real losers in the whole drama, termed it a ‘great conspiracy’ against the nationalists. The Khudai Khidmatgars, against their will, were forced into joining a state against which they had till recently been struggling. It provided the Leaguers with a chance to brand the Khan Brothers as ‘traitors’, who, according to them, had never reconciled themselves to the ideology and programme of the AIML, and opposed the creation of Pakistan. The Khudai Khidmatgars generally, and the Khan Brothers specially, were accused of friendship with the Hindus, and, above all, with Nehru and Gandhi, the two ‘die-hard’ opponents of Pakistan. The acceptance of the partition plan, and, in particular, the agreement to the holding of the referendum in the

---

183 The Pakistan Times, 19 July 1947.
184 In Lachi (Kohat) due to the non-availability of females, male members of the League were brought in disguise to the female polling booths. The election staff present on the occasion took no notice of it. Interviews with Nazir Tila M. Khan, Peshawar, 10 December 1984 and 20 October 1988; Aminul Wahab, Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 17 January 1986; Sardar Jamal, Peshawar, 27 November 1984; Mumtaz Majeed, Peshawar, 31 October 1984; Mir Aslam Khan, Manki Sharif, 9 September 1984.
185 Interview with J. R. Sahni, Delhi, 18 December 1994; also Sahni’s interview in the Oral Record Section, NMML, pp. 31-4.
NWFP on the issue of Hindustan versus Pakistan was a real setback to the Frontier Congressmen. They were not prepared to face the new circumstances, which they regarded as a surrender to the forces of communalism. The Khudai Khidmatgars were perturbed by the ‘treachery’ of the Congress at the eleventh hour. The Congress, after agreeing to the partition plan, had sacrificed their allies in the Frontier, who were forced to join Pakistan against their will. The Khudai Khidmatgars were left to the mercy of their ‘enemies’, who until the recent past were accusing them of friendship with the enemies of Pakistan.

Dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry

To come to an amicable settlement, the Frontier Governor induced Abdul Ghaffar Khan to meet Jinnah once more and discuss the future of the Pashtoons with him. Jinnah was informed in advance of the demands of the Frontier leader, but he flatly refused even to meet Abdul Ghaffar Khan. With regard to Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s conditions, Jinnah argued that these matters could only be dealt with in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The Frontier Governor, who termed the League’s ‘victory’ in the referendum a ‘decisive vote for Pakistan’, foresaw some trouble before 15 August. He noticed no change in Dr Khan Sahib’s policy regarding the coalition with the League and his unwillingness to resign. The Leaguers, according to the Governor, were eager to remove Dr Khan Sahib from office. The only solution, then was the dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry and the assumption of

---

187 Abdul Ghaffar Khan presented Jinnah the following three conditions for joining Pakistan: (i) ‘Complete provincial autonomy for the Province in all matters except defence, external affairs and communications, (ii) The right of any party to move for the secession of the Province from the Dominion, in the same way that a Dominion has the right to secede from a Commonwealth, should it so desire, (iii) That it should be open to areas contiguous to the Province, which are included in the present boundaries of the British India and are inhabited by Pathans, to ask to become part of the NWFP and, if they do, be included in it’. Mievelle to Jinnah, 20 July 1947, *TP*, XII, pp. 271-2.
power under Section 93 of the Government of India Act.\textsuperscript{189}

Mountbatten opposed the imposition of Section 93. According to him, it would be seen by the public that the last act of the British was to introduce direct rule. Jinnah demanded the dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry and the formation of an interim ministry of the Provincial Muslim League. Mountbatten was reluctant\textsuperscript{190} to implement a change before 15 August. The NWFP Governor and Liaquat also insisted on immediate dismissal of the ministry. To avoid further complication of the issue and to legalize his step, the Viceroy sought the opinion of the members of the ‘Pakistan Cabinet’.\textsuperscript{191} They confirmed the views of Jinnah. Another proposed alternative was the imposition of Section 93 with a League Council of Advisers and the installation of a League ministry on about 14 August. In the opinion of the Viceroy the second course would place the responsibility of running the administration entirely on the British, which Her Majesty’s Government would not like. With regard to the first course, Mountbatten promised that after consulting the relevant authorities he would let them know the exact position of the central government.\textsuperscript{192}

Mountbatten informed the Secretary of State of the latest situation in the Frontier. He asked for permission for the immediate dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry and the formation of a new League ministry. The main reasons, according to the Viceroy were the apprehensions\textsuperscript{193} of the League leaders concerning Dr Khan

\textsuperscript{189} Lockhart to Mountbatten, 20 July 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, p. 278.

\textsuperscript{190} ‘It is within my legal powers’, commented the Viceroy, ‘to direct the Governor to dismiss the Ministry and that decision would be contrary to normal constitutional practice since the Ministry undoubtedly have a majority in the legislature, and would almost certainly be taken amiss by Congress, who wish their Ministry kept as long as possible as a matter of prestige’. Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 15, 1 August 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, p. 448.

\textsuperscript{191} Minutes of the Viceroy’s Twenty Third Miscellaneous Meeting, 29 July 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, pp. 405-409.

\textsuperscript{192} Meeting of the Pakistan Cabinet, 1 August 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, pp. 441-3.

\textsuperscript{193} Jinnah was informed by Abdullah Shah of the grave situation in the NWFP. ‘As the day of transfer of power to the Dominion of Pakistan draws nearer’, remarked Shah, ‘tension has also reached its peak, and
Sahib’s intended declaration of an independent *Pashtoonistan* on 15 August. The India Office did not approve the Viceroy’s suggestions. The Secretary of State regarded the dismissal as unconstitutional, because the ministry still had a majority in the legislature. Law and order were under the control of the provincial administration, therefore the imposition of Section 93 was also ruled out. On Liaquat’s allegations concerning Dr Khan Sahib’s declaration, Listowel (Secretary of State for India), asked Mountbatten for its confirmation by other sources. Liaquat, according to the Secretary of State ‘is very interested party and I do not think that we ought to accept his unsupported assertion regarding Dr Khan Sahib’s intentions particularly as you in India presumably and we in Parliament certainly would have to justify our action by reference to our knowledge that Dr Khan Sahib was about to declare Pathanistan’. Listowel advised Mountbatten ‘to leave the problem to be resolved after 15 August and this must be without intervention of myself and His Majesty’s Government’. Moreover, Mountbatten was informed that Cunningham would be taking over as the new Governor before 15 August (the latter was coming to the NWFP because Jinnah wanted him to be Governor)195, and ‘if he believes that there is the slightest risk of such a step’ he would be left with no choice but to dissolve the ministry instantly.196 Mountbatten informed Liaquat of his inability unless steps on the lines suggested below are taken at once 15th of August may be a day of rejoicing in the rest of Pakistan but it will witness one of the bloodiest massacres of innocent Muslim League in the Peshawar District. All this is being arranged under the aegis of the Congress Government who are freely distributing Government rifles to their party men, issuing unlicensed arms under chits signed by Abdul Ghani Khan son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and also openly encouraging the carrying of arms in large numbers’. The proposed suggestions were: the immediate replacement of the Congress ministry; the immediate withdrawal of all government rifles; display of troops in ‘danger spots’; and ‘enforcement of martial law or similar provisions in parts of the districts which may be declared as “explosive” by us’. Abdullah Shah to Jinnah, 6 August 1947, AFM, Nishtar Collection, vol. III, p. 107.

194 Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 8 August 1947, Mss. EUR., F. 200/97, IOLR, p. 241. 
195 Detailed correspondence can be seen in Mss. EUR., D. 670/8, IOLR. 
196 Secretary of State to Mountbatten, 8 August 1947, Mss. EUR., F. 200/97, IOLR, p. 242. Cunningham was ‘horrified’ at Viceroy’s suggestions. ‘It
to dismiss the ministry, and anticipated further discussion of the matter between Jinnah and Cunningham.\textsuperscript{197}

Cunningham arrived in Karachi on 11 August. He met Jinnah, who remained adamant on the immediate dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry.\textsuperscript{198} Cunningham persuaded Jinnah ‘with great difficulty’ to allow him to try to settle affairs in the NWFP without ‘having recourse to such drastic means’.\textsuperscript{199} Cunningham replaced Lockhart as Governor on 13 August; he had a meeting with Dr Khan Sahib on the same day. Dr Khan Sahib was informed of Jinnah’s apprehensions and was warned of his dismissal from office in the event of non-cooperation with the Pakistan government. Dr Khan Sahib assured Cunningham that he neither had any intentions of declaring an independent \textit{Pashtoonistan} nor would he be jeopardizing the Pakistan government. The Frontier Premier opined that if they found themselves unable to support the government of Pakistan, they would tender their resignations without hesitation. He promised Cunningham that they would create no problems if Jinnah dissolved the ministry.\textsuperscript{200} Next day Cunningham had a meeting with Qaiyum, who informed him that if the government could place troops in a few particularly

\textsuperscript{197} Mountbatten to Liaquat, 10 August 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, p. 640.
\textsuperscript{198} Jinnah was suspicious of Dr Khan Sahib’s assurances of ‘playing fair with Pakistan’. He had no doubts that ‘Dr Khan Sahib meant to “sabotage” the whole idea of Pakistan. I asked Jinnah three or four times’, recorded Cunningham, ‘what he really meant by this, and how Dr Khan Sahib could destroy the whole Constitution, but he refused, both on this and on other points, to say exactly what he meant, and confined himself to vague general statements’. Entry for 11 August, Mss. EUR., D. 670/6, IOLR, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{199} Viceroy’s Personal Report No 17, 16 August 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, pp. 763-4.
\textsuperscript{200} Meeting between Cunningham and Dr Khan Sahib, 13 August 1947, D. 670/6, IOLR, p. 3.
‘disturbed’ areas, there would be no trouble.\textsuperscript{201}

Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947. Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues decided not to attend the flag-hoisting ceremony held on 15 August at Peshawar. The sole reason was that they wanted to avoid a situation where League volunteers might misbehave or become violent. This provided a \textit{casus belli} for the dismissal of Congress ministry; Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues were charged with insulting the Pakistan government by their wilful absence from the official flag-hoisting ceremony. On 21 August Jinnah authorized Cunningham to dissolve Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry, which he did accordingly. Cunningham invited Qaiyum on the same afternoon to form a League ministry in the NWFP.\textsuperscript{202} The Leaguers felt relieved as their concept of Pakistan accompanied by full Muslim League control was now fulfilled. On the other hand, the Frontier Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars, who opposed the Pakistan movement from its inception, regarded it as Jinnah’s first undemocratic step and a severe blow to democracy in the newly created state of Pakistan. Pakistan, which till the very recent past was regarded by them as only an electioneering slogan of the League, had become a reality. Before they could think over what their responses to the drastic changes in the subcontinent and their attitude to their future relations with Pakistan would be, a campaign of intimidation and torture was initiated by Qaiyum, the new Frontier Premier, which resulted in a ban on the Khudai Khidmatgars and the arrest of all the prominent leaders of Frontier Congress in the NWFP.

\textsuperscript{201} Cunningham to Mountbatten, 14 August 1947, \textit{TP}, XII, pp. 727-9. Also see, Mss. EUR., D. 670/6, IOLR, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{202} Entry for 21 August 1947, CD, Mss. EUR., D. 670/6, pp. 5-7; CID Diaries, 23 August 1947, F. No. 231, SBP, p. 89.
CONCLUSION

In contrast to the other Muslim majority provinces in British India during the last decade of the Raj, the majority of Muslims of the NWFP supported the AINC. Many factors contributed to the alliance of the regional Pashtoon nationalist forces with the main continental organization representing Indian nationalism. As both were opposing British imperialism in South Asia, their interests at certain points were identical. For the Khudai Khidmatgars, the alliance served two purposes. Firstly, for the time being, it made it impossible to call them foreign (Bolshevik) agents, as the British intelligence did in 1930. Secondly, it gained them recognition and backing at an all-India level. Having the firm support of the Khudai Khidmatgars, The Congress was able to ‘prove’ to its opponents, particularly to the Muslim League during the last decade before Partition, that it was not just a Hindu organization. Before that alliance, the number of Congress members in the NWFP was less than that formally required for a separate Congress Committee; after the alliance with Khudai Khidmatgars the number reached about eighty thousand.

As a result of their collaboration with the Congress, the Khudai Khidmatgars generally and the Khan Brothers particularly, were called ‘Hindu agents’, ‘traitors’, and ‘enemies of Islam and Pakistan’ by their political opponents. The opponents of the Khan Brothers missed no opportunity of harassing them. The Khudai Khidmatgars were of course not the only Muslims who opposed the creation of Pakistan. The Ahrars, Khaksars, Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind and Jamaat-i-Islami were a few amongst many other organizations which opposed the Muslim League and Pakistan, but none of them except the Khudai Khidmatgars were branded as traitors or as enemies of Pakistan. Probably one of the main reasons was the misunderstanding between the Khudai Khidmatgars and the central leadership of the Muslim League created by Qaiyum Khan, the Congress deserter, and the League’s first Chief Minister of the Frontier Province after the creation of Pakistan, and his associates. After Partition there was further
Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism

escalation of hostilities between the two groups. The Khudai Khidmatgars showed willingness to cooperate with the Pakistan government. There was no hostile demonstration on the dismissal of the Frontier Congress ministry by Jinnah in August 1947; and the Khudai Khidmatgars formally severed their connection with the AINC on 3-4 September.

In January 1948, Abdul Ghaffar Khan took the formal oath of allegiance to Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly at Karachi. He met Jinnah in Karachi and invited him to the Khudai Khidmatgar camp at Sardaryab during his intended visit to the NWFP, which Jinnah accepted. Qaiyum was, however, indignant at any rapprochement between Jinnah and the Frontier nationalists. Jinnah visited the NWFP in April 1948, but on Qaiyum’s advice, supported by the Frontier bureaucracy, he refused to proceed to Sardaryab, and invited Abdul Ghaffar Khan to meet him in Peshawar. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was formally invited to join the Muslim League, which he bluntly refused because the Provincial Muslim League, according to him, was notorious, and the provincial leadership was corrupt. This provided an excuse to the provincial authorities to deal with the Khudai Khidmatgars in their ‘own way’. In June 1948 the Khudai Khidmatgar organization was banned, and the leadership incarcerated. This course of events starkly underline some of the issues at stake in India, notably the construction of political identities in South Asia as the empire drew to a close, in particular, the identities of ‘nation’ and ‘community’ and the relationship between the two.

The NWFP had its own peculiar type of society, which distinguished it from the rest of India. While in other parts of the subcontinent, religious nationalism had acquired some appeal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in the NWFP Islam was interwoven to such an extent with Pashtoon society that it formed an essential and integral part of it. The sense of belonging to a separate ethnicity, was infused by an understanding of Islam. Being a Muslim majority province, there was no fear of Hindu domination as was sensed by Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces, because in the NWFP the non-Muslims were viewed as traders and businessmen. It was because of the traditional hatred of slavery that the Pashtoons regarded the colonial authorities as their
main enemy. The anti-establishment ulema provided a base for the armed resistance against the British in that part of South Asia. These were the main reasons for the initial failure of the communalist ideologies in the NWFP.

The Pashtoons, who always took great pride in their glorious past, differed in their accounts of history and the memories of defeats and victories from other Indian Muslims. The Mughals remained heroes in Muslim India, while due to the long and chequered history of the Afghan-Mughal conflict, the Pashtoons regarded them as usurpers. Ahmad Shah Abdali, the poet warrior of eighteen century, who defeated the Maratha confederacy in Panipat (AD 1761), considered a scourge by many Indian Muslims was one of the most remarkable figures in Pashtoon history. This was another reason why at the outset the Muslim League was unsuccessful in mobilizing public opinion in its favour in the NWFP.

As in the rest of the Indian subcontinent, the British empire relied on local elites, the big Khans, and Nawabs to establish itself firmly in the Frontier. Their services were utilized in return for granting them jagirs, titles, and cash inams. The smaller Khans, who found themselves being neglected by the government, took part in a number of other activities. As ‘politics’ in the modern sense were not allowed, most of them joined social organizations. Some, however, expressed their resentment against the authorities by taking an active part in all-India politics, but, to their chagrin, they found that neither the political parties nor the leaders were interested in the ‘welfare’ of the inhabitants of the Frontier. An alliance at the local level was reached between the Pashtoon intelligentsia and the smaller Khans and their united efforts resulted in the formation of various socio-political organizations.

The emergence of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement in 1929 had its roots in the pan-Pashtoon movements of 1921 and onwards. A group of Pashtoon intelligentsia, mainly from Peshawar Valley, including some small Khans, formed various organizations, whose main aims and objectives were to educate the Pashtoon community, to encourage Pashto language, and to rid society of prevailing ‘evils’, i.e. to persuade the Pashtoons to give up their blood feuds and to reform their social habits by preventing lavish
spending on marriage and funeral ceremonies. Their appeals had a positive response and the majority of Pashtoons flocked to this organization. The movement was confined to the Pashtoon dominated regions of the NWFP as the non-Pashtoons had little interest in such pan-Pashtoonism.

The most remarkable feature of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was its strict adherence to non-violence. It was a complete departure from the earlier militant movements against imperialism. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his followers adopted non-violence as a creed and remained firm on it. They regarded it as not only an ideal way to stop the traditional blood feuds among the Pashtoons, but also as a form of struggle against the oppressors in which there was minimal chances of defeat. The biographers of Abdul Ghaffar Khan have wrongly attributed his non-violence to the influence of Gandhi. But did Gandhian non-violence have any effect on the Pashtoons? Careful research suggests this was not so in the NWFP, as during the early twenties, allegiance to the Congress remained confined to a few educated Hindus in the urban centres. Muslim participation in Congress was minimal, and the Congress programme and Gandhian non-violence had little appeal to the Pashtoons.

‘Traditional’ Pashtoon society was notorious for factionalism and violence. The Pashtoon reformers’ main emphasis was on the prevention of blood feuds. Examples from the lives of the Holy Prophet and other true believers in Islam were cited giving details of how they faced humiliation and oppression boldly by non-violent means. The accounts of the lives of the holy men had great impact on the mind of the Pashtoons. Gandhi was appreciated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan for reminding the Muslims the forgotten lessons of non-violence. The strict adherence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his followers to non-violence sometimes created differences between them and the Congress High Command. During 1939, as a protest against the Congress support for the British war effort, Abdul Ghaffar Khan resigned from the Congress, but rejoined it after the party withdrew its earlier resolution. One of the main reasons for success of the Congress in the Frontier province was its non-interference with Pashtoon ethnicity. The Pashtoons were left free to support the policies of
the Congress and were allowed to retain their own separate identity.

Only when the situation of ‘Islam in crisis’ was created, did a small section of the Pashtoon society consider it their religious duty to forget temporarily their sense of belonging to a separate ethnicity and set out to defend Islam from any harm. During the last few months before Partition, the Muslim League exploited the riots in northern India and appealed to the Pashtoons in the name of religion. A small but influential section of Muslims in the NWFP was won over by the League to the ideas of the safeguarding of Muslim interests and support for Pakistan.

Initially the Muslim League had been unsuccessful in the NWFP, mainly because of its reliance on the big Khans and title-holders in the NWFP. During the tenure of the first Congress ministry (1937-9), the big Khans found themselves vulnerable to the anti-Khan measures of the Congress, and they found the Muslim League to be a bulwark against it. Thus they flocked into the League not from choice, but from force of circumstances. The primary image of the Muslim League in the eyes of an average Frontier Muslim thus became that of a party of the pro-British Khans and the elites. Moreover, the Pashtoons’ sense of belonging to a separate community with its own identity was very strong, so they had little interest in ‘belonging to the larger Muslim community’ of the subcontinent. As it was a Muslim majority province, there was no fear of Hindu domination in the NWFP, and the majority of the Frontier inhabitants lacked interest in the League’s ‘communal’ ideology. The demand for Pakistan on religious grounds, therefore, had no appeal and did not arouse the hoped-for support of the NWFP Muslims. To the majority of Frontiermen the idea was unacceptable and ambiguous; the division of India on communal grounds seemed impossible to them. Their doubts about the reality of Pakistan were strengthened during Aurangzeb’s ministry. Despite being a League leader and its Chief Minister in the NWFP, he ‘shelved’ the issue of Pakistan during his tenure of office. However, the last few months of the imperial rule had seen a remarkable shift in the forming and reforming of alliances in the NWFP. The League succeeded in publicizing the accounts of ‘Hindu atrocities against innocent Muslims’ in northern India, thus
creating a sense of ‘Islam in danger’ in the subcontinent.

Alarmed at the ‘Hindu domination’ in India and convinced of the need to safeguard and protect wider Muslim interests in a separate Islamic state, a significant number of Frontier ulema and sajjada nashins including Badshah Gul, Abdullah Shah Mahzara, Badshah Sahib of Bamkhel, and the Pir of Manki Sharif lent their full support to the FPML. A few nationalist Pashtoon politicians, Arbab Ghafoor, Mian Abdullah Shah, and Khan Mir Hilali, also temporarily gave priority to their sense of belonging to a larger Indian Muslim community as well as a specific Pashtoon identity and were in the forefront of agitation against Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry during 1946-7. Some Congress leaders including Mian Mohammad Shah, G. M. Khan, and Ibrahim Khan, deserted the Congress and joined the League, because of their personal differences with the provincial leadership. It provided more strength to the Muslim League civil disobedience campaign against the Congress ministry. But once Pakistan came into being, all these allegiances proved short-lived. Indignant at certain measures taken by the new Pakistan government and its policies against the Khudai Khidmatgars, a majority of the above-mentioned including Arbab Ghafoor, the Pir of Manki, and Mohammad Shah reconsidered their loyalties and supported the nationalists in the NWFP.

The political history of South Asia in the twentieth century has been shaped by an interplay of nationalism, imperialism, and communal identity. Structural pluralism, constituted by religious and linguistic communities, made the political process extremely complex, with different elements pursuing their own ends, constituting transient alliances, and the colonial power having its own agenda. Nationalism in India was a movement with many enemies.

In the NWFP Indian nationalism found an extraordinary and powerful ally in the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. In this province the forces of communalism, so powerful in the rest of the subcontinent, did not find acceptance for a very long time. Islamic consciousness, which is said to be the foundation of Muslim communal identity, expressed itself here politically, in
nationalistic, not communal language. The Pashtoons have a strongly developed collective identity, but it is not communal. Being Islamic did not require them to postulate a relationship of hostility towards non-Muslims. The social structure of the province made it possible for a non-communal nationalism to be fashioned there. Its creation, however, required the fashioning of a new ideology, and this was the achievement of the Khan Brothers. They harnessed anti-imperialist sentiment to the cause of the non-violent, non-sectarian movement for freedom built elsewhere in India under the leadership of the Congress. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement they built in the NWFP dominated provincial politics, keeping the Muslim League at bay for over two decades. Its success raises important question for understanding: (a) the role of religion in politics; (b) the political aspect of Islamic identity in South Asia; and (c) the nature of the historical process or the historians’ understanding of it.

Politics are a product of interaction between interest, skill, and circumstance, while the overall framework is supplied by social structure, political power, and dominant ideology. In the NWFP a Muslim population, deeply religious, aligned itself with Indian nationalism, thus bringing into question the conventional identification made between Islamic consciousness and Muslim communal ideology. The Pashtoon identity was neither ‘nationalist’ (in the Indian context) nor communalist. It was specific to the people of the NWFP. This identity has survived the political catastrophe of Partition, a fact which can be seen in the present day NWFP where national political movements are still popular and dominating the politics of the province.
APPENDIX I

Statement of Khan Abdul Akbar Khan, President of the Afghan Youth League, and Mian Ahmad Shah, B.A., Barrister, General Secretary of the Afghan Youth League, Charsadda.

‘Two years ago, we three men: Abdul Akbar Khan, Mian Ahmad Shah, and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and a few of our brethren laid the foundation of the Afghan Jirgah or the Youth League. Rules and regulations were properly framed to carry on the work. The Working Committee, the Central Jirgah and the Loe Jirgah were formed to settle important matters. According to the rules it is necessary to put up a question first to the first Jirgah, then to the second Jirgah and then to the third Jirgah for the final decision. The Central Committee consists of forty men and the Loe Jirgah consists of men from every Jirgah.

In the beginning we toured villages and asked people to come and join us in “building a house for the Pathans”. We told them “why should not the Pathans have a Jirgah of their brotherhood when all other communities have formed such for themselves”. The villagers cheerfully responded to our call, and became ready for national service. Later on when we were in jail, thousands of people became Khudai Khidmatgars and members of the Jirgah.

During the days of the war with the Government our Afghan Jirgah cooperated with the Congress and fought against the Government shoulder to shoulder with the Congress for the benefit of the country. You are not unaware of the past hardships. Although we cooperated with the Congress, yet our “sitting room” was a separate one, which we called the Afghan Jirgah or the Youth League. After the war we had para janba (alliance) with the Congress. Even at that time our Jirgah was a separate institution. The officers and subordinates, the good and bad and the authority of the Jirgah were entirely in our own hands.

On 9th August [1931] Abdul Ghaffar Khan made an agreement with the Congress (Working Committee) at Bombay that the
Frontier Afghan Jirgah would become the Frontier Congress Committee, that the Khudai Khidmatgars would become Congress volunteers, and that the black flag of the Afghans would be replaced by the Congress flag. Of course so much authority has been given to the Frontier leaders by the Congress Working Committee that, to save themselves from the criticism of the people, they can retain the names of the Afghan Jirgah and the Khudai Khidmatgars. But in fact the Jirgah will not be the old Jirgah and the Khudai Khidmatgars will not be the Khudai Khidmatgars, rather than the Jirgah will be the Congress Committee and the Khudai Khidmatgars will be the Congress volunteers. You should read the agreement so that you may be convinced of its truth. When this news was published in newspapers, we called the Afghan Central Jirgah on twenty-third August. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was also present. We read out word for word the agreement which Abdul Ghaffar Khan had made with the Congress (Working Committee). We requested Abdul Ghaffar Khan to explain why he had made such an agreement. The Khan Sahib stood and said “we have achieved victory, because the Congress committees would also become Jirgahs and their volunteers would also wear red clothes and the headquarters will be at Utmanzai”. After this we stood and told the Khan Sahib that the agreement which he had signed contained that all Jirgahs of “our brotherhood” would be dissolved, and Khudai Khidmatgars would become Congress volunteers and it rested with the Khudai Khidmatgars to wear red clothes or of purple colour, and that the Afghan Jirgah would become the Frontier Congress Committee. Well, we tried out utmost that our institution may not lose its entity because every body looks graceful in his own party, but no body listened to our words. The people who were present in the meeting accepted the agreement of (Abdul Ghaffar Khan) and in their own imagination they dissolved their own Afghan Jirgah. The amusing point was that on the one hand the members of the Central Jirgah dissolved their Jirgah and on the other formed the Provincial Congress Committee there and then. They did not think that they had a Loe Jirgah also which had to be consulted. Offices in this new Congress Committee were offered to us but we requested to be excused as it was, in our opinion, an irregularity.
The meeting was adjourned in the evening. We also left the meeting without knowing what to do. Abdul Ghaffar Khan went to Peshawar on the same evening and left for down country next morning. We kept silent as our friends advised us, and waited for the return of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. We thought we would discuss the matter once again with him. Abdul Ghaffar Khan returned on 12 September and we, accompanied by a few of our friends, went to him to discuss the matters. We commenced the discussion by saying “Abdul Ghaffar Khan says that the Bombay agreement had been made with our consultations”. Abdul Ghaffar Khan should himself say whether we had asked him to go and settle with the Congress the destruction of our house, break the rules and regulations of the Jirgah and hand over Khudai Khidmatgars to the Congress? Or whether we had asked him to tell Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru that the complaints of the Peshawar Congressmen against the leaders of the Afghan Youth League, were baseless? We had asked Abdul Ghaffar Khan to tell Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru that our institution was not a communal one, that we had cooperated and were even now cooperating with the Congress and that they (M. Gandhi and P. Jawahir Lal) should not apprehend any danger from the Afghan Jirgah. If the Afghan Jirgah is strong today, the reason is that that the Pathans do not like any other institution or Jirgah. We told Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other men that we were ready to cooperate with the Congress, but our Jirgah should not lose its entity. We then requested that the matter should be finally settled by the Afghan Loe Jirgah. Along with this many other proposals were also put up, but none was accepted. At last it was settled that we should make a statement showing the real facts to the nation.

Hence the nation should know that we have neither tendered resignations nor have we stopped our work. We are standing like a hill on our old site. The people who would resign and stop their work, will be those who forsake their old Jirgah and join the Congress. The rumours of our resignations spread perhaps because on twenty-third August (when other people accepted the Bombay agreement, forsook the old Afghan Jirgah and joined the Congress) we requested to be excused from accepting the new offices in the Congress Committee. We say to the nation that we have no
personal enmity with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and he is even now one of our sweet friends. We have respect for him even now. Our difference is only of principle. He says that we would have the advantage when we all become Congressites. We say that we should cooperate with the Congress like the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind or the Sikh League but we should not lose our own entity. The Bombay agreement leaves only bones to us and takes away the marrow. We do not intend to form a separate party. But we say that constitutionally our Afghan Jirgah has not been dissolved as yet. Even at the present time we do not consider it proper to fight out this issue because it may lead the public to think that there is a friction between us. We say that we will not refuse to serve the nation if it needs our services and wishes to retain its old Jirgah. We have given the details of these facts, because we have honestly and faithfully served the nation for full twelve years and we fear lest people suspect us and our past services go in vain, because “by the time truth comes to light, falsehood devastates many villages”.

(Printed at the Lakshmi Art Steam Press, Peshawar, n.d.)

Contradiction of the Statement of Abdul Akbar Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah, and the Exposition of the Facts by Abdul Ghaffar Khan

My brethren I have read the statement which Abdul Akbar Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah have published in the form of a tract. I did not feel so much pain in the reading it as I am feeling now in contradicting it, because I very much hate these sort of quarrels, that is, quarrels with pen. Many attacks have been made in newspapers upon my person and many objections are raised against me, but I do not consider it necessary to reply as long as I do not apprehend some danger that may harm the nation. I would not have contradicted this statement, but I know that it will cause some misunderstanding in the nation and my silence would eventually prove a guilt.

In this statement my brethren have written many things here and there to deceive the public, but their real objection is “why did I amalgamate the Youth League with the Congress without the previous sanction of the Frontier Loe Jirgah?”

All national workers are aware of this story, but in order to
convince the masses I consider it proper to state the facts from the beginning.

The facts are as follows:

Our Youth League was formed in September 1929. At that time we had started only the “construction of the house of the Pathan nation” and the removal of serious defects from it. It was only for this purpose that we formed Jirgahs and enlisted Khudai Khidmatgars in the Frontier Province. A few months passed in this way. In April 1930 we were arrested. After this the Government began to practise great tyrannies upon our national workers and the Khudai Khidmatgars. When the Members of the Working Committee of our Jirgah were convinced that the Government wanted to ruin the Pathans by various excuses, they, in order to save themselves, asked moral help from the various institutions of India. But none was prepared to give this help except Congress. The Congress began to sympathise with our Pathan nation, as far as it could, that is, it exposed our oppressedness to the world through newspapers and speeches. It sent a Committee to enquire into the incident of 23 April 1930 and similarly it showed sympathy in many other ways. For these reasons Mian Abdullah Shah and Mian Jaffar Shah, two responsible members of our Jirgah, published a detailed pamphlet in English containing the facts, with the consent of Abdul Akbar Khan, Mian Ahmad Shah and myself. On page 1, line 31 of this pamphlet they have announced “our Youth League is a part of the Congress”. The Afghan Central Jirgah also made a statement in the support of this. After this Government made many efforts by different ways that our Jirgah should sever its connection with the Congress, a separate peace would be made with us. But when I, Mian Ahmad Shah and Abdul Akbar Khan thought over the question, we arrived at the conclusion that the Government would ruin us in case the Jirgah severed its connection with the Congress. We, therefore, did not accept the proposal.

In short truce was made after this. We came out of the jail. Mian Ahmad Shah might remember well that it was on his insistence that I admitted the Jirgah to be a part of the Congress in the course of a contradiction I published in reply to false propaganda of the
Civil and Military Gazette. Rather the Mian Sahib had himself said in strong words “we should join the Congress, otherwise the Government would ruin our Jirgah”. Mian Sahib knows this well what can be the meaning of admitting the Jirgah to be a part of the Congress on the one hand and on the other making a statement that we simply had “para jamba” (alliance) and connection with Congress.

Later on the people of the Peshawar Congress Committee began to raise objections. We had a discussion with them. Abdul Akbar Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah were prepared to accept that the Jirgahs of the Peshawaris should be called Congress Committees and that of the Villagers should retain their old name of the Jirgah, and that their headquarters should be at Utmanzai. But the Peshawaris did not accept this. The dispute prolonged and both parties had to go to Bombay. Abdul Akbar Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah both entreated me to get them rid of the Peshawaris and asked me to try my best with the Congress to let the name of the Jirgah remain as it is. At last we went to Bombay. Mian Ahmad Shah returned from Bombay as he thought that Devi Das Gandhi had not shown sufficient respect to him. What a weakness it is on the part of Mian Ahmad Shah to become angry at such an ordinary matter before the settlement of such an important question! How much carelessness it proves on Mian Sahib’s part towards the national interests! If Mian Sahib has so much sympathy with the nation as he has expressed in his statement why did he not give preference to the national cause over a personal matter so that every thing would have been settled in his presence? When Mian Sahib came back, I was forced to make whatever agreement I considered advantageous to the nation. I would have cancelled my agreement even afterwards, had it not been unanimously accepted by the Provincial Central Committee, which according to the rules and regulations is the only Loe Jirgah. How much harm can be done to the nation by Mian Ahmad Shah’s secret propaganda and his whispering into the ears of each individual member that the agreement is wrong! Then, how great a national crime it is to publish such an improper statement! My brethren! Whatever has been done has been in accordance with the rules and regulations. The Mian Sahib called the members of the Jirgah from the whole
Province and they unanimously ratified my agreement. This is the Loe Jirgah. There is no mention in the rules and regulations of any other Loe Jirgah to which Mian Sahib refers. Of course it is written there that a Loe Jirgah will be held annually, but it means annual meeting.

Besides this, it is wrong to say that our connection with the Congress would be like that of the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind or the Sikh League, because these have never said that they are a part of the Congress whereas, as I have said, our Jirgah had already announced that it was a part of the Congress.

Well, now about the question of flag I say that everybody is aware of the fact that our Jirgah had not fixed any flag for itself up to that time. Everywhere flags were irregular. Every party gave to its flag the colour it liked. Many of them had even the Congress flag. Hence what is the harm to the nation if the Provincial Jirgah has selected the Congress flag. My brethren! It is quite wrong that the Jirgah had chosen the black flag. It is quite wrong that the Jirgah would disappear in the Congress like sugar (in water) as Mian Ahmad Shah thinks.

In my opinion it is not a new settlement. It has already been admitted that the aims, principles, policies and the opponents of the Jirgah and the Congress are one and the same. The only difference is that our party was called the Jirgah and our volunteers were called Khudai Khidmatgars and their uniform was red. Even after this agreement these things will continue as before. You should yourselves think that difference has come now. I do not know what is the underlying object of Mian Ahmad Shah and Abdul Akbar Khan. I think they are finding some excuse to leave the work, because they had tendered resignations almost in every meeting of the Jirgah but the latter had not accepted them. If this is the object, what is, then, the need of causing disunion in the nation? Willingly and peacefully they should leave the work and should not disturb other people engaged in national service.

In conclusion without any self praise I humbly say to my nation that I have passed about 21 years, the best part of my life, in serving the Pathan nation. I considered haram for myself all sorts of rest and comfort and all benefits of health and wealth. I have
served the nation caring not whether it was night or day, whether it was hot or cold, whether it was raining or whether I was ill. I did not care for any hardships, neither of jail and imprisonment. All this I did only that the Pathan nation may become prosperous and may honourably stand on a level with the other nations of the world. It is quite impossible that without any cause I may sell to other people the honour and distinction which the Pathans have achieved in the world as a result of their sacrifices.

If you have trust in my faith and sincerity, believe me that at the present time it is good and advantageous for us to join the Congress. You should not blindly believe in the nation. It is a result of our unity and organisation that we are commanding respect in other nations. We would become disgraceful if we split into parties and the whole world would laugh at us. The fruit of my 21 years’ national service and the sacrifices of the Pathans will go with the wind.

Through this statement I assure you that I would be the first man to sever my connection with the Congress if our union with it was, in any way, going to prove disadvantageous to the Pathans or to the Faith, and I would be the first person to declare a peaceful war against the whole world for the interests of the Pathans. The Congress is, in accordance with its past pledges, bound to render us every sort of help. If the Congress breaks its pledge, we reserve the right to withdraw. No body has tied our hands.

Brethren! You should now settle for yourself what religious or worldly harm can come to us by joining with the Congress. We have, on the other hand, been strengthened by our union with the Congress, a strong companion.

For these reasons I request you not to listen to the statement of Abdul Akbar Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah and do not join them in forming separate bodies and do not disgrace yourselves in the eyes of the world.’

Abdul Ghaffar

21 September 1931

(Printed at the Lakshmi Art Steam Press, Peshawar)

APPENDIX II

Speeches delivered on the occasion of the No-Confidence Motion against Sir A. Qaiyum’s Ministry (3 September 1937)

Dr Khan Sahib (Hashtnagar, Muhammadan Rural) Congress Leader in the NWFP Assembly

‘...It is my earnest request that those who are sitting on the Treasury Benches should banish from their minds the sectional feeling and should, after the pronounced judgement of this House, make up their minds to take a forward step to help the cause of the freedom of their motherland. It is the duty of every citizen to take part in the constitutional advance of his country and to try to bring about the freedom of his land from the hands of the foreign dominators. I know that coercion has been practised by some officials to which I have no intention to make a reference. The hon’ble members will agree with me if I venture to say that the old autocratic system in the process of delivering the new-born child of democracy has suffered from the consequences and natural causes of labour pains and hence may compromise their misdeeds, if any justification for compromise can be effected.

This Ministry naturally was educated under the autocratic system and was quite new to the new system and principle of democracy and hence were unaware of their power and its exact application. I am sure they have realised now that it will be an idle thought to make oneself responsible to anybody else but the electorate who have sent us to this House. I know that some feeling of fear of the officials who are the paid servants of our country and have to be controlled by those who command the majority of this House is an idle phantom and exists only in the minds of those whose brains are not developed. Sir, in my mind I would not be going beyond my duty if I say that democratic institutions and instruments are not the only thing but it is the way to handle the spirit of democracy which counts; and I still further take the courage to say that we have to promote unity of aim and solidarity of sentiment which will help individuals to sink personal as well as group
advantages for the common good of the motherland...’

Khan Bahadur Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan (Chief Minister)

‘...I and my colleagues will as in honour bound as the result of today's proceedings be tendering our resignation and I should like to take this early opportunity of extending to our successors whoever they may be, a hearty welcome and of wishing them all success in their efforts to serve the real interests of the Province. I may be excused if I were to strike a rather personal note at this moment. Throughout the rather lengthy period of my public life I have tried my hardest to serve the true interests of this land of my birth to the best of my lights. But time changes and with them come changes in social, economic, political and even religious views of the people. I tried to go abreast of the times and was occasionally criticised by some of my friends for going too fast, but I continued to do whatever I considered to be my duty and stuck throughout my career to the one aim of my life, namely the educational and political advance of my homeland and the betterment of the condition of our people. Today, however, the world seems to be going at breakneck speed and no wonder therefore if I feel the earth slipping from under my feet. In the field of politics I have been outpaced by the impatient youth and I feel that the time has come for me to leave the field for young men and afford them an opportunity to prove what they are capable of doing.

I had a great desire to see the Frontier people united and a strong entity in the India of the future. I have always been a believer in the principle that Reforms must come from within and not from without. My conception of an autonomous Province has been and still is a complete and self-contained administrative unit which should be really autonomous in the sense that its people should be entirely free to develop according to their own traditions and their genius. I for one cannot reconcile myself to the idea of taking my cue from people outside the Province and for that reason I wish that the organisation which is now to guide the destinies of this Province had been indigenous and of local growth—it is only my wish and I do not want to impress it upon others—because then it
would have had greater stability and closer affinity to the real needs of the people. But as is human destiny my wishes did not come true. Times were when waves from the cool north swept over the country to the south thereby lending fresh vigour to the old and rather worn out culture and civilisation of India, but my friends would now have me believe that we must henceforth draw our inspiration from the torrid south which will in its turn send its monsoons of modern conceptions of social and economic values and of new tendencies towards the centralization of authority and a blending of culture. The idea of running different autonomous units on stereotyped lines from one Centre may be and in fact is an indigenous way of bringing about an apparent unity of heart and aim among diverse sections of a vast population. But we of the older generations brought up in different surroundings believe that appearances are often deceptive and that some semblance of real unity should be brought about among the units internally before they can be successfully conglomerated into a federation of the future. Unfortunately no such sense of unity exists anywhere at present; our various cultures still dominate us and a single act of conversion (of a girl) can bring to surface our essential differences. Such petty incidents smash not only all ties of unity of aim and Party discipline of a mighty organization but set the whole countryside ablaze, as has recently been the case, and devastate not only districts within settled areas but even vast tracts across the administrated Border. Far be it from me to suggest that no attempts should be made to bridge the gulf between the communities and to make them more friendly towards each other. But I am afraid real unity which is the aim of every true son of India and which is not based on self-interest will take long to come. This is undoubtedly a delicate problem and in their light the present Ministry tried to solve it by a Pact which safeguarded the rights of the minorities without necessarily infringing the rights of the majority....’

‘There has been a flood of criticism—some wise, some otherwise, and some indifferent. In short, the bulk of it is destructive and can safely be ignored and the remainder of it, firstly from Hindu quarters, may be here summarized thus:-

a. India from its very nature is indivisible and Indians are one nation.

b. India will become weaker by this partition internally and externally and the present Hindu-Muslim tension will also increase.

c. That the Musalmans of India are mainly Aryan converts and hence not a separate nation.

d. Muslim zones will not be self-supporting.

e. Mr. Gandhi’s view is that it is disadvantageous to Muslims through and through and calls himself ‘A great friend of Muslims’ and further adds ‘That those whom God has united no power can separate.’

India—a Subcontinent

As to (a) India is a subcontinent like Europe, and India cannot be more indivisible than America or Spain and Portugal (old Iberia) or Europe itself. India is a land of diverse races, cultures and civilizations and the only bond is the British yoke. The moment it ceases, India will revert to its old normal component parts. But our scheme does not preclude the possibility of a common centre of common agreement, for common good, if need be, but it will be the last stage of our political evolution when we both have fully developed the national stages and are in a mood to enter internationalism in a happy straight partnership, but not now.
**Happy Separation**

As to (b). To my mind, on the other hand, it will solve the present tension. When two partners or even two brothers cannot carry on jointly it is in the best interest of domestic harmony and peace that they should separate. Think of unwilling Cheko-Slovakia or German-Russo-Polish partnership, or in Biblical times, think of Abel and Cane. What was the end of these forced unions? Instead of bringing about unity the independence and unity both were lost. Historical prudence conclusively shows ‘Do not have unwilling partners for the sake of mere unity and, if after separation, they cannot carry on as separate units they reunite as sadder and saner partners’. Let them separate if they wish, as in case of failure of either they will combine again without even asking and kiss each other again (sic. against?) tears.

To my mind in a separate sphere of influence the independent charge-holder in a spirit of healthy competition will do his best to have the best possible ideal Self-Government by enlisting the confidence of all other interests entrusted to his charge. Muslim zones will try to surpass the Hindu and vice versa in the art of democratic Government. There will be free scope for self-expression, culturally and otherwise according to the genius of each nation concerned with a strict sense of responsibilities to have the best possible Self-Government. Contented Hindus evolving their destinies in their respective spheres will be impregnable bulwarks against internal and external dangers. May I sincerely give a note of patriotic warning to Hindus in this connection. Supposing by any means they secure Dominion Status or independence from the British all alone, unaided by Musalmans and the British hand (as Dominion Status implies) totally or partially disappears—will they be able to retain it internally or externally without the willing cooperation of ten crores of Musalmans?

**Fallacy of Conversion**

As to (c). The English people of today are but the old Anglos and Saxons of yesterday or the modern German nation and, but what of that? Are not English people now a nation and absolutely separate from the German nation? History abounds in such instances.
Nations do emerge out of the ribs of old nations. This is the law of nature and nobody can stop it.

**Unfounded Fears**

As to (d). Why should Hindus worry about us? I will cut my coat according to the cloth I have got. If Bulgaria or Rumania or Isle of Man or Maler Kotla and similar principalities can present balanced budgets, why not I? Do these critics imagine for a moment that we will barter away our free national homelands for budgetary considerations or for a mess of this pottage. What a barren criticism? If I cannot manage I will again come to you as a wiser and tamer man.

As to (e). Yes they say when a lady tells you that she loves a baby more than the real mother of the baby, sages of old have said that she must be a witch.

‘**Now as to God’s Union**’

‘**Divine Union’ in Practice**

Where was that ‘Divine union’ when a Muslim Minister without abjuring his League loyalty could not be appointed in Orissa or UP, or CP. Or *Anjuman Himayat-ul-Islam* books in NWFP were for the sake of five per cent minority banned, or when Ali Brothers were jettisoned for the Nehru Report, or why this baiting of Urdu, India’s *Lingua Franca* or national language (the common language of Aurangzeb and Shivaji) in favour of Hindi, and if really Hindus and Muslims are twins as is claimed then why Mr. Gandhi is proud of being a Hindu and why is Mr. Jinnah proud of being a Muslim? In twins there are no terms of Hindu or Muslim, but they will have only different names as Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah.

Gandhiji, the fact that you have published a catalogue of the good turns you have done to the Muslims especially Khilafat movement—betrays the undeniable fact that you take Muslims as a separate nation and distinct from Hindu. Anyhow you are a great patriot and we invite your patriotic consideration to the Lahore proposal’.

Source: *PROGRESS An Islamic Weekly*, Bombay, Sunday, 28 April 1940.
APPENDIX IV

A ‘Red Shirt’ Camp

(Miss F. Mary Barr)

‘It has been a privilege, during a short first visit to the North-West Frontier Province, to be able to attend a camp of the Khudai Khidmatgars, if only for a bare two days. As I understand no Pashtoo and very little Urdu and all meetings and most conversations were held almost entirely in the former, with a small sprinkling of the latter, I cannot give any idea of what was said. I had to rely almost entirely on impressions gained through “eye-gate”.

The camp was situated in an angle formed by two rivers, so water was plentiful. On approaching the camp from the high road, one came first to the open space in which the flag-stand had been built, and where a large new silk National Flag kept watch night and day. Beyond was a large *pandal* used for the meetings, “school” and spinning, and beyond that again, the two enclosed “compounds” which formed the living quarters of the camp, and which housed (or rather “tented”) some five hundred people for nearly a week. In the larger of these enclosures the so called “Red Shirts” lived under the discipline of a strict commander, who I was told, ordered pack-drill as punishment to any defaulter.

In the Centre of the other enclosure was the tent of “Bad-Shah Khan”, as the Pathan people call him. It was labelled store when I first saw it. Perhaps some wag had put this label on it on account of the large amount of my luggage which had been dumped at the entrance—at any rate the label disappeared when the luggage did.

Round the two sides of this enclosure were the tents of other Frontier men and men from Baluchistan, Kashmir, Punjab and other friends and visitors.

The Doctor’s tent and dispensary was at the far end of one row of tents and a small hospital had been erected outside the “compound”. Separate smaller enclosures had been made for
commissariat department and temporary mosque.

The ground of the whole camp was dust held together here and there by patches of rough grass. But the floors of the tents were made warm and clean by straw and carpets. The day’s programme was not followed to the minute on the one full day that I was there, but as that was Friday, with public Namaz, and considered to be more or less of a holiday, it is difficult for me to judge as to punctuality. The general plan was as follows:

- Drill and Running;
- Morning tea;
- Village cleaning;
- “School”;
- Two hours for bath, food and rest;
- Spinning;
- Public Meeting;
- Rest or Exercise, including some wonderful Pathan dance in which the band seemed to take as keen a part as the dancers, but the air sometimes became so full of dust as to hide the performers from view;
- Another Meeting;
- Bed.

It was a pretty strenuous day. For village cleaning groups went out to various nearby villages. School consisted mainly of political education, specially with regard to the history and duties of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Spinning also may really be considered as part of “School”.

The red uniform worn by the Khudai Khidmatgars (not on account of any connection with Bolshevism, it should be emphasised, but for purely economic reasons) were provided by the men themselves, often dyed by their womenfolk and this accounts for the variety of colour to be found among them, from a dark red brown to brilliant scarlet. The uniform too was by no means uniform in the strict sense, some men wearing shorts and red
stockings and some wearing long trousers. All wore a red turban and leather “Sam-Brown” belt. The only ‘boy’ of the camp wore a Fez instead of a turban. This uniform, varied though it was, marked out its wearers definitely from the other mostly-white-clad members of the camp. It was worn only for meetings and parade occasions and I noticed that several of the men in the early morning frost were clad only in cotton trousers and shirts with a small blanket round their shoulders. In commenting on this to somebody and wondering whether these poor people felt the cold as much as we should in similar clothes, I was told a story of a man who was thus thinly clad in intense cold and on being asked if he did not feel it badly, answered: “Does your face feel cold?”

“No.”

“Well, I am all face,” came the cheery reply.

Drill was not so smart as soldiers attain. How could it be when these men were drawn from all over the province and had probably never drilled together as a unit before? Nevertheless discipline was excellent in all public meetings, “school” etc., even in such as were attended by villagers and others from outside the camp. All listened keenly to speeches and occasionally burst into cheers. One specially noteworthy instance of this apparently natural discipline occurred on the last day, when a large number of outsiders had been present at the afternoon meeting. As the Khudai Khidmatgars paraded out of the pandal and marched towards their enclosure, the crowd attempted to follow them along the broad road leading there. However, a single guard, by speech only and without so much as a short cane in his hand, held the people back, even the eager youngsters who are always ready to follow a band and marching troops. After a while he went off, probably to ask for permission for the people to come inside, but whatever his errand, the noteworthy point is that the crowd, now held only by their own sense of discipline, never attempted to move forward. Other items of interest for me were:

The fact that nobody in the camp carried any sort of weapon of attack or defence, not even a walking stick or the small cane which uniformed soldiers generally seem to enjoy flourishing in their hands.
The atmosphere of unity and happiness which seemed to pervade the camp. There was much laughter and no strained looks, except occasionally in the early morning cold. The whole atmosphere was one which is only attained where people work together with a common purpose, a purpose which demands some self-sacrifice and entire sincerity.

As I stood one day at the end of the two long rows of Khudai Khidmatgars, several being old men with grey or white beards and the whole comprising a great variety of status and wealth, it suddenly struck me that not one corpulent man could be seen. All were slim round the waist, a tribute to their regular physical discipline as to exercise and food.

Complete trustworthiness. My luggage had been carried off somewhere, when I had arrived, but although it was unlocked, I had from the first no fear for—not only its safety but its privacy or integrity. Not a thing was even touched without my request. Once when the whole camp was retiring to the pandal for a long session, I did just wonder if it were wise to leave things open and asked a fellow Southerner if it would be wise to lock my suitcase. “No need” came the laconic reply.

Even the children who came flocking into the camp on the last day, as the tents were being dismantled, did not attempt to touch anything. Yet they were friendly and unafraid even with a strange creature like myself who could not talk their language.

Thus and thus have I found the Pathans on my first visit—and, except that this account is only of the Khudai Khidmatgar camp, I could unfold a tale of hospitality and democracy in school and home. They themselves would not wish me to claim perfection for them, yet surely the virtues indicated here by definite illustrations cannot fail to earn our humble respect and affection.’

Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan’s letter to Convenor, Committee of Action, All-India Muslim League giving reasons for casting his vote against the Muslim League Ministry in the NWFP on 12 March 1945 (8 August 1945)

‘Kindly refer to your letter no. 3135 dated 1st August 1945.

It is true that I voted against Mohd Aurangzeb Khan’s Ministry on the no-confidence motion which was brought against his ministry on 12th March 1945 and my reasons for doing so are contained in the speech which I made on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. I regret to say that the official report of that speech is not with me here, but I can send a copy of the same later on, if required.

My reasons for voting against M. Aurangzeb Khan’s ministry were that M. Aurangzeb Khan and his colleagues in the Cabinet were abusing the Muslim League label and were committing fraud upon the Muslim population and upon the Leaguers of this Province. I kept a very close watch on the activities of this ministry and found that the programme and instructions of the League were cast to the winds and the Ministers daily conduct of the administration was for the aggrandisement of their selfish ends. The entire Muslim population of the province was in revolt against the conduct of the Ministers. They indulged in different kinds of corruption. Nepotism was the rule of the day; and service of the people and promotion of the interests of the League was far in the background. There was a great outcry against their anti-League and anti-Islamic activities and this state of affairs was reported by me, and I believe by several others to the Quaid-e-Azam. Most of the evils in which the Ministry indulged were brought to the notice of the Committee of Action which visited this Province in Summer of 1944.

I, along with many other Leaguers found that the good name of the League was being ruined and in my judgement and in the judgement of many other prominent Leaguers of the Province, who could not tolerate any stigma on the good name of the League it became imperative either to remove the label of the League from
the Ministry or to wreck it in order to save the League from being stigmatized any further. The false swearing on Quran, false promises of gain to members of the Assembly party intact, became the talk of the day in the Province. The Ministry was commonly known as ‘Quran Talaq Ministry’. This name was foisted on it as the Premier made false promises on Quran and on the oath of divorce. The Ministry was in fact being run by keeping the Members of the Party intact by the offers of bribes in the forms of contracts and permits and nomination to the syndicate which brought gains to them in thousand. These facts are well known in the Province and can be ascertained from the Government Record. Under these circumstances in the honest opinion of many prominent Leaguers it was imperative in the interest of the League to wreck that Ministry and it was under these circumstances and in the interest of the League that I voted against M. Aurangzeb Khan’s Ministry.

Apart from the above during M. Aurangzeb Khan’s Ministry attempts were made to disgrace me in the Province and involve me criminally under Section 40 F. C. R. By binding me with cash security of Rs. 25,000/- in connection with the out-laws and do other personal harm to me. My house was searched on the pretext of hoarding wheat and I was publicly disgraced and nothing incriminating was discovered. These things were intolerable because I was innocent and I knew that revenge was being wreaked on me for my criticism of the Ministry of their anti-League and anti-Islamic activities. I made a suggestion in the Provincial Muslim League Meeting for convening All-India Muslim League Conference in this Province and made offer of subscription myself and toured in the province and obtained handsome offers of subscriptions to meet the expenses of the Conference, but the opposition came from M. Aurangzeb Khan. He opposed this suggestion because he feared that veil would be drawn from the anti-League and anti-Islamic activities of his Ministry and his daily corrupt practices would be undiscovered. I found a very large section of the Leaguers in this Province in revolt against M. Aurangzeb Khan’s Ministry. Only those who profited by his illegal and unjust favor remained on his side. Most of the Leaguers were of opinion that it would be to the advantage of the
League if the Ministry is wrecked. As he was profuse in making false promises on oath and broke these next moment—and as he was keeping his party intact by the grant of contracts, permits and by showering other undue favours on them I also found myself under Koranic injunction to desert his lead. If in the opinion of the Committee of Action I should have followed his lead in spite of all that has been stated above I regret my decision and am sorry for it.’

Source: Shamsul Hasan Collection, NWFP-1, pp. 60-60(a).
APPENDIX VI

Letter from Mian Abdullah Shah, President District Muslim League, Peshawar, to Jinnah on the ‘Grave Situation’ in the NWFP on the Eve of Independence (6 August 1947)

‘Recently a deputation from the Provincial Muslim League waited on you to acquaint you with the critical situation in the Province. Prominent individual League workers have also stressed the need for a more rigorous enforcement of law and order in their meetings with you.

As the day of transfer of power to the Dominion of Pakistan draws nearer, tension has also reached its peak, and unless steps on the lines suggested below are taken at once, 15th of August may be a day of rejoicing in the rest of Pakistan but it will witness one of the bloodiest massacres of innocent Muslim Leaguers in the Peshawar District. All this is being arranged under the aegis of the Congress Government who are freely distributing Government rifles to their partymen, issuing unlicensed arms under chits signed by Abdul Ghani, son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and also openly encouraging the carrying of unlicensed arms in large numbers. To avert the great catastrophe (sic) [catastrophe] which is bound to overtake us in our present state of unpreparedness and complacency, the following suggestions are made as a sheer sine-qua-non of Peace in the Province.

- Immediate replacement of the Congress Ministry.
- Immediate withdrawal of all Government Rifles.
- Display of military force coupled with the police in danger spots in consultation with the League organization.
- Enforcement of martial law or similar provisions in parts of the district which may be declared as ‘explosive’ by us.
- Rounding up of bad characters hired and let loose by the Congress regime to create a state of anarchy.

These are suggestions which must be implemented without any
further delay, otherwise what is going to be a day of rejoicing for
the rest will certainly prove the greatest day of mourning in the
district of Peshawar and the adjoining district of Mardan.'
Source: F. No. Ill, p. 107, A.R. Nishtar Collection, Freedom Movement
Archives, Karachi.
APPENDIX VII

Dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry: Correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State (8-9 August 1947)

(i) Viceroy to the Secretary of State Mountbatten to The Earl of Listowel
No. 3265-S of 8 August 1947

‘I would instruct Lockhart [Governor NWFP] to dismiss his Ministry on the afternoon of the 11th or the morning of August 12th; Cunningham should take over as Governor on the evening of the 12th or the morning of the 13th and ask the leader of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly to form a new Ministry. Lockhart to arrange for military precautions to be taken to prevent trouble by the Red Shirts over the dismissal of the ministry and the formation of a Muslim League Government. Liaquat Ali Khan states that Dr Khan Sahib, if he remains in office, proposes to declare an independent Pathanistan on August 15th. This must obviously be avoided if there is to be peace on the Frontier. I should be grateful for your agreement to this course with least possible delay.’

Source: Mountbatten Collection, Mss. EUR., F 200/97, IOLR, p. 241.

(ii) Secretary of State’s Reply to the Viceroy
The Earl of Listowel to Mountbatten
Telegram No. 10278, 8 August 1947

‘Your telegrams Nos. 3170, 3171 and 3172 of 5th August and No. 3265 of 8th August. North-West Frontier Province, I have considered two alternatives given in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 3170. With regard to present position as I understand is that Ministry have suffered no defeat in Legislature and still retain confidence of majority of its members; and that although Governor may have very good reason to believe that Legislature as at present constituted no longer represents majority of electorate, general
elections is ruled out for security reasons. Dismissal of Ministry in these circumstances with no choice of dissolution would be unconstitutional, particularly in view of injunction in Governor’s Instrument of Instruction to appoint as Ministers those best in position to command confidence of Legislature.

As regards second alternative Governor does not appear to consider that present situation in the Province in respect either of law and order or of Ministry’s position, is such that in words of Section 93 government of Province cannot be carried on in accordance with provisions of Act. Furthermore, withdrawal of Section 93 regime as soon as Muslim League were installed in office would be evidence that resort to it had been merely a device.

Thus (subject to paragraph 6 below) both your alternatives would be unconstitutional, although of course, either would be legal in the sense that it could not be challenged in courts.

On information before me I am not convinced that removal of present Ministry by us before August 15th however much desired by Provisional Pakistan Government would really be wise, particularly as it could be done only by an unconstitutional action. Even though you could state that you had acted on advice of Pakistan Provisional Government and Mr. Jinnah, responsibility both legal and moral would be that of H.M.G. Governor evidently does not consider that disappearance of Ministry would necessarily bring about improvement in local situation on 15th August (see paragraph 4 and 6 of his telegram repeated in your telegram No. 3172). Pressure for action to be taken before 15th August appears to come wholly from Muslim League High Command.

My inclination therefore would be to leave the problem to be resolved after August 15th and accordingly without the intervention of myself and H.M. Government. Resolving of the difficulty in a constitutional manner after 15th August might possibly involve urgent action by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly under Section 8(1) of Indian Independence Act so as to confer special powers on Governor of Province or on Governor General of Dominion to deal with it. We have no information here as to what adaptations if any you have made or making before 15th August or Jinnah contemplates on or after 15th August under
Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act in relation to either Provincial Executive. Accordingly we are not in a position to judge whether after 15th August any special action desired by Jinnah in relation to NWFP. Executive could be taken constitutionally without bringing in his Constituent Assembly as suggested.

Of course if you or Governor were satisfied that information quoted in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 3265 is correct the position would be different and you would I think be entitled to adopt course you propose in that telegram or to impose Section 93 regime. But have you any information confirming Liaquat Ali Khan’s fears? He is a very interested party and I do not think that we ought to accept his unsupported assertion regarding Khan Sahib’s intentions particularly, as you in India presumably and we in Parliament certainly would have to justify our action by reference to our knowledge that Khan Sahib was about to declare independent Pathanistan.

Even if there appears to be fairly good ground for believing that Khan Sahib might take such a course, I am still not sure that action by you before August 15th is the wisest course. Cunningham will have taken over just before August 15th and if he believes that there is the slightest risk of such a step by Khan Sahib he could warn the latter that such action would be unconstitutional as being entirely outside powers of NWFP Government, and that if Khan Sahib made any attempt to issue any such a declaration without the Governor’s approval it would be followed by instant dismissal of Khan Sahib and his Ministry.

Possibly a friendly warning to Khan Sahib at once by Lockhart on the lines of the preceding paragraph might be useful but as to the wisdom of that I must leave you to judge.

Cunningham has seen this telegram and fully agrees. Indeed he had independently come to much the same conclusion before the matter was discussed with him.

I shall telegram to Lockhart Cunningham’s Commission as acting Governor from 12th-15th August.

I shall be grateful for an urgent reply.’

Source: Mountbatten Collection, Mss. EUR., F. 200/97, p. 242. See also The

(iii) Mountbatten’s Reply to the Secretary of State
Mountbatten to The Earl of Listowel

Telegram No. 3284-S, 9 August 1947

No. 3284-S. Your 10278 of 8th August.

‘I note your instruction that it would be unconstitutional to dismiss the Ministry. I propose to inform Jinnah that I have had this instruction from you and to ask him to discuss with Cunningham at Karachi what action should be taken about a change of Ministry on or after 15th August. I shall send a letter to Jinnah and make a copy available for Cunningham when he arrives at Karachi.

If possible please contact Cunningham and tell him the situation before he leaves.’

GLOSSARY

Anjuman  Association
astanadar  an individual with hereditary spiritual status
azad  free, independent
bigar  forced labour
bania  merchant, trader or moneylender (in most cases were the Hindus in the NWFP)
fatwa  formal judicial decree by a learned religious figure
fiqh  Islamic jurisprudence
hadith  Saying of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) based on the authority of a chain of transmitters; 'tradition'
hijrat  migration, exodus
hartal  Strike
inam  grant of land revenue free or of control over land revenue
jagir  grant of an estate revenue free
jihad  a religious war of Muslims against unbelievers
jirga  council of Pashtoon elders; also can be used for a party
khel  clan or a subdivision of a Pashtoon tribe
Khudai  Servant(s) of God
Khidmatgar(s)  Peasant
kisan  village revenue official
lambardar  tribal army
lashkar  thick stick, usually bamboo, sometimes bound

* The terms in the glossary are ones which appear more than once in the text. Other Pashto and Urdu terms are defined within the text.
with iron rings

**mahajan** Moneylender

**maulana** title of respect accorded to Muslim judges, heads of religious orders, and persons of great learning

**murid** disciple of a Muslim spiritual leader, particularly of a *Pir*

**naib** deputy, assistant

**pashtoonwali** Pashtoon code of life; Pashtoon system of values

**parajamba** Factionalism

**pir** an *astandar*; any hereditary spiritual leader in Islamic tradition

**razakar** Volunteer

**sajjada nashin** successor to a sufi saint at his shrine, usually a family descendant

**salar** commander, general

**salar-i-azam** commander-in-chief

**sanad** document specifying grant

**Satyagraha** Gandhian non-violent protest campaign; literally ‘truth force’

**tacavi, takavi** loan made by government for agricultural purposes

**tarbur** first cousin; in Pashtoon society an enemy among one’s close patrilineal cousins

**tarburwali** rivalry between close patrilineal cousins

**tehsil** the largest administrative subdivision within a district

**ziarat** shrine of a holy man
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

(i) Private Papers

India Office Records and Library, London (IOLR):

Papers of the Earl of Halifax (then Lord Irwin), Mss. EUR., C. 152
Papers of Lord Zetland, Mss. EUR., D. 609
Papers of Sir Hamilton Grant, Mss. EUR., D. 660
Papers of Sir George Cunningham, Mss. EUR., D. 670
Papers of Sir Arthur Parsons, Mss. EUR., D. 696
Papers of Dr Verrier Elwin, Mss. EUR., D. 950
Papers of Lord Templewood (then Sir Samuel Hoare), Mss. EUR., E. 240
Papers of Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, Mss. EUR., E. 352
Papers of Sir John Simon, Mss. EUR., F. 77
Papers of 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow, Mss. EUR., F. 125
Papers of Lord Mountbatten, Mss. EUR., F. 200
Papers of Sir Olaf Caroe, Mss. EUR., F. 203

Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge (CSASC):

Papers of Charles William Foster
Papers of George Leslie Mallam
Papers of Philip Edmund Stanley
Papers of Robert Vivian Eric Hodson

Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML) Individual Collection:

All-India Congress Committee Papers (1917-47)
D. G. Tendulkar Papers
Jamnalal Bajaj Papers (1917-46)
Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur Papers (1936-63)

*Oral Record Manuscripts* (NMML):
Bhagat Ram Talwar
Girdhari Lal Puri
Jagat Ram Sahni
Mohammad Yunus
Shaukat Usmani

*NWFP Provincial Archives, Peshawar* (PAP):
Aziz Javed Papers
Dost Mohammad Khan Kamil Papers
Sardar Abdur Rashid Papers

*National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad* (NAP):
Quaid-i-Azam Papers

*Freedom Movement Archives, University of Karachi* (AFM):
Abdur Rab Nishtar Papers
All-India Muslim League Papers

*Personal and Private Papers:*
Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar Collection, Charsadda
Allah Bakhsh Yusufi Collection, Karachi
Maulana Midrar Ullah Collection, Mardan
Maulana Popalzai Collection, Peshawar
Mirza Shamsul Haq Collection, Islamabad
Pir of Manki Collection, Nowshera
Shamsul Hassan Collection, Karachi
Zamarud Collection, Swabi
Unpublished Memoirs and Diaries:
Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, ‘Diary’ (Pashto), Charsadda
Abdul Ghafoor, ‘From Memory’ (Urdu), Peshawar
Amir Mohammad Khan, ‘Diary’ (Pashto), Mardan
C. R. Foster, ‘My Years in the Indian Police 1905-1920’, CSAS, University of Cambridge
G. L. Mallam, ‘Imperial Frontier: The Last Thirty Years’, CSAS, University of Cambridge
G. L. Mallam, ‘A Pair of Chappals and a Cassock’, CSAS, University of Cambridge
Mian Akbar Shah, ‘Diaries’ (Pashto), Nowshera
Mian Ata-ud-Din, ‘Memoirs’ (Pashto), Nowshera
Shad Mohammad, ‘Deed Wa Shuneed’ in three volumes (Urdu), Peshawar
Zamarud ‘Diaries’, in twelve volumes (Pashto), Swabi

(ii) Personal Interviews
Mian Akbar Shah, Badrashi (Nowshera), 8 September 1984.
Qanita Bibi, Peshawar, 7 October 1984.
Mohammad Ashraf Khan, Peshawar, 28 October 1984.
Haji Mohammad Asim, Nowshera, 30 October 1984.
Malik Shad Mohammad, Peshawar, 29 March 1985.
Mian Maab, Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 1 May 1985.

Warris Khan, Rashakai (Nowshera), 3 June 1987.
Sultan Mohammad, Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 1 December 1990.
Fazalur Rahim Saqi, Wardagga (Charsadda), 17 November 1991.
Ajoon Khan, Yaqoobi (Swabi), 6 March 1992.
Nabat Khan, Yar Hussain (Swabi), 6 March 1992.
Abdul Aziz, Shawa (Swabi), 7 March 1992.
Haroon, Shawa (Swabi), 7 March 1992.
Khaista Mir, Farmuli (Swabi), 7 March 1992.
Umra Khan, Adina (Swabi), 7 March 1992.
Asim Khan, Maneri (Swabi), 5 June 1992.
Azim Khan, Dagai (Swabi), 5 June 1992.
Naubat Khan, Dagai (Swabi), 5 June 1992.
Wahid Ullah, Yar Hussain (Swabi), 6 June 1992.
Mohammad Arif, Marghuz (Swabi), 6 June 1992.
Sher Khan, Baja (Swabi), 6 June 1992.
Zamarud Khan, Yar Hussain (Swabi), 6 June 1992.
Abdul Malik, Jalsai (Swabi), 7 June 1992.
Bibliography and Sources

Gul Rahman, Jalsai (Swabi), 7 June 1992.
Mohabbat Shah, Jalsai (Swabi), 7 June 1992.
Naik Khan, Malakand, 21 October 1994.
Maulana Mohammad Hashim, Bannu, 29 October 1994.
Gul Baqi Jan, Razmak (Waziristan), 31 October 1994.
Gul Mazar Khan, Razmak (Waziristan), 31 October 1994.
Umra Khan Masood, Razmak (Waziristan), 31 October 1994.
Khair Mohammad Masood, Razmak (Waziristan), 1 November 1994.
Maulana Noor Mohammad, Wana (Waziristan), 2 November 1994.
Muntazir Bhittani, Tank, 3 November 1994.
Ghazi Khan, Pabbi (Nowshera), 10 November 1994.
Mohammad Yunus, Delhi, 29 December 1994.
Ansar Harvani, Delhi, 13 January 1995.
Sushila Nayar, Delhi, 20 January 1995.
Ishar Das Talwar, Delhi, 24 January 1995.
Manohar Lal Talwar, Delhi, 24 January 1995.

(iii) Government Records

India Office Library and Records, London:
Files of Public & Judicial Department (LP&J)
Papers of Indian Police Department, Mss. EUR., F. 161

**NWFP Provincial Archives, Peshawar:**
Record of Special Branch Police, Peshawar (SBP)

**National Archives of India, New Delhi:**
Files of Home Political Department (Home/Poll.)

**Unpublished Thesis:**

**PUBLISHED SOURCES**
(i) **Newspapers and Journals**


_Pakhtun_, Utmanzai (May 1928-April 1930, July 1931-December 1931, May 1938-December 1940, July 1945-August 1947), collected from various sources, presently under the possession of the author.

_Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi:_
_Al-Jamiat_ (Delhi)
_Bombay Chronicle_ (Bombay)
_Pioneer_ (Allahabad)
_The Free Press Journal_ (Rawalpindi)
_Times of India_ (Bombay)
Bibliography and Sources

Tribune (Lahore)

NWFP Provincial Archives, Peshawar:
Ehsan (Lahore)
Milap (Lahore)
Observer (Lahore)
Prabhat (Peshawar)
Reekhtaney Khudai Khidmatgar (Peshawar)
The Veer Bharat (Lahore)
Zamindar (Lahore)

Allah Bakhsh Yusufi Private Collection, Karachi:
Progress (Bombay)
Sarhad (Peshawar)
The Information (Peshawar)

National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad:
Dawn (Delhi)
The Pakistan Times (Lahore)

Khyber Mail Press, Peshawar:
Khyber Mail (Peshawar)

Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi:
Madina (Bijnore)

(ii) Material in Pamphlet Form (Published and Unpublished)


Dr Shah, Muslim League and Frontier (Kohat, 1946).
Fourteen Points of Khaksar Tehreek (Lahore, 1937).
Pakistan (Delhi, 1940).

Presidential Address of Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman at Hazara Muslim League Conference, Abbottabad, 10 September 1938 (Lucknow, 1938).


(iii) Parliamentary Papers


(iv) Government Publications

Administration Report North West Frontier Province 1936-37 (PAP).

Census of India, 1911 volume XIII, North-West Frontier Province (Indian Institute, The New Bodleian Library, Oxford) hereafter IIL.

Census of India, 1921 volume XIV, North-West Frontier Province III.

Census of India, 1931 volume XV, North-West Frontier Province III.

Central Legislative Assembly Debates (Simla, 1921-1947), PAP, III.

Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942-43 (Delhi, 1943), III.

Dhawan, A. S., Report on the General Elections to the Central Assembly (NWFP Constituencies) and to the NWFP Legislative Assembly in 1945-46 (Peshawar, 1946), PAP.

Government Gazette Extraordinary, 10 May and 2 June 1919, PAP.

Government of India Bill (London, 1934), IIL.

Gazette of India, 3 September 1939, (PAP).
NWFP Legislative Council Debates, 1932-1936, (Peshawar, 1933-1936), PAP, IIL.

NWFP Provincial Legislative Assembly Debates, 1937-1947, (Peshawar, 1937-1947), PAP, IIL.

Some Facts About the Disturbances in India 1942-43 (nd, np), PAP.

The Indian Annual Register, 1947, (Calcutta, n.d.), IIL.

Thornburn, S. S., Report on the First Land Revenue Settlement of the Bannu District in the Derajat Division of the Punjab (Lahore, 1879), IIL.

(v) Non-Official Publications (Reports and Statements, published and unpublished)

‘A Scheme of Special Reforms for the North-West Frontier Province’, Ahmad Nawaz Khan, Nawab of Dera Ismail Khan, Simon Collection, Mss. EUR., F. 77/132, IOLR.

A Statement of Facts About the Present Situation in the NWFP by Shah, Jaffar-Shah, Abdullah (Lahore, 1930).


Report (With Evidence) of the Peshawar Inquiry Committee (appointed by the Congress Working Committee in April 1930 to inquire about the Peshawar riots), Allahabad, 1930.


(vi) Collections of Source Material

Ahmad, J., Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Lahore, 1970).

—Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, I, II (Lahore, 1968).

—Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, II, (Karachi,


Khan, Liaquat Ali, *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from May 1924 to December 1936* (Delhi, n.d.).

—*Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from October 1937 to December 1938* (Delhi, 1944).


*Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945-50* (Ahmedabad, 1972).


*Selected Works of Motilal Nehru*, Volumes 1-6, (Delhi, 1982-1995).

*Speeches by the Marquess of Linlithgow*, I (Simla, 1940).


**Articles**


Province of India’, *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXIV (1), January 1937.


(viii) Published Secondary Works

**English Language:**


—, *Some Thoughts on Pakistan* (Bombay, 1941).


Ansari, Shaukatullah, *Pakistan: The Problem of India* (Lahore, 1945).


—, *Turbaned Brother of the Frontier Pathans* (n.d., n.p.).
Bright, J. S., *Frontier and Its Gandhi* (Lahore, 1944).


Chandra, K., *Tragedy of Jinnah* (Lahore, 1941).


—, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London, 1943).


Desai, M., *Two Servants of God* (Delhi, 1935).


Guha, R., ed., Subaltern Studies, (Delhi, 1994).
Hamid, A., Muslims Separatism in India (Lahore, 1971).
Hodson, H. V., The Great Divide (Karachi, 1985).
Husain, A., Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography (Bombay, 1946).
Jalal, A., The Sole Spokesman, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, 1985).
Khosla, G. D., Stern Reckoning (Delhi, 1989).
Korejo, M. S., The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in History (Karachi, 1994).
Lalpuri, G., Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Delhi, 1985).
Majumdar, S. K., Jinnah and Gandhi: Their Role in India’s Quest for Freedom (Lahore, 1976).
Matlubul, H. S., M. A. Jinnah A Political Study (Lahore, 1945).
Mirza, S. H., Muslim Women’s Role in the Pakistan Movement (Lahore, 1969).
Minault, G., *The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (Delhi, 1982).


Mujeeb, M., *The Indian Mussulmans* (Delhi, 1985).


Puri, G. L., *Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan* (Delhi, 1985).


Robinson, F., *Separatism Among the Indian Muslims: The Politics of the
Sarkar, S., The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908 (Delhi, 1973).
Sayyid, M. H., M. A. Jinnah A Political Study: (Lahore, 1945).
Seal Anil, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1968).
Shah, S. W. A., Muslim League in NWFP (Karachi, 1992).
Smith, W. C., Modern Islam in India (Lahore, 1969).
Talbot, I., Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement (Karachi, 1988).
—, Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947 (Delhi, 1988).
—, Freedom’s Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India (Karachi, 1996).
Tendulkar, D. G., Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bombay, 1967).
Wolpert, S., Jinnah of Pakistan (Delhi, 1985).
Yunus, M., Frontier Speaks (Lahore, n.d.).
—, Frontier Pathans and Freedom Struggle (Delhi, 1985).
Yusufi, A. B., Meet the Frontier Gandhi (Bombay, n.d.).
Ziring, L., Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Kent, 1980).
Zutshi, G. L., Frontier Gandhi (Delhi, 1970).
**Pashto Language:**


Ghaffar, Abdul, *Zama Zhwand Ao Jaddo Jehad* (Kabul, 1983).


—, *Za AM Zama Zamana* (Peshawar, 1974).


Khan, W., *Da Azadi Tehreek* (Peshawar, 1988).


Shah, Mian Akbar, *Da Azadi Talash* (Peshawar, n.d.).

**Urdu Language:**

Aasi, M. D., *Dera Ki Kahani* (Dera Ismail Khan, n.d.).


Nagina, R. S., *Surkhposh Kisan or Tehreek Ghalla Dher* (Peshawar, 1939).

—, *Gandhiji Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Ki Nazar Men* (Delhi, n.d.).


Yunus, M., *Qaidi Key Khat* (Delhi, 1969).


—, *Siyasiyat Sarhad Key Irtaqai Manazil* (Karachi, 1972).

—, *Peshawar* (Karachi, 1984).
Index

A
Aasia (Basanti), 187.
Abazai Canal, 178.
Abbottabad, 1, 60, 71, 97, 98, 105, 109, 125, 187, 201, 205, 221.
Abdali, Ahmad Shah, 235.
Abdul Aziz, Mian, 16.
Abdul Qaiyum, Sahibzada, xix, 250.
Abdul Wahid, Begum, 204.
Abdullah Haroon, Lady, 204.
Abdullah Shah Mazara, Mian, xlvii.
Abdullah Shah, Mian, xlvi, 23, 40, 175, 184, 185, 188, 191, 193, 238, 245, 262.
Abdur Rahman, Raja, 87, 140.
Abell, 173, 174, 212.
Adam, 147.
Afghan Wars, 65.
Afghanistan, xli, 1, 3, 4, 16, 18-20, 26, 27, 36.
Afri dis, 132, 178, 182.
Agricultural Produce Market Bill, 63, 64.
Agriculturists Debtors’ Relief Bill, 63.
Ahmad Din, Munshi, 73.
Ahmad Shah, Mian, 23, 24, 41, 109, 241, 244-248.
Ahmad, Habib, 108.
Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din, 119.
Ahmad, Mir, 17, 96.
Ahmad, xlv, l.
Ahmadis, 11.
Ahmadzai, 177, 178, 182.
AICC (All-India Congress Committee), xxxix, 34-36, 38, 40-43, 45, 53, 59, 63, 82, 123, 125, 126, 128, 131, 149, 215, 217, 218, 220.
Akali Dal, 55, 160.
Akbar Shah, Mian, xlii, 21, 27, 29.
Akhand Hindustan, 142, 170.
Akhtar, Ghulam Haider, 98.
Alaptagin, 4.
Alexander, A. V., 165.
Ali, Muzaffar, 96.
Aligarh, xxiii, 23, 119, 156, 159. Aligarh Muslim University, 156.
All India Adhdharam Mandal, 120.
All-India Muslim League, xii, xxi, 48, 52, 87, 88, 259, 260.
All-India National Congress, 15.
All-India Socialist Party, 73.
Amazai, 112.
Ambedkar, B. R., 120.
Amritsar, 18, 26, 73, 140.
Amtus Salam, Bibi, 203.
Andamans, 19.
Anjuman-i-Gharibanan, 198.
Anwar, Khurshid, 195, 211.
Aryans, 3, 4.
Asaf Ali Commission, 83.
Assam, 59, 119, 137, 149, 164, 166, 168.
Ataullah, Qazi, 4, 26, 54, 61, 63, 77, 78, 80, 81, 86, 88, 147, 161, 163, 200, 216.
Attlee, Clement, 153.
Attock, xxxv, 2.
Awans, 6, 9.
Azad Islamia Madrassa (s), xli, 17, 23, 24.
Index

Bengal, xv, xvi, xviii, xix, xxvii, xxviii, xxix-xxxii, xlii, 25, 59, 67, 74, 80, 92, 119, 137, 149, 165-167, 215.

Bhave, V., 128.

Bhittanis, 178.

Bibi, Qanita, 203-206.


Bokhari, Ali Abbas, 16.

Bokhari, Farigh, xliv, 17.

Bolshevik Revolution, xlvii.

Bolshevik, xlvi, 39, 233.

Bolshevism, 136, 256.


Bombwal, Amir Chand, 15.

Bose Brothers, xxxi.


British East India Company, 4.

Bukhara, 27.

Burma, 35.

C

Cabinet Mission (Plan), 164, 166-169, 203, 212.


Cambridge, xvi, xvi, xix, xxiii, xxix-xxxii, 5, 13, 18, 19, 34, 67, 74, 92, 154.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, 163, 176.

Cawnpore Mosque, xxiii.

Central Asia, 3, 4, 40, 47, 136.

Central Khilafat Committee, 1, 20, 33.

Chand, Bakhshi Faqir, 73.

Chand, Hukam, 64.

Chand, Ram, 16.


Chimanlal, 60.

Chishti, Khwaja Muin-ud-Din, 12.

Chishtiya, 12.

Chitral, 1, 2.

Christian, xxxvii, 168.

Christmas, 42.

Communal Award, 86, 98.

Communism, 18, 136.

Communist Party of India, 120.
Congress Enquiry Committee, 36, 37.


Congressmen, xx, xxxix, 34, 37, 44, 54, 59, 60, 71, 169, 225, 227, 243.

CP (Central Provinces), 59, 110, 165, 166, 254.

Creighton, 176.

Cripps Mission, 130, 131.

Cripps Proposals, xv.

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 130.

Cunningham Park, 211.

Cunningham, Sir George, 56.

Curzon, Lord, 5.

D

Dad, Maula, 98, 191, 198.

Damsaz, Malik, 184, 191.

Dandi, 33.

Dar ul Harb, 20.

Dar ul Islam, 20.

Dargai, 178.

Das, Ishar, 64, 68, 80, 88.


Dera Ghazi Khan, 1.

Dera Ismail Khan, xxvii, xlvi, 1, 2, 4-10, 35, 38, 43, 46, 53, 55, 56, 72, 73, 83, 98, 108, 111, 113, 158, 160, 184-186, 191, 194, 196, 198, 201, 205, 222.

Desai, B., 55.

Desai, M., xxxvii, 32.

Dev, N., 73.

Dheri, Mir Wais, 134.

Dir, 1, 23.

Dir, Nawab of, 23.

Doaba, 108.

Down Bombay Express, 206.

Dur Marjan, 202.

E

Easwaran, E., xxxvii, 32.

Emergency Powers Ordinance, 42.

English, xxxix, xliv, 9, 17, 36, 57, 58, 94, 115, 197, 245, 253.

European (s), xxxix, 6, 45, 165.

F

Fargue, Lt.-Col. de la, 208, 223.

Fazaldad, Shahzada, 145.

Fida, Abdul Malik, 26, 203.

Forward Bloc, 127.

Frontier [see North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)]

Frontier Advocate, 15.
Frontier Congress Socialist Party, 69.
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), 16, 25, 36.
Frontier Gandhi (see Khan, Abdul Ghaffar).
Frontier Province Congress Committee (FPCC), 35, 36, 39, 53, 55, 57, 71, 124-126, 128, 133, 137, 150, 158, 219, 220, 222.

G
Gandhara, 3.
Gandhi, B. R., 142, 147.
Gandhi-Irwin Pact, 40.
German (s), 18, 136, 253.
Germany, 18, 86.
Ghalla Dher (is), xlii, xlix, 66-74.
Ghazi Pakhtun, 200.
Ghazni, 3, 4.
Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza, 11.
Gilmartin, David, xxv, xxvi.
Gita, 110.
Gomal Pass, 2.
Goondas Bill, 81, 84.
Gosh, C. C., 34.
Government of India Act of 1935, xii, xiii.
Greeks, 3.
Gujars, 6.
Gujrat, 37, 40, 42, 80.
Gul, Badshah, 238.
Gul, Hijab, 28, 29.
Gupta, A. K., xlv, xlvii.
Guptas, 3.

H
Habibullah (Bacha Saqao), 26.
Habibullah, Begum, 204.
Haji Sahib of Turangzai, Fazli Wahid, 13, 17.
Hajvairi, Shaikh Ali, 12.
Hamid Gul, Mian, 34.
Hanbal, Imam, 11.
Hanbalis, 11.
Haq Nawaz, Sardar, 98.
Haq, Fazlul, xv, 92.
Haripur, 72, 112, 187.
Hasan, Mushirul, xxvii, xxviii.
Hasanat, Amin ul, 150.
Hassanabdal, 187.
Hathi Khel, 37.
Hayat, Sikandar, xxii, 22, 91, 92, 138.
Hazara, xxix, xxxvi, xlvi, 1, 2, 5-7, 9, 10, 22, 38, 43, 44, 46, 53, 56, 73, 80, 101, 103, 105, 109, 112, 128, 140, 156, 158, 160, 184, 185, 187-189, 191, 193, 194, 196, 205.

Hazara Democratic Party (HDP), 56.

Hazari Bagh Jail, 44.

Hijrat, xlvi, l, 15, 19-21, 23, 28.

Hilali, Khan Mir, 34, 185, 190, 238.

Himalayan Range, 2.

Hindko, 6.


Hindu Mahasabha, 55, 89, 120.

Hindu Shahiya, 4.

Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party (HSNP), 54.


Hindustani, 1, 10, 203, 209.

Holy Places, 19.

Holy Prophet, xxvi, xxxiv, xxxvii, 31, 41, 81, 105, 236.

Hoti, M. Ali Khan, 184, 188, 189, 191.


Hussain, Ghulam, 17, 143.

Hydari, Sir Akbar, 138.

Hyderabad, 122, 134.

I


India League, 43, 45.

Indian Franchise Committee, 52.
Indus, xiii, 1, 2, 4, 11.
Islamic, xiv, xviii, xxiii, xxvii, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvii, xlvi, 12, 17, 20, 21, 24, 36, 74, 106, 107, 125, 220, 238, 239, 254, 259, 260.
Islamists, l, 15.
Ismail, M., 99, 103, 110, 155, 195.
Ismay, Lord, 207, 208, 213, 214, 224.
Italy, 27.

J
Jaffar Shah, Mian, 23, 245.
Jains, 6.
Jalal, Ayesha, xxix.
Jalal, Syed, 65, 103.
Jalil, Hakim Abdul, 34, 95, 121, 161.
Jallianwala Bagh, 18.
Jamaat-i-Islami, 233.
Jamia Millia Islamia, 24.
Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind (JUH), 22.
Jamiatul Ulema-i-Sarhad (JUS), 22, 135.
Jamrud, 178.
Jan, Maqsood, 24.
Jan, Samin, 72, 140, 141, 184, 193, 212, 213.
Jan, Yahya, 163, 164.
Jandola, xlii, 178, 179, 181.
Jansson, E., xvi, xlv, xlvi, 55.
Japanese, 130.
Jats, 6.
Jesus Christ, xxxvii, 31.
Jews, xxxiv, 6, 41.
Jilani, Shaikh Abdul Qadir, 12.
Jinnah Islamia College, 203.
Joshi, P. C., 120.
Jowaki hills, 2.

K
Ka Ka Khel, 112.
Kabul, 2, 3, 4, 18, 23, 53, 68.
Kakki, 199.
Kandahar, xxxv, 27.

Kashmir, 1, 122, 255.

Khaisor, Malik, 177.

Khajuri Maidan, 95.


Khaleeq, Abdul Khaliq, xliv, 17.

Khalifa, 19.

Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhry, 109.

Khaloono, 23.


Khan, Abbas, 23, 59, 61, 63, 64, 147, 150, 163, 184.

Khan, Abdul Akbar, xlii, 23-28, 36, 41, 241, 244-248.


Khan, Abdul Ghani, xliii, 4, 25, 26, 32, 75, 197, 200, 220, 229.

Khan, Abdul Malik, 193.

Khan, Abdul Wali, xlv, xlix, 24, 26, 32, 38, 96.

Khan, Ajun, 38, 69.

Khan, Akhti, 177.

Khan, Ali Ahmad, 97.

Khan, Allahdad, 112.

Khan, Amanullah, xlii.

Khan, Amir M., 53, 69, 80, 203.

Khan, Amir, 70.

Khan, Attai, 57.

Khan, Azimullah, 68.

Khan, Baz M., 64, 65, 72.

Khan, Dilbaz, 177.

Khan, Fateh M., 103, 110.

Khan, Fida M., 103, 188, 191.

Khan, Ghulam Haider, 98, 103, 184.

Khan, Habibullah, 35.

Khan, Ibrahim, 158, 175, 184, 194, 238.

Khan, Inayatullah, 109, 110.

Khan, Kamdar, 112, 125, 132.
Index

Khan, Khwaja M., 65.
Khan, Kuli, 55, 95, 135.
Khan, Liaquat Ali, 264, 266.
Khan, M. Afzal, 64, 65, 147.
Khan, M. Ishaq, 190.
Khan, Mehdi Zaman, 53, 112.
Khan, Mir Alam, 8, 103-105, 109.
Khan, Mufti Taj M., 74.
Khan, M. Afzal, 64, 65, 147.
Khan, M. Ishaq, 190.
Khan, Mehdi Zaman, 53, 112.
Khan, Mir Alam, 8, 103-105, 109.
Khan, Mufti Taj M., 74.
Khan, Musa, 177.
Khan, Nasrullah, 98, 143, 184.
Khan, Nawab Hamidullah, 68.
Khan, Nawab M. Zafar, 76.
Khan, Nawab Zaman, 132.
Khan, Nazir Tila M., 203, 206, 226.
Khan, Parmana, 177.
Khan, Ramzan, 191.
Khan, Saadullah, 44, 55, 58, 139, 146, 155, 197, 259.
Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb, xix, xxxvii, 61, 115.
Khan, Sardar Bahadur, 88, 112.
Khan, Sarfaraz, 26, 28, 30, 32, 132, 179, 203, 220.
Khan, Sher Ali, 142, 143.
Khan, Sher Bahadur, 184, 191.
Khan, Taj Ali, 145, 156.
Khan, Warris, xlii, xlvii, xlix, 29, 38, 70, 72.
Khandan, Malik, 177.
Khanna, M. C., 44, 46, 58, 187.
Khattak, Khushal Khan, xxxv.
Khattaka, Alaf Jan, 203.
Khattaks, 65.
Khilafat, xiv, xlvi, l, 15, 19-21, 28, 34, 36, 38, 254.
Khilafat Committee, 28, 34, 36, 38.
Khilafat Movement, xiv, 19, 20, 254.
Khilafatists, 21.
Khudai Khidmatgari Tehreek, l.
Khyber Agency, xliii.
Khyber Mail, 21, 33, 56-58, 60, 61, 71-76, 80, 81, 85, 86, 89, 95, 98, 99, 103, 104, 112, 113, 120, 122, 125, 127, 134, 139, 140-144, 150, 155-157, 161, 170, 172, 180, 184-190, 194, 199, 200, 204, 205, 210.
Khyber Pass, 2, 3, 19, 178, 179, 182.
Khyber Union, 94.
Kitchlew, 36, 219.
Kiyani, M. R., 58, 184.
Kohala, 187.
Kohat, 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 38, 43, 46, 55, 56, 73, 98, 103, 111, 154, 158, 160, 184, 185, 191, 194, 196, 198, 205, 226.
Korejo, M. S., xxxvii, 32.
Kripalani, 216.
Krishak Proja Party, xv.
Kunah Valley, 3.
Kurram Agency, 2, 136.
Kurram Militia, 132.
Kurram river, 2.
Kushanas, 3.

L
Labour Party, 153.
Lalpuri, G., xxxvii, 32.
Landi Kotal, 95, 178, 182, 213.
Latif, Abdul, 95, 184.
Liberals, 52.
Linlithgow, Lord, 51, 115.
Lockhart, Rob McGregor Macdonald, 224.
Lohia, 219.

Low, D. A., xxi.
Lyallpur, 120.

M
Maaruf Shah, Mian, 24.
Madina, 58, 60, 105, 163, 177, 199, 200, 219, 220, 222, 227.
Madras, xvii, xix, 59, 67, 165, 166.
Maharashtrian, 203.
Mahboob Ali, Shaikh, 139.
Mahmud, 4, 36.
Mahsuds, 177, 199.
Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, 21.
Makhfi, Fazal Mahmood, 23.
Makin, 177.
Malakand, xlii, 2, 5, 13, 46, 132, 175, 178, 179, 181.
Malik, Imam, 11.
Malikis, 11.
Mallam, G. L., 180.
Mallam, G. L., 180.
Mandal, J. N., 168.
Manki Sharif, Pir of (Amin ul Hasanat), xxvii, 150, 175, 238.
Mansehra, 1, 99, 189.
Maratha, 235.
Index

Mardan, xli, 1, 37, 53, 67, 70, 71, 97, 98, 103, 105, 110-112, 133, 134, 160, 184, 185, 190-193, 196, 198, 200, 204, 205, 263.

Masani, M. R., 73, 74.

Mauryans, 3.

Mehr Dil, Khan Bahadur, 177.

Mian, Jamal, 109, 142.

Milli, Shaikh, 7.

Mirabehn, 203.

Miranshah, xliii, 176, 179.

Mishwani, 9.

Mitchell, A. N., 195.


Mohammad Shah, Mian, 69, 185, 238.

Mohammad, Arbab N., 213.

Mohammad, Faqir, 70, 132.

Mohammad, Shad, 44, 121.

Mohammad, Tila, 97.

Mohammadzai, 17.

Mohmand, 6, 74, 75, 120, 132, 158.

Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 46, 47.

Moon, P., 119, 149, 165.

Morley-Minto Reforms, 46.


Muftiabad, 66, 74, 75.

Mutfis, 74.

Mughal, xxxv, 235.

Muhajireen, 20.

Mukarram Shah, Mian, 69.

Mullah, Adda, 13.

Mullah, Mastana, 13.

Mullah, Powindah, 13.

Mullah, Sandakai, 13.

Mullah, Syed Akbar, 13.


Muslim Independent Party, 54, 93, 94.

Muslim League National Guards, xliii, 195.

Muslim Nationalists, 54, 55.

Muzaffarabad, 187.

N

Nandihar, 187, 189.

Naqshbandi, Khwaja Baha-ud-Din, 12.

Naqshbandiya, 12.

Naujawan Bharat Sabha, 39, 67.

Nazism, 136.

Nishtar, Abdur Rab, 76, 93.

Noon, Feroz Khan, 140.

Noorun Nisa, 202.

North Waziristan, 5, 46.


North-West Frontier Province Public Safety Ordinance, 187.

Nowshera, xxvii, 1, 4, 21, 29, 72, 93, 97, 99, 101, 103, 109, 150, 156, 158, 172, 185, 198, 202.

O

Oghi, 187.

Old Party, xxiii.

Orissa, 59, 165, 166, 254.

Ottoman, 19.

Oxford University, 16, 20.

P

Pabbi, 30, 32, 36, 38, 105, 185, 202.

Pacific Conference, 140.

Pakhtun, xl, xlii, 26-29, 36, 41, 72, 75, 78, 80, 82, 83, 85, 89, 122, 123, 125, 126, 134, 159, 163, 169, 171, 172, 177, 179, 192, 200, 202, 203, 218-220.


Pakistan Resolution, xv, 115, 118.

Palestine, 98, 109.

Pand, Shah, 112, 177.

Pashto, xxxv, xxxix, xl, xlii, xliii, xlvi, 6, 10, 14, 15, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 46, 79, 163, 190, 235.


Pashtoonistan, xxxv, 236.

Pashtoonistan (Pakhtunistan), 215, 216, 220, 222, 229, 230.
Index

Pashtoonkhwa, xxxv.

Pashtoonwali, xxv, xxxv, 216.

Patel, V., 55.

Pathan, 3, 46, 68, 124, 161, 170, 208, 216, 217, 245, 247, 255, 256.

Paunar, 128.

Perrot, A. F., 137.

Persians, 3.

Pesari, 187.


Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 165.

Piewar Kotal, 3.

Political Prisoners Conference, 73.

Poona Offer, 122.

Prasad, Rajendra, xlvi.

Provincial Khilafat Committee, 1, 25, 33.

Public Tranquillity Act, 54.


Punjab Revenue Act of 1887, 78.

Purna Swaraj, 34.

Q

Qadiriya, 12.

Qazi Mir Ahmad, Begum, 204.

Qissa Khwani Bazaar, 37.

Quit India, 115, 122, 131, 142, 196.

Quran (Holy), xxvi, xxxiv, 24, 110, 172, 185, 260.

Quranic, 125.

Qureshi, 9, 21, 71.

R

Rabbani, Ghulam, 37.

Rahim, Abdur, 35, 70, 71, 95, 99.

Rahman, Hifzur, 219.

Raj, xvii, xviii, xx, xxi, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, xxxi, xxxii, xxxv, xxxvi, l, 7, 65, 76, 110, 121, 143, 157, 163, 233.

Rajput, 9.

Ram, Bhagat, 67, 70, 71.

Ramgarh, 118, 125.

Ramzan, M., 53, 184, 185.

Rashid, Abdur, 112.

Rawalpindi, 26, 73, 83, 97.

Razar, 112.
Razmak, xliii, 177, 179.
Red Shirts, 30, 133, 179, 197, 255, 264.
Rittenberg, S. A., xvi, xlv, 8, 16.
Robinson, Francis, xxiii.
Round Table Conference, 42, 148.
Rowlatt Act, 17.
Russia, xxiv, xlv, 40.
Russian (s), xxiv, xlv, 30, 136.

S
Saeed Shah, Pir, 98.
Sahajananda, 219.
Saif-ul-Muluk, 72.
Salim, Yusuf, 112.
Sardaryab Camp, 126.
Sarhad Khilafat Committee, 20.
Sarwar, M., 58.
Satyagraha, xxxvii, 70, 71, 72, 118, 125-127, 129, 133.
Savakar, V. D., 120.
Scythians, 3.
Seal, Anil, xviii, xix.
Servants of God, xxxiv, xxxvii, 28, 30, 31, 32, 39, 108.
Shafi, Imam, 11.
Shah, Ghulam Mustafa, 110.
Shah, Qaim, 94.
Shah, Sahib, 69, 72.
Shah, Syed Ali, 95.

Shahid Ganj Mosque, 98.
Shaikh, Farzana, xxix.
Shakirullah, Maulana, 98, 185, 190.
Shakirullah, Mian, 190.
Sherpao, 126.
Shias, xxiii, 5, 11, 136.
Shinkiari, 189.
Shinwaris, 178, 182.
Sikh (s), xv, xxii, xxiv, 4, 6, 9, 10, 25, 53, 54, 63, 81, 87, 140, 142, 149, 160, 165, 168, 187, 188, 195, 192, 198, 214, 215, 244, 247.
Simla, 47, 59, 115, 148-150, 165.
Simon Commission, 47.
Sindh, xv, xxx, xxxii, 13, 80, 92, 109, 119, 122, 137, 165, 166.
Sindhi, Abdul Majid, 109.
Singh, Ajit, 64, 88, 140, 141.
Singh, Ram, 53, 54.
Singh, Ranjeet, 4.
Socialists, 70, 72, 73, 75.
Soomro, Allah Bakhsh, xv.
South Asia, xii, xiii, xvii, xviii, xxiii, xxiv, li, 7, 12, 19, 20, 101, 116, 121, 149, 154, 233-235, 238, 239.
South Waziristan, 5, 46.
Soviet Union, 27.
Index

Subuktgin, 4.
Suharwardi, Sayyid Mutahar-ud-Din, 12.
Suhrawardy, H. S., 165.
Sunnis, xxiii, 5, 136.
Swabi, 1, 32, 38, 198, 202.
Swat, xlv, xlv, 1-3, 178.

T
Tabrizi, Jalal, 12.
Tajik, 26.
Takkar, 37.
Talbot, Ian, xxiii, xxiv, xlv, xlviii.
Tanaolis, 9.
Tandon, P., 219.
Tank, xlii, 2, 54, 160, 178, 179, 186, 198.
Tarburwali, xxxvi, 14
Tendulkar, D. G., xxxvii, 32.
Teri, 64, 65.
Teri Dues Regulations Repealing Bill, 64, 65.
The Pakistan Times, 192, 196, 197, 199, 200, 205, 206, 208, 210-212, 214, 215, 219-222, 225, 226.
Thorburn, S. S., 9.
Tiwana, Khizar Hayat, xxii, 165.
Torkham, 3, 95, 178.
Toru, xlix, 68.
Tsarist, xxiv.

Turkey, 18, 19, 27.
Turkish, 4, 18, 19.
Turks, 4, 48.

U
Union Jack, 221.
Unionist Ministry, 194, 205.
Unionist Party, xxii, xxiv, xxv.
Unionists, xv, xxii, xxiv, 139.
Unlawful Association Ordinance, 42.
Unlawful Instigation Ordinance, 42.
Urdu, xxiii, xxxix, xlii, xlv, 10, 15, 57, 58, 80, 94, 163, 254, 255.
Utmanzai, 18, 24, 25, 27, 35-37, 126, 242, 246.

W
Wahab, Abdul, 11.
Wahabis, 11.
Wahid, Abdul, 97, 99.
Wana, xlii, 177-179, 182.
War Council, 70, 191, 193, 214.
Wardha, 105, 109, 110, 123, 128, 131, 184.
Wazir (is), 6, 16, 52, 176, 177, 213.
Waziristan, 2, 13, 21, 82, 98, 109, 132.
Westminster Abbey, 116.
White Huns, 3.
Women Muslim League, 204, 206.

Y
Yakatut, 94.
Young Party, xxiii.
Yusufi, A. B., xlv, li, 34.
Yusufzai, 6, 7.

Z
Zakori, Pir of, xxvii, 191.
Zalmo Jirga (Youth League), 15, 26, 27, 36, 41, 241, 243-245.
Zaman, M., 163, 184, 187.
Zamindar, 43, 107, 135.
Zardad, 74.
Zetland, Lord, 119.
Ziarat Ka Ka Sahib, 34, 109, 110, 121, 186, 192, 202, 226.
Zia-ud-Din, Mian, 76, 78, 80, 85, 99, 102, 103, 109, 121, 156, 162, 175, 184.
Zikirya, Baha-ud-Din, 12.
Zoroastrians, 6.
Zutshi, G. L., xxxvii, 32.